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The Navy Vol_64_Part2 2002 - Navy League of Australia

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JULY - SEPTEMBER <strong>2002</strong>VOLUME <strong>64</strong> NO. 3 (including GST)<strong>The</strong> Magazine <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Navy</strong> <strong>League</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>ISSN 1328 b?31<strong>Australia</strong>'sLeading Naval Magazine Since I93X


O M E G A3 0 0 M D I V E R S$500m Your m illO M E G AO M E G A6 0 0 M D I V E R S 1 Q O O M D I V E R S$1 ,200 $1 ,500/v7//v/.w< j nsi rn fj rj / r\ T 1 * n,t •• •• • U• I •RQLEX O Y S T E R ROLEX O Y S T E RS U B M A R I N E RWithout Crown ProtectorsS U B M A R I N E RWithout Calendar Onto$1 ,300 $1,500n/w t t\t //w u M /SEIKO3 0 0 M D I V E R S1 960's$ S O OSEIKO6 0 0 M D I V E R S1970 2 Automatic Wind$ 4 5 0R O L E X O Y S T E RSUBMARINER/SEAOWEUERWith Calendar Date$ 2 , 0 0 0mi 1 NYlift1EGA/ERSWATCHANYROLEXMens or LadiesnWATCHI W CO M E G AMILITARYInternational Watch Co.1940 s 70S 1 MP's - 70"B$ • 4 0 0 , 2 5 0n/w t f\f f n/w u n/r r A^ / A/ / /VZ t / r\sr rALSO BUYING: Any Rolex, Omega, Jaeger LeCoultre, Heuer, IWC etcFresco <strong>Australia</strong> 1$ <strong>Australia</strong>'s largest dealer in vintage and ore-owned time pieces - especiallywnstwatches. If you have pne ol the above watches and would be interested in selling it. please callus in Melbourne on 03 9663 0660 or send Ihe watch along with Ihe coupon to the right, by registeredor certified mail to FRESCO AUSTRALIA. Level 5/252 Collins Street. Melbourne. VIC 3000JEWELLER • GEMOLOGIST • H0R0L0GISTPhone 03 9663 0660 Fax 03 9650 8038Email watchco@vicnetnet.auFREECALL 1800 253 253PAIDPOSTCODEDESCRIPTION OF CONTENTSt'vntrntfTHE NAVYVSTOL - WAS IT A GOOD<strong>Vol</strong>ume <strong>64</strong> No. 3IDEA?By David Hobbs Page 3THK DELHI CLASS - SCOURGETHE INDIANBy Ian JohnsonOCEANAUSTRALIA'S MARITIMEOFDOCTRINEPage SPARTS Page 11HSY-XI Page 27RegularFeaturesFrom the Crow s Nest Page 2Flash TrafficPage ISObservations Page 25Hatch. Match & Dispatch Page 26Product Review Page 29<strong>The</strong> opinions or assertions expressed in THE SAW art- those <strong>of</strong>the author, and not necessarily those <strong>of</strong> Ihe Federal Council <strong>of</strong> the<strong>Navy</strong> league or <strong>Australia</strong>, Ihe Editor <strong>of</strong> THE NAVY, Ihe RANor the Department <strong>of</strong> Defence. <strong>The</strong> Kditor welcomes correspondence,photographs and contributions and Mill assume that by makingsubmissions, contributors agree that all material may be usedfree <strong>of</strong> charge, edited and amended at Ihe Editor's discretion.No part or this publication may IM- reproduced without Ihepermission <strong>of</strong> the Kditor.Front cover: An F/A 2 Sea Harrier lifts <strong>of</strong>f from the \ki jump onHMS ILLUSTRIOUS. <strong>The</strong> Sea Harrier s days in the RN an- numberedgiven its inhereni inability to upgrade its engine lo accommodatcwidening mission requirements and heavier weapon loads. On page 3 <strong>of</strong>this edition, coincidcnily. David Hobbs examines ihe question wasV/STOL a good idea.'(RN)<strong>The</strong> <strong>Navy</strong>All letters and contributions to:<strong>The</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>The</strong> EditorTHE NAVY<strong>Navy</strong> <strong>League</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>GPO Box 1719Sydney. NSW 1043E-mail to: editorthenavy@hotmail.comAll Subscription and Membership enquiries to:<strong>The</strong> Hon Secretary.<strong>Navy</strong> <strong>League</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>. NSW DivisionGPO Box 1719.Advertising enquiries only to:Mr James Rickards0419 731 371Deadline for next edition 5 August, <strong>2002</strong>I III N;t\ \ I l iljilll nl \llstl ,lllilFKDKRAL COUNCILPatron in Chief: His Excellency. <strong>The</strong> Governor GeneralPresident: Graham M Hams. RFD.Vice-Presidents: RADM AJ Robertson AO. DSC. KAN (Rub: John Bird.CDRE HJ.P. Adams. AM. RAN (Rub CAPT H A Josephs.AM. RAN (RuliHon Secretary: Rav Corboy. PO Box 309. Mt Wavetfcy. Vic 3149.Telephtme: (03) 9X88 1977. Fax: (03)9888 1083NEW SOITH WAIJvS DIVISIONPatron: I fcrExcelfcncy. <strong>The</strong> Governor <strong>of</strong> New South Wf<strong>of</strong>cs.President: K () Albert. AO. RFD. RDHon Secretary: J C J Jeppesen OAM. RFD. GPO Box 1719. Sydney. NSW 1043Telephone: (02) 9132 2144. Fax: (02» 9232 8.383VICTORIA DIVISIONPatron: I lis Excellency. <strong>The</strong> Governor <strong>of</strong> Victoria.President: J M Wilkins. RFDHon Secretary : Rav Gill. PO Box 1303. Box Hill. Vic 3128Telephone: (03) 9884 6137. Fax: (03) 9884 4481Fnuil: rgill I


I ROM I 111 ( Kim s M MPublicity - Good and not so goodIn the last issue <strong>of</strong> THE NAVY ihe writer remarked "For betteror worse the <strong>Navy</strong> receives a fair share <strong>of</strong> publicity (at timesmore than it wants) ...". Looking back over the past sixmonths it is hard to know whether the considerable amount <strong>of</strong>publicity received by the RAN. prompted in the main by the'children overboard' affair, has been good for die service ornot.On balance, in mid-May when this item is written, one isinclined to think the seagoing people have gained respect inthe public's estimation but that this has not been reflectedamong those ashore, in particular in the upper echelons <strong>of</strong> theDefence Department.In his youth the writer recalls that one <strong>of</strong> the exercisesundertaken by cadets, scouts and others was to pass a simplemessage via a chain <strong>of</strong> messengers. As <strong>of</strong>ten as not and nomatter how short the chain, the message was quite differentby the time it reached its destination. It might be thoughtsurprising that despite the enormous advances incommunications the problem seems to continue in ourDefence Department.If damage temporary or otherwise was caused toreputations in Defence and in the <strong>of</strong>fices <strong>of</strong> the PrimeMinister and Defence Minister, it was not caused so much bymishandling <strong>of</strong> messages originating in HMAS ADELAIDEas they passed through various channels to their destination,as to proceedings at the subsequent inquiry into a "CertainMaritime Incident". Comment on several <strong>of</strong> the statementsmade in the course <strong>of</strong> the inquiry are contained in the writer'sObservations' in this issue <strong>of</strong> THE NAVY.<strong>The</strong> Defence Department spends quite a lot <strong>of</strong> money onpublic relations and creating a favourable impression:however, one relatively small incident that happens to attractmedia attention can create impressions in the public mind noamount <strong>of</strong> money can buy.By Ge<strong>of</strong>f Evans<strong>The</strong> BattleshipsGiveawayJoin the <strong>Navy</strong> <strong>League</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Australia</strong> toda> and be in therunning for a free copy <strong>of</strong> Ajrbrilliant brand new TVdocumentary <strong>The</strong> BattlesfttHPtiec 'Product Review'this edition).<strong>The</strong> first eight peopleedition will be eligibleapplication.Thanks to Roadshowdoeumeniarx Tin Battleshipsthe Nav> <strong>League</strong> <strong>of</strong>magazine. Make sureI or Video copy <strong>of</strong> theconsidered lor our»in the Nawthe publication dale ol th •A RN F/A 2 Sea Harrier. <strong>The</strong> Sea Harrier <strong>of</strong> loda) is a different beast from its l-'alklands War days. <strong>The</strong> aircraft employs a very sophisticated air-search radar,ihe 'Blue-Vixen', and AMRAAMs (Advanced Medium Range Air-Air Missiles) for long range air superiority tasks and was until very recently, consideredthe best air superiority fighter in Europe. (RN)<strong>The</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> producing a practical, winged, aircraft able to use aerodynamic lift for flight, yet capable <strong>of</strong> VerticalTake Off and Landing (VTOL) has fascinated designers since the dawn <strong>of</strong> powered flight. Whilst helicopters haveachieved it. their fixed wing cousins have not, to anything like the same degree.During World War II. the Germans produced a VTO (no 'L'because it did not land) 'target defence interceptor' called theBachem BA 349 'Natter'. It was powered by a single WalterHWK 109 rocket motor augmented by four boosters andlaunched vertically up a railed structure 80 feet high. It had arate <strong>of</strong> climb in excess <strong>of</strong> 35.000 feet per minute but apowered endurance <strong>of</strong> only two minutes and was. in effect, a'manned missile' intended to intercept daylight bombingraids. Il was armed with 33 Type R4M unguided rocketprojectiles in the nose and. as soon as he had fired them, thepilot ejected himself and the rocket motor for parachutedescents while the remaining wooden airframe structurecrashed to the ground. Ten were deployed to Kircheim-on-Teck in April 1945 but the war ended before they could beused operationally.<strong>The</strong> "Natter" was a weapon <strong>of</strong> desperation but. no doubtstimulated by it. the Admiralty wrote a more rationalspecification in 1945 for a "quick reaction" fighter capablc <strong>of</strong>countering Kamikaze aircraft. <strong>The</strong> Fairey Aviation Companysketched a design for a small, turbojet powered, delta winged'tail sitter' that achieved VTO by being boosted up rails fixedto a carrier's flight deck. It would have landed 'more or less'conventionally. <strong>The</strong> end <strong>of</strong> the war against Japan took theurgency out <strong>of</strong> the requirement but it continued as a post warresearch project w ith some interest from the RN and RAF. Anumber <strong>of</strong> scale models were launched vertically from a railstructure at WRE Woomera. <strong>The</strong>re was some USN interest inturbo-prop powered 'tail sitters' in the USA at the same timebut these, too. came to nothing and the concept proved to be adead end.High speed research studies carried out at the RoyalAircraft Establishment. Farnborough. in the late 1940s ledscientists to predict that future supersonic aircraft would needwings so small that conventional take <strong>of</strong>f and landing on flightdecks would not be possible. Thus, they believed VTOLwould be inevitable for future generations <strong>of</strong> fast jets becausethere was no other way <strong>of</strong> operating them. <strong>The</strong> concept hadnothing to do with simplified deck operations or improvingrough sea landing capability.By 1954. the Admiralty's Construction Department hadprepared plans for a light fleet carrier capable <strong>of</strong> operating thenew Supermarine Nl 13 (Scimitar) fighter in the short term butsuitable for the operation <strong>of</strong> VTOL aircraft in the mid 1960s.<strong>The</strong> design was unfettered with conflicting requirements and.although not pcrfect. had greater aircraft operating potentialthan the Invincible class designed 15 years later. <strong>The</strong> samedepartment produced sketch proposals for modifications to theMajestic class that would have enabled MELBOURNE andSYDNEY to operate the same types.Ashore. NATO became interested in VTOL strike fighters.This followed a large and expensive programme <strong>of</strong> airfieldconstruction in Europe intended to enable tactical aircraft tosupport NATO armies against any Soviet aggression. Despitethe evidence from two world wars and Korea that airfields arcextremely difficult to destroy, a belief grew that the newconcrete runways and hard-standings were vulnerable toattack and that aircraft should be dispersed "into the field".<strong>The</strong> Treaty Organisation was trying to standardise a number<strong>of</strong> weapons and systems at the time, ranging from rifles andtheir ammunition to radars. In consequence two relevant14 VOL <strong>64</strong> NO. 2 IHE NAVYTHE NAVYVOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. 3 15


R T<strong>The</strong> early prototype <strong>of</strong> the Harrier, the PI 127. (XP83I) conducts ademonstration landing on HMS ARK ROYAL. X February 1963. NATO Basic Military Requirements (NBMR) were written.NBMR 3 called for a lightweight, single-role. VTOI. strikeaircraftcapable <strong>of</strong> carrying a single nuclear weapon on ashort-range tactical mission. It had to be able to take <strong>of</strong>f andland vertically on unprepared fields near the Forward Edge <strong>of</strong>the Battle Area (FEBA). NBMR 4 asked for a VTOL tacticaltransport aircraft in the C-130 class able to support NBMR 3in the field. Both completely under-estimated the logisticproblemsposed by dispersed operations and took no account<strong>of</strong> bad weather recovery, homing through hostile or friendlyairspace, intelligence briefing, site defence and many otherpractical details.Britain. France, the USA and Germany all put effort intoNBMR 3 but only Britain put design effort into NBMR 4.Aircraft such as the Hawker PI 127. Dassault Mirage IIIV andVAK 191 were all flown for evaluation purposes with paperstudies based on them put up for the glittering prize <strong>of</strong>standardised NATO production. <strong>The</strong> British Treasury hopedthat production by an international consortium wouldradically reduce development costs for a new UK aircraft butNATO had no power to order anything itself and could onlyrecommend a solution. Sensitive to the political issues atstake, it named the British and French entries as "jointtechnical winners" and left the various governments to make<strong>of</strong> that w hat they would.In 1961. the British concept had evolved into a practicalstrike fighter design which was given the Hawker type number1154. It was more capable than the NBMR had demanded andwas to have a single Bristol Siddeley BS KM) engine,developed from the Pegasus, w ith rotating nozzles giving a farmore elegant solution to the VTOL problem than the batteries<strong>of</strong> lift and thrust jets fitted in the rival designs. It couldcertainly land vertically and with a form <strong>of</strong> reheat* known as"plenum chamber burning": it was capable <strong>of</strong> VTO with asmall military load for a few minutes endurance. It did muchbetter with a short take <strong>of</strong>f run. however, and was betterreferred to as a Vertical/Short Take <strong>of</strong>f and Landing (V/STOL)aircraft. It would have been expensive to develop and operatebut it would have been supersonic at height and would have<strong>of</strong>fered a useful performance increase over aircraft like theHunter and Scimitar. With an engine optimised to give athrust to weight (T/W) ratio <strong>of</strong> better than 1:1 on landing,however, it wouid have had a poor Specific Fuel Consumption(sfc) in cruising flight. This would have led to a pay load/radius <strong>of</strong> action capability inferior to that <strong>of</strong> othercontemporary fighters, especially those designed in the USA.Export potential would not have been great, as it would havebeen expensive and very specialised. Sir Sydney Camm,Hawker's chief designer, is believed to have said that V/STOLfighters would not sell well until they approached thecapability <strong>of</strong> the F-4 Phantom. Time has shown him tobe right.To complicate matters, in 1961 the UK Defence Secretaryinsisted that the PI 154 form the basis <strong>of</strong> a joint project toreplace the de Havilland Sea Vixen in RN service and theHawker Hunter in RAF service. This despite the fact that theformer wanted a two seat, twin-engine, high flying fighterwith a very powerful radar forming the core <strong>of</strong> an integratedweapons system and the latter a single seat, single-engine, lowHying ground attack aircraft without radar. Further, the navalversion had to be stressed for catapulting, carry a large fuelload to give endurance on combat air patrol (CAP) andweapons for at least two interceptions. <strong>The</strong> RAF version couldaccept less fuel and lighter structure to give "quick dash"strike capability. Two years were wasted trying to produce acommon airframe that met these two very differentrequirements before the RN managed to convince the BritishGovernment that the USN Phantom II was the only aircraftcapable <strong>of</strong> delivering the operational capability that itrequired. Eighteen months later the simplified RAF versionwas. in turn, cancelled in favour <strong>of</strong> a buy <strong>of</strong> Phantoms. <strong>The</strong>NBMR 4 design, by then identified as the ArmstrongWhitworth Type 681 was also cancelled.Some operational analysis <strong>of</strong> V/STOL operations wascarried out in 1965 using nine aircraft derived from the PI 127and given the name Kestrel. Three each were purchased by theGovernments <strong>of</strong> the UK. USA and Germany to form aTripartite Evaluation Squadron, which operated from RAFWest Raynham. Pilots and ground crews were drawn from theRAF. USAF. Luftwaffe and US <strong>Navy</strong>. <strong>The</strong> RN was notrepresented. When the squadron disbanded, six <strong>of</strong> the eightsurviv ing aircraft went to the USA for further evaluation whiletwo continued with development work in the UK. <strong>The</strong>Luftwaffe and USAF both concluded that operations fromhardened aircraft shelters on conventional airfields byconventional aircraft were both cheaper and more efficientthan dispersed operations by VTOL aircraft. Had there beenoperational merit in the latter, it is difficult not to believe that theUSAF would have hastened it into service in the Vietnam War.After all the investment, some interest in V/STOLremained in the UK and a developed version <strong>of</strong> the Kestrelwent into operational service with the RAF in 1969. This hadlittle to do with cost-effective delivery <strong>of</strong> an interdiction/strike capability and more to do with the sitting LabourGovernment's wish to provide some work for the Britishaviation industry which had suffered a series <strong>of</strong> cancelledprojects in the preceding months. <strong>The</strong> new version was giventhe name Harrier, originally intended for the PI 154 had it goneinto service. 84 were ordered in the first batch but.significantly, the RAF ordered 200 <strong>of</strong> the cheaper but morecapable Jaguar strike aircraft to form the main component <strong>of</strong>its strike force.A USMC AV-8 Harrier 11970s). <strong>The</strong> USMC took up the Harrier design foruse <strong>of</strong>f its smaller helicopter carriers. <strong>The</strong>y believed, quite rightly, that ilsVSTOL ability would give its troops an edge by having USMC Close AirSupport assets readily available at short notice. (USMC)A RAF GR-3 ground attack Harrier. RAF GR-3s were tasked with operatingon the FEBA (Forward Edge <strong>of</strong> the Battlefield Area) in Europe againstWarsaw Pact forces. Its ability to take <strong>of</strong>f vertically or from very shortrunways was seen as an advantage as war gamming proved time and againthat major airbases would be the first victims <strong>of</strong> a NATO - Warsaw pactconflict. <strong>The</strong> GR-3 also performed well in the Falklands War. (RAF)In retrospect, this British fascination with the platform,rather than the operational effect it was intended to create isdifficult to understand. It contrasts starkly with the Germandecision to focus on a strike capability that was best providedby conventional aircraft operating from conventional airfields.Even more difficult to understand is the NATO planners'assumption that concrete runways were the vulnerable part <strong>of</strong>the equation, not the aircraft or their logistic and technicalsupport. On the ground, near the FEBA. aircraft and thehundreds <strong>of</strong> men and vehicles needed to make them workwould have been vulnerable to small arms, mortar andartillery fire in addition to missile and air attack. In hardenedshelters on an airfield in a rear area, they must have been lessso. even though it took longer to reach an urgent target. <strong>The</strong>concept <strong>of</strong> dispersal away from airfields was quietly droppedin the 1970s.<strong>The</strong> US Marine Corps was impressed by the Harrier'sundoubted ability to deliver bombs in amphibious operationsand to move ashore with the marines and their helicopters. Ibelieve they were also impressed by the fact that it was sohighly specialised in the short-range ground attack role that itwas not likely to be miss-employed on naval missions as theF-8 Crusader and F-4 Phantom <strong>of</strong>ten were. <strong>The</strong> politics behindprocurement can be surprisingly devious. Despite a licenceagreement between Hawker Siddeley and McDonnell Douglasthe AV-8A Harrier was built in such small batches that all werebuilt in the UK.After the cancellation <strong>of</strong> its CVA-01 carrier project, theRN found considerable political opposition to the idea <strong>of</strong>maintaining any sort <strong>of</strong> fighter aircraft in ships at sea. <strong>The</strong>Chief <strong>of</strong> Naval Staff. Admiral Sir Varyl Begg was an opponent<strong>of</strong> embarked aviation and acted quickly to run down theconventional carrier force. He focused attention on a futurenavy comprising cruisers armed with missiles and. to a limitedextent. VTOL aircraft or helicopters. Design work started on acommand cruiser which went through more than 50 iterationsA RN FRS-I Sea Harrier <strong>of</strong> 800 NAS. During the Falklands War Argentinepilots had great respect for the Sea Harrier which they dubbed '<strong>The</strong> BlackDeath - . (RN)and which had an aviation facility which grew from a singlespot for a helicopter aft to a runway running the length <strong>of</strong> theship with an island structure to starboard. <strong>The</strong> latter proved sosuperior, even for the operation <strong>of</strong> a modest number <strong>of</strong>helicopters that it was adopted. <strong>The</strong> ability to embark Harrierswas obvious and. from the outset, was a factor in the design <strong>of</strong>what became the Invincible class.<strong>The</strong>re is a myth that V/STOL fighters can use small,simple and. therefore cheap, ships, <strong>of</strong>ten called HarrierCarriers, which provide affordable capability. In researchingbackground papers for this article. I found a Paper written in1966. only six weeks after the cancellation <strong>of</strong> CVA-01. whichputs the counter argument. It compares a baseline V/STOLaircraft, the Kestrel, with the maritime Jaguar, in developmentat the time for the French <strong>Navy</strong> and seeks to put numericalvalues on their relative cost effectiveness. Kestrels were moreexpensive to buy than Jaguars in the ratio 8:5. Because thelatter was designed for cruise efficiency in flight and theformer for its take <strong>of</strong>f and landing performance. Jaguars havebetter SFC and carry more weapons further, faster. For a giventask, fewer Jaguars than Kestrels would be needed.Two RN FRS-I Sea Harriers from 801 NAS <strong>of</strong>f HMS INVINCIBLE conducta •cross-deck' landing on the US aircraft carrier USS RANGER (RN)<strong>The</strong> Paper compares two weapon effort planningscenarios, sinking a destroyer sized contact and destroying abridge. Different parameters were used, some favouring theKestrel, some the Jaguar. On average, it was evaluated that 12Kestrels would be needed to do the same task as 8 Jaguars andthere are tasks that the latter could do that the former couldnot. Thus cost factors <strong>of</strong> 96 against 40 were given making theJaguar more than twice as cost effective as the Kestrel. <strong>The</strong>larger number <strong>of</strong> Kestrels need a large ship from which tooperate but it would be a simple V/STOL carrier. <strong>The</strong>re is,therefore, a cost penalty <strong>of</strong> building the V/STOL capabilityinto every aircraft rather than the single ship from which theyoperate. Taking the CTOL (Controlled Take Off and Landing)comparison further, the Paper examines the cost <strong>of</strong> puttingV/STOL capability back into the carrier. It uses pricesequivalent to half the cost <strong>of</strong> a Jaguar for each catapult and thecost <strong>of</strong> a whole Jaguar for the arrester wire system. For aHermes sized ship with two catapults and arrester wires, thismodified the cost factors to 96 against 50. It is still nearlytwice as expensive to procure the less capable V/STOLaircraft and the 'cheap ship' has been 'bought' by expenditureon an expensive but less capable aircraft. <strong>The</strong> numbers mayvary, but these factors still hold good for today's Joint StrikeFighter where comparisons show that the USN's carrierversion is cheaper but gees further with more weapons thanthe V/STOL version. It is arguable that the British decision totake V/STOL to sea was politically rather than capabilitybased.4 VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. I THE NAVYTHE NAVY VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. I 33


Sea Harriers began lo enter front line service with the RNin 1980. Although not as capable as conventional carrieraircraft, it was immediately apparent that they were moreeffective in their mobile base than the discredited dispersedoperations had been ashore. <strong>The</strong> new aircraft's Release toService was limited at first by the novelty <strong>of</strong> its deckoperations and weapons systems. It was still being expandedfive years later. In addition to INVINCIBLE, the former CVAHERMES was modified to operate Sea Harriers from 1981onwards.Fighters embarked in these two ships were fundamental tothe British plans to liberate the Falkland Islands after theirseizure by Argentinean forces in 1982. 28 out <strong>of</strong> RN's total, atthe time, <strong>of</strong> 32 Sea Harriers were deployed in four Naval AirSquadrons, one <strong>of</strong> which was formed at short notice. <strong>The</strong>y flew2.(XM) operational sorties and achieved 32 confirmed kills <strong>of</strong>enemy aircraft in air to air engagements. <strong>The</strong>y also carried outsuccessful •irikes against enemy shipping and shore targets.None were lost in air combat but two were lost to ground fireand others m operational accidents. An overall serviceabilityrate in excess <strong>of</strong> 9 w a s achieved.This performance surprised many outside the RN and wassufficient to prevent Argentine air forces from defeating theamphibious landings. However, by comparison with the airdefence system the Service had wanted but lost with thecancellation <strong>of</strong> the CVA-01 replacement carrier project, theperformance fell short <strong>of</strong> the optimum. Enemy aircraft andmissiles were able to penetrate the defences and inflict heavycasualties in ships and lives. This was predictable due to thelack <strong>of</strong> embarked Airborne Early Warning (AF.W) aircraft andshortcomings in Sea Harrier performance and armament. Withonly a basic pulse radar, no Beyond Visual Range (BVR)weapon, no high speed dash to gain position and no embarkedtanker aircraft to sustain them on CAP (Combat Air Patrol) orgive flexibility in recovery, the Sea Harrier was markedlyinferior to the aircraft it replaced.It did well because <strong>of</strong> the highly skilled pilots availablefrom previous conventional carrier operations, many <strong>of</strong>which were instructors w ith thousands <strong>of</strong> flying hours. It alsohad a very good weapon in the newly supplied AmericanAIM-9L Sidewinder and an excellent landing capability inhigh sea states that caused excessive ship motion. Althoughrated as a Fighter/Reconnaissance/Strike aircraft, the FRS-ISea Harrier could hardly be compared with USN carrieraircraft in the last two roles and relied on above average pilotskill in the first to command success. In 1982 that level <strong>of</strong>skill was available.Given this very public success, hopes for export sales roseand several navies bought Sea Harrier or AV-8 derivatives butonly in small numbers. <strong>The</strong>y include India (23 plus 4 trainers):An Aviation Boatswain's Mate launches a USMC AV-8B Harrier II from theflight deck <strong>of</strong> USS BATAAN (LHD-5) for a mission supporting SpecialForces over Afghanistan. Its armament consist <strong>of</strong> two 5001b LGBs (LaserGuided Bombs) and a Sidewinder AAM for self-protection. <strong>The</strong> Harrier hascome a long way from the P-l I2 7 . (USN)51VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. IThree generations <strong>of</strong> Harrier in formation from the Spanish <strong>Navy</strong>. Frombottom to top. an AV-8 Matador (now used by the Thai <strong>Navy</strong> <strong>of</strong>f its aircraftcarrier HMTS CHAKRI NARUEBET). an AV-8B Harrier II and a A PC. 65radar equipped AV-8B Harrier II + (Spanish <strong>Navy</strong>/Armada)Spain (32 plus 3 trainers): Italy (16 plus 2 trainers) andThailand (7 plus 2 trainers purchased from Spain secondhand). Total PI 127/Hartier/Sea Harrier/AV 8 production hasamounted to 15 prototypes. 237 first generation single sealers,98 Sea Harriers. 395 AV 8B second generation single sealersand 86 trainers <strong>of</strong> all versions.By the 1990s, the Sea Harrier FRS-I's capability as afighter was becoming marginal and replacement with the F/A-2 was timely. This has the Blue Vixen pulse doppler radar,track-while-scan capability and up to four AMRAAM missilesconstituting one <strong>of</strong> the West's best fire control systems, albeitfitted in a 40 year old airframe design. Even w ith this upgrade,it faces tough opposition in many areas <strong>of</strong> potential conflict.<strong>The</strong> A' indicates a limited attack capability giving thi..improved version a limited swing in performance.Given this background, we have to answer several keyquestions before deciding whether V/STOL was a good ideafor the RN.Q: Was V/STOL inevitable?A: Advances in wing design made it possible to producevery successful fast jets lhat could land on carriersconventionally. <strong>The</strong> RAE scientists were wrong: it was not.therefore, inevitable.Q: Was V/STOL ever viable for the USN?A: <strong>The</strong> USN considered and rejected it. It did not acceptthe reduction in operational capability that V/STOL broughtwith it. Even today, the USN will not accept the V/STOLversion <strong>of</strong> the Joint Strike f ighter, which is being consideredfor the USMC.Q: Why did the USMC opt for it ?A: It wanted a specific aircraft to support amphibiouslandings, moving ashore with the marines. Almost asimportant, it wanted one that could not be used for generalfighter duties by the USN in a carrier battle group.Q: Was it the best fighter that the RN could buy ?A: No. but it was the only aircraft that the BritishGovernment <strong>of</strong> the day. which cared little for costeffectiveness or capability issues, would allow it to buy. Inpractical terms, it was the only fighter that could be operatedat sea once the mistake had been made <strong>of</strong> ordering ships <strong>of</strong>such limited capability as the Invincible class. In naval termsit was not the best fighter, nor was it the best that could beoperated from a ship <strong>of</strong> the size Ihe RN had planned toprocure.THE NAVYA F/A 2 Sea Harrier about to land back aboard HMS ILLUSTRIOUS withIhe Type 23 frigate HMS SOMERSET acting as plane guard in thebackground. <strong>The</strong> Sea Harrier is to be retired from RN scrvicc early in 2006as it is unable to be upgraded with a more powerful engine for the extratasks it is now required to do above ihe fleet air defence role. <strong>The</strong> Indian<strong>Navy</strong>, who operate FRS-l Sea Harriers, arc said to be interested in the'Blue-Vixen' equipped/AMR A AM capable fighter after its retirement fromRN service. (RN)Q: Did it perform as expected?A: It performed better than expected in the Falklands Warbut desperately needed the capability upgrades in the F/A-2version.Q: Could anything else have dime better?A: An embarked AEW capability would have made themost significant difference in the Falklands War. A USNfighter operated from a larger ship would have been a betterplatform.Q: Is another V/STOL fighter a viable replacement for iheSea Harrier?A: Look at the JSF. V/STOL versions lack the radius <strong>of</strong>action and weapon carrying options <strong>of</strong> the CTOL versions andcannot guarantee to land on vertically with unexpendedordnance in the hot summer temperatures found in the Gulf.<strong>The</strong>y are more expensive to buy and maintain and <strong>of</strong>fer lessoperational capability. Even today. 41 years after NBMR 3.CTOL remains the more cost-effective option.We must conclude from these answers that V/STOL wasseen as a good idea politically and provided something for thework force to build after Ihe spate <strong>of</strong> cancellations in the mid1960s. In the negative climate <strong>of</strong> opinion that surroundednaval aviation in the 1970s, it was the only fighter optionavailable to the RN and no Government wanted to listen towell reasoned arguments about cost, capability oreffectiveness. In naval terms, it was not the best fighteravailable, nor did it represent the most affordable weaponssystem. <strong>The</strong> Service was fortunate to have the skill base tomake it work and to 'fight above its weight' in the FalklandsWar. <strong>The</strong> ability <strong>of</strong> Sea Harriers to recover in rough weatherwas fortuitous since it had not been called for in the StaffRequirement. Comparisons with ARK ROYAL wereinappropriate, since she was at the end <strong>of</strong> a very longcapability stretch since her original completion and had. inany case, been scrapped. <strong>The</strong> new generation <strong>of</strong> carriers theRN had tried to procure, the CVA-01 class, were specificallydesigned to be good at operating CTOL aircraft in roughweather with an eye to possible strike operations in theBarents Sea. <strong>The</strong> true comparison should be made with them.With the introduction <strong>of</strong> simple carriers and their limitedV/STOL air groups, the RN not only lost the ability to operateaffordable AEW aircraft but also the capability to cross deckstrike aircraft with its biggest and most important ally, theTHE NAVY VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. I 33United States <strong>Navy</strong>. Worse, the change <strong>of</strong> direction made itimpossible to purchase or make use <strong>of</strong> USN carrier aircrafttypes, forcing the RN down the lonely and expensive route <strong>of</strong>having to develop its own unusual and expensive fighter withfew prospects <strong>of</strong> export sales. <strong>The</strong> USN had itself evaluatedthe idea <strong>of</strong> a Sea Control Ship with a mix <strong>of</strong> V/STOL fightersand helicopters embarked but had rejected it as being tooexpensive for the minimal capability provided! <strong>The</strong>y cannothave been impressed by the loss <strong>of</strong> allied capability as the RNchose lo follow this expensive option. <strong>The</strong> adoption <strong>of</strong> the CVversion <strong>of</strong> the Joint Strike Fighter by the RN would reversethis situation and bring the Service back into line with itsprincipal partner.In historical terms. V/STOL was made to work andproduced belter results than the UK Government had a right toexpect. Other aircraft and air defence systems would haveperformed better at a more competitive procurement cost hada more enlightened outlook prevailed in Whitehall. In terms <strong>of</strong>cost effective capability. V/STOL was not a good idea. Acombination <strong>of</strong> F-4 Phantoms and Gannets was so nearlyachievable and would have been better. A replacementcombination <strong>of</strong> F-14 Tomcats and E-2C Hawkeyes could havegone into service in the 1980s and would still be very hard tobeat even today.Postscript May 02:Those who opposed the procurement <strong>of</strong> a V/STOL fighterfor the Royal <strong>Navy</strong> in the 1960s and 70s feared that weightgrowth, common to all previous carrier fighters in service,would eventually prevent the aircraft from flying. <strong>The</strong>ir timescalewas out but they were right. <strong>The</strong> principal reason for theSea Harrier's early withdrawal from service in 2006 (seeTHE NAVY <strong>Vol</strong> 63 No 2. pi9) is its lack <strong>of</strong> power from itsearly Pegasus engine. Fitting the Pegasus 107 engine into anairframe designed over 40 years ago would be technicallycomplex and the cost <strong>of</strong> modifying 30 airframes wasun<strong>of</strong>ficially believed to exceed AUSS500 million.A RAF GR-7 at altitude. <strong>The</strong> GR-7 is optimised for night attack and strikemissions and can cany a substantial weapon load. GR-7s have beenoperating from RN aircraft carriers under the 'Joint Force Harrier Concept'for sometime and upon upgrade to the GR-9 standard will replace the SeaHarrier at sea in 2006. (RAF)<strong>The</strong>re is a lesson here that no matter how good the weaponsystem, a fighter that relies on vertical landing performancewill always need engine development if it is to continue to flyas weight grows during its service career. Let us hope that thelesson is learned before the decision on which type <strong>of</strong> JSF forthe RN to order is taken.(•) Commander David Hobbs. MBE. RN (Rctd) joined the RN in 19<strong>64</strong> andspecialised as a pilot flying Gannet AEW aircraft. Hunter and Canberraaircraft and Wessex commando helicopters. He served in a variety <strong>of</strong> carriersincluding VICTORIOUS. HERMES. ARK ROYAL 4 and ARK ROYAL5. Several staff appointments included the management <strong>of</strong> sea trials to clearthe Invincible class to operate V/STOL fighters. He became curator andprincipal historian <strong>of</strong> the Fleet Air Arm Museum on leaving the <strong>Navy</strong> in1997. A member <strong>of</strong> the Australirui <strong>Navy</strong> <strong>League</strong>, David was one <strong>of</strong> thespeakers at the second King-Hall Naval History Conference in Canberra heldin July 2001.


INS MYSORE al anchor during ihe Indian Naval Review <strong>of</strong> 2001. MYSORE and her iwo sisters are ihe most powerful surface combatants built by India andemployed hy any Indian ocean power. (Brian Morrison. Warships & Marine Corps Museum)Last year Frtmantle became the first <strong>Australia</strong>n port <strong>of</strong> call for the Indian <strong>Navy</strong>'s latest guided missile destroyer, theDelhi class INS MUMBAI (D-62). THE NAVY"s WA based correspondent Ian Johnson toured this impressive destroyerand filed this report.INS MUMBAI arriving in Sydney Harbour for the first time. <strong>The</strong> smokeemanating from her slacks made many Sydneysiders fear she was on fire.(Brian Morrison. Warships & Marine Corps Museum Ivisually on a clear day but difficult on bad days. All bulkheadsigns arc bilingual, with Sanskrit first, and English second,reflecting the use <strong>of</strong> English as a language used in all regions<strong>of</strong> India.MUMBAI is powered by a Ukrainian-built ZoryaProduction Association M36 COGAG (Combined Gas AndGas) plant comprising two paired DT59 reversible gasturbines each using a RG 54 gearbox. <strong>The</strong> powerplant cangenerate in excess <strong>of</strong> 8().(KX) hp. <strong>The</strong> ship also has installed 2Bergan-Garden Reach KVM-18 Diesel engines. <strong>The</strong> enginesarc housed in soundpro<strong>of</strong>ed boxes, lowering the acousticsignature <strong>of</strong> the ship. <strong>The</strong>se engines move the ship at morethan 32kts. <strong>The</strong> ship's cruising speed is 24kts with the class"maximum range not known.WEAPONS AND SENSORS<strong>The</strong> Delhi class is equipped with Russian weapons andIndian sensor suites. <strong>The</strong> ship's Air/Surface Surveillance radarconsists <strong>of</strong> a Bharat/Signaal RAWL/P318Z (LW-08) operatingin D-band with an IFF interrogator mounted atop the antenna.MUMBAI is also equipped with a MR-775 Fregat (NATOcode name: Half Plate) planar array radar. <strong>The</strong> ship relies on aBharat Rashmi 3 Pa,.a Frond (I-band) radar system fornavigation.MUMBAI's surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) comprisesixteen Kh-35 Uran or SS-N-25 (NATO: Switchblade) SSM s.housed in four quadruple KT-184 launchers, angled out at30°. <strong>The</strong>se sea skimming missiles have an activeradar homing seeker, a range <strong>of</strong> 13()kms at Mach 0.9 anduse a 145kg blast fragmentation warhead. All sixteenmissiles can be ripple-fired at one-second intervals. Firecontrol for the missiles is provided by a Garpun-Bal (NATO:Plank Shave) radar. <strong>The</strong> Switchblade is the equivalent <strong>of</strong> theUS Harpoon Bli>ck IC SSM hence its Western nickname <strong>of</strong>'Harpoonski'.MUMBAI's air defence relies on two single arm KashmirSAM missile launchers one <strong>of</strong> which is locatcd forward <strong>of</strong> thebridge and the other is aft just before the helicopter hangar.Each launcher has a magazine <strong>of</strong> 24 missiles. Guidance andtarget illumination for the missiles is provided by six MR-90Orekh (NATO: Front Dome) fire control radars. <strong>The</strong> Kashmirlaunchers use the SA-N-7 (NATO: Gladfly) SAM which has a70kg warhead and a speed <strong>of</strong> Mach 3 out to 25kms.<strong>The</strong> ship is equipped with one KKImm AK-100 gun whichis used against surface targets, firing 60rpm (rounds a minute)with a range <strong>of</strong> up to I5knis. <strong>The</strong> AK-I00's fire control isprovided by the MR-184 (NATO: Kite Screech) radar system.MUMBAI's visit was timed as part <strong>of</strong> the Centenary NavalReview that was to be held in Sydney in early October 2001before world events, and the possible commitment <strong>of</strong> the RANin military action, forced the review's cancellation.<strong>The</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers and crew <strong>of</strong> MUMBAl were disappointedwith the event's cancellation, yet were happy that their 2001goodwill cruise would continue, even with events near Indiaescalating towards war.MUMBAI is assigned to the IN's (Indian <strong>Navy</strong>'s) WesternCommand and is based at Mumbai (formerly known asBombay). This was her first overseas cruise sincecommissioning earlier in 2001.<strong>The</strong> IN. once a nation that relied on the UK and then theSoviet Union for ship designs, began to design a warship fromscratch in the early 1970's. After the success <strong>of</strong> the six shipGodavari class frigate program, the IN began to plan for adestroyer size ship to be built at the Mazagon Dockyards inMumbai.THE CLASSKnown by the IN as Project 15. the first <strong>of</strong> the class. INSDELHI (D-60) was laid down at the Mazagon Dockyard on 14November 1986. <strong>The</strong> class are the largest warships built inIndia, yet as the project continued, delays began to occur asthe Soviet Union, who was providing techical assistance aswell as the weapons suite, began to collapse. When the SovietUnion finally disolved in 1991. the Delhi class were alreadyfar behind schedule as the supply system from Russia failed.It would be another six years before supply problems werefixed and INS DELHI outfitted enough to begin sea trials inIW7. Her two sister ships. MYSORE and BOMBAY (whosename was changed to MUMBAI in 1999) were also delayeddue to these problems. INS DELHI (D-61) was finallycommissioned on 15 November 1997. with MYSORE (D-60)following on 02 June 1999 (after modifications from thelessons learnt from DELHI'S construction) and MUMBAIcommissioning in Mumbai on 22 January 2001.<strong>The</strong> Delhi class were designed as multi-role ships thatcould operate either as part <strong>of</strong> a carrier screen orindependently with a balanced weapons outfit to handlesurface, sub-surface or air threats.DESIGN<strong>The</strong> Delhi class design, which Russia's Severnoyc DesignBureau assisted as a consultant, is described as a stretchedRAJPUT (Kashin-II) with Godavari features. Because <strong>of</strong> thedelays in building the Delhi class, design advances such asstealth were seen as too costly for the first three ships. It ishoped to incorporate these into the follow on class known asProject I5A.MUMBAI's displacement is between 6.700 standard to6.900 tons fully loaded, and is 163 metres long. <strong>The</strong>se vesselsare fitted for use as flagships and can accommodate anAdmiral with staff.<strong>The</strong> 320 crew live in quarters comparable to the RAN'sPerth class destroyers, while the 31 <strong>of</strong>ficers live in two bunkcabins except for the Captain who has his own cabin.One <strong>of</strong> the interesting aspects <strong>of</strong> MUMBAI is the near fullgloss dark sea grey paint used on the outer hull, which makeslight reflect <strong>of</strong>f the ship, making it easier to find the ship14 VOL <strong>64</strong> NO. 2 IHE NAVYINS MUMBAI. Note the two banks <strong>of</strong> eight SS-N-25 Switchblade' ASCM on her starboard side <strong>The</strong> class carries 16 <strong>of</strong> these Russian madeanti-ship missiles, known in the West as "Harpoonski*. (Brian Morrison. Warships & Marine Corps Museum)THE NAVY VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. 5215


Ml'MBAI has lour multi-barrelled 30mm AK-630Gallingguns (two »MI either beam) which can fire 3000rpm at a rangeto 2.5 kilometres i«» intercept incoming missiles. <strong>The</strong> AK-630guns are controlled by two MR-123 (NATO. Bass Tilt) firecontrol radars using H/l/J band frequencies.Unatcd just aft <strong>of</strong> Ml MBAI's funnel is a 533mm PTA533 quintuple torpedo lube launcher. <strong>The</strong> tubes can lire theSFT-65F anti-submarine torpedo, which has both passive andactive tracking sensors with a range <strong>of</strong> up lo I5kms at 40ktsand with a 205kg warhead. <strong>The</strong> tubes can also fire the Type5 V65 passive wake homing lorpedo with a range <strong>of</strong> l^kms at45 knots which carries a W5kg warhead.Anti-submarine duties are shared with two 12 barrelledRBU-6000 ASW mortars which are located forward <strong>of</strong> thebridge <strong>The</strong> RBU-6000 can reach targets up to 500m deep w itha range <strong>of</strong> 6kms carrying a 31kg warhead. Both the RBU-6000and the PTA 533 torpedo tube launchers are controlled by thePuiga ASW system.<strong>The</strong> Electronic Warfare suite <strong>of</strong> the iXlhi class consists <strong>of</strong>the Bharat Ajanta FSM system as well as the KllectronicaTQN-2 jammer ptnls. <strong>The</strong> ship also has two PK-2 chafflaunchers mounted alongside the aft SAM launcherAll sensors and weapons are controlled throughout theship's Bharat IPN Shikari (IPN 10) Combat Data System,wholly designed in India.AIR OPERATIONS<strong>The</strong> IX-Ihi class carries two helicopters located in twohangers aft. <strong>The</strong> air traffic control b»»oih is loeated between thehangers, and a large flight deck is equipped with the FrenchSamahe helicopter handling/landing system. <strong>The</strong> class canoperate either the light Aloucttc helicopter or the heavier andmuch more capable Sea King. Apart from the standard ASWarmament Indian Sea King helicopters are also lilted to lirethe impressive Briiish made Sea Hagle ASMHISTORYMl'MBAI is the ninth ship to be named after the cityformally known as BOMBAY. <strong>The</strong> eighth Ml'MBAI was an<strong>Australia</strong>n built Bathurst class corvette commissioned asHMINS BOMBAY (J 249) which operated out <strong>of</strong> Sydneyduring the Second World War before returning to India,serving until I960.INS ML'MBAI leaving Fremantle ()f mne in ibis image is the two largehangar doors ai the stern <strong>The</strong> ship can operate two large Sea King ASWhelicopters Indian <strong>Navy</strong> Sea Kings can also he fitted with the British madeSea Hagle ASC'M (roughly the equivalent ol the Harpoon Block IO givingthem a potent stand<strong>of</strong>f anti-ship capability (Graeme Fuller IVOL. <strong>64</strong> NO 3An interesting feature <strong>of</strong> the Delhi class is its use <strong>of</strong> five 533nim torpedoluhes tor either the SET 65E active/passive ASW torpedo or the Type 53-65passive wake homing torpedo lor use against ships. <strong>The</strong> larger torpedo givesihe ship greater stand <strong>of</strong>l range when dealing with enemy submarines11 Skin- j( -Mlkisi as well as another means <strong>of</strong> sinking surface ships (Graeme Fuller)<strong>The</strong> current INS MUMBAI (D-62) is the first Indianwarship it» sail into a foreign harbour (Fremantle) with thenew Indian Naval Fnsign. which was changed in August 2000.During her sea trials MUMBAI became the first <strong>of</strong> her class tochange a gas turbine altei the ship's GT 3 unit experiencedproblems during builders trials in October. <strong>The</strong> gas turbinewas replaced in record time on 7 November. This forced theship's original commissioning date <strong>of</strong> 15 November 2000 tobe pushed back to Januarv 2001 as further trails on the newturbine were needed. In earlv 2001 MUMBAI conducted asimultaneous launch <strong>of</strong> two SS-N-25 Switchblade SSM'sduring her weapons trial . both missiles scored hits.A cl«»se-up <strong>of</strong> two <strong>of</strong> the four SS-N-25 'Switchblade' ««ct:iple launchersthe Delhi class carries. Nearly all Western warships are happy withonly eight anti-ship missiles. (Graeme Fuller)CONCLUSIONMUMBAI is a most impressive warship, with a first classweapons and senor suite. For a second attempt at buildingtheir own destroyers, the Indians have produced a better thanaverage warship. <strong>The</strong>y have learnt the lessons from this classfor their new Project I5A ship already in the early stages <strong>of</strong>development at the Ma/agon Dockyard in Mumbai.Note. Inn Johnson and Graeme Fuller would like lo thank the Officeri andCrew <strong>of</strong> the ISS Ml 'MBAI for their Militantr in this article<strong>Australia</strong>'s ——DoctrineHMAS AN/AC in the Persian Gulf conducting embargo/sanctions enforcement operations in 2001. <strong>The</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> these operations sometimes involves thepossibility <strong>of</strong> reprisal by the affected party requiring a warship to either deter such action i»r affect some measure <strong>of</strong> sea control. (RAN)In part 5 <strong>of</strong> our presentation <strong>of</strong> the RAN's new Maritime Doctrine we detail Chapters 7 and 8 on Maritime Operationsand <strong>Navy</strong>'s people. <strong>The</strong> document was written by the Seapower Centre and is reproduced in THE NAVY, with theCentre's approval, given its importance to readers <strong>of</strong> THE NAVY, <strong>Australia</strong>ns and to the <strong>Navy</strong> league in general.Chapter 7MARITIME OPERATIONSTHE SPAN OF MARITIMEOPERATIONSMaritime forces possess considerable utility in a widerange <strong>of</strong> situations that span not only the .spectrum <strong>of</strong> conflict.but also much peaceful human activity. Contemporarystrategic thinkers, notably Ken Booth, have suggested that theroles <strong>of</strong> maritime forces in this context fall into one <strong>of</strong> threecategories: military (or combat related), diplomatic (or foreignpolicy related) and policing U>r constabulary). <strong>The</strong> Royal<strong>Navy</strong> makes the distinction in a siightly different fashion,dividing the roles <strong>of</strong> maritime forces into military,constabulary and benign. In <strong>Australia</strong>n Joint doctrine, thedistinction is drawn in a third way. between combatoperations, military support operations and shaping activities.However, when discussing maritime activities, the idea <strong>of</strong>constabulary operations is particulaily valuable because itemphasises the historically close-and continuing-relationshipbetween maritime forces and domestic and international lawenforcement. <strong>The</strong> differentiated category <strong>of</strong> benign roleswithin diplomatic operations is also important incomprehending just how flexible Navies can be.<strong>The</strong> ability <strong>of</strong> maritime forces to undertake constabularyand diplomatic operations depends substantially on theirability to carry out their combat roles. <strong>The</strong> capability to dothese things is thus largely a by-product <strong>of</strong> the resources andcore skills developed for warfighting.<strong>The</strong> major activities <strong>of</strong> maritime forces that fall into each<strong>of</strong> these three categories are shown adjoining the triangle.Although the circumstances surrounding benign operationsarc clear enough, the crossovers from military to constabularyroles and back are not always so distinct. As Sir James Cablehas suggested, the distinction between combat and noncombatactivities applies when the infliction <strong>of</strong> damagebecomes an end in itself. <strong>The</strong> other important differencebetween military and constabulary activities is that the latterdepend upon legitimacy deriving from a legal domesticmandate or an internationally agreed order, while the former,whatever the degree <strong>of</strong> force implied, threatened or exercised,is defined primarily by the national interest.COMBAT OPERATIONS AT SEAIntelligence Collection and SurveillanceAlthough intelligence collection, surveillance and geographicinformationactivities are conducted in both pcacc and conflictand have obvious application to national requirements outsideconflict, they are vital enablcrs in maritime combat.Comprehensive intelligence and surveillance are fundamentalto the generation <strong>of</strong> the degree <strong>of</strong> battlespace awareness thatwill be necessary to seize and maintain the initiative andachieve battlespace dominance. AH maritime units cancontribute to the development <strong>of</strong> this awareness and exploit itsproducts. Space based assets, over the horizon systems,signals intelligence and other systems play a vital andincreasingly important role, particularly in the provision <strong>of</strong>cueing information which allows local assets to beconcentrated and focused against a particular threat or target.Submarines, because <strong>of</strong> their ability to remain covert, areTHE NAVY VOL <strong>64</strong> NO 3 II


An Army Leopard lank drives ashore from HMAS TOBRUK. <strong>The</strong> ability <strong>of</strong>nasal forces io suddenly present a threat and exploit a weakness lo a landbased enemy's Hank by ihe insertion <strong>of</strong> land forces from the sea has been akey military tactic for thousands <strong>of</strong> years 1RAN1particularly effective in intelligence collection within theirlocalities, while maritime patrol aircraft, surface combatantsand their organic helicopters are the principal maritimecontributors to surveillance operations over wide areas.CoverCover is defined as the provision <strong>of</strong> support lor less capableforces to ensure their protection and the completion <strong>of</strong> theirtasking without interference from an adversary. Thismay require the deployment <strong>of</strong> covering forces in theproximity <strong>of</strong> the units requiring protection, but. givenappropriate capabilities, cover may be effectively exercisedthrough the simple threat <strong>of</strong> intervention. This is particularlyapplicable to situations in which it is desirable to contain theintensity or branching <strong>of</strong> a conflict. An adequate degree <strong>of</strong>cover in such circumstances can be an important deterrent <strong>of</strong>a would-be adversary and will ensure that the situation willnot escalate. Cover is a concept which, transcendsenvironments and one <strong>of</strong> the most important services w hichdifferent force elements can prov ide for others at their points<strong>of</strong> greatest \ ulnerabilily.Interdiction <strong>of</strong> Commercial Shipping and SealiftCombat operations are conducted against adversary shippingfor either strategic effect or to meet an operational or tacticalaim. In the case <strong>of</strong> strategic effect, this will usually be asystematic campaign aimed at reducing the adversary's abilityto sustain the conflict by preventing his use <strong>of</strong> the sea foreconomic activity. At the operational level, the intent will beto prevent an adversary's reinforcement or resupply <strong>of</strong>deployed units and any attempt to conduct manoeuvreoperations by sea.Maritime Strike and InterdictionInterdiction <strong>of</strong> an adversary 's maritime forces, to prevent theiruse for sea denial, sea control or power projection, can beconducted from the sea or from the land and can be directedagainst targets at sea or in harbour. Strike assets in the form <strong>of</strong>submarines or attack aircraft will be the most commonplatforms employed for interdiction, but surface combatants,helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft can also be utilised t<strong>of</strong>ire land attack weapons, or anti-ship missiles and antisubmarineweapons for operations at sea. Aircraft andsubmarines can be employed to lay <strong>of</strong>fensive mine fields.Containment by DistractionBy threatening an adversary's critical vulnerabilities it ispossible to force the diversion <strong>of</strong> his maritime forces intodefensive roles, thus preventing their use for the <strong>of</strong>fensive.Combat Operations in Defence <strong>of</strong> Shipping<strong>The</strong> basis by which shipping can be protected is either bydefending an area or by defending the ships themselves. Bothmethods are valid in particular circumstances, but thecomplexity <strong>of</strong> the maritime environment means that areaoperations must be approached with particular cautionbecause they carry the risk <strong>of</strong> placing too many demands onsensor systems and allowing the adversary to achieve surprisein its attacks.Barrier Operations and Defended AreasBarrier operations may be conducted in situations in whichgeography and or oceanography combine to create a focalarea thai can be closed to the adversary. Similarly, therequirement to concentrate assets in one particular localitymay mean that defended area operations are the most effectivemethod lor their protection. Generally dcfcncc in depth is themost effective approach tt> the problem, with units allocatedsectors based on the ability <strong>of</strong> their sensors and weapons tocontribute to Ihe force. Defensive minefields can be aparticularly effective mechanism for achieving the aim.Layered Defence (Convoy, Close and Distant Screening)<strong>The</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> layered defence is one <strong>of</strong> the oldest inmaritime strategy, including as it does the method <strong>of</strong> convoy.Escorting units, generally surface or airborne, maintain watchon their sensors and provide warning and weapon coverageagainst air. surface or underwater threats by acting as movingbarriers around the ship or ships to be protected. Convoyingships, or grouping them together for their own protection, isbased on the simple fact that the concentration <strong>of</strong> defensiveassets in close proximity increases the overall defensivecapability <strong>of</strong> the escort av ailable. Properly carried out. convoyoperations may also reduce the period <strong>of</strong> vulnerability.Search And Rescue (SARI operations at great distances require not only theright assets hut also the people who trained to deal with such difficulties.Here an RAN Sea King winches a sailor from the sea during an SARexercise. tRANiAdvance Force OperationsAdvance force operations are conducted in advance <strong>of</strong> a mainforce, notably an amphibious force, in order to makeacceptably safe the area in which the latter will operate. <strong>The</strong>maritime elements <strong>of</strong> such activities are primarily directedagainst submarines and mines or are concerned withdeveloping improved knowledge <strong>of</strong> the operatingenvironment. Advance force operations are asset intensiveand lime consuming and may themselves be vulnerable,especially in the case <strong>of</strong> mine countermeasures. <strong>The</strong>y thusfrequently require cover from other forces. <strong>The</strong> nature <strong>of</strong>these forms <strong>of</strong> maritime warfare means that advance forceoperations must be thought <strong>of</strong> in terms <strong>of</strong> threat minimisationrather than threat elimination.Protection <strong>of</strong> ShippingNav al Control <strong>of</strong> Shipping (NCS) is a term applied to a widevariety <strong>of</strong> procedures, the object <strong>of</strong> which is to ensure thatmaritime trade is affected as little as possible by threats orcontingencies. NCS provides for a series <strong>of</strong> measures scaledto the nature <strong>of</strong> the threat to merchant shipping in anyparticular area, whether that threat is military or <strong>of</strong> anothernature. <strong>The</strong>se measures can range from the provision <strong>of</strong>briefing, debriefing and routing information to the mostsophisticated escort and screening operations. Much NCSeffort, particularly in guiding and monitoring the progress <strong>of</strong>merchant ships, assists substantially in developing thesurveillance picture. Only in the event <strong>of</strong> extreme threatswould such active measures as escort be adopted, either tocover a specific campaign or area <strong>of</strong> conflict, or. in the finalevent, to ensure national economic survival.COMBAT OPERATIONS FROMTHE SEAMaritime Mobility<strong>The</strong> sea can be utilised for ihe projection <strong>of</strong> power against theshore in a number <strong>of</strong> ways. At its most basic, maritime meanscan be used to transport land forces into theatre and sustaintheir operations there by the provision <strong>of</strong> sealift. <strong>The</strong>limitation <strong>of</strong> this approach is that il requires the utilisation <strong>of</strong>developed port facilities for embarkation and disembarkationand the forces so transported are likely to require significanttime to prepare themselves for operations after landing.Thus, although maritime mobility in the form <strong>of</strong> sea liftcan be a very useful tool <strong>of</strong> manoeuvre warfare, achievingmaritime manoeuvre, the reality <strong>of</strong> operational contingenciesand local threats will <strong>of</strong>ten require ihe use <strong>of</strong> amphibiousforces which are capable <strong>of</strong> transporting land forces anddisembarking them in a high state <strong>of</strong> tactical readiness in theabsence <strong>of</strong> developed facilities.I .and Strike<strong>The</strong> ability <strong>of</strong> maritime forces to strike directly at the land hashistorically depended upon the possession <strong>of</strong> organic fixedwing aircraft or large calibre guns. Surface combatants withmedium calibre guns possess a limited capability to conductbombardment. <strong>The</strong> development <strong>of</strong> extended range guidedmunitions and ship and submarine home land attack missilesis likely to increase the potential for these operations in thefuture.Amphibious OperationsAmphibious operations seek to exploit the superior mobility<strong>of</strong> seaborne forces to those on land as well as their ability totransport mass. <strong>The</strong>y may be used to contribute to thecampaign by interdicting the adversary's vulnerabilities onland, by seizing an objective, conducting a turning movementto expose a vulnerable flank or. on a smaller scale, byinfiltrating forces to interfere with the adversary's lines <strong>of</strong>communication. Not all amphibious operations are conductedby surface forces. Submarines can be particularly useful forcovert insertions and extractions <strong>of</strong> Special Forces.Amphibious forces can be particularly effective whenconducting an amphibious demonstration. <strong>The</strong>y may tiedown much larger numbers <strong>of</strong> land-based forces bythreatening but not conducting a landing. This utilises theinherent capabilities <strong>of</strong> ships to poise and be persistent andthus achieves distraction <strong>of</strong> the adversary.<strong>The</strong> principal stages <strong>of</strong> an amphibious operation normallybegin with the advance force or pre-assault operations bymaritime forces already discussed. <strong>The</strong>y may also include thelanding <strong>of</strong> small numbers <strong>of</strong> personnel by covert means toconduct scouting and reconnaissance. <strong>The</strong> amphibiousassault will be the main landing <strong>of</strong> forces to seize one or morelanding points and secure an objective. Whether land forcesseek to move out from that objective will depend upon Iheaim <strong>of</strong> the operation.<strong>The</strong> processes by which men and women arc trained for maritime combatinvolve both individual and collective efforts. <strong>The</strong> complexities <strong>of</strong> modemcombatants and the systems that they carry mean that naval personnel <strong>of</strong> allranks and specialisations require intelligence and a high level <strong>of</strong> educationfrom the outset, while the provision <strong>of</strong> quality basic and specialist trainingon entry is essential. tRANi<strong>The</strong> term assault is employed to describe this part <strong>of</strong> theamphibious operation, but it must be emphasised thai this willnot he an attack on heavily defended coastal areas in thefashion <strong>of</strong> the operations in Normandy and the Central Pacificin World War II. Rather, amphibious forces will seek to landwhere the adversary is not and they will go ashore only whenthey are confident that local superiority exists on and underthe sea and in the air.<strong>The</strong> insertion <strong>of</strong> a smaller force for a particular andlimited task and its withdrawal immediately on completion isknown as an amphibious raid.An amphibious withdrawal is an operation conducted toremove the landed force. It is a routine evolution foramphibious forces after their tasks have been completedbecause it is an important part <strong>of</strong> maintaining their flexibilityanJ speed <strong>of</strong> response. When a withdrawal is requiredbecause <strong>of</strong> the arrival <strong>of</strong> superior land, sea or air power, veryclose co-ordination is required between all elements <strong>of</strong> theforce to ensure a safe departure.VOL <strong>64</strong> NO 3THE NAN YTHE NAVYvol.. <strong>64</strong> NO. 3


Support to Operations on I.and<strong>Australia</strong>'s naval forces do not possess the organic aircapability to protect operations on land. <strong>The</strong>y neverthelesshave considerable potential to contribute to combat operationsthroughout the battlespace. Medium calibre guns in surfacecombatants can be used for naval surface fire support or shorebombardment operations, while air warfare weapons andsensors are used to contribute to anti-air operations over thecoast. This will be particularly useful if it can be integratedwith airborne early warning and control and lighter aircraft, orwith land-based sensors and weapons. Army battlefieldhelicopters (organic to the amphibious task group) and navalutility helicopters can provide extensive support to operationson land. In littoral zones, maritime forces prevent theadversary moving forces by sea. This protects the seawardHank <strong>of</strong> friendly land forces and denies the adversary theability to conduct maritime manoeuvre.SHAPING OPERATIONSShaping operations can also be described as naval diplomacyor the use <strong>of</strong> maritime forces in support <strong>of</strong> foreign policy.Some <strong>of</strong> the activities that fall under this heading includeconstabulary or benign operations. <strong>The</strong>re are. however,significant elements that rely directly upon the inherentcombat capabilities <strong>of</strong> maritime forces and are diplomatic intheir intent. That is. their activities are designed to influencethe policies and actions <strong>of</strong> other nation states. One importantaim is to develop the conditions which will allow thesuccessful conduct <strong>of</strong> coalition operations in the future. Many<strong>of</strong> the inherent characteristics <strong>of</strong> maritime forces described inChapter Six (see THE NAVY. <strong>Vol</strong> 63. No 2.) are attributes thatmake maritime forces the instruments <strong>of</strong> first resort forgovernments. In particular, they possess the versatility and therange <strong>of</strong> response which makes them very useful Ux>ls in times<strong>of</strong> uncertainty and crisis, allowing governments the maximumfreedom <strong>of</strong> decision.PresencePresence is the term used to describe the operations <strong>of</strong> navalforces in areas <strong>of</strong> strategic significance that are intended toconvey an interest. <strong>The</strong>se may involve simple passage pastanother nation's coast, port visits or exercises. Warshipsrepresent perhaps the most sophisticated manifestations <strong>of</strong>particular societies and are thus unique symbols <strong>of</strong> a nation'sidentity. <strong>The</strong> influence <strong>of</strong> presence derives directly from suchfeatures as access, flexibility, poise and persistence. Itdepends, however, fundamentally upon credible combatpower. Presence is not itself a threat <strong>of</strong> force, but ademonstration <strong>of</strong> capability that can be used to reassure, toimpress and to warn. <strong>The</strong> means by which this can be achievedare legion and extend much further than the social activities <strong>of</strong>tradition, including many <strong>of</strong> the benign operations describedbelow.CoercionIf a situation requires more direct action, maritime forces canbe used to coerce a would-be adversary by demonstrating thereadiness to deploy a degree <strong>of</strong> combat power which wouldmake its aim unachievable or the consequences <strong>of</strong> achieving itnot worthwhile. <strong>The</strong>y are thus effective at achievingdeterrence. In many circumstances, particularly those inwhich the main events are on land rather than in the maritimeenvironment, such coercive action requires a high degree <strong>of</strong>joint co-operation to demonstrate credible capability in allenvironments. Maritime forces, including amphibious forceshave, however, particular value in terms <strong>of</strong> such actionbecause they are able to achieve coercive effects withoutnecessarily violating national sovereignty.MILITARY SUPPORT OPERATIONSCONSTABULARY OPERATIONSConstabulary operations operate within the framework <strong>of</strong>domestic law and <strong>Australia</strong>'s international law obligations.<strong>The</strong> amount and degree <strong>of</strong> force that can be applied must bestrictly within the context <strong>of</strong> the mandate given.Peace OperationsPeace operations encompass those operations that support thediplomatic peace process. <strong>The</strong> major categories inthe maritime environment are explained below.PeacekeepingPeacekeeping formally refers to observer and interpositionforces, although its popular usage extends much morewidely to international intervention <strong>of</strong> any kind. Implicit inpeacekeeping operations is that they operate under a mandateand according to conditions which arc agreed by all thebelligerentparties.Open sea peacekeeping operations are rare: more commonlynaval forces will be used to patrol coasts, estuariesand rivers to monitor ceasefires. Naval units maybe used asneutral territory for talks, while naval personnel can beemployed as military observers, liaison <strong>of</strong>ficers. HQ staff<strong>of</strong>ficers, disarmament inspectors or in medical orcommunications teams. Naval forces, particularly amphibiousvessels and organic helicopters, can provide substantiallogistic support.Peace EnforcementPeace enfort ement moves a step further than peace keeping. Itmay occur in circumstances where one or more <strong>of</strong> thebelligerents have not consented to intervention byinternational forces and coercive action may be required torestore peace. <strong>The</strong> Gulf War in 1991 was an importantexample <strong>of</strong> such action, authorised under Chapter VII <strong>of</strong> theUnited Nations charter. <strong>The</strong> roles played by maritime forceswill depend upon the nature and scale <strong>of</strong> the conflict, but mayextend to high-level sea control and power projectionoperations, as well as the provision <strong>of</strong> logistic support.Embargo. Sanctions and Quarantine EnforcementEmbargo, sanctions and quarantine enforcement are a majormaritime component <strong>of</strong> peace enforcement. While the level <strong>of</strong>force which may be employed is carefully controlled, thepossibility <strong>of</strong> reprisal by the affected party generally requiressuch operations to be conducted in concert with a range <strong>of</strong>self-protective measures. Depending upon the nature <strong>of</strong> thethreat, this may require sea control operations on anappropriate scale.Peace BuildingWhere reconstruction <strong>of</strong> a state or region is beingattempted in the wake <strong>of</strong> conflict, naval forces canprovide many facilities to assist with such work, both inplatforms and personnel. Key areas where naval forcesundertake such efforts include mine clearance, theopening <strong>of</strong> ports and ordnance disposal and salvage.Depending upon the scale <strong>of</strong> the task, such activitiesmay take many years to complete. <strong>Australia</strong>n units haveworked since 1945 to clear enormous quantities <strong>of</strong>mines and other dangerous ordnance not only fromBaltic readiness is an important aspect <strong>of</strong> all <strong>Navy</strong> training. Here a flightdeck crew practice fighting fire after a helicopter crash. Crew cohesion,discipline, mutual trust and support arc essential factors in sustainingbattle readiness. (RAN)national territory and waters, but from South East Asia.Papua New Guinea and the islands <strong>of</strong> the South West Pacific.Defence Force Aid to the Civil PowerIn constabulary terms, naval operations to provide militaryassistance to the civil power are usually aimed at supportingdomestic law enforcement at sea within national jurisdictions.Defence Force Aid to the Civil Power involves the GovernorGeneral calling out permanent service personnel to preventdomestic violence where civil authorities are inadequate orunsuitable to do so. Maritime operations to provide militaryassistance to the civil power could include counter-terroristoperations such as the recovery <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fshore gas or oilinstallations, or ships held by terrorists.Environmental and Resource Management and ProtectionFisheries protection is one <strong>of</strong> the oldest constabulary roles <strong>of</strong>naval forces and remains an important activity in an era<strong>of</strong> extending jurisdiction and increasing exploitation <strong>of</strong>and stress on fish stocks in both coastal and oceanic waters.<strong>Australia</strong>n naval units have been engaged in this task sincebefore the Commonwealth Naval Forces became the RAN in1911. <strong>The</strong> role has extended considerably in recent yearsto include the surv eillance and protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fshore resourceindustries and the surveillance and monitoring <strong>of</strong> the naturalenvironment and the actions <strong>of</strong> humans within it. <strong>The</strong>emphasis <strong>of</strong> such operations on direct national economicbenefit has thus begun to include more wide-ranging concerns<strong>of</strong> environmental quality.Anti-Piracy OperationsNaval forces have international obligations to suppress piracy,which by definition is an activity on the high seas. Withinterritorial waters, piratical activities are legally described asarmed robbery at sea and must be dealt with by domesticmandate. In circumstances where piracy or armed robbery atsea are actively interfering with commerce and other peacefulactivities, the same measures which apply in other situationsfor the protection <strong>of</strong> merchant shipping will require to beapplied in sea control operations. <strong>The</strong> more sophisticated,technologically advanced and aggressive the criminal activity,the more demanding such operations will be.Quarantine Operations. Drug Interdiction and Prevention<strong>of</strong> Illegal ImmigrationMaritime forces play a significant role in combinationwith other Government agencies in operations such as theenforcement<strong>of</strong> quarantine regulations, drug interdiction andthe prevention <strong>of</strong> illegal immigration. Defence Forcepersonnel are specifically empowered to undertake suchactivities by legislation such as the Customs Act and theMigration Act.THE BENIGN APPLICATION OFMARITIME POWEREvacuationSeaborne forces can be key elements in Service AssistedEvacuations (SAE) and Serv ice Protected Evacuations (SPE).<strong>The</strong> increasing frequency <strong>of</strong> failed states and civil disorders inthe last decade has seen the need for these operat-ns increase.Evacuations will almost al vays be conducted on a joint basisand seek to utilise a seaport or airport, but an amphibiousoperation may well prove necessary in undeveloped areas. Inthe case <strong>of</strong> SAE. the safety <strong>of</strong> the evacuation is guaranteed bylocal authorities and the focus is on achieving the safe andtimely removal <strong>of</strong> national.* or displaced persons. In SPE.protective operations safeguard the process. <strong>The</strong>se may be <strong>of</strong>considerable scale and complexity and could extend to seacontrol measures. Apart from their ability to transport andsupport large numbers <strong>of</strong> people, maritime forces alsoprovide significant assistance with shore to ship transportutilising boats and helicopters, as well as the command,control and communications facilities to coordinateoperations.One particular advantage which maritime forces havecomes with their ability to poise and be persistent.Evacuations are not initiated lightly and the circumstances inwhich the requirement develops generally involve a highdegree <strong>of</strong> uncertainty for governments. Seaborne unitsdeployed to the locality assist in keeping options open whilethe alternatives arc examined.Defence Assistance to the Civil CommunityDefence assistance to the civil community differs from aid tothe civil power in that it is related simply to the provision <strong>of</strong>help in civil matters and not the enforcement <strong>of</strong> law and order.It includes search and rescue and ordnance disposal in thedomestic environment, but can extend to salvage,environmental management, pollution control and theprovision <strong>of</strong> personnel and systems to help communitydevelopment. One <strong>of</strong> the most important military assistanceactivities is hydrographic surveying but all maritime forcesalso make major contributions to the collection <strong>of</strong>oceanographic and meteorological data. Two importantelements <strong>of</strong> DACC that deserve consideration in their ownright are search and rescue and disaster relief.Search and RescueAll vessels on the high seas and aircraft operating over themhave obligations under international law to assist in search andrescue. In addition, individual sovereign states, including<strong>Australia</strong>, have accepted coordination responsibilities withintheir areas <strong>of</strong> interest. In <strong>Australia</strong>'s case, this encompasses asignificant proportion <strong>of</strong> the earth's surface, ranging well outfrom the coast and into the Southern Ocean. Naval and airforces may therefore be required to engage in search andrescue operations at very long range and in extremelydemanding conditions with little notice.Disaster ReliefNo nation is immune to natural or man-made disasters. Navalforces repeatedly demonstrate that their inherent capabilitiesmake them uniquely valuable in providing both short notice14VOL <strong>64</strong> NO 3THE NAVYTHE NAVY VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. 3 IS


and long term assistance in disaster relict, not only for coastallocations, hut sometimes well inland. While shiphornehelicopters can be particularly useful and ships may act aslogistic support bases, hospitals and command posts for longperiods, the specialist skills available in ships also mean thattheir personnel can be invaluable sources <strong>of</strong> trained manpowerfor rehabilitation and repair work. Naval forces are selfsupportingand do not create logistic burdens in situationswhere infrastructure has been destroyed or severely damaged.Disaster relief is one <strong>of</strong> die many activities to which navalforces can be expected to make an immediate and effectivecontribution with little or no warning.Defence Force Assistance to Allied and Friendly NationsDefence Force assistance can be provided to other countries ina wide variety <strong>of</strong> ways. In addition to those benign activitiesalready listed, maritime forces can exercise with and assistwith the training <strong>of</strong> other national forces to increase theireffectiveness. Examples include the provision <strong>of</strong> subsurface orair assets to practice the tactics <strong>of</strong> undersea and air warfare toa sophistication which is not possible in the absence <strong>of</strong> therelevant force elements, as well as the sharing <strong>of</strong> intelligenceand surveillance dala.Chapter STHE MOST IMPORTANTFACTOR• . - . ' „ .. v .THE HUMAN FACTOR[ It is not technology which gives the <strong>Navy</strong> capability bin theI way that technology is employed. <strong>The</strong> capabilities represented| by systems that can be effectively employed and sustainedtake many years to develop in maritime forces and they aremuch easier to lose than tlicy are to create. It is people whogenerate the real capabilities that (IK RAN's surface ships.! submarines, aircraft and support organisations represent.I People are thus the musl important factor lor the <strong>Navy</strong>'sj operations. <strong>The</strong> RAN has a history <strong>of</strong> achievement anilexcellence which provides a firm foundation for its currentactivities and for the future, but this Inundation is one thaican rapidly be eroded if wc do not give the<strong>Navy</strong>'s people the priority theydeserve.. Life at SeaLife at sea is unlike any other. <strong>The</strong> maritime environment istiring, demanding and unforgiving. Maritime operations are-•fcfct unremitting atteotion to the task in hand and maritimewarfare isTharacterised by long periods <strong>of</strong> surveillance andpatrol" followed by short bursts <strong>of</strong> intense and .destructivecombat.Peacetime operations require nearly the same degree <strong>of</strong>commitment and effort and they, too. can be arduous andunremitting. Officers and sailors in seagoing units-as well asthe soldiers and airmen who go with them-must live and workfor long periods in very close proximity to each other. Eventhe biggest ships are cramped and confined and all are subjectto the effects <strong>of</strong> weather and seastale. All in their crews mustbe constantly alert to the possibility <strong>of</strong> emergencies and theunexpected. Even in harbour, ships require watchkccpingpersonnel to ensure their safe operation and physicalintegrity.DisciplineIt follows from the nature <strong>of</strong> life at sea that naval discipline isas much self-discipline as it is externally imposed. <strong>The</strong>re areoccasions on which orders need to be obeyed instantly andw ithout question, but the key elements <strong>of</strong> naval discipline areco-operation and teamwork. Naval discipline at its best is theresult <strong>of</strong> a clear understanding <strong>of</strong> the code <strong>of</strong> hchaviouirequired 111 a war lighting and seagoing sen ice li pn»\ ides theframework b\ which personnel i .in o|«eiatc elle»n\el\ uudeithe strain, slun k and leai ol ui.iiiluue COIIIIK IMoraleMm oh IN defined .IN the state ol mind <strong>of</strong> a group <strong>of</strong> people asrcllcctcd by then behaviour under all conditions. Indeveloping morale, although it is a collective quality, it isnecessary to start with the individual as the way to stabilisethe group. <strong>The</strong> creation <strong>of</strong> high morale depends upon a way <strong>of</strong>life. Naval training must focus on the development <strong>of</strong> thequalities needed to create a spirit which, sustainedpr<strong>of</strong>essional mastery and leadership, will never acceptdefeat.BLeadershipLeadership in the maritime environment is as vital as that onland. Its nature and exercise nrc, however, different becausethe nature <strong>of</strong> what is done at sea and on land arc themselvesvery different. <strong>The</strong> focus at sea is on the effort <strong>of</strong> the entirecrew to place the combat instrument which is tlie ship into thecontrol <strong>of</strong> the directing mind <strong>of</strong> the commander. No bullet isfired, no nubile can be launched without specific commanddirection. With very few exceptions this applies even in themost intense <strong>of</strong> combat situations and it is never widelydelegated. By contrast, the infantry commander must lead hismen as individuals to make their singular contributions to thecombat effort in accordance with his intent. It is a fairgeneralisation to say that the aim <strong>of</strong> leadership at sea is theship's company and their ship as a fighting instrument and theaim on land is the individual as a fighting instrument.This means that leadership at sea depends vitally uponpr<strong>of</strong>essional competence, but in no way does it diminish theimportance <strong>of</strong> die human element. One advantage that theleader at sea possesses is that risk is shared by allthose onboard the ships involved incombat. <strong>The</strong> need for teamwork,the enclosed and confinednature <strong>of</strong> the shipboardenvironment andthe long andarduous nature<strong>of</strong> maritimeoperation Nsuch capability set forachievement will dependupon the operationalrequirement but no unitwill be deployedfor peacetimeservice untilit has^ • • W V 'ivUK.Ill lll.ltreached the Minimum Level <strong>of</strong> Operational Capabilityli .ulei--IIIII IIIIINI IK.(MLOC). An assessment as to whether a ship has achieved this\ ii.il. |H-rsonal and consistent. <strong>The</strong> crowning example <strong>of</strong> naval state will be made by the staff <strong>of</strong> the Sea Trainingleadership remains that <strong>of</strong> Lord Nelson, whose ability logenerate enthusiasm and devotion amongst his subordinates atevery level was a basic element <strong>of</strong> his success in battle. Anoutstanding <strong>Australia</strong>n naval leader was Captain 'Hec' WallerCroup. Certain threats or contingencies will require priority tobe given to particular warfare areas or techniques, while otherscan be held at designated peacetime standards. This focusingallows the most efficient allocation <strong>of</strong> resources, as well aswhose command <strong>of</strong> IIMAS Stuart (1) and the 'Scrap Ironensuring that forces are provided as quickly as possible.Flotilla' in 1039-41 set a standard recognisedDesignating the standards required for peacetimeby all who knew him.operations is a particularly important process. It must draw aTraining<strong>The</strong> processes by which men andbalance between achieving standards which will make thetransition to battle readiness as rapid as possible, as well aswomen are trained for improving pr<strong>of</strong>essional performance generally, and not askingmaritime combat involve more <strong>of</strong> personnel than they are able to give, not just in a singlework up or commission, but for an entire seagoing career.ptfjfBattle Readiness and Combat Stress_ , Units must be in a battle ready state before theyentei the area <strong>of</strong> operations. This condition isnot something that is wholly susceptible toobjective measurement and its attainment must bea matter <strong>of</strong> judgement on the part <strong>of</strong> thoseresponsible for combat training and those who willcommand the operation. In reality, the preparations fordeployment will be working against time and the package<strong>of</strong> preparative training will almost always be a compromisebetween operational imj .-ratives and training ideals. It isalmost certain that units will not achieve their highest degree•>;.->' both individual and collective <strong>of</strong> battle readiness until they have actually had someefltotis. <strong>The</strong> complexities <strong>of</strong> modem experience <strong>of</strong> combat and developed confidence in their own• nbatants tAd the systems that they carry mean fighting abilities and in those <strong>of</strong> the other units with whichthat uaval personnel <strong>of</strong> all ranks and specialisations require they operate. This will be particularly true in the case <strong>of</strong>,jointintelligence and a high level <strong>of</strong> education from the outset, or coalition operations, in which pre-existing 'sharedwhile the provision <strong>of</strong> quality basic and specialist training onentry Is essential, particularly in an eia <strong>of</strong> minimum manningconcepts. It is a reality, however, that the individual's trainingas a sailor will not be completed until after he or she has hadexperience is less likely.<strong>The</strong> maintenance <strong>of</strong> a battle ready state is one oC^thc -primary responsibilities ol commanders. <strong>The</strong>y must be able to 4demand.the utmost from their people and systems withoutihe first hand experience <strong>of</strong> seagoing.Units newly commissioned or operational after extendedperiods <strong>of</strong> leave and maintenance, both <strong>of</strong> which usuallyinvolve considerable changeover <strong>of</strong> personnel, cannot beexhausting them beyond the point <strong>of</strong> no return. This<strong>of</strong> effort also applies to commanders themselves,must be able to maintain their personal efficiencyconserve their strength for the critical periods. Crew-expected to conduct operations with any degree <strong>of</strong> efficiency. and mutual trust and support are essential factors in sustaining- *Ships in these circumstances require to conduct harbour battle readiness.training nnd systemch&JS^heff>re they go to sea to shakedown to achieve minimum standards <strong>of</strong> safety and work up HMAS KANIMBLA (clocefl t«. earner*) and HMAS ADELAIDE in the^to achieve the operational capability requited. <strong>The</strong> level <strong>of</strong> Persian Gulf conductinc emhar?o/sanciiom enforcement operations, (RAN)THE NAVY


US <strong>Navy</strong> announcesDDX decision<strong>The</strong> USN has announced lhai IngallsShipbuilding Inc.. Northrop GrummanShip Systems (NGSS) has been selectedas the lead design agent for the DDXship program.This includes the award <strong>of</strong> a costplusaward-fee contract in the amount <strong>of</strong>US$2.9 billion for design agentactivities such as the systems design <strong>of</strong>the DDX destroyer, and the design,construction and test <strong>of</strong> its majorsubsystems. NGSS was the leader <strong>of</strong> ateam <strong>of</strong> contractors called the 'GoldTeam' that included Raytheon SystemsCo. as the combat systems integrator,and a number <strong>of</strong> other companies.Gold Team's proposal alsoincorporated Blue Team' member BathIron Works (BIW) as a subcontractor toperform DDX design and test activities,which will ensure BIW will have theability to produce a detailed DDXdesign and build these ships in thefuture.<strong>The</strong> award <strong>of</strong> the DDX DesignAgent contract signals the start <strong>of</strong> arevolution for the USN's surfacecombatant fleet, with the development<strong>of</strong> transformational technologies thatwill create new capabilities whilereducing crew size and yieldingsignificant combat advantage. DDX isthe foundation <strong>of</strong> a family <strong>of</strong> surfaceFlash Trafficcombatants, including a future cruiser.CGX. and littoral combat ship (LCS).providing the US with what is hopedto be a balanced set <strong>of</strong> war-fightingcapabilities to meet the nationalsecurity requirements in the 21stcentury.<strong>The</strong> award <strong>of</strong> the DDX DesignAgent contract marks the beginning <strong>of</strong> anew family <strong>of</strong> surface combatants." saidEdward C. Pete' Aldridge Jr.. UnderSecretary <strong>of</strong> Defense for Acquisition.Technology and Logistics. "Thisprogram and its spiral developmentapproach will be the model for <strong>Navy</strong>acquisition in the years to come. DDX isthe Joint Strike Fighter equivalent forshipbuilding."<strong>The</strong> DDX program will provide abaseline for spiral development <strong>of</strong> theDDX and the future cruiser or CGXwith emphasis on common hull-formand technology development. Advancedcombat system technology andnetworking capabilities from DDX andCGX will be leveraged in the spiraldevelopment <strong>of</strong> the littoral combat shipto produce a survivable. capable nearlandplatform for the 21st century. <strong>The</strong>intent is to innovatively combinethe transformational technologiesdeveloped in the DDX program withthe many ongoing R&D effortsinvolving mission focused surfaceships to produce a state-<strong>of</strong>-the-artsurface combatant to defeat adversaryG o l d Proposed Systems0nlft»4IW«r H* SmM" .~ - wo,**** : r• „ 'J* ... »11 %••«•»•••»•».» »»•»>».«»«»•' M>>*»« » U>


Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering inSouth Korea, for a partial re-build underthe provision <strong>of</strong> a warranty contract.Delivered in June 2(M)I (sec THENAVY <strong>Vol</strong>. 63 No. 4. pi7) to replace theSalisburx-class frigate BNS I'MARFAROOQ (ex-HMS LLANDAFF). theBangladesh <strong>Navy</strong> found the frigateunsuitable' for operational deploymentfollowing its shakedown cruise. <strong>The</strong>Bangladesh <strong>Navy</strong> is said to bedemanding the replacement <strong>of</strong> the sonarsystem and other unspecified 'combatinadequacies'.Additional weapons systems arereportedly also to be fitted during the'warranty service'. After its refit, thefrigate - now referred to simply as theDW-2000H in Bangladesh - will bere-commissioned into the <strong>Navy</strong> andreturned to service, assuming no otherproblems. <strong>The</strong> frigate was SouthKorea's first major warship export andwas equipped mainly with Italiandesignedweapons and a Thalescommand-and-control sensor suite.<strong>The</strong> ship, ordered in 1997. hasproven politically controversial inBangladesh, where critics have claimedthai its operations and maintenancecosts are prohibitive and that itrepresents too sophisticated a warshipfor the maritime security tasks that arethe focus <strong>of</strong> the Bangladesh <strong>Navy</strong>. As aresult, the procurement <strong>of</strong> the frigateand its problems were the subject <strong>of</strong> aninvestigation which has indicated graftand corruption in the BangladeshDepartment <strong>of</strong> Defence decision topurchase the ship.CHARLES-DE-GAULLEupdateA Rolls-Royce subsidiary willdeliver two propellers for the Frenchaircraft carrier CHARLES DEGAULLE by the end <strong>of</strong> the year to theFrench ship building agency DCN.<strong>The</strong> aircraft carrier suffered anembarrassing failure <strong>of</strong> the propellersduring its first shakedown cruise andhad to return to Toulon to have themreplaced by less efficient propellersdesigned for its predecessor (see THENAVY <strong>Vol</strong> 63. No3. p 17).DCN gave a contract for two newpropellers to Atlantic Industrie deNantes, the French manufacturer thatmade the original propellers for theCHARLES-DE-GAULLE, then put outan international tender for another twopropellers, which Roll's Bird Johnsonsubsidiary in Pascagoula. Mississippi,won. <strong>The</strong>y are in the course <strong>of</strong>completion and will be delivered toDCN at the end <strong>of</strong> the year.<strong>The</strong> French nuclear powered aircraft carrier CHARLES-DE-GAULLE. <strong>The</strong> carrier is still plagued withpropeller problems which will hopefully be fixed by year's end. (IX'N)In other news, while participating inOperation Enduring Freedom.CHARLES DE GAULLE broke <strong>of</strong>f itsoperations in the Arabian Sea lo travelto Singapore to assess its suitability as aregular supply centre for the Frenchfleet.CHARLES DE GAULLE stopped inSingapore between 3-8 May and thenheaded back to the Arabian Sea for ajoint exercise with the Royal Saudi<strong>Navy</strong>.<strong>The</strong> ship was planned to visit<strong>Australia</strong> as well but operationaldemands precluded her slop over.However, the reason for the trip toSingapore is widely thought to be asales pitch for the Singaporeanrequirement for 20-24 new generationfighter aircraft, <strong>of</strong> which CHARLES DEGAULLE has seven new-generationRafale fighters on her flight deck. <strong>The</strong>Rafale's maker. Dassault Aviation, seesSingapore as a potential customer forthe Rafale.<strong>The</strong> Rafales aboard CHARLES DEGAULLE are air combat fighters and.as such, did not conduct operations overAfghanistan. However, il is reportedthat they logged a total <strong>of</strong>400 flying hours in exercises in theArabian Sea. many <strong>of</strong> them conductedwith US <strong>Navy</strong> F/A-18 Hornets fromthe aircraft carrier USS JOHN CSTENNIS.Since late December the French<strong>Navy</strong>'s (Marine Nationale's) 16 SuperEtendard fighters deployed onCHARLES DE GAULLE have logged atotal <strong>of</strong> 669 operational flightsover Afghanistan. <strong>The</strong>se included250 missions. 60^f <strong>of</strong> which wereground support operations and 40%reconnaissance flights over 437 targets.<strong>The</strong> CHARLES DE GAULLE's twoE-2C Hawkeye airborne early warningaircraft also flew 482 hours onreconnaissance flights for coalitionforces in Afghanistan.Boeing delivers firstHarpoon Block II kitsto DenmarkFollowing the installation <strong>of</strong> thenecessary upgrade kits, the DanishNaval Materiel Command has takendelivery <strong>of</strong> its initial Harpoon Block IImissiles, marking the first internationalsale <strong>of</strong> the upgraded missile. <strong>The</strong> kitsare to be installed by the RoyalNetherlands <strong>Navy</strong> for the Royal Danish<strong>Navy</strong> at their joint missile maintenancefacility in Den Hclder.<strong>The</strong> Harpoon Block II kit provides anew Guidance Control Unit flightcomputer, a new guidance section shelland a Global Positioning System (GPS)antenna. When installed, the Harpoonmissile has a more accurate navigationsystem than its predecessors, and can beused for coastal clutter suppression.<strong>The</strong> Block II missile incorporatesguidance technologies from two otherBoeing weapons programmes - the low -cost, inertial measuring unit from theJoint Direct Attack Munition; and thes<strong>of</strong>tware, mission computer, integratedGPS/Inertial Navigation System, andGPS antenna and receiver from theStand<strong>of</strong>f Land Attack MissileExpanded-Response. <strong>The</strong>se technologiesare designed to expand Harpoon'scapability to attack coastal, in-harbourand land targets.<strong>The</strong> US <strong>Navy</strong> completed flighttesting<strong>of</strong> the Harpoon Block II inNovember 2001. Denmark was the firstcountry to sign a $10 million contractfor 50 upgrade kits in 1997. Thismodification upgrades about half <strong>of</strong> theRoyal Danish <strong>Navy</strong> inventory.South Korean <strong>Navy</strong>gets first InternationalMk-45 Mod 4 GunUnited Defense and WorldIndustries Ace. have delivered the firstinternationally produced Mk-45 Mod 4gun to the Republic <strong>of</strong> Korea (ROK)<strong>Navy</strong>. This is the first time a Mk-45Mod 4 gun was sold overseas and is theculmination <strong>of</strong> teamwork by WIA andUnited Defense over the past 27months.United Defense and WIA jointlyproduced components for the Mod 4guns. United Defense providedtechnical assistance, spare parts, andtraining, while WIA did final assemblyand test in Korea.<strong>The</strong> Mod 4 variant <strong>of</strong> the ubiquitousnaval gun has a longer barrel, a stealthyturret shielding and able to fire theERGM (Extended Range GuidedMunition) as well as standard 127mmrounds. <strong>The</strong> longer barrel increases therange <strong>of</strong> a standard shell from 24kms tomore than 40kms.United Defense won a competitive$22 million contract in December 99 toco-produce three Mk-45 Mod 4 guns forKorea's KDX II lightweight destroyershipbuilding program. WIA will deliverthe second gun in October <strong>2002</strong> and thethird one in August 2003. Since theoriginal contract. United Defense hasbegun discussions with WIA to coproducethe next purchase <strong>of</strong> guns forthe Korean <strong>Navy</strong>.New RN First Sea LordHer Majesty <strong>The</strong> Queen hasgraciously approved the appointment <strong>of</strong>Admiral Sir Alan West to succeed<strong>The</strong> RN's new First Sea Lord. Admiral Sir AlanWest, who commanded the frigate ARDENTduring the Falklands Conflict a little over20 years ago. (RN)Caught in flight. A 127mm shell is caught in flight by the camera after being fired by a Mk-45 Mod 4gun. <strong>The</strong> Mod 4 version <strong>of</strong> the Mk-45 is able to take the new ERGM round, its longer barrel alsomeans that a standard projectile can reach over 4()kms compared to 24kms for the Mod 2 v(fitted lo the RAN's An/acs). (Raytheon)Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh as FirstSea Lord in September <strong>2002</strong>. and. onpromotion to Admiral. Sir JonathonBand to succeed Admiral West asCommander in Chief Fleet.Admiral West. at presentCommander in Chief Fleet, will takeover the post <strong>of</strong> First Sea Lord andChief <strong>of</strong> the Naval Staff on 17September 02 when Admiral Essenhighretires after 37 years service. ViceAdmiral Band, currently serving asDepu:y Commander in Chief Fleet,takes over as Commander in Chief Fleeton 2 August 02.Born in 1948. Admiral Sir Alan Westjoined the Royal <strong>Navy</strong> in 1965. He hasspent the majority <strong>of</strong> his career at sea,serving in fourteen different ships, andcommanding three <strong>of</strong> them. Hequalified as a Principal Warfare Officerin 1975. and Advanced Warfare Officer(Above Water Weapons) in 1978. andalso as a Fighter Controller. He is agraduate <strong>of</strong> the Royal Naval StaffCourse, the Higher Command & StaffCourse, and the Royal College <strong>of</strong>Defence Studies.In 1980. promoted to Commander,he took command <strong>of</strong> the frigate HMSARDENT, taking the ship south to theFalklands in 1982. where she was sunkduring the successful retaking <strong>of</strong> theIslands. He was subsequently awardedthe Distinguished Service Cross for hispart in the action and led the VictoryParade through the City <strong>of</strong> London.He has held several appointments inthe Ministry <strong>of</strong> Defence and played aprominent role in the reorganisation <strong>of</strong>ihe MOD. ihe introduction <strong>of</strong> a newbudgetary system within the Services.and headed the study into women'sintegration and their service at sea.Promoted to Rear Admiral in February1994. he was responsible for navalmanning, numbers and structures,as well as career management anddeployment. He moved the departmentfrom London to Portsmouth, set up anew organisation and prepared it foragency status.In February 1996 he becameCommander UK Task Group, and wasalmost permanently deployed in one <strong>of</strong>the aircraft carriers leading the twolargest and longest UK navaldeployments since the Falklands andGulf conflicts. <strong>The</strong> only Europeanseaborne principal subordinatecommander in NATO, he was alsoa UK-designated Joint ForceCommander. He was promoted to ViceAdmiral in October 1997 and appointedas Chief <strong>of</strong> Defence Intelligence.He was knighted in the MillenniumNew Year's Honours List and promotedto Admiral in November 2000, when hetook up his position as Commander-in-Chief Reel. Commander-in-Chief EastAtlantic, and Commander Allied NavalForces North.Canada acquiresPhalanx IB<strong>The</strong> massive US defence companyRaytheon is being awarded a US$29.8million contract to produce 21 PhalanxBlock IB upgrade kits for the RoyalCanadian <strong>Navy</strong>. This represents thesingle-largest contract to date for thesurface mode upgrade for the PhalanxClose-In Weapon System.20 VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. 3 THE NAVYTHE NAVYvol.. <strong>64</strong> NO. 321


A Mk-15 Block IB phalanx This newer versionhas a higher rale <strong>of</strong> fire, longer range, more onmount ammunition, is more accurate and can mmalso he remotel) controlled and fired from theoperations room via Us television camera againststationary or mov ing surface targetsAll 21 kits will be produced atRaytheon Missile System's Louisville.Kentucky, facility and installed at theRaytheon Canada Naval DefenceSystems Centre in Calgary. Alberta.Canada. Hie first kit will be delivered inSeptember 2(X)2 with the remaining kitsfollowing over a three-year period."This is a major undertaking forboth Raytheon and the Canadian <strong>Navy</strong>,said Dennis Carroll. Director <strong>of</strong> PhalanxSystems in Tucson. Ariz. "Not only doesthis initiative promote Phalanx in theinternational community, it also makesthe Canadian fleet one <strong>of</strong> the mostmodern in the world."Phalanx is a rapid-fire, computercontrolledradar and 20mm gun systemthat automatically acquires, tracks anddestroys enemy threats that havepenetrated all other ship defencesystems. More than 850 systems havemmbeen built and deployed in the Navies <strong>of</strong>21 nations. Most recently. PhalanxBlock IB was installed aboard USSHOWARD (DDG-83) and USSBULKELEY (DDG-84). the U.S.<strong>Navy</strong>'s newest Arleigh Burke-classRight IIA Aegis destroyers."<strong>The</strong> Block IB surface mode, ourmost advanced system, providesunequalled capabilities in near-shore,littoral environments", said Carroll. "Ilprovides protection to ships and theircrews against an increased number <strong>of</strong>threats including small, fast gunboats:standard and guided artillery:helicopters: mines and a variety <strong>of</strong>shore-launched, anti-ship missiles."China 'concerned' overASC sale<strong>The</strong> sale <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Australia</strong>ngovernment's 'nearly-idle' <strong>Australia</strong>nSubmarine Corporation (ASC) isreported to be encountering difficulties.It is believed that China has expressedstrong concerns during talks in Bejingbetween Prime Minister Howard andsenior Chinese leadership figures overany US companies buying an interest inthe Adeiaide-based submarine builder.<strong>The</strong> concern expressed involves thepotential ASC has to the US to buildsubmarines for Taiwan given the US'sinability to make diesel-electricsubmarines. President George Bushhas promised Taiwan diesel-electricsubmarines.ASC recently delivered its lastCollins-class submarines to the RAN.and it is anticipated that once theinstallation <strong>of</strong> a Replacement CombatSystem is completed around 2005 ASCwill be without any substantial workorders.Tlie MV-22 Osprey took to the skies <strong>of</strong> the US on May 29 for the first time after being grounded forover 17 months following the tragic Dec. II. 2(X)0 mishap. <strong>The</strong> first MV-22 test aircraft to resumeflying has improvements in its hydraulic an J flight control s<strong>of</strong>tware systems that make it practically abrand new aircraft and the safest Osprey yet. according to V-22 progam <strong>of</strong>ficial >.(US Naval Air Systems Command).r1With plans to privatise ASC thisyear. <strong>Australia</strong> has already signalled itspreference to secure General DynamicsElectric Boat Corporation (EBC) asASC's buyer, given the substantial USinvolvement in rectifying many <strong>of</strong> theCollins' problems.However. <strong>Australia</strong>'s 'One China"policy at this stage negates any sale <strong>of</strong>submarines to Taiwan but EBC'sacquisition <strong>of</strong> ASC could enable a vastamount <strong>of</strong> intellectual property onconventional submarine construction tobe transferred to EBC's US yard tocircumvent <strong>Australia</strong>n policy.Canada still lackingSSK capabilityIt has been reported that the RoyalCanadian <strong>Navy</strong> has discovered a dent inone <strong>of</strong> the four Upholder classsubmarines being acquired from theRN. and. to add insult to injury, iswaiting to see if it will have to replacethe diesel generator exhaust valves in allthe submarines.HMCS VICTORIA, formerly HMSUNSEEN, has a 900cm2 by 0.25cmdepression in its hull, below thewatcrline. <strong>The</strong> dent was found whenVICTORIA was in dry dock in Halifaxfor a hull inspection during anintermediate docking period. It isunderstood that the Canadian <strong>Navy</strong> willlaunch a formal investigation todetermine the cause, and when ithappened. If the dent occurred whileVICTORIA was in the UK Canadawill seek costs from the RN for therepair.VICTORIA had been in dry dock inBirkenhead UK for a shaft replacementand the dent had not been apparent then.<strong>The</strong> boat then underwent sea trialsbefore sailing to Halifax.While the dent affects the maximumdesign depth, there is still a large safetymargin to the diving depth.Nevertheless, the RCN has restricteddiving depth by 25%.<strong>The</strong> RCN is studying three optionsregarding the dent: wait until thesubmarine's extended docking period inlate 2003 to fix it; strengthen thearea: or cut out the patch and weldin a new section <strong>of</strong> steel.Meanwhile, a UK-Canadian team isexamining cracks found in the dicselgeneratorexhaust, hull and back-upvalve <strong>of</strong> HMCS CHICOUTIMI(formerly HMS UPHOLDER).HMCS VICTORIA is due to returnto sea in July/August, but if thevalves have to be replaced (hatwill slip by about three months. HMCSWINDSOR entered its Canadian workperiod at the beginning <strong>of</strong> Apriland. barring any added complications, isexpected to be ready for sea trials laterthis year. HMCS CORNERBROOK(formerly HMS URSULA) hascompleted reactivation in the UK and isready to start sea trials.10 New frigates forItalyItaly's senate and houseparliamentary defence committee hasapproved a Eur5.68 billion (US$5.2bn)frigate replacement programme. <strong>The</strong>programme envisages the Italian <strong>Navy</strong>commissioning 10 New GenerationFrigates (NGFs) between 2(X)8 and 2018.<strong>The</strong> NGFs will be built in twoconfigurations - four as anti-submarinewarfare (ASW) platforms and sixgeneral purpose/land attack vessels.<strong>The</strong> programme also calls forcommonality between the two types toreduce procurement and life-cyclesupport costs.<strong>The</strong> new ships will replace thecurrent inventory <strong>of</strong> two Lupo- andeight Macstrale-class frigates builtbetween 1977 and 1985. all <strong>of</strong> which aredueto retire in 12-15 years.Two Lupos have already beendecommissioned: the remaining pairwill follow by 2003. To bridge the gap.some <strong>of</strong> the Maestrales will undergo alimited overhaul between 2003 and2008 to extend their service life until theNGFs are commissioned.A preliminary feasibility study'Project 123". was completed by theNaval Staff's Studies and ProjectsDepartment earlier this year. <strong>The</strong> studycalled for a hull <strong>of</strong> no more than 5.000tons: 135m long, with a maximumcontinuous speed <strong>of</strong> 27kt and a cruisingA drawing <strong>of</strong> the Italian <strong>Navy</strong>'s planned NewGeneration Frigate.range <strong>of</strong> 6.000nm at I8kt. <strong>The</strong> designwill adopt an electric propulsionarchitecture and a high level <strong>of</strong>automation to cut operating costs andreduce manning requirements to around130. Survivability will be improved byreducing signatures, making use <strong>of</strong>internal compartmentalisation andselective armouring.Both versions will be fitted with theS A AM IT (surface-to-air antimissile/Italy)self-defence system(based around the EM PARmultifunction radar and verticallylaunched Aster 15 missiles) and a127mm lightweight gun w ith extendedrangeguided ammunition. Secondarysystems include two 76mm guns withcourse-corrected ammunition for shortrangeself-defence and a flight deckwith hangar for an NH90 helicopter. Ahull-mounted sonar and MU-90 ASWtorpedo launchers will also be acommon feature.<strong>The</strong> ASW variant is believed to havean active variable-depth sonar andtowed-array receiver, together witheight Milas ASW missile launchers,placed amidships.Federal Budget boostsRAN funds<strong>Australia</strong>'s defence efforts receivedanother boost in the recent FederalBudget. <strong>The</strong> Treasurer. Peter Costello.announced increases to meet the cost <strong>of</strong>current commitments to the war onterrorism and enhanced domesticsecurity arrangements in the aftermath<strong>of</strong> the September 11 terrorist attacks inthe United States, and for the RAN'scontinued commitment to maritimesurveillance and border protectionoperations.Overall funding risesOverall Defence Departmentfunding amounts to $19.3 billion for<strong>2002</strong>-03. This is up $711 millioncompared to the current financialyear. 2001-02. which was boosted by$1.1 billion in February after theGovernment was retur ted in theNovember general election. In additionto the costs <strong>of</strong> the current operations,the increases cover price rises and theimpact on the Defence Budget <strong>of</strong> thedepreciation <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Australia</strong>n douar.Border protection significantDefence Minister Robert Hill saidthe Budget allocation would continue<strong>Australia</strong>'s contribution to theinternational coalition against terrorism,including Operation Slipper deployments<strong>of</strong> Special Forces, an RAN Task Groupin the Persian Gulf, and RAAFrefuelling aircraft in Kyrgyzstan. Hesaid also the protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>'sborders was "one <strong>of</strong> the Defence Force'smost significant responsibilities."Defence and Customs have fundingin the Budget to trial the high frequencysurface wave radar that provides overthe-horizonborder surveillance.Capability delivery sustained<strong>The</strong> Deputy Chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>Navy</strong>. RADMBrian Adams said that <strong>Navy</strong> capabilitieswould account for $5.8 billion <strong>of</strong> thefunds provided by Government for ourdefence capabilities. and thatGovernment will expect those<strong>The</strong> phoenix has risen. <strong>The</strong>n (left) and now (right). <strong>The</strong> rebuilt USS COLE is back in service after being attacked by suicide bombers in the Yemeni Harbour<strong>of</strong> Aden. Unconfirmed reports have suggested that the damage to the ship was far more extensive then originally estimated but that the ship hadlo be repaired as a sign <strong>of</strong> US resolve towards termrism (this was well before Sept 11 2001). One US Admiral is on record as saying thai the blast whichnearly sank the Arleigh Burke class destroyer was equivalent to a 3.0001b bomb. (USN)22 VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. I THE NAVYTHE NAVY VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. I 33


capabilities to be delivered "in ways thatare financially prudent and sustainableinto Ihe future."Future <strong>Navy</strong> capabilities are alsoprovided for a key commitment in theDefence 2000 While Paper was theintroduction by about 2013 <strong>of</strong> at leastthree Air Warfare Destroyers - Phase Istudies lor this long-term project willexamine the ADF's future maritime airwarfare capability requirements.Capital equipment increasesExpenditure on new capitalequipment investment budget willincrease from $3.5 billion to $4.1billion, with a number <strong>of</strong> <strong>Navy</strong>-relatedmajor projects well advanced theAn/ac build program. Huon Classminehunler coastal acquisition,provisional acceptance <strong>of</strong> HMASKankin. the last <strong>of</strong> the CollinsClass new submarines, continuedredevelopment <strong>of</strong> HMAS ALBATROSSincluding a helicopter underwaterescape trainer and helicopter washfacility, and transition <strong>of</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> andAir Force radio network operationalcapability and staff to ihereplacement integrated high frequencycommunications system.Automated sites will eventuallyoperate in the Rivcrina. and at ShoalBay. TownsviHe and North West Cape.<strong>The</strong> project lor replacement <strong>of</strong> theFrcmantle Class Patrol Boats willcontinue, and tenders for newammunition storage facilities at Eden insouthern New South Wales are to becalled in mid-<strong>2002</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> thewharf began in March this year.Recruiting & retention improveA lew months ago. the <strong>Navy</strong>Capability Management Committee(NCMC) met in Canberra to reviewfunding priorities for the coming Budgetyear. All FEG (Force Element Group!Commanders attended, together withrepresentatives <strong>of</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> Headquarters.Maritime Command. SystemsCommand, and the DMO supportedby many til their respective BusinessManagers. Because recruiting andretention rates have now started toimprove. RAN numbers are expected toincrease in <strong>2002</strong>-03 by more than 2*2 toover 12.800 the highest level since1999-2000 and continue to increasesteadily towards the target strength <strong>of</strong>around 14.000. Funding will permitSystems Command to continue with theongoing review and civilianisation <strong>of</strong>non-MRU billets, a commitment madeb> the Chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> in September2000.From Nuw \rn \CDF pays tribute tounique unitCDF ADMI. Chris Barrie recentlyunveiled a plaque commemorating theEMU (Expcrimcrtal Military Unit)personnel <strong>of</strong> the RAN and the UnitedStates Army who served together in theVietnam War.Over a thousand people gathered aiBomaderry on the soulh coast onSaturday April 27 02 to participate inihe service.In the presence <strong>of</strong> US AmbassadorThomas Schieffer and many <strong>Australia</strong>nand American veterans and theirfamilies. ADMI. Barrie dedicated themonument to the men <strong>of</strong> the 135thAHC (Assault Helicopter Company)I'SS CARL VINSON <strong>The</strong> US company Northrop Gromman Corporation has heen awarded a USS42million planning contract from the USN to facilitate preparations for the overhaul and refuelling <strong>of</strong> thenuclear powered aircraft carrier USS CARL VINSON (CVN-701. scheduled lor 2004. This will he theship's first and only refuelling during a serv ice life expec ted to span approximately 50 years. (USN)<strong>of</strong> the US Army, which includedmany members <strong>of</strong> the RAN's FleetAir Arm.CDF said the 135th AHC was aunique combat unit. From October 1967to June 1971 a detachment <strong>of</strong> RANFleet Air Arm personnel was integratedwith the US Army unit. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>nsand Americans <strong>of</strong> the 135th operatedtroop carrying and ground attackhelicopters in the war againstinsurgency m the Republic <strong>of</strong> SouthVietnam. It was designated bv the USCommand as the Experimental MilitaryUnit, or EMU. and had as its motto Gelthe blixnly job done".<strong>The</strong> 135th AHC confirmed its mottowith an unsurpassed record, a highreputation, and hard work, which wasnot w ithout loss and sacrifice.History records eight RANpersonnel were killed in the war inVietnam: five were members <strong>of</strong> theEMU. Thirty-two American EMUswere also killed in combat.<strong>The</strong> nearly 50 strong group <strong>of</strong><strong>Australia</strong>ns were Fleet Air Ann andsupport personnel posted as the RANHelicopter Flight - Vietnam, adetachment <strong>of</strong> 723 Squadron, based atHMAS ALBATROSS, in Nowra. Fourflights spent a year's lour <strong>of</strong> duty Hyingand maintaining US Armv helicopterswith their American counterparts.RAN personnel were involved in allareas <strong>of</strong> 135th activities. A US army<strong>of</strong>ficer commanded the fully integratedinternational unit, totalling some 300personnel, with an <strong>Australia</strong>n <strong>Navy</strong>aviator as its XO and second incommand.<strong>Australia</strong>n pilots were in command<strong>of</strong> the helicopter platoons and <strong>Australia</strong>ntechnical personnel were in leadershippositions throughout the maintenanceareas. <strong>Australia</strong>ns were also in charge <strong>of</strong>the food preparation and the medicalsupport facilities.Part <strong>of</strong> the daily task <strong>of</strong> the multinationalunit was helicopter insertionand recovery ol troops, prov iding air toground attack, re-supply <strong>of</strong> ammunitionand equipment, and recoveringcasualties, throughout all weatherconditions, night and day. at times underdirect enemy fire.Former member CPOATWO JimHill said. "For me the EMU monumentis a unique reminder <strong>of</strong> the close<strong>Australia</strong>n links with United States."It is dedicated to those <strong>Australia</strong>nand United States service personnel <strong>of</strong>two different armed services <strong>of</strong> twoallied nations who were integrated into asingle military unit and fought a bloody,controversial and unconventional war.did it well and with honour."By LCDR Frank Eyck. NovyNews'A CERTAIN MARITIMEINCIDENT'ObservationsBy Ge<strong>of</strong>frey<strong>The</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> reference for the Senate Select Committeeinquiring into a 'Certain Marine Incident' - the so-called'children over board' affair involving HMAS ADELAIDE -are w ide and have allowed some interesting statements andallegations to be made by participants. <strong>The</strong> inquiry isincomplete as this item goes to the publisher.Former Chief <strong>of</strong> Naval Staff and Fleet Commander. ViceAdmiral Sir Richard Peek, enlivened proceedings at onestage-while vigorously supporting the Captain <strong>of</strong>ADELAIDE and his ship's company. <strong>The</strong> Admiral also madethe valid point that the services are not businesses - "theservices are no more businesses than is the parliament, thepolice force or the teachers. <strong>The</strong>y are services and servicescannot be organised in the same way as businesses. I think thatEvansaccepted that in recent years personal staff, who might beexpected to share the political aspirations <strong>of</strong> their minister,have become a not-to-be-disregarded factor in the discharge <strong>of</strong>ministerial responsibilities, once the prerogative <strong>of</strong> nonpoliticalpublic servants. <strong>The</strong> armed forces and civil servantsare unlikely to welcome any intrusion into their presentrelatively stable relationship.<strong>The</strong> relationship between the deface force and the civilauthority has been the subject <strong>of</strong> debate in <strong>Australia</strong> for overl(X) years, leading in the first place to the creation <strong>of</strong> a navalboard in 1905 to administer the force formed from colonialNavies following Federation. Debate on the subject hascontinued from time to time and it is curious to think anincident at sea in northern waters has caused the matter to beraised again.<strong>The</strong> Senate Committee's final report should makeinteresting reading.<strong>The</strong> images you were not meant to see. w hich were actually leaked to a television station. Had they not been leaked il is highly likely they would have neverheen seen. (RAN)is part <strong>of</strong> the problem in the current organisation <strong>of</strong> thedefence forces".Admiral Peek's statement will undoubtedly be widelysupported in the ADF but a further comment about the(present) 'stupid' chain <strong>of</strong> command may not be received soenthusiastically by Defence leaders. However it does appearthat the current division <strong>of</strong> responsibilities has causedconfusion - a "who is responsible to who for what" situation- in some parts <strong>of</strong> the defence force.Not the least interesting matter to be discussed at theinquiry concerned the role <strong>of</strong> ministerial staff 'advisers' whocome and go as portfolios change hands. It seems to beA LIMIT TO THE SIZE OF SHIPSIt has been interesting to read in various shipping publicationscomment on the seemingly ever increasing size <strong>of</strong> merchantships, in particular <strong>of</strong> passenger ships designed in the main forcruising.Tankers and bulk cargo carriers have been growing in sizefor many years, but they carry small crews and as they loadand unload at purpose-built ports and berths, are hardlynoticedby most people: Big passenger ships are a differentmatter altogether.To one w ho can recall the 'big' 28.000 - 30.000 tonne shipssuch as P&O's CANBERRA and HIMALAYA and the Orient24 VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. 3 THH NAVYTHF: NAVY VOL <strong>64</strong> NO. 3 25


E^2S3322EDLine s ORCADES (his favourite) and ORIANA. (he scale <strong>of</strong>almmt everything pertaining to ihe present generation <strong>of</strong>liners is quite staggering.P&O-Princess Line's GRAND PRINCESS, for example,has a dwt <strong>of</strong> 108.806 tonnes. or three and a half times thai <strong>of</strong>the group mentioned in the preceding paragraph, has 13passenger decks including internal promenades and a gardenon the upper deck (to remind travellers <strong>of</strong> home'.'), with allberths occupied 3.KM) passengers can be embarked plus acrew <strong>of</strong> I.KM) no doubt many <strong>of</strong> who would belong to thecatering staffMarine craft ha\e been growing in si/e throughout theages and from a shipbuilders point <strong>of</strong> view there would notseem to be a limit, limits however, there are. such as the depth<strong>of</strong> water in straits, channels, harbours etc.. able toaccommodate deep draught vessels, facilities in ports andberths able to handle the human and inanimate contents <strong>of</strong>ships and the cost <strong>of</strong> such ships in the first place: <strong>The</strong>economic factors.<strong>The</strong> International Maritime Organisation (IMO> isexamining other factors, not least the safety aspects<strong>of</strong> the super-liners. Fire continues to be a major hazardin ships; collisions and groundings take place despiteadvances in electronic warning devices andcommunications.Ever since the loss <strong>of</strong> the 47.(MM) tonne TITANIC and 1503lives in 1912. passenger safely at sea has been a vitalconsideration <strong>of</strong> marine architects and shipbuilders; one mightexpect the new floating cities to create a few more headachesfor both.Hatch, Match & DispatchHatchBALL A RAT LaunchesBALLARAT. the eighth ANZAC class Ship, has beenlaunched at Tenix Defence's Wilhamsiown dockyard inVictoria on Saturday. 25 May. 2(M)2<strong>The</strong> AN/.AC Ship Project is a collaborative projectbetween the <strong>Australia</strong>n and New Zealand Governments for thedevelopment and construction <strong>of</strong> 10 new guided missilefrigates eight lor the Koval <strong>Australia</strong>n <strong>Navy</strong> (RAN) and twolor ihe Royal New Zealand <strong>Navy</strong> (RNZN).St» far Tenix has delivered HMA Ships ANZAC. ARUNTAand WARRAMUNGA to the RAN and HMNZ ShinsTE KAHA and TE MANA to the RNZN. psfollow ing behind. Within minutes HSV-X I Joint Venture wasunderway again, departing the area at high speed andproceeding to sea to escort the MV Obrrgon into port.As night fell on thai hectic day. HSV-XI came into herow n. A night raid into enemy territory took enemy combatantsadvancing up Ihe Ijord toward friendly forces completely bysurprise.<strong>The</strong> following day M V Ohregon was again under HSV-X Iescort and an advance reconnaissance <strong>of</strong> the entire40 nautical miles route was completed in just one hour.Most apparent was HSV-XI's ability lo navigate at highspeed in the very tight confines <strong>of</strong> Norway's Ijords using theelectronic chart system F.CDIS and radar, particularly in poorvisibility due to snow and rain. Additionally, the craftdisplayed her capability <strong>of</strong> operating free from mechanicalproblems in sub-freezing temperatures with frequent snow.Captain Philip Beierl. Officer in Charge said "HSV-XI wasalso able to take advantage <strong>of</strong> narrow weather windows, as wedid by departing Trondheim eight hours early, to get ahead <strong>of</strong>a predicted weather front. A slower vessel would have had towail two days for a safe departure." In doing so. CaptainBeierl demonstrated his advanced understanding <strong>of</strong> strategiccapabilities only available to fast craft that easily out run badweather.Captain Beierl continued "<strong>The</strong> craft showed that we couldoperate safely at 15 knots in beam or following seas <strong>of</strong> 6metres significant wave height."If HSV-X I needed to prove she was a workhorse then shedid just that towards the end <strong>of</strong> the exercise, completing awinter intra-theatre lift <strong>of</strong> US Marine Corps (USMC)VOL M NO. JTHE NAVYTHE NAVY VOL <strong>64</strong> NO. 3 27


HSY XI heading lo sea from the US West Coast. It is understiNid thai theUSN is keen to fit a Mk-31 RAM launcher to the ship to test its ability loprovide its own sell defence from anli-ship missiles and aircraft. (USNIretrograde cargo for Larvik. Captain Beierl said "26 LAVs. sixHumvees and UK) troops, plus long range fuel brought thecraft to absolutely full load. Calm weather allowed us to travelan outside passage down the coast, rather than the inside route,saving us several hours. Over 650 nautical miles <strong>of</strong> Norway'scoastal and inland waters was covered in 24 hours at anaverage speed <strong>of</strong> 27 knots. On arrival we <strong>of</strong>floaded USMCcargo in just 22 minutes." Despite very heavy seas in the llnal<strong>of</strong>fshore leg <strong>of</strong> the circuit the round trip was completed in lessthan 2.5 days.One <strong>of</strong> the highlights <strong>of</strong> the week was when HSV-XIplayed host to His Majesty King Harald V. <strong>of</strong> Norway, theNorwegian Minister <strong>of</strong> Defence, the Chief <strong>of</strong> Defence and theUS Ambassador to Norway. <strong>The</strong> party got to see at first handthe impressive capabilities <strong>of</strong> the craft durir : a 40 knotpassage from Orkanger to Hommclvik. Norway. Ademonstration illustrated rapid arrival and departures fromaustere ports with the craft accelerating to high speed, turningaround three miles out and returning to pier-side in under15 minutes.Battle Griffin provided the Marine Corps with anopportunity lo explore the employment <strong>of</strong> the HSV-XI in aninter-theatre deployment role and utility <strong>of</strong> the High SpeedCraft (HSC) technology during expeditionary manoeuvrewarfare. <strong>The</strong> exercise prov ided valuable insight and feedbackon the capabilities and any additional requirements forpotential procurement and development <strong>of</strong> the vessel in thefuture.Just sonic <strong>of</strong> the many accomplishments achieved by HSV-XI J()l\l \l \/ / RE were;• flexibility to respond on very short notice to newrequirements w ith little or no outside supportHSV-XI unloading a USMC AAV 7 Amphihnws Armoured PersonnelCarrier (USMC)HSV-XI has now proven itself in a NATO exercise <strong>of</strong>l ihe freezing coast <strong>of</strong>Norway Here the ship approaches a wharf during a snowstorm. (USN)• sustained speeds <strong>of</strong> 40 knots in confined waters leading totactical surprise by opposing forces not expecting suchrapid movements• ability to launch an amphibious raid into an austere portwith complete <strong>of</strong>fload <strong>of</strong> vehicles and troops in tenminutes• ability to carry and precisely lay large numbers <strong>of</strong> mines• ability to easily manoeuvre in formation w ith conventionalwarshipsWith Battle Griffin complete HSV-XI JOINT VENTUREturned her bows towards the English Channel and sailed forRota. Spain where administrative control <strong>of</strong> the craft wastransferred to the US Army for the next stage <strong>of</strong> her evaluationby the US military.Transiting the English Channel the craft maintained fullspeed until entering the Bay <strong>of</strong> Biscay and turning south. Afterseveral hours at slow speed in 4.5 metre head seas CaptainBeierl made a 300 nautical miles diversion into the bay to stayin conditions that permitted high speed running. CaptainBeierl said "we skirted around Spain's Cape Finisterre a fewhours ahead <strong>of</strong> a storm. <strong>The</strong>re is no question, a slower shipwould have been forced to divert into a French or UK port forat least three days before the weather cleared. We had theability to divert hundreds <strong>of</strong> miles and still make schedule."During the passage HSV-XI also lost one main engine dueto a cylinder head problem. Despite this and the diversion, thecraft arrived in Rota on three engines ten hours ahead <strong>of</strong> heroriginal schedule.<strong>The</strong> craft has since joined US forces in the war tinterrorism in the Per.ian Gulf."i, naiM AHF* MHSV-XI at dock in the US. Some commentator, consider il a nationalembarrassment that Ihe US Military is conducting further research,development and experimentation on an idea first tested by the RAN duringthe Timor crisis and with a product made in <strong>Australia</strong>. Who said our bestideas always have lo go <strong>of</strong>t shore lo gel a proper hearing(USN)<strong>The</strong> BattleshipsDocumentaryA Rob McAuley ProductionProducer/Director Rob McAuleySeries Director/w riter/editor Peter RunNarrator Robyn Williams209 minutesPRODUCT REVIEWAvailable on DVD & as a Double-Box Set Video forapproximately S59.95rp each from all ABC Shops. ABCCentres. Online and leading video retailers.Preview copy supplied by Roadshow Entertainment/<strong>The</strong> ABCReviewed by Mark SchweikertBefore the nuclear bomb "No weapon evoked so muchpassion and fear as the battleship. <strong>The</strong> largest and mostexpensive weapon ever built it had a dramatic role inshaping the modern world". This is the opening statementin the new and brilliant television documentary <strong>The</strong>Battleships and sums up the central focus <strong>of</strong> the series.<strong>The</strong> story <strong>of</strong> the battleships is told in four epic one-hourepisodes - A Thirst for Blood IR00-I906: Clash <strong>of</strong> theDreadnoughts 1906-1916: <strong>The</strong> Darkness <strong>of</strong> the Future1916-1939. and. Terror from Above 1939 Now.<strong>The</strong> Battleships is a Rob McAuley production. Many willremember that other superb documentary scries producedby Rob. <strong>The</strong> Liners, which details the history <strong>of</strong> anothergreat world shaping man-made creation, the ocean liner.Those who have seen <strong>The</strong> Liners will remember theimpressive level <strong>of</strong> research and fascinating footage containedin the documentary which 'lifted the bar' for naval andmaritime documentaries to be judged by. <strong>The</strong> Battleshipscertainly lives up to the standard that Rob set. His newdocumentary is a concise yet broad history <strong>of</strong> the capital ship,the Navies that operated them and the battleship's empirebuilding contribution to the history <strong>of</strong> the world.<strong>The</strong> German High Seas Heel captured on film from an aircraft for the firsttime during Ihe Battle <strong>of</strong> Jutland.<strong>The</strong> Battleships is enriched with eyewitness accounts andcontributions from naval experts around the globe, the seriesspans almost two centuries - from the Battle <strong>of</strong> Trafalgarthrough to the Gulf War examining the rapid evolution <strong>of</strong>firepower and battleship design - from canvas to steam:timber to steel armour: muzzle-loading cannons to 18-inchguns, and beyond to rocket-launchers and missiles. As thespearhead for colonial expansion and in defence <strong>of</strong> the greatempires, the battleship reigned supreme. As one observer putit in an interview on the documentary, "the battleship drew theline between nation and empire".Some <strong>of</strong> the revelations and insights about the capabilities<strong>of</strong> the ships featured are amazing and for many will come as afirst, making the documentary a very interesting and satisfyingjourney <strong>of</strong> discovery.One such revelation involves the British capital shipVICTORY. This wcxxlen battleship had 27 miles <strong>of</strong> rigging,four acres <strong>of</strong> canvass, took 6 years to build and was made from2000 oak trees. One broadside from her three gun decks wasable to hurl half a tonne <strong>of</strong> metal at an enemy ship. Apart fromdescribing ships the documentary it also takes one on a virtualtour <strong>of</strong> some <strong>of</strong> these ships as they are today as museum pieces.Another little known insight involved the potential 1928Anglo-US war. With Britain and the US competing vigorouslyfor dominance <strong>of</strong> the sea via a naval arms race a release valvewas needed. This came in the form <strong>of</strong> the Washington NavalTreaty which limited the number and size <strong>of</strong> the world'scapital ships. Without it some believe that the US and Britainwould have gone to war for a second time.Another little known fact discussed was Hitler's plans fora 144.000 tonne battleship w ith a speed <strong>of</strong> 34kts and eight 20-inch guns. This behemoth would have been impervious toeverything but another battleship equal too or greater in sizeand fire power than her.<strong>The</strong> world renowned experts interviewed for the series arew ithout doubt the 'who's who' <strong>of</strong> the naval academic worldand include such eminent historians as: Norman Friedman.Eric Grove. Jon Sumida. Gary Weir. David Lyon. AndrewLambert. Richard Hill. Paul Stilwell. Mark Peattie. KiyoshiIkeda and many more. Museum ships such as VICTORY.MARY ROSE. M1KASA. NORTH CAROLINA. TEXAS arctoured for the v iewer and some <strong>of</strong> the ship's curators are alsointerviewed about the ships in their charge. EyewitnessesVOL <strong>64</strong> NO. YTHK NAVYVOL <strong>64</strong> NO Y


interviewed span time and distance from the sinking <strong>of</strong> theGerman Fleet at Scarpa Flow to the attack on Pearl Harbor.This documentary abounds with fascinating footage suchas the USS MAINE disaster in Cuba <strong>of</strong> 1893 - which spurredthe 1898 naval war between the US and Spain, the launch <strong>of</strong>HMS DREADNOUGHT by King Edward in Feb 1906 with abottle <strong>of</strong> <strong>Australia</strong> w ine, the battle <strong>of</strong> Jutland with the world'sfirst combat aerial photography <strong>of</strong> the German High SeasFleet turning for a second time to engage the UK Grand Fleet,the wrecked German Fleet at Scarpa Flow. HMASAUSTRALIA being sunk <strong>of</strong>f Sydney Heads and many moreastounding images and footage.Although a potential anti-climax' for battleship historyenthusiasts, the documentary does deal with the ascension <strong>of</strong>the aircraft carrier over the battleship and rightly so as this ispart <strong>of</strong> the battleship story. <strong>The</strong> aircraft carrier is also withoutdoubt the capital ship <strong>of</strong> today and with the documentary'sfocus being capital ships as opposed to straight out battleshipsthis end to the series is appropriate.Unlike other documentaries on the subject. <strong>The</strong> Battleshipsis not a Jutland. Iowa. UK or US centric view <strong>of</strong> the capitalship, nor does it try to emotionalise and sensationalise thesubject as other lesser documentaries have tried to in order toaccount for an acute lack <strong>of</strong> substance both in historicalinformation and footage.<strong>The</strong> Battleships is truly the thinking mans navaldocumentary and cannot be recommended highly enough.Pearl HarborTwo DVD Movie setA Jerry Bruckheimer/Michael Bay productionTouchstone Home VideoDistributed by Buena Vista <strong>Australia</strong>I S3 minutes main feature47 minute Making <strong>of</strong>' documentaryReview ed by Mark Schweikert7\ "FT .'.IMTNOED »OH MATURE[Ml AUDIENCES 'S TEARS AND OVER<strong>The</strong> long awaited special edition DVD movie Pearl Harboris now available and thanks to Buena Vista <strong>Australia</strong>THE NAVY has obtained a copy for review. <strong>The</strong> special\ NO. 3 THE NAVYfeatures included on this two DVD set comprise the originaltheatrical trailer; the Faith Hill Music Video '<strong>The</strong>re you'll be":a short documentary on the Japanese Perspective <strong>of</strong> the movieand a documentary on the 'Making <strong>of</strong> the Movie PearlHarbor, and <strong>of</strong> course the movie itself which was reviewed inTHE NAVY. <strong>Vol</strong> 63 No 3 p30.To those who enjoyed the movie the special edition DVDset is well recommended. <strong>The</strong> 'Making <strong>of</strong> documentary givesa whole new insight and understanding <strong>of</strong> the film and wouldhave served critics well had they seen it.Pearl Harbor is a balanced account <strong>of</strong> December 7. 1941and was never intended to demonise either side's participationon that infamous day. Leading man Ben Affleck says, duringthe 'Making <strong>of</strong> documentary that "1 wouldn't have done it(Pearl Harbor) if I thought it was a piece <strong>of</strong> propaganda".World renowned Japanese actor Mako. who plays AdmiralYamamoto. said that the Japanese are not portrayed as evil ordark and that the absence <strong>of</strong> sensationism lo promote anemotional response against the Japanese is a selling point <strong>of</strong>the movie to a world-wide audience, to which the makerswished to reach.Pearl Harbor doesn't glorify War or the opening stages <strong>of</strong>WW II but the use <strong>of</strong> special effects and the effort gone intodemonstrating the intense ferocity <strong>of</strong> the day can make somebelieve, incorrectly, that is anything but an open and honestattempt to describe this tragic eveni. Other criticisms involvethe two characters experiences as being unrealistic and to thispoint many are right. However, as the director explains, thestory <strong>of</strong> Pearl Harbor was so incredibly large thai no singleexperience could do justice or adequately explain whatoccurred. Thus, in order to tell the story the two centralcharacters are put through a collection <strong>of</strong> actual experiences,w hat happened to them happened to someone is the director'sphilosophy behind the characters. For example, during theattack on Pearl Harbor two pilots did manage to get airborneand shoot down six Japanese planes.<strong>The</strong> massive gimble made from 350.0001bs <strong>of</strong> steel for the movie to depictthe capsizing <strong>of</strong> the battleship USS OKLAHOMA. Superstructure andbackground was then added by computer later.To get an idea <strong>of</strong> the real story <strong>of</strong> December 7 1941 over70 Pearl Harbor Veterans were interviewed for theirperspective. Many also visited the set to act as advisers to the'work in progress". 'Doolittlc Raid' survivors were alsointerviewed and visited the set during shooting. <strong>The</strong>information and experiences passed on by these veterans'gives the movie a better grounding in realism than manywould think or know.From the documentary on the making <strong>of</strong> PearI Harbor, eight drums <strong>of</strong>petrol linked by 'del cord' on the bow <strong>of</strong> a decommissioned Spruance classdestroyer. No miniature models were used in the making <strong>of</strong> the film inorder to promote more realism.<strong>The</strong> film was shot on location in Pearl Harbor with thebattle scenes over the harbor taking six weeks to complete.<strong>The</strong> US Department <strong>of</strong> Defense gave the movie unprecedentedaccess and permission to use the military facilities andpersonnel not only at Pearl Harbor but at other US Militaryestablishments and ships, such was their confidence in thedirector's work. Aircraft used in the film are actual WW IIaircraft with extra aircraft computer added to give a betterperspective on the numbers involved. <strong>The</strong> film used acollection <strong>of</strong> flying 'warbirds' which included four P-40Warhawks. three Zeros, three Kates, three Vals and three B-25Mitchell bombers. <strong>The</strong> special effects team also receivedpermission to place explosive charges on a number <strong>of</strong>decommissioned ships in Pearl Harbor to create theimpression <strong>of</strong> an actual attack. This was coupled with actualJapanese aircraft flying over, in and around Pearl Harbor andthe ships. <strong>The</strong> special effects team used 7.(XX) sticks <strong>of</strong>dynamite. 2.000ft <strong>of</strong> del cord' and 4.000 gallons <strong>of</strong> petrol tocreate massive explosions on the many decommissioned USNships. It would have been rather perplexing for touristsvisiting the USS ARIZONA memorial to see propellerdriven aircraft with Japanese markings flying around theharbour at low level with large explosions and pillars <strong>of</strong> blacksmoke rising from a collection <strong>of</strong> ships just a few kilometresaway.Another fascinating element to the making <strong>of</strong> the movieinvolved flying condition B-25 Mitcheiis being hoisted aboardthe aircraft carrier USS CONSTELLATION for the at sea'Doolittle Raid' scenes. <strong>The</strong> B-25s had to compete for deckspace w ith S-3 Viking and F/A-18 Hornets landing and taking<strong>of</strong>f for their own take <strong>of</strong>f scenes from the carrier. <strong>The</strong> last timea B-25 took <strong>of</strong>f from a US carrier was during the 50thanniversary <strong>of</strong> the Doolittlc Raid.Other bits <strong>of</strong> trivial from the making <strong>of</strong> documentaryinvolve some <strong>of</strong> the lead actors actually attending US Armyboot camp to get a better perspective on military life and whatit means to be a service member.Nearly all extras were US military personnel with over8.000 WWII uniforms and other period clothing having tobe made for the film to generate a feeling <strong>of</strong> realism, forwhich the director and producer are well known for inHollywood.<strong>The</strong> two DVD set <strong>of</strong> Pearl Harbor is well recommended.


S I \ I I Ml \ I ol I'OI.IO<strong>The</strong> strategic background to <strong>Australia</strong>'s security haschanged in recent decades and in some respects becomemore uncertain. <strong>The</strong> <strong>League</strong> believes it is essential thai<strong>Australia</strong> develops capability to defend itself, payingparticular attention to maritime defence. <strong>Australia</strong> is. <strong>of</strong>geographical necessity, a maritime nation whose prosperitystrength and safety depend to a great extent on the security<strong>of</strong> the surrounding ocean and island areas, and on seabornetrade.<strong>The</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> league:• Believes <strong>Australia</strong> can be defended against attackby other than a super or major maritime power andthat the prime requirement <strong>of</strong> our defence is anevident ability to control the sea and air spacearound us and to contribute to defending essentiallines <strong>of</strong> sea and air communication to our allies.• Supports the ANZUS Treaty and the futurereintegration <strong>of</strong> New Zealand as a full partner.• Urges a close relationship with the nearer ASEANcountries. PNG and the Island States <strong>of</strong> the SouthPacific.• Advocates a defence capability which isknowledge-based with a prime consideration givento intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.• Advocates the acquisition <strong>of</strong> the most modemarmaments and sensors to ensure that the ADFmaintains some technological advantages overforces in our general area.• Believes there must be a significant deterrentelement in the <strong>Australia</strong>n Defence Force (ADF)capable <strong>of</strong> powerful retaliation at considerabledistances from <strong>Australia</strong>.• Believes the ADF must have the capability toprotect essential shipping at considerable distancesfrom <strong>Australia</strong>, as well as in coastal waters.• Supports the concept <strong>of</strong> a strong modern Air Forceand highly mobile Army, capable <strong>of</strong> island andjungle warfare as well as the defence <strong>of</strong> Northern<strong>Australia</strong>.• Supports the development <strong>of</strong> amphibious forces toensure the security <strong>of</strong> our <strong>of</strong>fshore territories and toenable assistance to be provided by sea as well as byair lo friendly island states in our area.• Endorses the transfer <strong>of</strong> responsibility for the coordination<strong>of</strong> Coastal Surveillance to the defenceforce and the development <strong>of</strong> the capability forpatrol and surveillance <strong>of</strong> the ocean areas all aroundthe <strong>Australia</strong>n coast and island territories, includingthe Southern Ocean.• Advocates measures to foster a build-up <strong>of</strong><strong>Australia</strong>n-owned shipping to ensure the carriage <strong>of</strong>essential cargoes in war.• Advocates the development <strong>of</strong> a dcfence industrysupported by strong research and designorganisations capable <strong>of</strong> constructing all neededtypes <strong>of</strong> warships and support vessels and <strong>of</strong>providing systems and sensor integration withthrough-life support.As to the RAN. the <strong>League</strong>:• Supports the concept <strong>of</strong> a <strong>Navy</strong> capable <strong>of</strong> effectiveaction <strong>of</strong>f both East and West coasts simultaneouslyand advocates a gradual build up <strong>of</strong> the Fleet toensure that, in conjunction with the RAAF. this canbe achieved against any force which could bedeployed in our general area• Is concerned that the <strong>of</strong>fensive and defensivecapability <strong>of</strong> the RAN has decreased markedly inrecent decades and that with the paying-<strong>of</strong>f <strong>of</strong> theDDGs. the Fleet will lack air defence and have areduced capability for support <strong>of</strong> ground forces.• Advocates the very early acquisition <strong>of</strong> the newdestroyers as foreshadowed in the Defence WhilePaper 2.• Advocates the acquisition <strong>of</strong> long-range precisionweapons to increase the present limited powerprojection, support and deterrent capability <strong>of</strong> theRAN.• Advocates the acquisition <strong>of</strong> the GLOBAL HAWKunmanned surveillance aircraft primarily for<strong>of</strong>fshore surveillance.• Advocates the acquisition <strong>of</strong> sufficient <strong>Australia</strong>nbuiltafloat support ships to support two naval taskforces with such ships having design flexibility andcommonality <strong>of</strong> build.• Advocates the acquisition at an early date <strong>of</strong>integrated air power in the fleet to ensure that ADFdeployments can be fully defended and supportedfrom the sea.• Advocates that all <strong>Australia</strong>n warships should beequipped with some form <strong>of</strong> defence againstmissiles.• Advocates that in any future submarineconstruction program all forms <strong>of</strong> propulsion beexamined with a view lo selecting the mostadvantageous operationally.• Advocates the acquisition <strong>of</strong> an additional 2 or 3updated Collins class submarines.• Supports the maintenance and continuingdevelopment <strong>of</strong> the minc-countcrmeasures forceand a modern hydrographic/oceanographiccapability.• Supports the maintenance <strong>of</strong> an enlarged, flexiblepatrol boat fleet capable <strong>of</strong> operating in severe seastates.• Advocates the retention in a Reserve Fleet <strong>of</strong> Navalvessels <strong>of</strong> potential value in defence emergency.• Supports the maintenance <strong>of</strong> a strong NavalReserve to help crew vessels and aircraft in reserve,or taken up for service, and for specialised tasks intime <strong>of</strong> defence emergency.• Supports the maintenance <strong>of</strong> a strong <strong>Australia</strong>n<strong>Navy</strong> Cadets organisation.<strong>The</strong> <strong>League</strong>:Calls for a bipartisan political approach to nationaldefence with a commitment to a steady long-term build-upin our national defence capability including the requiredindustrial infrastructure.While recognising current economic problems andbudgetary constraints, believes that, given leadership bysuccessive governments. <strong>Australia</strong> can defend itself in thelonger term within acceptable financial, economic andmanpower parameters.VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO 3THKNAVY


Two RAF C 11-47 ( hinooks about tu landback aboard HMS OCEAN after a SpecialForm insertion mission inlo Afghanistan. <strong>The</strong>Chinook's lone range. speed. reliahilit) andflesihilit.t. run in a marilimr environment. ismaking il Ihe workhorse <strong>of</strong> the war againstterrorism both in Ihr high rugged mountains <strong>of</strong>\fghanistan and Ihe hot tropical jungles <strong>of</strong> IhePhilippines. Dust and mud can he seen on Ihe luohelicopters as the* make their approach. I UN Ii\t sea aboard MM \S K VSIMBI \il P\-M>Jan. 15. ItXIl. K \N crew member. prep.ir>to launch a Rigid Hull Inflatable KoatiKHIB) <strong>of</strong> the IS Sass's Special Boat I'nil20 iSBl -20). Detachment 'Smember'Both countries arv conducting multinational Maritime Interdiction Operations(MIO) against Iraq during OperationKnduring Freedom. Two USN SF.AI. SpecialForces RIBs (Ripd Inflatable Boats) alsooperated from HMAS KANIMBLA.k k C *


<strong>The</strong> anti-terror Dnt Naval skips from ll»c nation saU in formation for a rare photographic opportunity ia theVrahian Sea. Krom lop row left lo right: Italian frigate. ITS MAESTRALE . (reach dotroyer FS DeMASSE Iivtlil. I'SS JOHN C. STENNIS (CVN-74). USS PORT ROYAL (CG «), French aircraft carrier. FSCHARLES DE GAULLE (R »1>. British Rosai Nary amphibious aarfare ship HSM OCEAN (L-I2I, FrenchFrigate FS SIRCOIF (F-711 J.L'SS JOHN F. KENNEDY lCV-*7>. Dutch frigate. HNI-SSI VAN AM8TEL |F-Wll.and the Italian destroyer ITS LL'IGI IX'RAND DE LA PENNE ID-SM). <strong>The</strong> coalition forces are deployed Insupport <strong>of</strong> Operation Enduring Freedom. ll'SN)


OCTOBER - DECEMBER <strong>2002</strong> VOLUME <strong>64</strong> NO. 4 $5.45 (including GST)www netsoace r>et au -navylea*<strong>The</strong>Creswell<strong>Australia</strong>'sMaritimeDoctrine-Part 6 !ISSNL3ee<strong>Australia</strong>'s Leading Naval Magazine Since 1938


I ll* latmanian built 'Joint Venture', current!* being leaved lo lh( I SY il tea and atspeed with a >n DSN Mlf-*OS about In land on It* flight deck. I hr I SS hat indicatedil It otremeK imprrvved with Ihr lavmanian ( at' and mav br close lo placing anordrr for up lo 100 vrMtlv (I'SN)HMC S SIMMKRSIDI pavvev a large iceberg while taking part in F.itrcbe NarwhalRanger. Kicrcivc Narwhal Ranger wai a Canadian joint operation with the army andair force and l« the flrtl <strong>of</strong> a verlrv <strong>of</strong> operation* ID reintroduce Ihr RCN lo the lr)North and get Ihr three branches <strong>of</strong> Ihe armrd force* working together. (RCN)


THE NAVYContents<strong>Vol</strong>ume <strong>64</strong> No. 4THE BATTLE O F SALAM1S - 480 B.C.By Paul Morrison. Warships & MarineCorps Museum Int Page 3REGIONAL ANTI-SHIP MISSILES ANDTHE LITTORAL PROBLEMBy Dr Roger Thornhill Page 7AUSTRALIA'S MARITIME DOCTRINEP A R T * Page 14THE C R E S W E L L ORATIONRADM Peter Bnggs AO. CSC. RAN (Rid) Page 29Regular FeaturesFrom the Crow's Nest Page 2From Our Readers Page 2Flash Traffic Page 18Observations Page 27Hatch. Match & Dispatch Page 33Product Review Page 34l.eague Policy Statement Page 36Thr opinions or assertions rxprrssrd in THE SAW arr lluisr <strong>of</strong>the authors and not nrrrvsaril) those <strong>of</strong> thr Federal Council oT I heNat) I .rax IK- «f <strong>Australia</strong>. Ihr I uT THE SAW. Ihr KANor Ihr DrparUnrnl <strong>of</strong> Drfrncr. I hr Kditor wdcoMM* rorrrspondrnrr.photographs and contributions and will assume that h> makingsubmissions, contributors agree lhal all malrrial ma> br usrdfrrr <strong>of</strong> charttr. rditrd and amrndrd al Ihr Kditor\ discretion.No part r this publication ma> br rrpnidurrd without theprrmKsion <strong>of</strong> Ihr Kditor.Kmnl coxrr: While flxini: over the USS WASP (l-andm; HelicopterDeck 11, two CH-53F Super Stallions prepare to lake luel from a KC-130Hercules <strong>The</strong> helici>plers are part <strong>of</strong> Marine Medium HelicopterSquadron 2b I (Rcinlorcedi the Aviation Combat Klement tor the 22ndMarine Fxpcdmonarx Unit (Special Operations Capable!, while theKC-13D is from Marine Aenal Ketueler Transport Sqaudron 252.Photo hx: Senior Airman {"heresa D Clark USAF<strong>The</strong> <strong>Navy</strong>All letters and contributions to:<strong>The</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>The</strong> KditorTHE NAVYNavv league <strong>of</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>GPO Box 1719Sydney. NSW 2001E-mail to: edit<strong>of</strong>thcnavy@hotmail.comAll Subscription and Membership enquiries to:<strong>The</strong> Hon Secretary.Navv <strong>League</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>. NSW DivisionGPO Box 1719.Sydney. NSW. 2001Advertising enquiries only lo:Mr James Rickards0419 731 371. rickardsmediaG?yahoo.com.auDeadline for next edition 5 November. <strong>2002</strong>I III \ ; i w I I'ilgllt' ol \us)r;ili;iKKDKRAI. COCMH.Patnm in Cfekt: lbs hxodlencv <strong>The</strong> (aitatw GeneralPreadml: (.rahain M Hans. RFDMa-PnridenteRADMAJ R.*erwm. AO. 1** . RAN (Rid) M n BirdCTIRK HJ P Adams. AM. RAN I Ridl ( ART H A kxphs. AM. RAN I Rid)Huei. Sccretarx: Rax (urtwx. Pt) Box Mt Wineries. Vic 3144TdepKmc: XI>JIN AlVTRAIJAN DIN LSIONPatnm: His pjicdkucv <strong>The</strong> (ioxemic <strong>of</strong> Western <strong>Australia</strong>.I "resident: AH Hewitt. OAM. JPHun.Sccntan: MTS(I IWitu 23 L^iwlcr RIXKL Atudtik-. WA 61.56.Tdephme: (08)9330.36(1)Stair Branches:( *n*fcm: Mrs (' kmev 24 ( imnin)4iam StreeL (icraldkm. W A 6530.TxHcphmc ((KI992I 5772Ahm: I) Bras. Lot 46 Frederick StreeL (ilcxlmw. via Ahny. WA6330Tdcphme: (t»t)9X4l 6542.ADVISORY COl'NtH.F Geuflrrx Kxans. OBE. VRD. ChatmianNol Kami Chaimcm Band PuNk.-jumsWm.BoWm.AM.Adrniral Michad W Hudni. AC. RAN (RidiVice Admiral Duxid Leach. AC CBF. I.VO, RAN iRldl1 .ichLm Pax-ne. CH) <strong>Australia</strong>n ShipiscTiers ASMvutKmVic* Admiral Sir Richad ttxk. KBF. CB. DSC. RAN (Rtdilohn Strati):. Chairman Stran)! IntematHmal Pty I JdCorporateMembers<strong>The</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>n Shipowners' AssociationHawker De HavilandLimitedComputer ScietK-e <strong>of</strong> <strong>Australia</strong> PtyStrang International Pty LtdLtdTHF. NAVY VOL <strong>64</strong> NO 4


FROM llll( ROW'S M SIWhere is <strong>Australia</strong> heading?In mid-year a number <strong>of</strong> changes in senior ADFappointments took place at a time when for several reasonsdefencc issues were receiving much closcr-than-usual publicattention.<strong>The</strong> principal changes were those <strong>of</strong> Chief <strong>of</strong> ihe Defence Force(CDF). Chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> (CN) and Chief <strong>of</strong> Army (CA»: the Chief <strong>of</strong>Air Force (CAF) remained in place. <strong>The</strong> deputies <strong>of</strong> CDF. CN andCA also changed.It might be though txld to change three <strong>of</strong> the four senior ADF<strong>of</strong>ficers at the same time, but leaving this aside the incoming Chiefstook up their appointments in different circumstances to those theirpredecessors had inherited.First and foremost was ihe September 2001 terrorist attack onNew York's World Trade Centre and its consequences which,together wilh ihe government's "border protection" policy, placedconsiderable pressure on an ADF already under strain as a result <strong>of</strong>the East Timor and other peace-keeping/making commitments. <strong>The</strong>outcome <strong>of</strong> the American Presidential election and the <strong>Australia</strong>nFederal election also played a part in focussing public attention onother than local events.Il is almost beyond belief that countries including <strong>Australia</strong>, stillpaying for the human and material costs <strong>of</strong> 2(Hh Century wars, shouldagain be considering war as a solution lo problems, if ever there wasa time for far-sighted and cool headed national leadership, this wouldseem to be thai time.<strong>Australia</strong>'s political leaders will no doubt consult the armedforces chiefs when determining the path the country is to follow inthe immediate and near future: it so happens the present Chiefs arewell qualified to provide advice, perhaps unusually so. and it mightbe accepted their counsel will be heeded.By Ge<strong>of</strong>f EvansI ROM Ol R Rl \l>l RSDear Editor.I greatly enjoyed the article in the last issue on (he DELHI class.Il does seem the Indians consider that naval ships should actually hearmed with <strong>of</strong>fensive weapons, particularly when one compares thiswith the lightly armed or un-armcd ships <strong>of</strong> the over-stretched RAN.<strong>The</strong> articles on <strong>Australia</strong>'s Maritime Doctrine would be <strong>of</strong> morevalue if <strong>Australia</strong> actually had the equipment to do all ihe things ourdoctrine espouses. That is not to criticize the efforts <strong>of</strong> the people <strong>of</strong>the RAN who have long experience <strong>of</strong> politicians wanting more'bang' than they pay for.Graeme Andrews OAM.Past editor <strong>of</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>n Sea Heritage Magazine.RAN/RANFR 1955-198(1Dear Editor.I am part <strong>of</strong> ihe organising crew for an upcoming Reunion for allex crew members <strong>of</strong> HMAS SUPPLY. This Reunion is to he held onthe Long weekend <strong>of</strong> June 2003. <strong>The</strong> location is to he Ihe Rooty HillR.S.L. in Sydney's western suburbs.Any ex crew interested in attending are asked to contacteither myself. Ken Witchard on (02) <strong>64</strong>92 3060. or RW BubblesCurrin' on (02)6843 1850. or visit the web page athttp://www.users.bigpond.com/WitchWeh/index.htm.So far we have located about 30 ex crew members and thisReunion is open to all ex crew Officers and Sailors alike from thevery first crew in 1962 lo the last in ihe KO's.Ken Ex: ABQMG R109525HMAS SUPPLY 73-74E-mail: WitchWeb@bigpond.comDear Editor.I do not share the enthusiasm <strong>of</strong> your reviewer for the ABC TVseries 'THE BATTLESHIPS". 1 confess though to missing one ortwo broadcasts. To me it has the now usual ABC bias against thingsBritish, in this ease the British Battleship. Was there mention <strong>of</strong> HMSWARRIOR, the first iron battleship? No matter how well builtGerman battleships were, they were not succcssful in the longer term.Much was made <strong>of</strong> US Battleships in European waters in WWI e.g.USS TEXAS. <strong>The</strong>ir contribution was not important nor lasted forlong even if she had ihe biggest hospital afloat. Surely through thecenturies and decades, like it or not. the British battleships and thefleets they made up were the most effective and successful. Can anyone show otherwise. This was not demonstrated in this seriesin my view.Bruce TurnerDear Editor.Firstly let me express my thanks to your magazine for theProduct Review <strong>of</strong> the television series. THE BATTLESHIPS. It wasindeed a delight to receive such positive comments on our attemptsto present such a highly technical, maritime subject in a form that ageneral audience could enjoy and appreciate. I have received wordfrom the ABC to say that the series had won the highest rating for theyear for lhat particular time slot. So I guess we must have donesomething right.British Admiral <strong>of</strong> the Reel. Lord I~ewin was to have been ourtechnical advisor on the scries, but unfortunately he died just as wewere about lo go into production. In one <strong>of</strong> my last conversationsw ith Lord Lcwin. he made me promise that we "would get it right".We tried very hard to keep our promise to Lord Lcwin. and my hopeisthat we did in fact get it pretty right.Regarding the letter to the Editor from Mr Bruce Turner. Perhaps,through your magazine. I could reply to Mr Turner.Dear Mr Turner.Thank you indeed for your comments regarding THEBATTLESHIPS. It is gratifying to know lhat the scries evoked aresponse from you. albeit harsh criticism <strong>of</strong> our treatment <strong>of</strong> theBritish battleship together with a couple <strong>of</strong> other items you feel wegot wrong. In response. I <strong>of</strong>fer the following comment.Firstly, this was not an ABC production. It was produced by mySydney-based company. Rob McAuley Productions and licensed tothe ABC for broadcast. As Producer <strong>of</strong> the series, the editorial buckstops with me - not wilh the ABC. So. Mr Turner - your shot at theABC regarding "the now usual bias against things British, in this caseihe British Battleship" is somewhat ill-informed.It is patently obvious that you did not see the entire series beforemaking your comments. In the first episode, an entire sequence wasdevoted to HMS WARRIOR - its design - its unique armoury <strong>of</strong>guns - and its place in Royal <strong>Navy</strong> history.<strong>The</strong> USS TEXAS received prominence for a number <strong>of</strong> reasons.It is the only Dreadnought class battleships still in existence. It foughtin both World Wars - and we were also able to interv iew one <strong>of</strong> thesailors who served on it in WWI. His eye-witness account <strong>of</strong> thesurrendered German High Seas Reel being escorted to Scapa Rowwas indeed unique. At 105 years <strong>of</strong> age. Paul Elliott - a pharmacist'smate on the USS TEXAS is the last remaining battleship veteran <strong>of</strong>World War I. 1 am sorry that you felt we had overplayed his roleand ihe USS TEXAS story, but very obviously a vast number <strong>of</strong>the viewers here and around the world thought all the elementscame together to provide a unique and very special sequence inthe series.Your comment regarding the series not acknowledging thesuperiority <strong>of</strong> the British battleships is a little baffling. We set out tomake t series about the battleships <strong>of</strong> the world - without bias -treating friend a.id foe alike. As ihe series was made for aninternational market, our editorial aim was to present a fairand balanced story <strong>of</strong> these great ships and the men who sailedthem. We had the privilege <strong>of</strong> interviewing a wide range <strong>of</strong> RNveterans - from Admiral <strong>of</strong> the Reet. right down through theranks, and not one <strong>of</strong> these extraordinary sailors has been critical<strong>of</strong> the way we presented the British battleships - or the RoyalN.i\ \So thanks for your comments. Mr Turner. I trust this informationwill encourage you to purchase a copy <strong>of</strong> the scries form your nearestABC Shop so that you can at least watch the complete series beforemaking any further comments or criticisms.Rob McAuleyProducerTHE BATTLESHIPSA modern replica <strong>of</strong> a Greek Trireme that fought al the Baltic <strong>of</strong> Salamis in 480 B.C. against ihe Persians.By Paul Morrison,Warships & Marine Corps Museum hitSome sea battles have changed the course <strong>of</strong> a campaign and even a war - very few change the course <strong>of</strong> world history.One such battle was fought nearly 2.500 years ago. <strong>The</strong> victory gained by this battle was to give prominence to seapower - for it was perhaps the first time that dominance in maritime power altered the outcome <strong>of</strong> a war and worldhistory. Nearly all the wars fought up to that time had been decided by large armies, but in 480 B.C. Greece had nolarge armies when she was threatened by the greatest military power in the ancient World - Persia.<strong>The</strong> events <strong>of</strong> 480 B.C. were later recorded in detail by theGreek historian. Herodotus, who was born sometime around490 B.C. As a young man Herodotus travelled widelythroughout Greece and the Mediterranean world, compilinghis book. "<strong>The</strong> Histories". During his travels he would havespoken w ith some <strong>of</strong> the veterans who took part in the seabattle <strong>of</strong> Salamis. His chapters on this battle not only give aninteresting insight into naval tactics <strong>of</strong> the time but also thepolitics <strong>of</strong> war.Plans for InvasionRevenge was one <strong>of</strong> the main reasons for Persia's plan toinvade Greece in 480 B.C. Ten years previously the PersianKing Darius had decided to punish the Athenians for theirsupport <strong>of</strong> the Greek city-states in Asia Minor. <strong>The</strong>se citystateshad risen up in revolt against their Persian rulers. Afterruthlessly putting down the revolt Darius made plans todestroy Athens.A large Persian army was landed on the plain <strong>of</strong> Marathonto the. south <strong>of</strong> Athens. An Athenian army <strong>of</strong> 9.000 men underGeneral Miltides hurriedly marched to meet them (theirphysical stamina saw them cover approximately 33kms inquick time with armour, hence the term Marathon to describea modern long distance race) - surprising the Persians as theywere setting up camp near the beach. Herodotus writes. "In theBattle <strong>of</strong> Marathon, some 6.400 Persians were killed, thelosses <strong>of</strong> the Athenians were 192". <strong>The</strong> Persians fled to theirships.Ten years later in 480 B.C. Darius' son Xerxes, who wasnow king on the death <strong>of</strong> his father, decided to avenge the lossat Marathon with another invasion on a far greater scale. <strong>The</strong>army was immense - numbering more than 180.000 fightingmen. with the fleet accompanying the army around thecoastline <strong>of</strong> Asia Minor and into Greece consisted <strong>of</strong> some 800triremes, as well as smaller warships and a large number <strong>of</strong>supply ships. Triremes were the largest warships <strong>of</strong> the periodand the 'capital ships' <strong>of</strong> their day. <strong>The</strong>y consisted <strong>of</strong> threebanks <strong>of</strong> oars and carried a crew <strong>of</strong> more than 200. Acontingent <strong>of</strong> up to 50 fighting men was a!>*:arried onboard.Logistics support for the massive land army in and around therugged mountains and valleys <strong>of</strong> Greece would be impossibleto transport by land but achievable by sea. <strong>The</strong> Persians thusrelied greatly on their supply ships, which the warships had todefend if Xerxes was to succeed.<strong>The</strong>rmopylaeActing on advanced warning the Greeks were determinedto stop the Persian land advance at <strong>The</strong>rmopylae, a narrowpass between the sea and the mountains in northern Greece.A fleet <strong>of</strong> 271 Greek triremes under the dual command <strong>of</strong><strong>The</strong>mistoclcs (Athens) and Eurybiades (Sparta) was quicklyassembled at Artemisium. between the island <strong>of</strong> Euboea and14 VOL <strong>64</strong> NO. 2 IHE NAVYTHE NAVYVOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. 4 15


the mainland to protect the seaapproaches to <strong>The</strong>rmopylae.Here they engaged the Persianwarships that were supportingXerxes' army down the coast.A storm had struck the Persianfleet a few days before,causing losses to both warshipsand supply ships. Herodotusdescribes the confusion thattook place amongst the Persianships. "After the wind haddropped and the sea had gonedown, the Persians got theships they had hauled ashoreinto the water again, andproceeded along the coast...Fifteen <strong>of</strong> the Persian shipswere far behind in gettingunder way. and the menaboard, happening to catchsight <strong>of</strong> the Greek ships atArtemisium. mistook them fortheir own. and on makingtowards them fell into theenemies' hands."A modem replica <strong>of</strong> a Greek Trireme under oar power. Thisis the dreaded' sight that many in the Persian Fleet wouldhave seen in September <strong>of</strong> 4S0 BC in the confined watersaround the Greek island <strong>of</strong> Salamis.<strong>The</strong> Greek land forces at<strong>The</strong>rmopylae numbered some7.000 Hoplites and they were under the command <strong>of</strong> theSpartan King. Leonidas. Hoplites were heavily armouredinfantry - unusual in that most infantry <strong>of</strong> this period wereonly lightly armed and wore little if any armoured protection.<strong>The</strong> Hoplites were equipped with heavy shields, plumedhelmets, breastplates and greaves. <strong>The</strong>y carried long spearsand short swords and fought in closed ranks or in a novelformation called a phalanx. This method <strong>of</strong> warfare was wellsuited to the valleys and mountains <strong>of</strong> Greece where it wasdifficult to deploy large numbers <strong>of</strong> soldiers and cavalry inopen battle.An old wall in the centre <strong>of</strong> the <strong>The</strong>rmopylae pass wasquickly repaired, and for several days Leonidas and his menhalted the Persian attempts to break through the pass - a passtoo narrow for the Persian King to deploy his cavalry andchariots as well as take advantage <strong>of</strong> his superior numbers(180.000 vs. 7.000). Xerxes was even forced by desperation todeploy his own elite bodyguard, the Immortals into the battlebut they too were forced back. It was only when a Greektraitor. Lpialtes. led elements <strong>of</strong> the Persian Army along ahidden mountain trail behind the defenders that the battle wasdecided.Leonidas now ordered the Greeks to withdraw from thepass before they could be encircled while he and his 300Spartans fought a rearguard action. Herodotus recorded thefinal stages <strong>of</strong> the battle. "As the Persian Army advanced tothe assault, the Greeks under Leonidas. knowing that theywere going to their deaths, went out into the w ider part <strong>of</strong> thepass much further than they had done before: in the previousdays' fighting they had been holding the wall and makingsorties from behind it into the narrow neck, but now theyfought outside the narrows. In the course <strong>of</strong> that fightingLeonidas fell, having fought most gallantly, and manydistinguished Spartans with him..."<strong>The</strong>v withdrew again into the narrow neck <strong>of</strong> the pass,behind the wall, and took up a position in a single compactbody. Here they resisted to the last,with their swords, if they had them,and. if not. with their hands and teeth,until the Persians coming on from thefront over the ruins <strong>of</strong> the wall andclosing in. from behind, overwhelmedthem."When news <strong>of</strong> the land defeat reachedthe Athenian fleet, the ships quicklywcighiu anchor and sailed south.<strong>The</strong>y ha


western entrance- with their Egyptian warships whilstassembling most <strong>of</strong> their fleet in the wider channel to the east.<strong>The</strong> Greek fleet lay at anchor in a bay <strong>of</strong> the island inside thiseastern channel. "<strong>The</strong> Greeks were in a state <strong>of</strong> acute alarm,especially those from the Peloponnese: for there they were,waiting at Salamis to fight for Athenian territory, and certain,in the event <strong>of</strong> defeat, to be caught and blockcd up in anisland, while their own country was left w ithout defence, andthe Persian Army that very night was on the march for thePeloponnese."Aeschylus, an eyewitness to the battle later wrote that thePersians were drawn up in three lines outside the entrance tothe channel. On the mainland nearby, a throne was erectedfrom where the Persian King Xerxes could watch the battle.On 20 September 480 B.C. at the break <strong>of</strong> day. the Persianfleet began its advance through the eastern channel. <strong>The</strong> linesformed up into columns with the Phoenicians leading. "<strong>The</strong>Athenian squadron found itself facing the Phoenicians on thePersian left wing." As the Phoenicians came through thechannel, which was about 4 miles (6.4kms) wide, they facedthe Greek fleet which was in an 'L' formation. <strong>The</strong> Greekships suddenly began to back water, leading the Persian fleetfurther into the narrow ing channel. "<strong>The</strong> Greeks checked theirway and began to back astern: and they were on the point <strong>of</strong>running aground w hen Ameinias <strong>of</strong> Pallene. in command <strong>of</strong> anAthenian ship, drove ahead and rammed an enemy vessel.Seeing the two ships foal <strong>of</strong> one another and loeked together,the rest <strong>of</strong> the Greek fleet hurried to Ameinias' assistance, andthe general action began. Such is the Athenian account <strong>of</strong> howthe battle started."Other ships lay in wait in the bay and now ambushed thePersians on their left flank, driving them towards the shore <strong>of</strong>the mainland. In the ensuring confusion, the Persian shipsbegan to crowd the narrow channel which was now only about2 miles wide. Herodotus wrote. "<strong>The</strong> Greek fleet workedtogether as a whole, while the Persians had lost formation andwere no longer fighting on any plan. None the less they (thePersians) fought well that day - far better than in the actionsA stone carving <strong>of</strong> the Persian ruler Xerxes on his throne overlooking thestraits <strong>of</strong> Salamis during the battle with the Greeks for what would bedescribed today as a battle for sea control.A modern a-plica <strong>of</strong> a Greek Trireme under oar and sail power. ATrireme would not normally exceed four knots, but for limitedperiods as in battle, the ship could exceed 10 knots.<strong>of</strong>f Euboea. Every man <strong>of</strong> them did his best for fear <strong>of</strong> Xerxes,feeling that the king's eye was on him"Main Phase <strong>of</strong> the Battle<strong>The</strong> Persian ships in the narrow channel had difficulty inturning to meet the enemy. <strong>The</strong>ir speed"would have been slowand in many instances they would have been broadside to theramming Greek ships.Herodotus recorded. "<strong>The</strong> greatest destruction took placewhen the (Persian) ships which had been first engaged turnedtail, for those astern fell foul <strong>of</strong> them in their attempt to pressforward. <strong>The</strong> enemy was in hopeless confusion: such ships as<strong>of</strong>fered resistance or tried to escape were cut to pieces.... Such<strong>of</strong> the Persian ships as escaped destruction made their wayback to Phalerum and brought up there under the protection <strong>of</strong>the army."By sunset the battle was over. "Amongst those killed wasthe son <strong>of</strong> Xerxes' brother, and many other well-known menfrom Persia. <strong>The</strong>re were also Greek casualties, but not many:for most <strong>of</strong> the Greeks could swim. Most <strong>of</strong> the enemy, on theother hand, being unable to swim, were drowned." ThoughHerodotus names many <strong>of</strong> the Persian commanders killed inthe battle there is no mention <strong>of</strong> ship losses. "After the battlethe Greeks towed over to Salamis all the disabled vesselswhich were adrift, and then prepared for a renewal <strong>of</strong> the fight,fully expecting that Xerxes would use his remaining ships tomake another attack..." But the Persians were defeated andXerxes, realising his sea borne logistics lines were no longersafe, reluctantly ordered his fleet, and thus the army, towithdraw. <strong>The</strong> losses suffered by the Persian fleet werethought to be a third or more <strong>of</strong> its total strength (450 ships).Although not a decisive defeat it was enough though to forcethe Persians on the defensive. A year after the Battle <strong>of</strong>Salamis. they were decisively defeated in a land battle atPlataea which brought the Persian invasion to an end.ConclusionWhat would have happened if tlic Battle <strong>of</strong> Salamis hadbeen lost? <strong>The</strong> Athenians had already made plans in the event<strong>of</strong> such a loss. Transports and warships were ready to evacuatethe Athenian population from the island under cover <strong>of</strong>darkness. <strong>The</strong>y were to be resettled in the Greek colonies ineither Sicily or Southern Italy. It was possible that other Greekcities faced with defeat by the Persians would have followed,for it is doubtful that the wall across the Isthmus betweennorthern and southern Greece would have stopped theinvaders. Athens and her allies would have dominated Italy,and perhaps there w ould have been no Rome - western historywould therefore have taken a different course. J,6 VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. I THE NAVYRegional ASMs andLittoral Problem*By Dr Roger Thornhill<strong>The</strong> first lest firing <strong>of</strong> the new Boeing Harpoon Block II with GPS to help it avoid inadvertently hitting land masses and civilianships. It also has a secondary land attack capability. (Boeing)Anti-Ship Missiles (ASM's) have enjoyed sensationalist media coverage over the last 30 years despite sporadic use andmixed results. However, this has not stopped some from attributing more to the ASM than reality allows. As Naviesand militaries around the world shift operations to the littoral. Dr Roger Thornhill examines the current regional ASMarsenal and the littoral problem that many are faced with.<strong>The</strong> 2(XX) <strong>Australia</strong>n 'Green Paper' on defence, a publicdiscussiondocument on how <strong>Australia</strong> should conduct itsdefence, cited the proliferation <strong>of</strong> ASMs in the region tocoerce readers into a re-think on the viability <strong>of</strong> surface shipsin <strong>Australia</strong>'s military strategy. While the paper was correct inarticulating that there are a large number <strong>of</strong> different types andusers <strong>of</strong> ASMs in the region, over 20 different types andversions used by approximately 12 countries, it failed tohighlight their level <strong>of</strong> sophistication and thus their influenceon a modern <strong>Navy</strong>'s operations, such as those <strong>of</strong> RAN/RNZN.<strong>The</strong> level <strong>of</strong> ASM technology found in the region rangesfrom the 1950s to the 1990s. Older missiles are the mostprolific and due to their age. pose the least threat. Further,many fail to appreciate the huge reconnaissance and targetingrequirements <strong>of</strong> ASMs. <strong>The</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> this critical elementrelegates the ASM. regardless <strong>of</strong> sophistication, to a shipboarddefensive weapon restricted to horizon-to-horizonengagements only. It should also be noted that the ASM is not100ft effective nor immune to counter measures.To complicate matters, the financial burden <strong>of</strong> acquiringtraining rounds and missile war stocks by many regionalcountries have led some to argue, with a degree <strong>of</strong> merit, thatfuture use <strong>of</strong> their ASMs may consist <strong>of</strong> harassing attacksonly. This prediction is consistent with Argentine use <strong>of</strong>Exocet in the Falklands. One or two missiles fired at theperiphery <strong>of</strong> a battle group with no real identification ortargeting conducted. <strong>The</strong> Argentines had little training on theAM 39 Exocet and only five missiles. Had their training withTHE NAVYVOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. Ithe missile been more complete and their war stocks larger, adifferent outcome from the conflict may have eventuated.<strong>The</strong> following is a list <strong>of</strong> ASMs found in <strong>Australia</strong>'s regionwith an explanation <strong>of</strong> each missile's characteristics. It ispresented in isolation from the user's reconnaissance andtargeting abilities and the counters that ships could employ todefeat them.SS-N-2 'Styx' a, b, c, d (4K30)Entering service in 1958 with the Soviet <strong>Navy</strong> the Styx' isstill used today by three regional Navies and can lay claim tothe title <strong>of</strong> 'grandfather' <strong>of</strong> modern. non-Western. ASMs. Itsmost successful use came in 1967 when three missiles hit theIsraeli destroyer EILAT sinking it <strong>of</strong>f Port Said.A Russian SS-N-2 Styx ASM being loaded into the missilelaunch tube <strong>of</strong> a fast attack craft.33


<strong>The</strong> firsl version, the SS-N-2a, employs an MS-2 l-band(8-10 GHz) active radar seeker with a barometric altimeter tolocate its target. <strong>The</strong> missile uses vacuum tube technology andis fitted with a 454kg hollow charge warhead w ith impact andproximity fuses. Its radar seeker locks onto a target after eightreturns have been received, usually at about I2kms. Closer tothe target the seeker switches <strong>of</strong>f and a gyroscope then guidesthe missile as radar returns are too close for the 1950's systemto interpret <strong>The</strong> missile cruises to the target at Mach .90 at analtitude anywhere from 100 to 350m out to a range <strong>of</strong>approximately 40kms.<strong>The</strong> SS-N-2b version w as a major redesign <strong>of</strong> the originalmissile which included a new 513kg hollow charge warhead,slightly increased range, the option <strong>of</strong> an IR seeker tocomplement the MS-2 radar and the ability to use a l5kTnuclear warhead.<strong>The</strong> SS-N-2c version was another major redesign with anMS-2A solid-state radar seeker which improved range,bearing accuracy, low level target detection capability andimproved clutter suppression/discrimination. <strong>The</strong> seeker alsohas improved ECCM (Electronic Counter Counter Measures)capabilities and a home on jam function. <strong>The</strong> barometricaltimeter was replaced with a radio altimeter to enable seaskimmingattack pr<strong>of</strong>iles with a terminal altitude <strong>of</strong> 2.5m. <strong>The</strong>missile also has a maximum speed <strong>of</strong> Mach 1.3 and a range <strong>of</strong>80kms.<strong>The</strong> SS-N-2d is similar to the e' Styx missile but has anL-band (l-2GHz) radar seeker and an electro-optic seeker tosupplement the radar in case <strong>of</strong> jamming.Users: Indta (B. C. D). North Korea (A) and Vietnam (B.C. D)SY-l/HY-1 & HY-2In 1959 the Soviet Union sold SS-N-2a Styx" ASMs tochina who then reverse-engineered them as the SY-I.However, flight-testing <strong>of</strong> the Chinese v ariant didn't concludeuntil 1966 when it entered Chinese service and dubbed the'Silkworm' by US intelligence. <strong>The</strong> missile suffered fromsimple ECM (Electronic Counter Measures) and an unreliablealtimeter w hich w ould cause the missile to drop height duringflight.A Chinese HY-1J ASM being loaded onto one <strong>of</strong> the PLAN's ships. NCHC thesimilar appearance <strong>of</strong> the HY-1 to the Russian SS-N-2 Styx ASM whichChina copied to make the H Y-1 series <strong>of</strong> ASMsNoting the SY-1's deficiencies the Chinese developed animproved version known as the H Y-1. This missile has a muchimproved radar seeker, rocket motor, booster and autopilot butdidn't go into production until 1975 due to flight testproblems. Both missiles have a 454kg hollow charge warheadand a range <strong>of</strong> 40kms at Mach .9.<strong>The</strong> HY-2 ASM is thought to be an improved version <strong>of</strong>the HY-1 with greater range (95kms) and a selection <strong>of</strong> seekerheads. In addition to the I-band seeker <strong>of</strong> the HY-I the HY-2is <strong>of</strong>fered with an IR seeker (HY-2A) and a monopulse activeradar seeker (HY-2G).Users: Bangladesh (SY-I. HY-2). China (SY-I. H\ 2) andNorth Korea (HY-I).YJ-1 (C-801) & YJ-2 (C-802)<strong>The</strong> Chinese YJ-I Eagle Strike'/C-80l (C-801 refers tothe export version) was first revealed in 1984 but thought tohave been under development since the mid-1970s. It isdesigned as a replacement to the 'Styx' based ASMs used by-China and was developed during a period <strong>of</strong> 'Westerninfluence', hence its resemblance to the French Exocet. <strong>The</strong>A Chinese YJ-1 (C-X0I i ASM being fired from one <strong>of</strong> their destroyer*. <strong>The</strong>YJ-1 (C-X0I > closely resembles the French Exocet missile and is areplacement for China's .ibsolete SY-I. HY-I and HY-2.YJ -1 uses a solid propellant rocket motor, is radar guided andhas a 165kg semi-armour piercing warhead. Guidance to thetarget area is via an INS (Incrtial Navigation System) with amonopulse J-band (10 - 20 GHz) active radar for the terminalphase. It follows a sea-skimming pr<strong>of</strong>ile. 20m for mid-courseand then 5-7m for terminal phase, which is controlled by aradio altimeter. <strong>The</strong> missile has a maximum range <strong>of</strong> 40kmswhen launched from sea level and a maximum speed <strong>of</strong> Mach.85.<strong>The</strong> YJ-2/C-802 (C-802 being the export version) differsfrom the YJ-I in that its solid propellant rocket motor isreplaced by an air-breathing turbo jet engine giving muchgreater range, approximately I30kms. It first entered servicein 1994 and is also thought to use the same guidance andwarhead as the YJ -1.Users: China (YJ-I. YJ-2) and Thailand (C-801).SS-N-22 'Sunburn' (3M80/3M82 Moskit)<strong>The</strong> SS-N-22 'Sunburn' ASM epitomises the Soviet beliefthat fast is better than smart. <strong>The</strong> Sunburn ASM travels atMach 2.5 to give its target the least amount <strong>of</strong> time to reactand thus initiate a hard and/or s<strong>of</strong>t kill counter. It alsodemonstrates that the Soviets realised that their ASMtechnology was behind in the 'smart' area and susceptible toWestern counter measures. <strong>The</strong> Sunburn entered Sovietservice in 1984 and has a 300kg semi-armour piercingwarhead and a liquid-fuel ramjet engine to maintain itssupersonic flight pr<strong>of</strong>ile which takes only two minutes tocomplete (over its maximum range <strong>of</strong> 90 - I2()kms). <strong>The</strong>missile uses an INS with data link back to the launch platformto get it to a point I0-I5kms from the target where ils radarseeker is activated. <strong>The</strong> missile's seeker can function in threemodes; active, passive home on jam and a combination <strong>of</strong> thetwo. Once the target is fixed the missile enters its terminalphase which can consist <strong>of</strong> either a sea-skimming, pop-up orweaving manoeuvre. Once the target is acquired the missiledescends to 7m and can execute evasive manoeuvres up tolOg. although this reduces speed and potentially accuracygiven the missile's speed. <strong>The</strong> missile also has no known reattackcapability which, given its very small acquisitionwindow due its supersonic speed, could produce inaccuracies.Users: ChinaAn SS-N-22 Sunburn' being fired by a Russian Sovremenny class destroyer.<strong>The</strong> SS-N-22 is a large, rocket powered, supersonic ASM which Chinabelieves will give il an anti-carrier capability against the USN in any futureChina-Taiwan conflict.SS-N-25 'Switchblade' (3M24 Uran)<strong>The</strong> SS-N-25 Switchblade represents a departure fromstandard Soviet philosophy and technology in ASMs. Ratherthan a large, technically simple, rocket powered supersonicASM. the SS-N-25 mirrors western technology and thinking,it's technically advanced, relatively small, has a turbo jetengine and is subsonic. Its resemblance to the US Harpoon hasearned it the title <strong>of</strong> 'Harpoonski'. <strong>The</strong> missile was first seenat the 1992 Moscow air show. It has an active radar seeker, theARGS-35. which operates in the I/J band (8-20 GHz) with arange <strong>of</strong> 20kms. It can search in azimuth +/- 45 degrees and+ 10/-20 degrees in elevation. It has a 145kg semi-armourpiercing fragmentation warhead with a delayed fuse and arange <strong>of</strong> approximately 130kms. <strong>The</strong> missile uses an INS withA Russian SS-N-25 'Switchblade' ASM. Given its resemblance ip looks andmission pr<strong>of</strong>ile to the US Harpoon many in the West have dubbed it'<strong>The</strong> Harpoonski'.radio altimeter to arrive at the target area. It cruises at Mach .9at 5-l0m until the radar, switched on at about 25kms from thetarget's expected position, locks on the ship, il then descendsto 3m and then 1.5m for the final few seconds. <strong>The</strong>Switchblade can be salvo fired with a two second delaybetween launches.An Indian Nayy Project 25A missile corvette. <strong>The</strong> Indian <strong>Navy</strong> is theregion's prime 'Switchblade' user. Indian ships employing the missile typegenerally have al least lb <strong>of</strong> the missiles (John Mortimer!Users: China (it was recently revealed that China would beacquiring the air launched version). India and Vietnam.MM 38/AM 39/MM 40 ExocetPerhaps one <strong>of</strong> the more widely known ASMs. the MM 38Exocet (French for Flying Fish) was first cleared forproduction in 1974. <strong>The</strong> MM 38 uses an AD AC l-band (8-10GHz) single axis active monopulse radar seeker, with a range<strong>of</strong> 25kms against fast attack craft, and an INS with radioaltimeter. <strong>The</strong> 165kg fragmentation warhead is linked to anautopilot controlled proximity and delayed impact fuse. <strong>The</strong>missile's range is approximately 40kms at Mach .9 using asolid propellant rocket motor.An MM 38 Exocet ASM at the point <strong>of</strong> launch. Given the MM 38's agemany <strong>of</strong> the region's slocks <strong>of</strong> the missile are in desperate need <strong>of</strong>maintenance just to be considered reliable enough to leave the launch tube.Exocet travels lo its target at approximately 100m which isthought to be high enough to provide greater range for theseeker and yet low enough to mask its approach. At around15kms from the target's expected location the ADAC seeker isactivated. Once a target is detected the missile descends to 9mbefore descending to 2m (highly dependant on sea state).<strong>The</strong> new MM 40 Exocet features a number <strong>of</strong>improvements over its 1970's cousin. <strong>The</strong> Block I version hasdigital processing and a larger search and acquisition radarangle. <strong>The</strong> Block II has a new J-band (10-20 GHz) SuperADAC radar seeker with improved ECCM performance, theability to distinguish between different targets and with a chaffVOL<strong>64</strong> NO 4THE NAVYTHE NAVY VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. 4 9


An MM 40 F.xocet being tried from one <strong>of</strong> Malaysia's Lekiu class frigates,tlx- MM 411 is j generation ahead <strong>of</strong> the MM 38 <strong>of</strong> Falklands lameradar switches on and scans a 40-degree sector in a/imuthonly. Once the target is acquired the missile descends to I Dmfor the run into the target where it further descends to 2m inthe terminal phase.Users: Malaysia (Mk 2).GabrielWith its Arab neighbours acquiring large quantities <strong>of</strong> SS-N-2 from the Soviets. Israel, being under an arms embargo,decided that it too should have an ASM. Work tin the GabrielASM began in the early 1960s and was complete by 1969. <strong>The</strong>either sensor if it feels its being jammed or environmentalconsiderations come into play (heavy rain, fog etc). <strong>The</strong>missile is housed in a similar launch canister as the HarpoonMk-141 launcher.Users: Taiwan.Sea Eagle<strong>The</strong> British Aerospace Sea Eagle missile was first put intoproduction in 1982. entering British service in 1984. to meet»the UK's requirement for an air-launched sea-skimming ASM.<strong>The</strong> missile uses an INS for the mid-course mode and a J-band (10 - 20GHz) active pulse radar seeker for the terminalphase. <strong>The</strong> radar seeker is programmed to switch on I8kmsfrom the target. However, the missile can be programmed toin 1999 in the Baltic and is a rather unique ASM. It has a range<strong>of</strong> approximately 220kms using a turbo jet engine and cruisewings (demonstrating its SS-N-21 cruise missile pedigree).Approximately 20-30kms from its target, which it approachesby an INS. the missile pops up. acquires the target by its ownradar seeker and then drops a supersonic dart whichaccelerates to Mach 3 at sea-skimming height using a solidfuel rocket motor. <strong>The</strong> smaller dart makes detection moredifficult than the larger 'cruise' body with its turbo-jet andwings. During the terminal phase the missile can either weaveor conduct a corkscrew manoeuvre to counter shipboarddefences. <strong>The</strong> later manoeuvre lends to reduce its speedconsiderably as the solid rocket fuel has already beenexhausted by this stage which also precludes any re-attackability if it misses the target. <strong>The</strong> Club's warhead is thought tobe approximately 250kgs and comes in two versions, the'Club-S' is launched from a submerged submarine and the'Club-N' from a vertical launch lube on a surface ship.discriminator function. <strong>The</strong> manufacturer also claims that themissile has a lower RCS and IK signature than the MM andable to be used in sea state 7. Its range has also been increasedto 75kms. still with solid propcllant rocket motor, and wilh a155kg warhead with both impact and proximity fuses.I seis Brunei (MM 40 Block III. Indonesia (MM 38).South Korea (MM 38). Malaysia MM 38. MM 40 Block II)and Thailand (MM 38).OTOMAT Mk 2<strong>The</strong> Italian Otomat missile began production in 1976 lorthe Italian <strong>Navy</strong>. However, in 1973 work began on a newlonger ranged Otomat known as the Mk 2. <strong>The</strong> turbo jetpowered Mk 2 has a range <strong>of</strong> IbOkms. a 210kg semi armourpiercingwarhead and a speed <strong>of</strong> Mach .9. To utilise themissile's full range a mid-course guidance system is fittedallowing the shtM>ter to relay updated target information to themissile's INS. <strong>The</strong> missile is capable <strong>of</strong> sea-skimming attacksonly and uses a single-axis, pscudo-monopulsc seeker. Otomatcruises at 15 - 20 m until about 7kms from the target (knownthrough accurate targeting and mid-course updates) when itsAn Israeli made (iabnel ASM being fried from a RSN (Royal Singapore<strong>Navy</strong>) fasi attack craft. (RSNIsinking <strong>of</strong> the Israeli destroyer EILAT in 1967 furtherstrengthened their resolve for an indigenous ASM.<strong>The</strong> Gabriel has a 150kg HE warhead and uses a semiactiveseeker. When the seeker acquires the target throughreflected radar energy the missile enters its terminal phase anddescends to 4.5 - 6m. Gabriel can also be guided manuallythrough an optronic system on the launch craft. This feature isgenerally used in severe ECM conditions. Gabriel is poweredby a solid rocket motor propelling the missile lo a speed <strong>of</strong>Mach .7 out to a range <strong>of</strong> 20kms.Users: Singapore and Thailand.Hsiung Feng I/I I<strong>The</strong> Hsiung Feng ASM was thought to be a reverseengineered Gabriel ASM given Taiwan's use <strong>of</strong> the Gabriel Iand II. but Taiwanese sources suggest a far more complexmissile. Taiwan set to work on their own ASM in 1980producing the Hsiung Feng I. which closely resembles theIsraeli Gabriel II ASM. It uses a radar seeker with INS. radioAn Indian Airforce Jaguar with a British made Sea Eagle ASM on itscentreline pylon. <strong>The</strong> Sea Eagle is regarded as one <strong>of</strong> the region's moredangerous ASMs given the level <strong>of</strong> technology in its seeker and guidancesystems. India >s now the sole user <strong>of</strong> the Sea Eagle which it also employsfrom its Sea King helicopters and 'Bear' long range maritime patrol aircraftt Indian Airforce)climb from its sea-skimming cruise mode when 30kms fromthe target's expected position lo conduct its own search. It iscapable <strong>of</strong> ignoring decoys or counter measures, flyingrandom evasive manoeuvres during the final phase and canattack from any bearing. <strong>The</strong> missile has a range <strong>of</strong> 1 lOkms atMach .85 and a 230kg semi-armour piercing warhead withdelayed impact fuse. It uses a kerosene fuelled turbojet enginewhich is said to have a very low IR signature and smoke free.<strong>The</strong> UK recently withdrew Sea Eagle from its order <strong>of</strong> battleleaving India as the sole user <strong>of</strong> this ASM. It is not known ifleft over UK stocks or support infrastructure for the weaponwas sold to India. If not. then India may have some difficultyin maintaining the Sea Eagle over the next few years.Users: India.SS-N-27 (3M54E) Club<strong>The</strong> SS-N-27 was first seen in the early 1990's as a conceptmissile and known by the names: P-10 Alfa. AFM-L and KS-127 however. 3M54E 'Club' is the name given to it by theRussian manufacturer Novator. <strong>The</strong> 'Club' concluded testingUsers: India (S & N versions)HarpoonHarpoon first entered service in 1977 as a basic ASM andsince then has undeigone a number <strong>of</strong> Block improvements. InJune 1982 the Block IB came with a sea-skimming capabilityand better ECCM. <strong>The</strong> Block IC. 1984. featured greater range,improved ECCM. better electronics, indirect attack capabilityvia waypoint programming and terminal phase tacticaloptions.Harpoon is guided to its target by an INS and uses a PR-53/DSQ-28 J-band (10 - 20GHz.) two axis active radar seekerwith a flat phased array radar capable <strong>of</strong> 90-degree searches.An RAN FFG fires a Harpoon ASM. Harpoon suffers in the littoral fromland-induced cluner. Its unrestricted use in the archipelagic environment to<strong>Australia</strong>'s north must be held in question. (RAN)It has a 221kg semi-armour piercing warhead with delayedimpact fuse, a turbo jet engine with a speed <strong>of</strong> Mach .85 and amaximum range <strong>of</strong> 120kms (Block IC variant).<strong>The</strong> Royal Malaysian Nav> Laksamana corvette I.AKSAMANA TUNABDUL JAMIL. <strong>The</strong> Laksamana corvettes are armed with six Otomai Mk 2ASM launchers as seen on ihe stem <strong>of</strong> the corvette. <strong>The</strong> Otomat has anexcellent stand <strong>of</strong>f range and mid-course guidance update ability hul manywonder if the RMN can fully exploit the missile's capabilities (RMNI<strong>The</strong> Taiwanese made Hsiung II ASM is unique as its targeting system ismade up <strong>of</strong> two guidance sensors, radar and IR. making this 'mulit-spectral'ASM a difficult proposition to decoy.altimeter, solid rocket motor and sustainer and a 150kgwarhead. <strong>The</strong> Hsiung Feng I uses a similar attack pr<strong>of</strong>ile as theGabriel and has a range <strong>of</strong> 36kms at Mach .9.<strong>The</strong> Hsiung Feng II was developed as a longer rangedASM given the refusal <strong>of</strong> some nations to sell ASMs toTaiwan, for fear <strong>of</strong> upsetting China. This missile has an activeradar seeker with planar array which is complemented by anIR seeker. <strong>The</strong> Hsiung Feng II is able to assign priority to<strong>The</strong> SS-N-27 is regarded as one <strong>of</strong> the more dangerous ASMs in the world.It has a range <strong>of</strong> approximately 220kms. employing wings and an airbreathing jet engine like its 'cruise missile' ancestors. Once its target isdetected it drops a supersonic rocket powered dan from the nose which thendocs a 'corkscrew' manoeuvre to evade hard kill counter measures beforehitting the target ship.At 2kms from the target the Block I would climb and makea 30 degree dive attack onto the target. <strong>The</strong> Block IB comeswith the pop-up dive attack mode and the option <strong>of</strong> seaskimmingall the way to the target. <strong>The</strong> Block IC has a number<strong>of</strong> improvements over the B version. It can fly at high altitudefor the first phase <strong>of</strong> the attack to avoid land masses orfriendly ships and approach the target indirectly by means <strong>of</strong>up to three waypoints.Users: <strong>Australia</strong>, Indonesia (no test firings reported noracquisition <strong>of</strong> missile stocks). Japan. South Korea. Singapore.Taiwan and Thailand.VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. 4THE NAVYTHE NAVY VOL <strong>64</strong> NO. 4 II


<strong>The</strong> Littoral ProblemWith 80% <strong>of</strong> the UN's membership having a coastalborder the littoral becomes an ever increasingly importantand potential area <strong>of</strong> future conflict. Despite this fact, nearlyevery ASM presented so far has a major deficiency whenused in the littoral/archipclagic battle space. Given thedependence on radar seekers the current generation <strong>of</strong> ASMsare unable to distinguish targets when backgrounded by landthe British withdrew the Sea Eagle ASM from servicerecently for this reason. Most ASMs in use today weredesigned with the classic open ocean naval battle in mind thathad no landmass clutter to return multiple confusing radarpictures to the ASM.<strong>The</strong> littoral also presents the problem <strong>of</strong> a compressedbattle space littered with fricndlies. non-combatants, manmadestructures and natural features which the ASMs listedare unable to discriminate against. Further. ASMs with a longrange like Harptx>n are more likely to continue on if its targetis obscured by land and hit a non-combatant <strong>of</strong> a neutral flagor another politically sensitive asset. Use <strong>of</strong> such a missilethen becomes less attractive to responsible militaries or thosewith few stocks. <strong>The</strong> recent <strong>Australia</strong>n While Paper's focuson Harpoon use in the littoral seems to have neglected thisTTwo frame by frame images <strong>of</strong> the firsl Harpoon Block II striking a land target. Block II will givemany navies a long range precision land attack capability previously only enjoyed by the USN.(Boeing)problem. In reality it could mean that its use will be restrictedor banned.<strong>The</strong> following five missiles, due to enter service shortlywith Navies around the world, have been designed toovercome the littoral problem, giving their users a distinctadvantage when operating in this environment.Harpoon Block II<strong>The</strong> new Block II Harpoon is designed to operate in thelittoral env ironment through the application <strong>of</strong> a number <strong>of</strong>new and existing technologies. Its new guidance systemincorporates technologies from two other existing weapons -the low-cost, incrtial measuring unit from the JDAM (JointDirect Attack Munition); and the s<strong>of</strong>tware, mission computer,integrated Global Positioning System (GPS)/INS. and theGPS antenna and receiver from ihe SLAM-ER (Stand-<strong>of</strong>fLand Attack Missile Expanded Response) missile.<strong>The</strong> new mission computer can be fed a database <strong>of</strong>coastlines to allow accurate navigation and targct/landmassdiscrimination. Its search pattern can also be controlled bylimits placed on it by the GPS correlating landmass andcoastline data. Upon finding the ship target the HarpoonBlock II can attack in the same manner as the Block IC. <strong>The</strong>accurate navigation solution also allows the missile to overtlyland and aid in discriminating target shipsfrom islands or other natural or man madestructures. An added benefit <strong>of</strong> this Blockupgrade is the ability to attack land targetssuch as SAM sites, harbour facilities,runways, buildings etc. It is understoodBoeing is keen to sell Harpoon Block II tothe RAN for the Anzac upgrade programmegiving it a littoral ASM and land attack stand<strong>of</strong>f capability, a perfect fit to the recent<strong>Australia</strong>n White Paper's focus for futureoperations.Users: none in the region - at this stage.MaverickWhile the AGM-65 Maverick has beenaround for some time it's the RNZN'semployment <strong>of</strong> the new maritime enhancedversion on its Super Seasprite helicopterswhich make it even more useful as an ASM.Given the missile's IR TV passive guidanceit does not suffer from the problems <strong>of</strong> landmass clutter or confusion as radar guidedmissiles do. Further, the operator can identifythe target before firing thus having the option<strong>of</strong> aborting if the target turns out to be not theintended. Although the new Maverick isspecifically designed to be used against shipsit also retains its land attack pedigree givingthe RNZN a rather unique littoral attackcapability against ships and shoreinstallations.Users: RNZN.Penguin<strong>The</strong> Norwegian Penguin ASM was designedfrom the outset with the littoral problem inmind. Norway needed an ASM that it coulduse along its jagged coastline that would notfly into the first mountain the ASM's radarseeker found. Penguin uses a passive IRseeker with an INS to find and attack ships12 VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. 4 THE NAVYThree images <strong>of</strong> a Penguin ASM being fried from a USN Scahawk during the recent R1MPAC 2(X)2 exercise <strong>of</strong>f Hawaii. <strong>The</strong> Penguin is being acquired bythe RAN for use <strong>of</strong> the new Super Seasprite helicopters. (USN)near land masses. It has the capability to fly over iand. makepre-programmed changes in height and direction and can alsobe programmed to fly over a selected number <strong>of</strong> ship targetsbefore making its attack, it comes with a 120kg semi-armourpiercing warhead and has a range <strong>of</strong> approximately 35kms. Inits terminal phase the missile is programmed to dive at theship's waterline for maximum damage from blast andHooding. <strong>The</strong> missile will be used from the RAN's SuperSeasprite helicopters and hopefully the Seahawks.Users: RAN.A Polyphem missile undergoing wind tunnel testing. <strong>The</strong> Polyphem is awire-guided missile making it impervious to Electronic Counter Measuresand imp«>ssible to detect by passive means.PolyphemOne <strong>of</strong> the more interesting and useful missiles for thelittoral environment currently under development is theGerman Polyphem. <strong>The</strong> missile is an optically guided rocketcontrolled by a fibre optic data link cable feeding IR TVimages back to the fircr - allowing for target identificationand an indication <strong>of</strong> a hit. Tne IR seeker can detect shiptargets at 8.300m or 42 seconds from impact and identify thetype <strong>of</strong> ship at 1.350m or 12 seconds before impact. Its INS.with GPS. lakes the missile to a point near the target wherethe firer then guides the missile during the terminal phase.v TA ICM Polyphem heing fired from a ground launchcrPolyphem has a range <strong>of</strong> approximately 60kms and a 20kgfragmented shaped charge warhead. It is immune to ECM andcan be used against and by ships, shore installations, vehiclesand helicopters.Users: none at this stage.IViton<strong>The</strong> German Triton missile is very similar to Polyphemexcept that it is used by submarines while submerged againstASW helicopters, fixed wing aircraft or against land targets.ConclusionMany ASMs currently in service around the region willexperience problems when used in the littoral, some will betotally useless. Also, the age and level <strong>of</strong> sophistication <strong>of</strong>most makes countering them a somewhat straightforwardexercise. <strong>The</strong> reconnaissance requirement for the pr<strong>of</strong>icientuse <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> the region's ASMs is <strong>of</strong>ten a forgotten andneglected crucial factor in their successful use. <strong>The</strong> high cost<strong>of</strong> more advanced ASMs makes them either unattainable bymany, or forces them to be ineffective users relying on theconfidence trick/bluff <strong>of</strong> deterrence. All these factorscontribute to reduce the effect and influence <strong>of</strong> the ASM inthe littoral environment. However, technology, in the form <strong>of</strong>new missiles such as Harpoon Block II. Maverick. Penguin.Polyphem and Triton, can re-address littoral deficiencies.Pr<strong>of</strong>icient users make the littoral battle space an even moredynamic and dangerous domain even for the pr<strong>of</strong>essional<strong>Navy</strong>.It should be noted that despite the deficiencies <strong>of</strong> theASMs listed earlier the littoral docs remain a dangerous placefor the surface <strong>Navy</strong>. As ASM radar seekers suffer fromincreased radar clutter from land so do many ship basedradars which can be rendered blind to an ASM attack.However, many Navies have already addressed this problemthrough development and improvements in surveillance andhard and s<strong>of</strong>t kill counter measures. Despite this. WesternNavies still need to be extra vigilant in the littoral. J-•This anicle first appeared in Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter and isreproduced with the Editor's permission.THE NAVY VOL M NO 4 13


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>n built An/ac class frigate HMAS WARRAMUNGA proceeding down Cockburn Sound in WA. While many only see the "sharp end' <strong>of</strong> anavy. HQ. shore support facilities, industry and hydrography services all act as vital enahlers and force multipliers <strong>of</strong> maritime power. (RAN)In part 6 <strong>of</strong> our presentation <strong>of</strong> the RAN's new Maritime Doctrine we detail Chapter 9 on <strong>The</strong> Knablers <strong>of</strong> MaritimeForces. <strong>The</strong> document was written by the Seapower Centre and is reproduced in THE NAVY, with the Centre'sapproval. Riven its importance to readers <strong>of</strong> THE NAVY. <strong>Australia</strong>as and to the <strong>Navy</strong> league in general.Chapter 9THE ENABLERS OFMARITIME FORCES<strong>The</strong> enablers <strong>of</strong> maritime forces are the structures, systemsand elements which support the armed forces within themaritime environment.ORGANISATION<strong>The</strong> effective organisation <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Navy</strong> is fundamental toits efficiency and its capacity to accomplish its missions. <strong>The</strong>objective <strong>of</strong> the RAN's current structure is to align the entireService and its supporting agencies into a system which isfocused on the delivery <strong>of</strong> combat capability.<strong>The</strong> Chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> commands and is responsible forraising, training and sustaining the RAN. Under him are Avemajor elements: <strong>Navy</strong> Headquarters (NHQ). the ForceElement Groups (FEGs). <strong>Navy</strong> Systems Command(NAVSYSCOM). Support Command (<strong>Navy</strong>) (SCA(N)) (untillate 2000) and Maritime Command (MHQAUST). <strong>The</strong>Maritime Commander <strong>Australia</strong> has operationalresponsibilities to the Commander <strong>Australia</strong>n <strong>The</strong>atre and theChief <strong>of</strong> Defence Force.<strong>The</strong> core <strong>of</strong> this structure are the Force Element Groups(FEGs) as the centre <strong>of</strong> capability output and managementwith responsibilities direct to the Chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> for capabilitymanagement and direct to the Maritime Commander foroperational output delivery. <strong>The</strong> FEGs arc divided intoAviation. Submarines. Surface Combatants. Patrol Forces.Amphibious and Afloat Support. Hydrography, and MineWarfare and Clearance Diving.<strong>Navy</strong> Systems Command and Support Command (<strong>Navy</strong>)Provide services commonly required to some extent by allseven FEGs. <strong>The</strong> FEGs are functionally located withinMaritime Command. <strong>The</strong> FEGs draw together FEG specificoperations and preparedness, doctrine, research, developmentand capability proposals, integrated logistics andconfiguration management, repair and maintenance, trainingand personnel requirements, and resource management.<strong>The</strong> FEGs define and articulate their requirements,priorities and expectations from other agencies and serviceproviders. <strong>The</strong>y monitor the delivery <strong>of</strong> goods and services toachieve goals defined by the Chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> and the MaritimeCommander.<strong>Navy</strong> Headquarters supports the Chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> in directing<strong>Navy</strong> capability management and the delivery <strong>of</strong> the DefenceOutput for which the Chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> is responsible, togetherwith <strong>Navy</strong> contributions to other Defence Outputs.<strong>Navy</strong> Systems Command integrates centres <strong>of</strong> knowledgeand expertise in key technology areas with logisticsrequirements, personnel (including training) and safety. It isthe provider <strong>of</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> services required by other elements. Itis responsible for command, control, communications,computers and intelligence (C4I): the delivery <strong>of</strong> personneland training: systems support: safety, certification and audit:and command <strong>of</strong> fleet bases and establishments.NUSHIP STUART at the Tenix dockyard in Melbourne. BALI.ARAT canbe seen in the background just prior to her launch. Navies are particularlydemanding in terms <strong>of</strong> technology and manufacturing and the RAN is noexception. An effective relationship with national industry is vital for thedevelopment, manufacture and support <strong>of</strong> sophisticated combatforces. (Tenix)Support Command (<strong>Navy</strong>) is the <strong>Navy</strong> Component <strong>of</strong>Support Command <strong>Australia</strong>. <strong>The</strong> fundamental charter <strong>of</strong> theSupport Command is to provide Joint Logistics and systemsto take advantage <strong>of</strong> national economics <strong>of</strong> scale. Within itsLogistics Operations branch and its Commodore Logistics<strong>Navy</strong> branch. Support Command (<strong>Navy</strong>) provides a widerange <strong>of</strong> logistics, material support and minor projectmanagement services for the <strong>Navy</strong> as a whole, as well as toother ADF agencies. Support Command will soon be foldedinto the new Defence Material Organisation which will takeresponsibility for provision <strong>of</strong> these services. Acquisition <strong>of</strong>major projects will also fall within these new arrangements.Maritime Commander <strong>Australia</strong> has responsibility to theChief <strong>of</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> for the full command <strong>of</strong> assigned assets and toCommander <strong>Australia</strong>n <strong>The</strong>atre for the planning and conduct<strong>of</strong> operations as directed. While thr Chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> setsstrategic <strong>Navy</strong> requirements and priorities, the MaritimeCommander is responsible for implementing these at theoperational level. <strong>The</strong> Maritime Commander thus has dualresponsibilities: to the Commander <strong>Australia</strong>n <strong>The</strong>atre as theNaval Component Commander (NCC) and to the Chief <strong>of</strong><strong>Navy</strong> as the commander and operator <strong>of</strong> the Fleet. Seatraining, assessment and cross-FEG operational integrationare major activities for Maritime Headquarters.NATIONAL INDUSTRYAn effective relationship with national industry is vital forthe development and support <strong>of</strong> sophisticated combat forces.Navies are particularly demanding in terms <strong>of</strong> technology andmanufacturing. Properly managed, however, the successfulmeeting <strong>of</strong> such demands on shipbuilding, systemdevelopment and integration, as well as in service supportbrings substantial benefits for industry and for the nationaleconomy.A careful balance needs to be maintained by countriessuch as <strong>Australia</strong> lo ensure that capability requirements areproperly met while such national benefits are gained over thelong term. <strong>The</strong> fact that many elements <strong>of</strong> maritime capabilityseek lo exploit the latest advantages in technology as theydevelop means that accepting technical risks is an inevitableaccompaniment <strong>of</strong> this process. Success in meeting thischallenge depends upon close co-operation between all levels<strong>of</strong> Government. Defence and industry.MARITIME LOGISTICSLogistic support exists to ensure that combat forces canmeet readiness levels and be deployed, sustained andredeployed to meet the operational aims <strong>of</strong> the commander.Logistic support includes the provision <strong>of</strong> the stores and spareparts required by units, the supply and re-supply <strong>of</strong> fuel andlubricants, ammunition and food, and the provision <strong>of</strong>medical support, maintenance support, personnel support andhotel services. Maritime logistic support exists to providethese services to maritime combat units.In practice, logistic support will <strong>of</strong>ten be conducted on ajoint basis and logistic related issues lend themselves readilyto the economies <strong>of</strong> effort possible by integration <strong>of</strong> the needs<strong>of</strong> the various environments. <strong>The</strong>re are. however, significantdifferences between the three Services' logistic systems. <strong>The</strong>strategic, operational and tactical levels <strong>of</strong> logistics consist <strong>of</strong>many support organisations manned by ADF. Defencecivilian personnel and contractors. Continuity <strong>of</strong> logisticsupport is paramount to combat success.<strong>The</strong> naval logistics system is structured very differently tothose <strong>of</strong> the other Services because <strong>of</strong> the differences in theenvironment in which the <strong>Navy</strong> operates. Generally speaking.<strong>Navy</strong>'s fundamental unit <strong>of</strong> combat is a warship. Its logisticcapability is inherent in the design. Ships deploy from theirhome ports with spare parts typically <strong>of</strong> an endurance level <strong>of</strong>90 days, rations typically <strong>of</strong> 30 days and with large quantities<strong>of</strong> fuel onboard.HMAS WESTRALIA conducts an underway replenishment <strong>of</strong> HMASADELAIDE. Logistics support at sea is imperative if a <strong>Navy</strong> is to keepships on station. (RAN)Naval forces are therefore largely self-sustaining for longperiods if supported by an underway replenishment groupand the "pull" forward <strong>of</strong> mission critical stores. Thiscontrasts to the "push" system used for land forces where thefundamental unit <strong>of</strong> combat is the soldier who has limitedcapacity for self-support.<strong>Australia</strong>'s strategic circumstances reinforce the truismthat the sea remains the principal medium for the movementVOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. 4THE NAVYTHE NAVY VOL <strong>64</strong> NO. 4 15


<strong>of</strong> large quantities <strong>of</strong> material. This means that much logisticeffort,whether directed towards maritime combat forces ornot, will be by sea. Shipping must thus be considered a jointlogistic asset. Its protection may well become a critical issuewithin a campaign that has few other apparent maritimedimensions.Shore support facilities such as the submarine training establishment in WAare vital to train new submariners and sharpen the skills <strong>of</strong> existingsubmariners. < RAN I<strong>The</strong> logistic capacity <strong>of</strong> maritime forces can also act as aforce multiplier. Ships can provide a large range <strong>of</strong> logisticsupportto land and air units and arc especially useful inproviding these services in the interim while single services'support units are deploying. That maritime forces are largelyself-reliant and are not adversely affected logistically bydifferent operating areas to the same extent as land or airforces remains a strategic advantage. Furthermore, althoughthe concepts <strong>of</strong> lines <strong>of</strong> communications can be applied toboth land and maritime environments, they do noi mean thesame thing and pose very different problems <strong>of</strong> security andprotection.Shore Support<strong>The</strong> logistic support process is founded directly upon shoresupport, a concept which embraces not only service facilitiessuch as bases and supply depots, but private contractors, bothdomestic and international, as well as formal arrangementswith allied governments for access to material and technicalsupport. <strong>The</strong> sophistication <strong>of</strong> such support will depend uponthe point within the logistic chain that it operates, as well asthe urgency <strong>of</strong> the need.<strong>The</strong> operations <strong>of</strong> deployed maritime forces can begreatly assisted by the provision <strong>of</strong> local host nation support.Even at its simplest, in the form <strong>of</strong> sheltered anchorages,such support can considerably reduce the difficulties <strong>of</strong>re-supply and provide the opportunities for stand-downsand deep maintenance which will considerably increase thelength <strong>of</strong> time which units can remain operationally efficientin area. However, it is also true that such host nationsupport is not an absolute necessity for maritime forces,provided that sufficient seaborne support exists to accomplishthe mission.Reach and SustainmentHowever capable the maritime combat forces, theirpotential is enormously increased by the presence <strong>of</strong> supportvessels. In fact, unless maritime units are acting purely incoastal defence roles at short distances from their shore bases,there are very fe* modern maritime operations which can beconducted effectively without such support. At its mostsophisticated, extending to repair ships as well as stores,ammunition, food and fuel supply units, such support canmake maritime combat forces indefinitely independent <strong>of</strong> theshore. This level <strong>of</strong> capability is currently possessed in fullmeasure only by the United States and to a degree by theUnited Kingdom. Smaller forces, such as those <strong>of</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>,nevertheless achieve a high degree <strong>of</strong> force multiplication bythe possession <strong>of</strong> replenishment ships which are primarilyconfigured to provide liquid fuels but can also supply limitedamounts <strong>of</strong> ammunition, stores and food. Within the<strong>Australia</strong>n context, a credible surface task group for extendedmaritime operations will always include a replenishmentship. <strong>The</strong> inicr-operability <strong>of</strong> most maritime forcesfor replenishment is itself a significant force multiplier thaiallows the rapid combination <strong>of</strong> coalition forces in anemergency.Larger combinations <strong>of</strong> maritime forces can achieveeconomies <strong>of</strong> scale in the critical areas <strong>of</strong> spares, storessupport and repair expertise. Mechanisms exist for the stockholdings <strong>of</strong> vital spare parts to be "screened", such that theycan be transferred from one unit to another which has a defect.This procedure is regularly conducted during internationalexercises and operations and extends to the loan <strong>of</strong> expertmaintainers to rectify difficult defects. <strong>The</strong> process is greatlyassisted by commonality in equipment between Navies.<strong>The</strong> former HMAS JERVIS BAY being overflown by a Sea King helict>picrin East Timor. <strong>The</strong> ability <strong>of</strong> the RAN to Take Ships Up Erom Trade', suchas JERVIS BAY. was an important enabler to the East Timor Operation.(RAN)Ships Taken Up From TradeSupport capabilities can be improved by taking merchantships up from trade and converting them to the extent requiredby the operation. <strong>The</strong>se vessels cannot replicate thecapabilities <strong>of</strong> built for the purpose replenishment units, butthey can play a vital role in maximising the capacity <strong>of</strong> thelatter by acting as re-supply units between shore bases and the16 VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. I THE NAVYoperational area. If vessels are to be taken up from trade, thenmechanisms need to exist for their identification within thenational register and charter or requisitioning. In thesecircumstances, the possession <strong>of</strong> a substantial national flagmerchant fleet can be an important strategic advantage.Merchant vessels can also be employed to provide sea lift forthe movement <strong>of</strong> land forces and their logistic support.Nations with smaller merchant fleets may be forced topurchase or charter ships for these purposes from overseassources, an expedient which can be difficult to achieve inemergencies.ENVIRONMENTAL KNOWLEDGEUnderstanding <strong>of</strong> the environment in which maritimeforces operate is critical to the success <strong>of</strong> operations. Crediblemaritime combat capability therefore depends fundamentallyupon the ability to access and analyse environmentalknowledge. If this does not exist, then deployment plans canbe flawed by the use <strong>of</strong> unsuitable platforms, surveillanceintentions can be thwarted by the inability <strong>of</strong> sensors to meetrequirements and weapons may prove ineffective against keytargets. <strong>The</strong>re are three main areas <strong>of</strong> effort in this regard, all<strong>of</strong> which are important for commanders and planners at alllevels <strong>of</strong> warfare. <strong>The</strong>y are hydrography, oceanography andmeteorology.iHydrographers in a small boat conduct a survey <strong>of</strong> the approaches to DiliHarbour during the East Timor Operation. Without accurate underwatercharts <strong>Navy</strong>'s ability to operate in unfamiliar water is greatlyreduced. (RAN)HydrographyNaval hydrographic forces work in peacetime to surveyand chart littoral and ocean areas in accordance with strategicguidance.Much <strong>of</strong> this effort is focused towards therequirements <strong>of</strong> commercial shipping, generally aimed atshortening trade routes, reducing existing uncertainties oranomalies from older surveys and allowing deeper draughtships or fishing vessels to operate safely. <strong>The</strong>re arc obviousflow ons for combat forces from this activity, but surveyingwork in peacetime can also be used to improve theunderstanding <strong>of</strong> areas in which operations may take place.<strong>The</strong>se can involve either the littoral, including beach surveyswhich extend to the hinterland <strong>of</strong> possible landing areas foramphibious forces, or deep water, particularly wheresubmarine operations are involved. <strong>The</strong>se activities givecombat forces increased freedom <strong>of</strong> manoeuvre.Hydrographic units also have important roles duringconflict. <strong>The</strong>y may be required to conduct precursor surveysTHE NAVYVOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. I 33Two <strong>of</strong> the RAN's inshore hydrographic vessels. Much <strong>of</strong> the RAN'shy drographic effort is focused towards the requirements <strong>of</strong> commercialshipping, generally aimed at shortening trade routes, reducing existinguncertainties or anomalies from older surveys and allowing deeper draughtships or fishing vessels to operate safely. (RAN)for amphibious operations or to act in conjunction with minecountermeasure forces in assessing shipping routes which willbe safe from mines.OceanographyOceanography plays a vital role in undersea warfare, notonly for submarines themselves, but also for anti-submarineand mine warfare forces. For efficient operations, these unitsrequire not only an extensive knowledge <strong>of</strong> the watermass inwhich they are operating, but the means to analyse prevailingconditions and predict sensor and weapon performance. Inpeacetime, much effort must go towards the development <strong>of</strong>sophisticated databases <strong>of</strong> watermass characteristics, such astemperature, current and turbidity, and the refinement <strong>of</strong>predictive models. In addition to training and exercises, theseactivities contribute much to weapon and sensor developmentfor the long term. In time <strong>of</strong> conflict, such efforts may requireto be both continued and concentrated within specificoperation areas and the means provided to planners andoperational units to exploit such knowledge in the mosteffective ways. This requires the maintenance <strong>of</strong> a core <strong>of</strong>personnel expert in the subject and skilled in providing theappropriate advice and guidance.MeteorologySimilar requirements apply to the effects <strong>of</strong> weather onnaval operations. Planners and commanders need to draw oncomprehensive databases, well developed prediction systemsand expert analysts. In time <strong>of</strong> peace, the gathering <strong>of</strong> datawithin expected areas <strong>of</strong> operation is a constant activity by al 1units, while the effects <strong>of</strong> weather need to be clearlyunderstood by those developing operational concepts and newweapons and sensors. In the operational environment,meteorologists arc vital contributors towards ensuring thatunits are deployed and operated to best effect within theprevailing conditions. J,


AmphibiousWatercraft go aheadA computer generated image <strong>of</strong> the Army's newMinister for Defence Robert Hill hasannounced the signing <strong>of</strong> a S32.73million contract with Newcastleshipbuilder ADI Limited for the designand construction <strong>of</strong> six AmphibiousWatercraft for the <strong>Australia</strong>n Army.Senator Hill also announced that acontract for SI0.66 million has beenconcurrently signed with ADI Limitedto provide 15 years through life supportfor the watercraft.<strong>The</strong>se lightweight vessels, to be builtfrom aluminium and powered by twodiesel engines and wateijet propulsion,will build on the total amphibiouscapability <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Australia</strong>n DefenceForce.<strong>The</strong> new watercraft will enable theArmy to deploy greater amounts <strong>of</strong>tanks, vehicles, soldiers and suppliesfrom ship to beach in a significantlyshorter time than is currently possiblewith the existing LCM 8 capabilityIn particular, the new watercraft willimprove the discharge rate <strong>of</strong> unloadingcargo by more than 30^.Senator Hill said the new watercraftwill be carried on the decks <strong>of</strong> the Royal<strong>Australia</strong>n <strong>Navy</strong> ships HMASMANOORA and KANIMBLA. <strong>The</strong>craft will be based in Townsville at die10 Force Support Battalion at all othertimes.'This project is expected to create40 jobs in the Newcastle area." SenatorHill said.When the watercraft are introducedinto service they will be maintained inTownsville by ADI Limited through aFlash Trafficsub-contract with a local company,which will create additionalemployment in the area.<strong>The</strong> first watercraft is planned toundergo extensive trials late next yearwith the final craft expected to befinished in 2005.RAN patrol boattenders short listedThree companies have been shortlistedto tender for the supply <strong>of</strong> patrol boatsfor the Royal <strong>Australia</strong>n <strong>Navy</strong>, afterthey were endorsed by Defence MinisterRobert Hill.<strong>The</strong> shortlisted tenderers are ADI.Defence Maritime Services partneringwith Austal. and Tenix.ADI would construct the boats inNewcastle. DMS and Tenix in Perth -providing significant economic andemployment opportunities in theseareas.Competition for the final shortlist togo on to stage two <strong>of</strong> the contractprocess was intense - highlighting thefact that <strong>Australia</strong> has a competitivesmall vessel shipbuilding industry.Nine companies provided tenders,seven <strong>of</strong> which qualified to produce thevessels.<strong>The</strong> RPB project is designed toprovide replacements for the RAN'sFremantle-class patrol boats (FCPBs).<strong>The</strong> new Patrol Boats are expected tocost approximately $375 million. <strong>The</strong>ywill be expected to provide over 3,000operational sea days per year, 1,800days will be directed towardsCoastwatch operations, plus a surgecapacity <strong>of</strong> 600 additional days per yearto deal with short-warning missions.<strong>The</strong> current FCPB fleet averages around2,700 operational sea days per year. <strong>The</strong>new boats will be larger and haveimproved seakeeping abilities over theFCPBs as well as a range <strong>of</strong> 3.000nm.(or 25% greater than the FCPBs).Maximum continuous speed shall be noless than 25kt.<strong>The</strong> shortlisted companies will beinvited to provide detailed tenderproposals by the end <strong>of</strong> October.Defence expects to be in a position torecommend to Government a preferredtenderer by late this year, with a view tosigning the in the new year.This would ensure the replacementpatrol boats would be ready for servicein the second half <strong>of</strong> 2004. consistentwith the Government's 2000 DefenceWhite Paper commitments.<strong>The</strong> new Patrol Boats will have theability to carry an additional 20personnel for emergencies in a separatefacility isolated and lockable from theboats other spaces. <strong>The</strong>y will carry tworigid-hull inflatable boats, no less than6m long and capable <strong>of</strong> sustaining 25ktin sea state 4 when fully laden, and anunrefuelcd range <strong>of</strong> lOOnm at 12kt. <strong>The</strong>patrol boats will have a full electroopticalsuite for day/night surveillanceoperations. <strong>The</strong> system must be capable,in tropical conditions, to detect a fishingboat at a range <strong>of</strong> 12km: detect a personin the water at 1.000m; and classify afishing boat at l()km. Radar andsearchlight will also be fitted.<strong>The</strong> boats will be armed with a25mm stabilized lightweight gun(similar to that found on the Huon classMCM). supported by two 12.7mmmachine guns.One <strong>of</strong> the short listed patrol boats.Sixth Indiansubmarine to haveClub-S missile system<strong>The</strong> Zvyozdochka shipbuilding plant inSeverodvinsk is to refit, repair andupgrade the Indian <strong>Navy</strong> Kilo diesclelectricsubmarine INS SINDHUGOSHunder the terms <strong>of</strong> a contract signed inDelhi between Russia's arms exportagency Rosoboronexport and the IndianMinistry <strong>of</strong> Defence.INS SINDHUGOSH. built by theAdmiralty Shipyard in St Petersburg,was commissioned into the Indian <strong>Navy</strong>in 1986.18 VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. I THE NAVYSINDHUGOSH arrived in Russialast month and will become the thirdIndian Kilo to be refitted andmodernised at the Severodvinsk yard.SINDHURAJ and SINDHUKKSARI.have been upgraded at the AdmiraltyShipyard in St Petersburg.<strong>The</strong> modernisation refit, due tobe completed in 2004. will seeSINDHUGOSH retr<strong>of</strong>itted with theClub-S strike missile system (whichincorporates 22()km-range 3M-54Eanti-ship cruise missiles, see page 11this edition) developed by the NovatorDesign Bureau. It is also possible thatSINDHUGOSH may also be equippedwith the 3M-I4E land-attack cruisemissile also associated with the Club-Ssystem.Acceptance trials <strong>of</strong> the Indian<strong>Navy</strong>'s first three modernised Project877EKM Kilo class submarinesinvolved six successful 3M-54E testlaunches, demonstrating both minimum(20km) and maximum range capabilityagainst surface targets. However, in April2001 a missile launched on an IndianOcean test range failed to hit its target.June's Defence Weekly reported afault with the target on the test rangewas subsequently blamed for the failure:an anchored target with a corner radarreflector simulating a frigate-classsurface ship was displaced, and thereflector began to radiate signals in adirection perpendicular to a flighttrajectory <strong>of</strong> the missile's thirdsupersonic stage. As a result, the ARGS-54 seeker failed to acquire the target.All three <strong>of</strong> the Indian <strong>Navy</strong>'sProject 1135.6 ships will be armed withthe Club-N missile system, consisting <strong>of</strong>an eight-cell vertical launchcr andonboard missile-planning and launchcontrolsystem. A Garpun-Bal radarsystem will provide targeting data.Largest class evergraduates fromCRESWELL<strong>The</strong> RAN College HMAS CRESWELLhas graduated the largest intake <strong>of</strong> newentry <strong>of</strong>ficers in its history.One hundred and five <strong>of</strong>ficerspassed out <strong>of</strong> the College in what wasthe culmination <strong>of</strong> two days <strong>of</strong>ceremonies. <strong>The</strong>se began with aCeremonial Sunset and then the PassingOut Parade itself, reviewed by the thenTHE NAVYChief <strong>of</strong> the Defence Force. ADMLChris Barrie. in one <strong>of</strong> his last <strong>of</strong>ficialengagements before leaving the <strong>Navy</strong>and the ADF. Admiral Barrie himselfjoined the Naval College in 1961.Visitors to the Ceremonial Sunsetsaw the tradition <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Australia</strong>nNational Rag and the <strong>Navy</strong>'s WhiteEnsign lowered together, to the music <strong>of</strong>the Royal <strong>Australia</strong>n <strong>Navy</strong> band and thesalute <strong>of</strong> an armed guard. <strong>The</strong> eveninggun was fired, signalling the last nightthe class <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers would have asinitial trainees.<strong>The</strong> passing out parade, which washeld the following morning, saw thenew class arrayed in their finestuniforms and assembled once again asan armed guard. <strong>The</strong>y were joined bytheir instructors and staff <strong>of</strong> the Royal<strong>Australia</strong>n Naval College, under thecommand <strong>of</strong> CAPT Andrew Cawley. onthe quarterdeck <strong>of</strong> the college. Manydistinguished visitors both Service andcivilian also watched the parade, as wellas families and friends <strong>of</strong> the trainees.A sad note in the proceedings wasthe mention <strong>of</strong> the death <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> thetrainees some weeks before graduation.MIDN Robert Maguire died in a caraccident.At the end <strong>of</strong> the parade, a marchpast. ADML Barrie took the salute. <strong>The</strong>award <strong>of</strong> prizes and a flyover followed.<strong>The</strong> new <strong>of</strong>ficers then celebrated withCDF. the college staff, members <strong>of</strong> theirfamily and friends.By LEUT Tom Lewis. NAVY NEWSUS ERGM flight testsuccessIn a first-<strong>of</strong>-a-kind test. Team ERGM'successfully fired a precision guidedprojectile from a representative gunsystem and guided it to a designatedtarget area last June. <strong>The</strong> flight testexceeded tactical end-game accuracyrequirements, and the test demonstratedterminal accuracy performance soonerthan called for in the program'sdevelopment plan.Led by Raytheon Company and theNaval Surface Warfare Center DahlgrenDivision, the All Up Round (AUR)guided flight <strong>of</strong> the Extended RangeGuided Munition (ERGM) took place atWhite Sands Missile Range, N. M.In the flight test. ERGM waslaunched from a representative Mk45Mod 4 gun system, using a tacticalVOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. Ipropellant charge, and successfullyexecuted navigation and guidance afterglobal positioning system (GPS)acquisition.This flight test achieved all testobjectives.<strong>The</strong> projectile demonstrated propernavigation and guidance despiteexperiencing extreme G-forces duringA cutaway <strong>of</strong> an ERGM showing its deployablewings and submunition warhead.33


gun launch. <strong>The</strong> 18-mega joulepropellant charge impacted theprojectile like a 40 ton hammertravelling at 70 miles per hour, almostimmediately accelerating the round to1.875 mph. <strong>The</strong> test also demonstrated aflight range <strong>of</strong> 39 nautical miles inunder four minutes time <strong>of</strong> flight andairframe stability and control withproper internal system operation.This guided flight test successfullycompleted the subsystem and systemlevel design validation tests <strong>of</strong> theERGM guidance. control andpropulsion systems. <strong>The</strong> final validationtests are planned for next year afterintroduction <strong>of</strong> the new unitarywarhead. This ma.ks the start <strong>of</strong> groundenvironmental and flight performancequalification testing phase, which is theprecursor to fleet deployment."<strong>The</strong> real accomplishment in thistest was demonstration <strong>of</strong> GPSacquisition and navigation over anextended range after a tactical gunlaunch, which we did flawlessly." saidBrian O'Cain. Raytheon's ERGMprogram manager."Unfortunately. range safelyfootprint constraints and the current gunposition prevented us from stretchingERGM' s legs and flying to a longerrange target. With this launch energyand rocket motor we could have easilyexceeded 50 nautical miles".Former <strong>Navy</strong> <strong>League</strong>Federal President DiesJohn Brooke Howsc KsU VRD. FederalPresident <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Navy</strong> <strong>League</strong> fromAugust 1968 to December 1971 andlong-serving ACT President died inCanberra in July aged 88.John Howse served in the RANduring World War II and retired at therank <strong>of</strong> Commander RANVR. He joinedthe <strong>Navy</strong> <strong>League</strong> soon after the war andbecame closely associated with the SeaCadet movement. As a member <strong>of</strong> the<strong>Australia</strong>n Sea Cadet Council, withCouncil Chairman Captain Neil BoaseRAN (the Director <strong>of</strong> Naval Reserves)and Council colleague Ge<strong>of</strong>f Evans(who succeeded him as FederalPresident), he toured <strong>Australia</strong> anddiscussed with State representatives thefuture <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Australia</strong>n Sea CadetCorps, an increasingly expensiveresponsibility <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Navy</strong> <strong>League</strong>. <strong>The</strong>report <strong>of</strong> the three-member committeeled to the formation <strong>of</strong> the NavalReserve Cadets (now <strong>Australia</strong>n <strong>Navy</strong>Cadets) in 1973 as a navalresponsibility. John and his wife.Valerie, continued to support the cadetsas well as other organisations inCanberra for many yearsJohn Howse had a distinguishedcareer in business and was a member <strong>of</strong>the Federal Parliament representing theNSW seal <strong>of</strong> Calare 1946-60. He was aTrustee <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Australia</strong>n War Memorial1967-73.Lockheed Martin-Northrop GrummanTeam selected for USCoast GuardDeepwater project<strong>The</strong> United Stales Coast Guard todayawarded Integrated Coast GuardSystems (ICGS) a contract to carry out afar-reaching modernization program forthe agency's Deepwater forces - theships, aircraft, command and control,and logistics systems that protect theUnited States and support the CoastGuard's many missions. <strong>The</strong> contractwas announced in a ceremony held inWashington. D.C.ICGS - a co-equal partnership <strong>of</strong>Northrop Grumman Corporation andLockheed Martin Corporation - wasawarded a contract valued at USS 11billion to modernize the Coast Guard'sDeepwater assets over a 20-year perit»d.<strong>The</strong> program's total potential valueover three decades is estimatedat approximately USS 17 billion.Deepwater is the largest recapitalisationeffort in the history <strong>of</strong> the US CoastGuard and will involve the acquisition<strong>of</strong> up to 91 ships. 35 fixed-wingaircraft. 34 helicopters. 76 unmannedsurveillance aircraft, and upgrade <strong>of</strong>49 existing cutters and 93 helicopters,in addition to systems forcommunications, surveillance andcommand and control."<strong>The</strong> nation depends on the CoastGuard to protect our homeland andsecure over 95.000 miles <strong>of</strong> shoreline,save lives and protect the environment."said Lockheed Martin chairman andchief executive <strong>of</strong>ficer Vance D.C<strong>of</strong>fman. "We are proud to partner withthe Coast Guard to assure its abilityto meet its evolving missions througha transformational modernizationprogram."Coast Guard Commandant AdmiralThomas H Collins said that theNorthrop Grumman / Lockheed Martinjoint venture <strong>of</strong>fered a superior solution,a strong management approach, a lowriskimplementation strategy and anOpen Business Model, all <strong>of</strong>which address the Coast Guard'smodernization needs. Thisperformance-based contract willdevelop, acquire, and sustain anaffordable, integrated system <strong>of</strong> surface,air. command, and logistics assets,while maximizing operationaleffectiveness at the lowest possible totalownership cost.ICGS will manage over 100companies from 32 states, as well asfour international teammates, toimplement its comprehensive plan forthe Coast Guard. <strong>The</strong> ICGS OpenBusiness Model 1 N1 approach maximizescompetition and assures best value to theCoast Guard and the American taxpayerthroughout the life <strong>of</strong> the program.ICGS has structured a program thatwill greatly enhance the US CoastGuard's core system capability withinthe first five years <strong>of</strong> the contract, andensure a low-risk transition to the fullvision <strong>of</strong> the Deepwater system. In thefirst five years. ICGS will:• Provide a network centric capability<strong>of</strong> robust C4ISR (Command. Control.Communications. Computers.Beginning to end. (Left) a Tactical Tomahawk, the next generation <strong>of</strong>Tomahawk cruisc missile, launches from its VLS test tube during a contractortest and evaluation. (Right) demonstrating its accuracy for which it isrenowned. Tomahawk provides a long-range, highly survivablc. unmannedland attack weapon system capable <strong>of</strong> pinpoint accuracy. <strong>The</strong> upgradedversion — referred lo as Tactical Tomahawk — adds the capability toreprogram Ihe missile while in-flight lo strike any <strong>of</strong> 15 preprogrammedallemale targets or redirect the missile lo any Global Positioning System(GPS) target coordinates. It also will be able (o loiter over a largcl area forsome hours, and with its on-board TV camera, will allow the warfighlingcommanders to assess battle damage <strong>of</strong> the target, and. if necessary redirectthe missile to any other target. Launched from the <strong>Navy</strong>'s forward-deployedships and submarines. Tactical Tomahawk will provide a greater flexibility toihe on-scene commander. Tactical Tomahawk (Block IV) is due to reach thefleet in 2004. and will supplement the current.VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. 4T1IE NAVY VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. 4


Intelligence. Surveillance, andReconnaissance) resources on newand existing air. land and sea assets• Upgrade older assets until newships, aircraft and systems arefielded• Provide more capable systems withgreater speed, longer endurance, andbelter onboard working spaces, allwith a common integrated supportinfrastructure that will significantlylower operating costs.• Design, build and deploy ihe first <strong>of</strong>a new class <strong>of</strong> cutters for the CoasiGuard - the National Security Cuiter(NSC).ICGS' long-range Deepwatersolution will transform the force intomission-designed, fully integratedassets with complete life-cycle support.Submarines forMalaysia<strong>The</strong> Malaysian Ministry <strong>of</strong> Defence hasawarded European naval shipbuildersDCN International and Izar a contractlo build two medium-size Scorpenesubmarines.A Cutaway model <strong>of</strong> the Scorpene submarinebeing acquired by Malaysia. (DCN)<strong>The</strong> two new-generationconventional attack submarines (SSKs)will be built jointly by DCN and Izar.<strong>The</strong> first, to enter service in 2007. willbe assembled in Cherbourg (France) andthe second, to enter service in 2008. atlzar*s Cartagena shipyard in Spain.<strong>The</strong> Scorpene SSKs - alreadychosen by the Chilean <strong>Navy</strong> (two unitscurrently in production) - feature state-<strong>of</strong>-the-art developments derived directlyfrom France's submarine buildingprograms. <strong>The</strong> Scorpene <strong>of</strong>fer excellentsize- and cost-effectiveness ratios.Designed for missions ranging fromanti-submarine and anti-surface warfareto special operations and intelligencegathering. Scorpene SSKs featureadvances in hull shape and modularconstruction plus a range <strong>of</strong> state-<strong>of</strong>-thearttechnologies. <strong>The</strong> combat systemcombines proven weapons handling andfire control with a complete sensorsuite. It is not known at this stage if AIP(Air Independent Propulsion) will beadded to the contract.Dutch submarine joinsfight on drugs<strong>The</strong> Royal Netherlands <strong>Navy</strong> (RNLN)has revealed that one <strong>of</strong> its Walrus-classsubmarines has been deployed tothe Caribbean to conduct covertsurveillance missions in the fightagainst drugs.HrMs ZEELEEUW has beenengaged in detecting, tracking andreporting suspect ship movements(including suspicious speedboats) <strong>of</strong>fthe coasts <strong>of</strong> Colombia and Venezuelasince May. using its towed array sonar,hull-mounted sonar and above-watersensors such as periscopes andelectronic support measures masts.HrMs ZEELEEUW worked jointlywith Dutch P-3C Orions. frigates andother patrol assets assigned to the areain order to relieve USN assets for theWar on Terror.<strong>The</strong> 2,800-tonne diesel-electricsubmarine has also taken part in a US<strong>Navy</strong>-run Prospective CommandingOfficers Course <strong>of</strong>f Puerto Rico, actingas sparring partner to the Los AngelesclassSSNs USS HARTFORD andJACKSONVILLE.Greece orders fourthType 214Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft (HDW)has won a EUR700 million (US$695m)contract to build a fourth Type 214 airindependentpropulsion submarine forthe Hellenic <strong>Navy</strong>. <strong>The</strong> boat, like two<strong>of</strong> three already on order, will beconstructed at the HDW-ownedHellenic Shipyards in Skaramanga nearAthens.A German Type 212 starling sea trials. <strong>The</strong> 212and 214 share many similar features.FEARLESS forBrazil?It is understood that the Brazilian <strong>Navy</strong>is negotiating w ith the UK to acquire theformer RN amphibious assault shipHMS FEARLESS.FEARLESS was the last steampoweredship in the RN and retired fromservice in March <strong>of</strong> this year after 37years <strong>of</strong> service. During its final eightmonthdeployment the vessel operatedin the Gulf as part <strong>of</strong> Exercise "Sail"Sareea II' (see THE NAVY <strong>Vol</strong> <strong>64</strong> No. I.pp 24- 28) and then participated inOperation 'Veritas'. the UKcontribution to the US-led OperationEnduring Freedom.Currently alongside at PortsmouthNaval Base. FEARLESS is due to moveto a lay-up berth in the base pending afinal decision on its disposal.A British Army Lynx flies past the LPD HMSFEARLESS. FEARLESS may be sold to Braziland see out her days in the South Atlantic, whereshe is no stranger having seen extensive serviceduring Ihe Falklands War. (RN)It is understood that Brazil isinterested in buying both FEARLESSand its decommissioned sister ship.HMS INTREPID, which has been laidup at Portsmouth Naval Base for severalyears as a source <strong>of</strong> spares, with theintention <strong>of</strong> further cannibalisingINTREPID to provide a source <strong>of</strong> sparesand components for its sister vessel.However, there are now contraryindications that while INTREPID will beused as a source <strong>of</strong> spares, the ship itselfmay not form part <strong>of</strong> the sales package.India and Franceconduct naval exerciseIndia and France conducted joint navalmanoeuvres in the Arabian Sea in mid-May as part <strong>of</strong> Exercise 'Varuna II".their second bilateral exercise in asmany years. Held <strong>of</strong>f Goa. this was thefirst time a French aircraft carrier hastaken part in a joint exercise with theIndian <strong>Navy</strong>.Participating in 'Varuna II' wereFrench aircraft carrier CHARLES DEGAULLE and the guided-missiledestroyer CASSARD: India contributedthe Rajput (Kashin ID-class destroyerINS RANVIJAY and Godavari-cl'assfrigate INS GODAVARI. French SuperEtendard and Rafale M fighter aircraftand four Indian Sea Harrier FRS.5l'salso took part. India decided towithdraw INS VIRAAT. its only aircraftcarrier, from the exercise at the lastmoment because <strong>of</strong> tensions withPakistan."As India is a democracy and has apowerful navy, it's important for us toexercise with it and build up confidencein areas <strong>of</strong> mutual interest." said RearAdm Francois Cluzel. the French taskforce commander.Indian Minister <strong>of</strong> Defence GeorgesFcrnandes visited CHARLES DEGAULLE on 14 May with Chief <strong>of</strong>the Indian <strong>Navy</strong> Adm MadvcndraSingh. <strong>The</strong> aim <strong>of</strong> 'Varuna II' was toimprove defence co-operation andinteroperability between India andFrance.Argentina seeksaircraft carrierArgentina has again articulated itsaspiration for an aircraft carriercapability, despite the country'seconomic disaster.Argentina has been without a carriersince 1988. when the UK-builtVEINTICINCO DE MAYO was retiredto undertake a US$200 million refit,which was never completed due tobudget cuts. In the mid-1990s Argentinawas <strong>of</strong>fered the French aircraft carrierCLEMENCEAU. but could notafford it.In 2001 Brazil <strong>of</strong>fered its ownageing 17,500-tonne carrier. MINA1SGERAIS. following its acquisition <strong>of</strong>the SAO PAULO (ex-FOCH). for onlyUS$2 million, to be used for training<strong>The</strong> Brazilian Majestic class carrier MIN'AISGERAIS with an Argentine Super Etendardlanding. <strong>The</strong> Brazilian and Argentine navies airarms arc developing a joint air group to operatefrom Brazil's new aircraft carrier. SAO PAULO.purposes. However, the <strong>of</strong>fer wasdeclined because <strong>of</strong> the carrier*?inability to launch any <strong>of</strong> Argentina'saircraft fully loaded.<strong>The</strong> Argentine <strong>Navy</strong>'s aims to buildan aviation-capable principal ship, witha displacement <strong>of</strong> 15.000-20.000tonnes, to be built in the next decade,comes under a project called 'PlanApolo'.While plans arc being formulatedthe air arms <strong>of</strong> Argentian and Brazilhave conducted another joint exerciseto hone and retain carrier air powerskills.Between 1-5 May. surface vesselsand aircraft <strong>of</strong> the Armada dc laRcpublica Argentina (ARA) took part ina joint exercise. ARAEX <strong>2002</strong>. with theBrazilian <strong>Navy</strong> <strong>of</strong>f the Argentine coast,vessels included Brazil's Clemenceauclassaircraft carrier SAO PAULO (A12). For five days Super Etendards andS-2ET TracKers operated alongsideBrazilian A-4 Sky Hawks from theflight deck <strong>of</strong> SAO PAULO.Since the exercise both navies havebegun talks to create a joint Brazilian-Argentine air group.Since 1998 half <strong>of</strong> the Brazilian<strong>Navy</strong>'s combat pilot trainees have beentrained by the US <strong>Navy</strong>, the other halfby the Argentine <strong>Navy</strong> in its NavalAviation School at Punta Indio.However, due to costs and a Brazilian<strong>Navy</strong> assessment <strong>of</strong> newly graduatedpilots, which demonstrated that thosetrained by the Argentines performedbetter, the Brazilian <strong>Navy</strong> plans to sendall <strong>of</strong> its fixed-wing combat aviationtrainees to Argentina.Aegis Baseline 7.1testing completeLockheed Martin Naval Electronic &Surveillance Systems (NE&SS)-SurfaceSystems has completed equipmenttesting <strong>of</strong> the latest iteration <strong>of</strong> the US<strong>Navy</strong>'s Aegis Weapon System, knownas Baseline 7.1.<strong>The</strong> Arleigh Burkc-class guidedmissiledestroyer USS PINCKNEY(DDG-91) will be the first ship toreceive the Baseline 7.1 fit. withinstallation planned to take placetowards the end <strong>of</strong> this year.Major enhancements have beenmade within Baseline 7.1. includingtheatre ballistic missile (TBM)detection and tracking, improved littoralwarfare capability, and increased targethandling and detection sensitivity.This latest Aegis system configurationalso includes the new AN/SPY-1 D(V)radar, and further migrates the overallsystem to a commercial <strong>of</strong>f-the-shelfcomputing architecture. Offering muchimproved performance in clutteredlittoral environments. SPY-ID(V) alsoincorporates a new Linear TrackProcessor to expand capability to theTBM defence mission.First South AfricanMEKO corvettenamed<strong>The</strong> first MEKO A200 corvette for theSouth African <strong>Navy</strong> (SAN).AMATOLA, was named at theBlohm+Voss shipyard in Hamburg on7 June.<strong>The</strong> first and third corvettes are tobe constructed at Blohm+Voss inHamburg, with HDW building thesecond and fourth <strong>of</strong> class in Kiel.Blohm+Voss will conduct sea trials forthe AMATOLA in November, followingwhich it is expected to be transferredin late December to South Africa.<strong>The</strong> SAN plans to commission theAMATOLA in August 2004.<strong>The</strong> SAN MEKO A20()s are to befitted with eight EADS AerospatialeExocet MM 40 Block II surface-tosurfacemissiles, a vertical-launchingsystem with 16 South AfricanUmkhonto surface-to-air missiles, arefurbished 76mm Oto Melara gunmount taken from the SAN's Warriorfast-attack craft and a 35mm dual-22VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO.ITHE NAVYTHE NAVY VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. I 33


Lifted from the OCCM floor. the revolving gun turret from the Civil War ironclad USS MONITORbreaks the surface <strong>of</strong> the Atlantic Ocean <strong>of</strong>f the coast <strong>of</strong> Cape Haitcras. N.C.. and is placeJ ontothe 300-foot derrick barge Woum. <strong>The</strong> raising <strong>of</strong> the 120-ton turret climaxed a five-year salvageoperation run by the U.S. <strong>Navy</strong> and the National Oceanic and Aimosphcnc Administration(NOAAl. which controls the underwater sanctuary where the wreckage is located. Since itsdesignation as the nations first marine sanctuary in 1975. MONITOR has been the subject <strong>of</strong>intense archaeological investigation. U.S. <strong>Navy</strong> divers assigned to Mobile Diving and SalvageUnit 2 (MDSU-2) provided expert deep-sea salvage crews to assist NOAA in the recovery <strong>of</strong> theship's gun turret. 11 inch Dahlgren cannons, and other artifacts from the historic ship. <strong>The</strong> turretstill shows dents from cannon balls shot at it by the Confederate ironclad CSS VIRGINIA in thet.minus battle in Hampton Roads. (USNIpurpose gun supplied by Denel. <strong>The</strong>corvettes will also be able to carry oneAgusta West land Super Lynx helicopter.USN to home-portSSNs at GuamInitial USN home-porting <strong>of</strong> nuclearpoweredattack submarines (SSNs) inGuam is on track to begin later this year.Plans call for a total <strong>of</strong> three SSNs to bebased there, starting with the USS CITY24OF CORPUS CHRISTI in October<strong>2002</strong>. <strong>The</strong> USS SAN FRANCISCO willjoin it in November <strong>2002</strong> and a thirdstill undetermined boat will arrive inFebruary 2004.Home porting <strong>of</strong> assets outside theUS is seen as a way <strong>of</strong> increasingavailability <strong>of</strong> the capability. By basingsubmarines at Guam instead <strong>of</strong> thecontinental US the transit time for thosesubmarines to and from a patrol area,such as the Persian Gulf, is reduced byVOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. Ihalf. Although the plan requires anentire crew-rotation after each patrolthis is seen as a minor point with theadvantages <strong>of</strong> having more assetsavailable outweighing any other issues.After a certain period the asset can berotated back the US for maintenanceand another take its place. US studieshave shown that foreign porting <strong>of</strong>assets to reduce transit time will provideat least twice the availability rates forthe platform thus providing a forcemultiplier effect.Taiwan to launchstealth patrol boat<strong>The</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> China (Taiwan) haslaunched the first prototype <strong>of</strong> a 150-tonne stealth-designed fast attackmissile patrol boat (PCFG) inKaohsiung.Developed by the ROC <strong>Navy</strong>'s ShipDevelopment Centre, the design isintended to reduce the radar and infraredsignatures <strong>of</strong> the patrol boat.Dubbed the Kuang Hua-6'(Glorious China) programme, the navyplans to begin building 30 boats inOctober 2003 to replace its ageing 47-tonne Hai Ou-class (Sea Gull) PCFGs.<strong>The</strong> new patrol boats will carry fourHsiung Fcng-2 (Brave Wind) anti-shipmissiles (see pp 10-11 this edition),compared to the Hai Ou-class. whichonly carries two older Hsiung Feng-1missiles.Typhoon SSBNcompletes refit<strong>The</strong> nuclear-powered ballistic missilesubmarine (SSBN) TK-208. originallycommissioned in 1985. completedits scheduled refit at theSevmashpredpriyatiye shipyard atSeverodvinsk on 26 June.After trials (reportedly scheduled tolast until 2005). the TK-208. nowrenamed DMITRI DONSKOI (after thelegendary Muscovite hero), will rejointhe Northern Fleet based at Nerpichya inZapadnaya Litsa. <strong>The</strong> refit was intendedto keep the submarine in service until2010.<strong>The</strong> refit has taken over 10 years tocomplete due to shortages <strong>of</strong> resourcesand has included upgrading thesubmarine through the use <strong>of</strong> systemsand components associated with theTHE NAVYupcoming Project 955 Borei-classSSBN.<strong>The</strong> main armament <strong>of</strong> the TyphoonclassSSBNs remains 20 RSM-52 (SS-N-20 'Sturgeon') submarine-launchedballistic missiles (SLBMs).Historic gun restoredA significant piece <strong>of</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>'smilitary history is now in better shapethanks to the men and women <strong>of</strong> HMASKANIMBLA. While operating nearChristmas Island during the ships recentOP RELEX II Deployment, severalsailors and soldiers from KANIMBLAexpended much blood and sweat torefurbish a 6-inch gun emplacement andobservation post which overlooksFlying Fish Cove.<strong>The</strong> 6-inch gun was made in 1900and installed at Christmas Island in late1940. It was manned by men from theRoyal Artillery who made up part <strong>of</strong> theisland's garrison. Christmas Island was.and still is. a large supplier <strong>of</strong> Phosphatefor the <strong>Australia</strong>n and South East Asianagricultural market and with thepotential threat <strong>of</strong> war with Japan theislands defences were increased. InFebruary 1942 a Japanese submarinesank a Phosphate carrying vessel <strong>of</strong>fthe island and the gun was fired inanger in an attempt to sink thissubmarine.In March 1942 the Japanese invadedChristmas Island. <strong>The</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> theisland's garrison was made up <strong>of</strong> IndianArmy troops who refused to fight theJapanese. Several <strong>of</strong> these men rose upin a mutiny against the British troops onthe island and murdered them beforesurrendering to the invading Japanese.<strong>The</strong> five Royal Artillery men manningthe 6-inch gun. near Flying Fish Cove,were amongst those killed and theirbodies dumped over the nearby cliffsinto the sea.Following the end <strong>of</strong> World War IIthe gun fell into disrepair. In 1983 amajor restoration <strong>of</strong> the gunemplacement was undertaken. When thesite was visited in July this year,however, it was found Ihe ravages <strong>of</strong>time had taken their toll with the gunshowing substantial weathering and theemplacement and observation post wereovergrown with trees and weeds.An <strong>of</strong>fer was made to the ChristmasIsland Shire Council to refurbish thegun emplacement site and this waseagerly accepted by the Councils ChiefEngineer Mr Gary Dunt (Ex WOETC)and the Island Administrator (CDREBill Taylor. RAN Retired).KANIMBLA's volunteer workparties, consisting <strong>of</strong> both <strong>Navy</strong> andseveral Army personnel embarked,turned to with a will and stripped thegun <strong>of</strong> its layers <strong>of</strong> rust, repainted it andthe emplacements external walls andremoved 20 years worth <strong>of</strong> dust, rubble,weeds and trees. <strong>The</strong> trees surroundingthe observation post were cut down aswere 50 metres <strong>of</strong> thick vegetation onthe seaward side <strong>of</strong> the gun to allowboth lo be more visible to visitorsto the island. Some concreting wasalso undertaken to strengthen theemplacement.<strong>The</strong> historic 6-inch gun on Christmas Island after it was restored by the crew <strong>of</strong> HMAS KANIMBLA.(LCDR Greg Swinden)THE NAVYVOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. I<strong>The</strong> Christmas Island Shire Councilprovided most <strong>of</strong> the tools, concrete andpaint for the venture with KANIMBLAsupplying the muscle. <strong>The</strong>refurbishment took place over severalweekends with groups <strong>of</strong> sailors andsoldiers, voluntarily giving <strong>of</strong> their owntime to ensure this important part <strong>of</strong>Christmas Islands history remains intactand in good condition.<strong>The</strong> site will become pan <strong>of</strong> theChristmas Island Museum linked to thenearby Colonial Administrators House,which is also being refurbished and dueto be opened as a Museum in September<strong>2002</strong>.By Lieutenant Commander Greg Swindcn<strong>Australia</strong>n companieswin systems contractfor German warshipdesignDefence Minister Robert Hill andIndustry Minister Ian Macfarlane havecongratulated the <strong>Australia</strong>n companiesCEA Technologies and Saab Systems<strong>Australia</strong> for their selection in a newwarship design announced by Blohm +Voss GmbH in Germany.<strong>The</strong> CEA-Saab Naval Advanced AirWarfare System was unveiled at theMECON <strong>2002</strong> Conference in Hamburgwhich was attended by naval staff fromover 40 countries.<strong>The</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>n system wasspecifically designed for the Blohm +Voss new generation frigate design. <strong>The</strong>proposed 3,500 tonne frigate would bethe first in the world to incorporateCEA's active phased array radar. Thisradar allows vessels to engage multipletargets at extended range and similarradars have previously only been fittedto ships <strong>of</strong> nearly twice the size.<strong>The</strong> radar is integrated with thelatest evolution <strong>of</strong> Saab CombatManagement System that is based oncommercial <strong>of</strong>f-the-shelf technology,incorporates surface-to-surface andsurface-to-air missile control systemsand illows the vessel to operate withcoalition and US forces."<strong>The</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>n <strong>Navy</strong> plans to fit aproduction system on one <strong>of</strong> our frigateswith a view to undertaking future seatrials." Senator Hill said. "If these trialsare successful, there is the potential for<strong>Australia</strong> to use this system in thefuture."33


Mr Macfarlane said: "This landmarkselection <strong>of</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>n companies toprovide leading edge technology in ahighly competitive international marketclearly illustrates the technicalknowledge and innovative practices<strong>Australia</strong>n defence industry possesses."VADM Taylor passesawayIt is with regret lhat THE NAVYmaga/.ine notes the passing <strong>of</strong> a formerChief <strong>of</strong> <strong>Navy</strong>. Vice Admiral RodneyCiraham Taylor.VADM Taylor joined the RAN in1954 as a Junior Entry CadetMidshipman and graduated from theRoyal <strong>Australia</strong>n Naval College in1957. He went on to serve both at homeand abroad.In'addition to serv ing in a number <strong>of</strong>RAN ships, he also served in HerMajesty's Yacht BRITANNIA and laterqualified as a sub-specialist navigator.VADM Taylor saw active service inVietnam and was mentioned indespatches during the first deployment<strong>of</strong> the guided missile destroyer. HMASBRISBANE.Other significant career highlightsincluded service as CommandingOfficer HMAS VAMPIRE (1979-80).Commander Third <strong>Australia</strong>n DestroyerSquadron and Commanding OfficerHMAS TORRENS (1983-85). DeputyFleet Commander and Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff(1987-88). and the inauguralCommodore Flotillas (1989).In 1990 he was promoted to RearAdmiral and held the appointments <strong>of</strong>Assistant Chief <strong>of</strong> Defence Force -Operations (1990-91) and Deputy Chief<strong>of</strong> Naval Staff (1991-94). RADM Taylorwas made an Officer in the Order <strong>of</strong><strong>Australia</strong> in 1992.Promotion to the rank <strong>of</strong> ViceAdmiral followed. along withappointment as Chief <strong>of</strong> Naval Staff inMarch 1994. VADM Taylor served inthis role with great distinction. Duringhis command. VADM Taylor oversawconsiderable development and changein the <strong>Navy</strong>. In this time the first <strong>of</strong> theAnzac class frigates and Collins classsubmarines entered service.VADM TaylorFeeling strong commitment to<strong>Navy</strong>'s people, he continuously stressedthe importance <strong>of</strong> preserving <strong>Navy</strong>'svalues. tradition. ethos andpr<strong>of</strong>essionalism during the defenceefficiency review and the subsequentdefence reform program. In February1997. VADM Taylor's title becameChief <strong>of</strong> <strong>Navy</strong>.ObservationsBy Ge<strong>of</strong>freyCOMMAND CHANGESAs reported elsewhere in THE NAVY, several changes insenior ADF appointments took plate mid-year: the followingcomments relate only to those involving naval personnel.<strong>The</strong> principal change was lhat <strong>of</strong> Chief <strong>of</strong> the DefenceForce (CDF). Admiral Chris Barric handing over to GeneralCosgrove on completion <strong>of</strong> a 4-year term. Pr<strong>of</strong>essionally wellqualified and with a Masters Degree in BusinessAdministration. Admiral Barne commanded Ihe ADF during adifficult period <strong>of</strong> "peacetime' stringency and suddenoperational demands lhat stretched the resources <strong>of</strong> the armedforces lo the limit: the demands were met but continue as achallenge for General Cosgrove. Apart from administrativeskills Admiral Barrie must he given credit for the ADF's partin the East Timor venture, an operation for which the armedIbrecs received much praise.EvansVAI)M Russ Shalders. Viee Chief ul Ihe Detente Forte<strong>The</strong> new Chief <strong>of</strong> N»vy Vitc-Admiral Cllris Rilthie. RAN. AO<strong>The</strong> 100th Super Hornet has been delivered to the USN and is seen here at Boeing s St Louis facility where they are built. (Boeing)VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. 4<strong>The</strong> RAN's chief also changed: Vice Admiral ChrisRitchie replaced Vice Admiral David Shacklelon as Chief <strong>of</strong><strong>Navy</strong> (CN) at the end or the latter's 3 years as head <strong>of</strong>arguably Ihe most stretched <strong>of</strong> the services. Rather likeAdmiral Barric with academic as well as pr<strong>of</strong>essionalqualifications, on appointment VADM Shacklelon tackled hisresponsibilities with vigour and introduced changes in theRAN too numerous lo record in this article - and not allaccepted wilh glee by Old <strong>Navy</strong>' personnel even if they wereprobably necessary.In Ihe writers view VADM Shacklelon did much lo restorethe status <strong>of</strong> CNS/CN as head <strong>of</strong> his service. For some time asvol. M NO. 4RADM Rowan M<strong>of</strong>Tll. Depuly Chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>Navy</strong>.


a result <strong>of</strong> interminable changes in Defence commandarrangements, the role <strong>of</strong> chiefs <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Navy</strong>. Army andAirforce appeared to becoming less important thanhitherto: David Shackleton made it quite clear he was theRAN's boss' even if his operational responsibilitiesremained shared.In terms <strong>of</strong> operational experience. VADM Ritchie took uphis appointment with the advantage <strong>of</strong> having served asCommander <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Australia</strong>n <strong>The</strong>atre (COMAST). MaritimeCommander. Captain <strong>of</strong> the destroyer BRISBANE duringthe Gulf War and other significant naval and defenceappointments: Given the troubled international scene hisappointment would seem to be a bonus for the <strong>Navy</strong> - and for<strong>Australia</strong>.<strong>The</strong> DeputiesIf their immediate superiors arc pr<strong>of</strong>essionally experienced,the same can be said <strong>of</strong> the deputies who were also appointedmid-year.Due to space considerations it is hard to do justice to thecareers <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>ficers named in Observatitms: that <strong>of</strong>the Vice Chief <strong>of</strong> the Defence Force (VCDF). VADM RussShalders. is no exception. Since graduating Irom Ihe RANC in1971 VADM Shalders has had a wide variety <strong>of</strong> sea and shoreappointments and undertaken advanced courses in the UK.<strong>Australia</strong> and USA. His sea commands include Ihe PNGDefence Force patrol boat SAMARAI (in 1975 as aLieutenant) and HMA Ships SYDNEY. DARWIN (during (heGulf War I and PERTH: He has also served as CommodoreFlotillas and came lo the public's notice when as a R-'arAdmiral he was seconded to Ihe Customs Department in 1999as the inaugural Director General <strong>of</strong> Coasi watch and built thatmulti-departmental body into a cohesive organisation. Prior tohis appointment as VCDF VADM Shalders was Head <strong>of</strong> theDefence Personnel Executive.Like other seaman <strong>of</strong>ficers before him. Deputy Chief <strong>of</strong><strong>Navy</strong> RADM Rowan M<strong>of</strong>filt (1975 RANC graduate) servedhis apprenticeship in patrol boats and specialised in surfacewarfare and navigation: he served as navigator in TORRENS.BRISBANE (and later as XO. acting Commanding Officerand Commanding Officer). HOBART and as staff navigator tothe patrol boat and mine warfare commander. RADM M<strong>of</strong>filtcommanded NEWCASTLE as well as BRISBANE. His lasttwo appointments were as Director General <strong>Navy</strong> CapabilityManagement and Commander <strong>of</strong> the ADF Warfare Centre atRAAF base. Williamlown.It is sometimes said that Deputies are akin to the fifthspoke in a wheel - <strong>of</strong> use only if a main spoke fails. This is farfrom the case with the VCDF and DCN who have extensiveresponsibilities in their own right as well as understudyingtheir chief. <strong>The</strong>se responsibilities will be outlined in a futureissue <strong>of</strong> THE NAVY.Statistics can be InterestingArriving too late on the Observations desk to be included inan earlier issue <strong>of</strong> THE NAVY, the May US Naval Institute'sjournal PROCEEDINGS contained a review <strong>of</strong> Ihe USmerchant marine and maritime industry and information likelyto be <strong>of</strong> interest to THE NAVY'S marilime-oricnialed readet*.Some <strong>of</strong> this information follows:-Top 20 Maritime Shipping Nations by DeadweighttonnageNation/Ownership orParent Company1 Greece 1 Panama2 Japan 2 Liberia3 Norway/NIS 3 Greece4 United Stales 4 Malta5 China 5 Bahamas6 Hong Kong 6 Cyprus7 German} 7 SingaporeNation/Ship Registry8 South Korea 8 Norway/NIS9 Taiwan 9 China10 UK 10 Hong Kong11 Singaporc 11 Marshall Islands12 IX* n mark 12 United Slates13 Russia 13 Japan14 Italy 14 India15 India 15 St. Vincent & <strong>The</strong> Grenadines16 Saudi Arabia 16 Italy17 Turkey 17 Isle <strong>of</strong> Man18 Sweden 18 Turkey19 Brazil 19 South Africa20 Belgium 20 Philippinesll will be noted that there is scarcely any relationshipbetween the ship's ow ner and Ihe (lag il wears. Also, that ourisland trading nation is not mentioned (it is understood to beabout thirtieth) regrettably reflecting the disinterest <strong>of</strong> mosl<strong>Australia</strong>ns in the shipping industry.VOI.. M NO 4In Ihe review the principal shipbuilding countries arestated lo be:Cargo ships: Japan 40%. South Korea .30%:Passenger Ships: Finland. Italy and France.It is sad lo note the absence <strong>of</strong> the United Kingdom as amajor shipbuilder but il has been reported thai the decline inBritish shipping has been arrested and overall, the maritimeindustry is the largest in Europe.Rather surprisingly for Ihe world's largest trading nation(some 2 billion tonnes <strong>of</strong> cargo pass through US Ports andwaterways annually) 95% <strong>of</strong> inward cargoes are carried inforeign-flag ships: <strong>The</strong> outwards figures is also high althoughspecific cargoes must be carried in nationally owned vessels.To compare. <strong>Australia</strong>n ports handled 550.122,000 tonnes in2000/1. while almost 97% <strong>of</strong> our trade - imports and exports- is transported in foreign ships*. <strong>The</strong> US alsooperates/maintains a substantial number <strong>of</strong> merchant shipsrequired or earmarked for military purposes.Cabotage, the name given lo legislation designed toprotect a nation's coastal shipping, is in force in the UnitedSlates and some fifty other countries including <strong>Australia</strong>: In<strong>Australia</strong> however, it is by no means strictly enforced and theissue <strong>of</strong> so called 'single voyage' permits (which in practicecan be extended almost indefinitely) allow foreign ships totransport coastal cargoes at the expense <strong>of</strong> the local industry.(•) Local statistics hy cnurtcsy <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Australia</strong>n Shipowners AssociationTHE NAVY<strong>Australia</strong>n <strong>Navy</strong> Foundation Day"CRESWELL ORATION"101st Anniversary CelebrationBirth oT the RAN<strong>The</strong> Leap From Obsolete Monitor To Battle Cruiser In Four YearsA Periscope Perspective<strong>The</strong> ships inherited by ihe new <strong>Australia</strong>n Commonwealth<strong>Navy</strong> at Federation in 1901 were tired, old and inadequateeven for training. Creswell's report to Minister Playford inSeptember 1905 paints a pretty grim picture:• No new ships or <strong>of</strong>ficers for 20 years.• Only two active and fit Lieutenants on the permanentlist <strong>of</strong> three.• a service on the verge <strong>of</strong> collapse and slowly dying.When the order was placed Ihrce years later on 8December 1909 for a Baltic Cruiser, two Cruiser, and twosubmarines, permanent personnel strength was virtuallyunchanged from that at Federation, when it was 239 <strong>of</strong>ficersand men.Less than four years later, on 4 October 1913 the Reel <strong>of</strong>Ihe new ly horn Royal <strong>Australia</strong>n <strong>Navy</strong> enter Sydney Harbour:• Bailie Cruiser. HMAS AUSTRALIA at 19.200 Ions• Light cruisers SYDNEY. MELBOURNE <strong>of</strong> 5.400 ions• Destroyers PARRAMATTA. YARRA. WARREOO <strong>of</strong>700 tonnes - (lo an <strong>Australia</strong>n instigated design)<strong>The</strong> two submarines AE 1 and AE 2. arrived in Sydney on24 May 1914 lo complete the Fleet Unit. <strong>The</strong> RAN strengththen stood al 3.800 men. 850 loaned by Royal <strong>Navy</strong> and 2950permanent members <strong>of</strong> the RAN.This was an enormous project by any measure.<strong>The</strong> slory leading up to this extraordinary achievement isIhe topic <strong>of</strong> my talk today.Limitations <strong>of</strong> Periscopes & My NavalHistoryThose who have looked through a periscope protruding2-3ft above the surface will know the limited field <strong>of</strong> view andhorizon (<strong>of</strong>ten the hack <strong>of</strong> the next wave), which is beheld.This is a relatively new area <strong>of</strong> naval history for me and I amconscious many in ihe audience will be belter versed in itthan I!I have drawn heavily on written work by GeorgeMacandie. David Stevens. Peter Firkins. Chris Coullhard -Clark and Michael White. David Campbell has kindlyprovided critical oversight. However, the analysis andconclusions are mine. If anyone apart from me should attractnonce it is John Wilkins for inviting a submariner to speak onsuch a topic!I will consider Ihe topic in five parts:• <strong>The</strong> historical setting,• Some <strong>of</strong> the Strategic factors at play,• <strong>The</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> technology changes underway duringthe period,• What was actually done to bring alt this about, and• Finally, lake a punt al /ho was the father for thisextraordinary prodigy?<strong>The</strong> Historical Setting<strong>The</strong> Royal <strong>Navy</strong> had a long history <strong>of</strong> involvement in<strong>Australia</strong>'s early political and social life. <strong>The</strong>ir perspectiveswere <strong>of</strong>ten cast with the wider world situation in mind -Address to the Na\y <strong>League</strong>'s Victorian Divisitmby Rear Admiral Peter Brings AO. CSC. RAN (Rtd)VOL M NO 4<strong>The</strong> first naval hoanl: front r.iw (L-Rl. Creswell. Scnalor Pcarcc and CaptHughes-Onslow. Back row IL-R). Manisty and Clarfcumcompetition with France. Spain and Russia in the nineteenthcentury, Germany and Japan in the early years <strong>of</strong> the 2


<strong>The</strong> (ileal While Heel ol Ihe USN enlennf Sidnei lldihHir <strong>The</strong> ISA became a Pacific po.er and Ihe visil ol Ihe Greal While Heel in Apnl IHW. al iheiMIation ol Prime MiniMer. Allied IJealun. made a freal impouon .HI Ihe local populace Il was a -llalefK |«.mlel lolhe lulure ollhe <strong>Australia</strong>n Nav)<strong>The</strong>> argued strenuously at a succession <strong>of</strong> ImperialDefence conferences for Ihe need for unity <strong>of</strong> command. <strong>The</strong>yregarded the local forces wilh disdain and refused to allow anylinks between them and the Royal <strong>Navy</strong>. Matters <strong>of</strong> navalpolicy were best left lo ihe Admiralty, they fell! Al Federationin 190i the Federal Parliament gained powers lo make lawsfor the naval and military defence <strong>of</strong> the Commonwealth<strong>The</strong>re were obviously many high priority issues and with80'* <strong>of</strong> customs ami excise monies going lo Ihe Slates for thefirst 10 years there were few' funds available for Defence.Those funds available were heavily biased toward preparingmilitary forcesCreswell's report to the Minister <strong>of</strong> Defence in September1905 argued Ihe strategic folly <strong>of</strong> preparing Ihe Army inpreference lo nav al forces for the defence <strong>of</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>.He complains <strong>of</strong> a 15:1 ratio <strong>of</strong> expenditure in favour <strong>of</strong>the Army.He argued, for the Army lo have been called into action, itfollows thai the <strong>Navy</strong> would have first had lo be defeated atsea.Since lhat defeat was inevitable (because ihe <strong>Navy</strong> wasinadequate) il was logical to invest in an Army. Some wouldsay lhai the Alice in Wonderland appeal <strong>of</strong> thai argumenlsurvives to this day.<strong>The</strong> Federal Parliament seems lo have been in constantturmoil <strong>The</strong>re were It) Defence Ministers between 1901 and1910 - the brief for the incoming Minister must have beenwell polished!<strong>The</strong> Naval Agreement Acts <strong>of</strong> 1902-03 extended the Royal<strong>Navy</strong> role, increased Ihe capacity <strong>of</strong> the Royal <strong>Navy</strong>'sSquadron based on <strong>Australia</strong> ports, but left control solely wilhIhe Admiralty. Some locals were trained and three drill ships,lo he manned as far a possible by locals, were planned. Eightcadetships were <strong>of</strong>fered annually for <strong>Australia</strong>ns lo be trainedas <strong>of</strong>ficers wilh the Royal <strong>Navy</strong>.Following his appointment as <strong>The</strong> Director <strong>of</strong> NavalForces in December I9(M. Captain Creswell tabled the first <strong>of</strong>his plans in June 1905. He recommended a navy based on:• 3 x 3,000 ton destroyers.• 16 x 550 ton torpedo boat destroyers and• 13 torpedo boats.<strong>The</strong> focus was on coastal defence.Al the same time, following the arrival <strong>of</strong> Jackie Fisher asIhe First Sea Lord. Ihe Admiralty had shifted its stance. Itadvised the Committee <strong>of</strong> Imperial Defence not lo oppose theestablishment <strong>of</strong> an <strong>Australia</strong>n <strong>Navy</strong>. Progress! However, theForeign and Colonial Office overruled this new foundpragmatism.Annual contributions grew to Slg 200.000. <strong>The</strong> localsgrew more unhappy and nervous.<strong>The</strong> Strategic Setting<strong>The</strong> reason for this grow ing concern in <strong>Australia</strong> lay wilhinternational developments in Europe and. more particularlytheir impact in Ihe Pacific <strong>The</strong> German Easl Asiatic CruiserSquadron based in China was modem and more capable thanthe Royal <strong>Navy</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>n Squadron.<strong>The</strong> growing power <strong>of</strong> Japan was also a major concern in<strong>Australia</strong>. Japan's navy had been trained by ihe Royal <strong>Navy</strong>and modernised wilh Brilish designed ships. <strong>The</strong> likelyinterruption <strong>of</strong> maritime trade in the event <strong>of</strong> hostilities wasviewed w ilh concern in <strong>Australia</strong>. This was accentuated by theAdmiralty recall or all its battleships lo the China Station anddowngrading or several ol' its ships on the <strong>Australia</strong> Station.<strong>The</strong> USA became a Pacific power and Ihe visil <strong>of</strong> Ihe GrealWhile Fleet in April 1908. al Ihe invitation <strong>of</strong> Prime Minister.Alfred Deakin. made a greal impression on Ihe local populace.Il was a strategic pointer lo the future.In March 1909. ihe First Lord <strong>of</strong> ihe Admirally rose in theHouse to point to the accelerated battle shipbuildingprogramme ol Germany, which mcanl the Royal <strong>Navy</strong> w ouldlose numerical superiority by 1912. Alarm spread through theEmpire. Germany had usurped France and Russia as theBritish Empire's most likely foe.<strong>The</strong> Changing Technology <strong>of</strong> NavalWarfare<strong>The</strong> period al the lurn ol the century and establishment <strong>of</strong>Ihe Commonwealth coincided wilh rapid changes in Navaltechnology. <strong>The</strong> Germans were rapidly overhauling the Brilishat Ihe forefront <strong>of</strong> naval technology and oul building them.<strong>The</strong> arrival <strong>of</strong> Jackie Fisher as First Sea Lord in October 1904galvanised the Admirally and accelerated the changesunderway lo introduce modem technologies into the Royal<strong>Navy</strong>.This was focussed on big gun battleships: greatlyimproved rales or fire, longe- range guns and developmentsin fire control, which gave greatly improved accuracy.<strong>The</strong> Dreadnought class battle ships epitomised thesedevelopments. <strong>The</strong>y were quickly followed by the higherspeed but more lightly protected Battle Cruisers.<strong>The</strong> move from coal lo oil fired turbine driven ships startedin destroyers and spread quickly lo the battleships, withconsequent increases in speed and endurance in these ships.Adoption and development <strong>of</strong> radio proceeded al a pace akinlo ihe internet today. Mobility and gun power were Ihe newmeasures <strong>of</strong> capability.Many existing Fleets were rendered obsolete overnight bythese changes.<strong>The</strong> submarine emerged as a future weapon system - butreliability and technology were limitations in the early years.Also, the standard role envisaged by the Royal <strong>Navy</strong> for thesubmarine appears to have been in coastal defence, or as amobile mine field in advance <strong>of</strong> the haltle fiect.Both tactics railed in WWI.<strong>The</strong> German <strong>Navy</strong>, nol tor ihe last time, demonstrated anability lo develop the capability, technology and tacticsrequired for submarine operations and apply it with greateffect in the strategic sea denial operations undertaken duringWWI.I should reflect on the foresight and boldness <strong>of</strong> those whoacted against the traditionalists <strong>of</strong> the day and bought twosubmarines for <strong>Australia</strong>. AE -I and 2. for the embryonicRAN. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>n boats were amongst the first fitted withradios - a capability which was to play a small, but criticalpart in the Gallipoli campaign.<strong>The</strong> Birth <strong>of</strong> <strong>The</strong> RANIn September I9()6. Deakin announced an initial three -year programme <strong>of</strong> eight coastal destroyers and four torpedoboats - following Creswell's recommendations. However, theplan made little progress.In December 1907. following discussions at the ImperialConference Deakin announced that the force structure hadbeen modified to include nine small submarines and sixcoastal destroyers. Creswell protested vigorously and voicedangry complaints <strong>of</strong> Deakin's foolishness in matters <strong>of</strong> navalstrategy. Commanders Colquhoun and Clarkson carried out aship building study, visiting shipyards in Japan. USA and theUK.In the UK. they engaged the services <strong>of</strong> Pr<strong>of</strong>essor JohnBiles to design a fast oil-burning destroyer, which was tobecome the River class. <strong>The</strong>se were a considerable advance onthe equivalent vessels then being built for the Royal <strong>Navy</strong>.From the beginning, our need to adapt the stock Europeandesigns to our requirements was recognised. Deakin set asideStg 250.000 for a naval construction programme prior tolosing <strong>of</strong>fice in November 1908.Creswell reiterated his plans for a navy based ondestroyers and torpedo boats to provide coastal defence to thetl 1Car "<strong>The</strong> famous <strong>Australia</strong>n submarine AE 2. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>n boats AE I and 2 were amongst the first fitted withradios - a capability which was to play a small, but critical part in the Gallipoli campaign.incoming Prime Minister. Andrew Fisher, who announced athree-year plan based on 23 destroyers.Finally, action! Tenders were called for construction <strong>of</strong>three - 700 ton River class destroyers. PARRAMATTA.YARRA and WARREGO in February 1909. using the fundsset aside by Deakin.<strong>The</strong> first ship. PARRAMATTA was launched on a bleakday in Scotland in February 1910. <strong>The</strong> Admiralty appears tohave been unimpressed by these Ships, the launching was notattended by any member <strong>of</strong> the British cabinet and apologieswere received from the First Lord <strong>of</strong> <strong>The</strong> Admiralty and FirstSea Lord! Of course, one should not read too much into this.Battleship launchings were common place at this stage <strong>of</strong> thebuild up to war.Meanwhile the mounting alarm over German navalexpansion and financial stringencies at home stirred theAdmiralty into action. Britain called an Imperial Conferencein 1909 to consider the whole question <strong>of</strong> imperial defence.<strong>The</strong> First Sea Lord. Jackie Fisher, seized on <strong>of</strong>fers fromNew Zealand and <strong>Australia</strong> to fund construction <strong>of</strong> aBattleship. He argued for a tactical unit formed around aBattle Cruiser, with three cruisers, six destroyers as scouts andthree submarines. This tactical unit would form the nucleus <strong>of</strong>an <strong>Australia</strong>n <strong>Navy</strong>.He proposed to transfer responsibility for naval defence <strong>of</strong>the <strong>Australia</strong> Station to <strong>Australia</strong>.<strong>The</strong> Commonwealth delegation was unprepared for thepace <strong>of</strong> change or the urgency, which now infected theAdmiralty. Creswell argued against Fisher's Fleet Unitproposal, suggesting instead using the funds to develop thefoundations <strong>of</strong> naval infrastructure, rather than spendingmoney on a battle cruiser.Fortunately, the Admiralty carried the day. by <strong>of</strong>fering to:• Pay any capital costs in excess <strong>of</strong> Stg 500.000.• Hand over control <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Australia</strong>n station, and• Transfer to the Commonwealth all imperial dockyardsand shore establishments.<strong>The</strong>ir motives were not entirely altruistic. Even with the<strong>of</strong>fered subsidy, the establishment <strong>of</strong> an <strong>Australia</strong>n <strong>Navy</strong>, withresponsibility for the defence in this area <strong>of</strong> the Pacific wouldallow withdrawal <strong>of</strong> the Royal <strong>Navy</strong>'s <strong>Australia</strong> Squadron(which was already well advanced under pressure <strong>of</strong>obsolescence and funding shortfalls). <strong>The</strong> moves would savethe Admiralty Stg 500.000 per year plus the cost <strong>of</strong> runningthe Garden Island Dockyard.In <strong>Australia</strong>. Prime MinisterAlfred Deakin promptly agreedthe Admiralty's proposal. Deakinhad earlier ncgo lated a fullinterchange between <strong>Australia</strong>nand British naval personnel. Thisproved to be fundamental to thesuccessful and rapid build up <strong>of</strong>personnel.<strong>The</strong> first contingent travelled toEngland in 1910 and completedtheir courses with impressivegrades.<strong>The</strong> Deakin Government orderedthe battle cruiser in December1909 as it lost government. <strong>The</strong>incoming Government <strong>of</strong>Andrew Fisher adopted the plan.Prime Minister Fisher refusedthe British <strong>of</strong>fer <strong>of</strong> funds and thepurchase was funded entirelyfrom the Commonwealth budget.<strong>The</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>n Naval DefenceAct <strong>of</strong> 25 November. 1910,provided the legislative cover.THE NAVY VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. 4 31


<strong>The</strong> Naval Board was reconstituted in March 1911 withCreswell promoted and knighted as the first Naval member.<strong>The</strong> King approved the title Royal <strong>Australia</strong>n <strong>Navy</strong> and theright to fly the white ensign on 10 July 1911. and the<strong>Australia</strong>n Commonwealth <strong>Navy</strong> became the Royal <strong>Australia</strong>n<strong>Navy</strong>.After Jackie Fisher retired as First Sea Lord in 1910. thelevel <strong>of</strong> cooperation dropped significantly. Any move towardgreater independence for the RAN was rapidly overtaken bythe onset <strong>of</strong> WW 1. when the Fleet was placed underAdmiralty control.What was actually done to bring all thisabout, this transformation frommoribund to modern fleet?Personnel was the obvious major challenge:• <strong>The</strong> Fleet Unit required 2.500 men. with another 900ashore (no sea shore ratio in those days!).• <strong>The</strong>y needed an additional 3.160 <strong>of</strong>ficers and men! <strong>The</strong>strategy sounds familiar: New pay rates.• Expand Williamstown training depot.• Commence the TING1RA training ship scheme.• Activate the Senior Naval Officers in the states asrecruiters.• jnvite <strong>Australia</strong>ns in the RN to transfer.• Recruit retired ex RN POs. and.• Borrow the balance from the RN<strong>The</strong> breakdown on 1 June 1913 was:• RN loan 900.• Ex RN retired 480.• <strong>Australia</strong>ns transferred back from the RN 360.• Recruited and trained in <strong>Australia</strong> 1.6601.660 in say 3 years, was an extraordinary feat from astanding start.On the logistics front the fledgling <strong>Navy</strong> was veryfortunate to have the services <strong>of</strong> Paymaster-in-Chief EldonManisty RN (later Rear Admiral), as the Finance and Civilmember <strong>of</strong> the Naval Board.<strong>The</strong> Board had three years to prepare for the reception,support and administration or the new fleet.<strong>The</strong> Naval Secretary. George Macandie remarks thatManisty's thorough knowledge <strong>of</strong> the needs <strong>of</strong> a modem navy,his legal qualifications as a barrister and his untiring energy,enabled him to push on with preparations which caused theFleet Unit to be in a state <strong>of</strong> readiness for the war whichoccurred on 4 August 1914.Of course the RAN inherited a substantial legacy fromthe RN - a first class naval dockyard in Sydney anda comprehensive infrastructure <strong>of</strong> victualling yards andammunition depots. But there was much more to be providedfor a modem fleet and the Henderson Report <strong>of</strong> 1911 had laidthis out - the establishment <strong>of</strong> the Naval Board itself: navalbases and so on.TINGIRA was commissioned for boys' training in April1912.<strong>The</strong> cruiser ENCOUNTER was borrowed from the RN forcrew training before BRISBANE, then building at Cockatoo,became available.<strong>The</strong> cruiser PIONEER was also borrowed, this time forgunnery training. Recruit training was undertaken atWilliamstown Naval Depot.Soon recruits were coming in faster than could be handled.By March 1913 there were I .(KM men under training. Schoolswere established for wireless telegraphy, signalling, gunneryand torpedo training. <strong>The</strong>se were later transferred to FlindersNaval Base.<strong>The</strong>se matters are easy to trivialise but in the aggregate,they amounted to a stupendous administrative achievementfor which Manisty deserves full credit. <strong>The</strong> other keypersonality in this process was Captain, later Vice Admiral. SirWilliam Clarkson. Clarkson was a trained naval architect andengineer, who accompanied PROTECTOR to <strong>Australia</strong> in1884 as the second engineer. He served with Creswell inSouth <strong>Australia</strong> and saw active service in PROTECTORduring the Boxer rebellion in China. He was heavily involvedin the design and construction <strong>of</strong> the three River Classdestroyers and was highly regarded by various Ministers <strong>of</strong>the day. who commissioned him to purchase and establish thesmall arms factory at Lithgow. This was in addition to hisnaval duties; he was appointed as the third member <strong>of</strong> theNaval Board at its establishment in 1911.<strong>The</strong> initial term <strong>of</strong> the Naval Board was not a happy one.Clarkson fell out with Creswell over the siting <strong>of</strong> bases arisingfrom the Henderson Report and the establishment <strong>of</strong> CockatooIsland as a shipbuilding dockyard. I must say history hasborne out the wisdom <strong>of</strong> Clarkson's stances.At the outbreak <strong>of</strong> War. Clarkson was appointed by theGovernment to oversee shipping and maritime transportationin addition to his duties as third naval member, which includeda very successful shipbuilding programme.This was the beginning <strong>of</strong> a series <strong>of</strong> high exposurepostings to controversial and contentious public duties forClarkson. His success was rightly recognised by hisknighthood and promotion to Engineering Vice Admiral - theRAN's first (and possibly only such promotion).It is hardly surprising and perhaps typical <strong>of</strong> thedysfunctional Board thai preparations for the two submarinesarrival were lacking. Two months before their arrival theNaval Board was discussing where to base them: less thanthree weeks before their arrival it was decided to advertise forsuitable depot ship. Perhaps Creswell's earlier opposition tosubmarines fostered an air <strong>of</strong> antipathy amongst many senior<strong>of</strong>ficers.So who was the Father?Rear Admiral George Tryon as the first Flag Officer andC-I-C <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Australia</strong> Station deserves an honourable mentionas one <strong>of</strong> the grandfathers.Creswell is traditionally viewed as the pr<strong>of</strong>essional father<strong>of</strong> the RAN. However, the impression I develop in reading therecords and his correspondence is <strong>of</strong> a man with strongly heldviews, which dated from his experiences as a juniorLieutenant in the Royal <strong>Navy</strong>, and who did not move with thepolitical, technology and strategic factors, which were sorapidly shaping the environment.Consequently, his political masters frequently ignored hisadvice. He argued courageously, but to no effect against theLords <strong>of</strong> the Admiralty, with whom he became persona nongrata. His letter to Deakin protesting the latter's decision toorder submarines in 1907. Deakin having rejected Creswell'searlier arguments against the purchase, was. in my opinion, aclassic example <strong>of</strong> a letter which should be left in the bottomdrawer overnight, and then never sent;• Prime Ministers are not noted for changing publiclyannounced decisions on such matters;• Creswell had after all. also achieved his major goal -purchasing six destroyers, after years <strong>of</strong> politicalvacillation.Experience with AE-I and AE-2 indicates that his technicalconcerns over mobility and sea keeping were vastly overstated. AE-2 steamed 30.000nm in its first 12 months incommission without incident, although there were somechallenging engineering feats needed to achieve this record.He gets full marks for determination and persistence - for hisunwavering advocacy for an independent <strong>Australia</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> andinfrastructure nec.essary to defend the Ports and sea bornetrade.A review in 1915 <strong>of</strong> the Department <strong>of</strong> Defence's financialand business operations functions, conducted by a respectedbusinessman commented critically on Creswell. who he found32 VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. I THE NAVYto be: "an exceedingly pleasant old gentleman". but with"only the foggiest idea <strong>of</strong> modern management" and "andexpensive luxury in his present position".<strong>The</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong> the day. Jensen, who chaired the NavalBoard, must bear the majority <strong>of</strong> the blame; he failed to leadand appeared determined to exploit for his own advantageany disunity. Couldn't happen today I hear you say!! This ishardly the setting for the successful birth <strong>of</strong> a navy!Looking behind the numerous conferences, committees,plans and proposals to those who made the decisions. 1 wouldsuggest that Deakin and Jackie Fisher shared the honours forconception.Deakin's involvement began with his leadership <strong>of</strong> the<strong>Australia</strong>n delegation at the 1887 Naval AgreementConference. He continued to provide this leadership invarious roles as Minister and Prime Minister, for the next 31years. He settled on the strategic objective <strong>of</strong> an independent<strong>Navy</strong>, controlled by the Commonwealth Government, fromthe earliest. He correctly recognised that this could only beachieved with the wholesale support <strong>of</strong> the Royal <strong>Navy</strong> andresisted efforts to proceed ahead <strong>of</strong> such agreement. When theopportunity came he acted with alacrity.Jackie Fisher was the other half <strong>of</strong> the duo. who initiatedthis journey. He displayed the courage to back his convictionsand a drive, which brooked no bureaucratic delays in theAdmiralty.<strong>The</strong> decision made, the Royal <strong>Navy</strong> was unstinting inproviding talented personnel to support the endeavour.<strong>The</strong> colonial sceptic would say that the strategic andfinancial circumstances facing Britain provided the mother <strong>of</strong>necessity.Finally. I suggest the successful result relied heavily onthe individual efforts <strong>of</strong> Manisty and particularly. Clarkson toMATCHHMAS STUARTachieve the end result.Paymaster-in-Chief Eldon Manisty RN. as the logisticianand Engineering, and Captain William Clarkson as theengineer on an otherwise dysfunctional Naval Board must beregarded as the midwives. without whom the successful birthwould not have been achieved.ConclusionsIt is a fascinating period <strong>of</strong> our history.I could not help but note the familiar themes:• <strong>The</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> trust between the politicians and the navalpr<strong>of</strong>essionals - both operating with great dedication,but to different agendas.• <strong>The</strong> misguided influence <strong>of</strong> the partly informed media.• <strong>The</strong> well-intentioned but badly informed vocalminority <strong>of</strong> citizens.• <strong>The</strong> failure to recognise the contribution <strong>of</strong> thelogistician and engineering specialist and their role atthe strategic level <strong>of</strong> management - which continuestoday.• At the end <strong>of</strong> the day. the ability at the sharp end to geton and make things happen, despite all theaforementioned negative assistance.• As a result, in less than 4 years <strong>Australia</strong> had a <strong>Navy</strong>,albeit one commanded by Royal <strong>Navy</strong> Officers forsome years to come.In my opinion Creswell's reputation as the pr<strong>of</strong>essionalfather <strong>of</strong> the RAN must be tempered by his limitations inmanaging the political and strategic issues. Without Deakin'svision and the drive <strong>of</strong> Jackie Fisher, responding to the press<strong>of</strong> Strategic circumstances, the Royal <strong>Navy</strong>'s unstintingsupport and the individual efforts <strong>of</strong> Manisty and Clarksonthe story would have been quite different. J,Hatch, Match & DispatchOn 17 August <strong>2002</strong> NUSHIP STUART was commissionedinto the RAN as HMAS STUART.STUART is the fourth <strong>of</strong> eight Anzac ships that arc beingconstructed in <strong>Australia</strong> for the <strong>Navy</strong> by Tenix. HMASANZAC was the first to be commissioned in May 1996 withPERTH to be the last to commission in October 2006.<strong>The</strong> STUART is the first warship <strong>of</strong> its class to becommissioned and home-ported in Sydney."<strong>The</strong> Anzac ships arc highly modern, multi-role frigatesthai undertake a number <strong>of</strong> important tasksincluding surveillance and patrol, protection <strong>of</strong>shipping and strategic areas, naval gunfiresupport in support <strong>of</strong> the Army, regional disasterrelief and search and rescue." said DefenceMinister Senator Hill who attended thecommissioning ceremony along with CDFGeneral Cosgrove and Chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> ViceAdmiral Ritchie.Senator Hill said the frigates' surface andsub-surface warfare capabilities would be furtherenhanced with the installation <strong>of</strong> the Harpoonsurface-to-surface missile, which will beproduced this financial year and enter intoservice in 2004. <strong>The</strong> Harpoons will be fittedbehind the bridge in two Mk-141 octuplelaunchers.Other enhancements being considered under the AnzacShip Alliance, a long term alliance contract signed in July2001 by Defence. Tenix Defence Systems and Saab Systemsfor development <strong>of</strong> all future Anzac ships capability changepackages, include a further mine and obstacle avoidance sonarand torpedo self-defence system.<strong>The</strong> $5,279 billion Anzac ship project, which is proceeding ontime and on budget, has provided significant employment andbusiness opportunities across <strong>Australia</strong>, with around 600companies involved in the provision <strong>of</strong> equipment andservices to the project's prime contractor. Tenix DefenceSystems.NUSHIP STUART on sea trials <strong>of</strong>f Melbourne (Tenix)THE NAVY VOL. <strong>64</strong> NO. I 33


PRODUCT REVIEW<strong>The</strong> Magnificent 9th -An Illustrated History <strong>of</strong> the9th <strong>Australia</strong>n Division 1940 - 46By Mark JohnstonAllen & Unwin Books 201)2Hani Cover. 272 pages IllustratedReview ed by Paul D. Johnstone•k.-TV \AN II.U StKA l'KI>IIIMIIIV Ol llll VihAl iiKAI.IANDIVISIONI 'MII-4M A K k 1 1 ' 1 l \ ' S I I ) \A key to the success <strong>of</strong> this book is stated within theintroduction when the author remarks how the opportunity toconduct thorough research for this topic will never again beable to be undertaken with the passing <strong>of</strong> so many who werethe 9th Division. This includes the ability to express and shareas an eyewitness accounting the hazards and challenges <strong>of</strong> theWestern Desert, the Jungles <strong>of</strong> South East Asia and NewGuinea.<strong>The</strong> many oral histories, as well as the generousinclusion <strong>of</strong> private collections <strong>of</strong> photographs, contributewidely to the success <strong>of</strong> this book. 1 for one enjoyed howpersonal experiences were so well blended with thechronological journey <strong>of</strong> the raising <strong>of</strong> the 9th Division in1940 and its subsequent adventures until its disbandmentin 1946.<strong>The</strong> book has excellent coverage <strong>of</strong> the 9th's exploits inboth maps and photographs. Many <strong>of</strong> the wide variety <strong>of</strong> thephotographs are from private collections and differ greatlyfrom those so <strong>of</strong>ten repeatedly exhibited in many otherpublications. Perhaps the only downside is that eachillustration does not have a caption beneath it to assist withmore readily identifying the finer details <strong>of</strong> the photograph ormap rather than the bold cross - reference to the photographsduring the prose. <strong>The</strong> author's research is most thorough inthat he actually points out many <strong>of</strong> the staged photographs thatwere constructed for prop-aganda purposes by "Chets Circus"a British photographic unit whose role was to reconstructbattle scenes.Insight and detail is provided into many <strong>of</strong> the experiencesand attitudes that prevailed in the 9th Division during thisperiod. One constant within the book is how poorly armed, illequipped and unprepared these men were for the enormouschallenges laid down before them. Clearly demonstrated is theAIF's ability to scrounge, make do and improvise under some<strong>of</strong> the most hostile and worst conditions, <strong>of</strong>ten channellingwit. courage and humour into a quest for survival andultimately a significant contribution to military victory in thedarkest hours <strong>of</strong> the Second World War. <strong>The</strong> Magnificent 9th- An Illustrated History <strong>of</strong> the 9th <strong>Australia</strong>n Division 1940 -46. is a well researched, well written and well illustratedinformative history and is highly recommended reading.Mutiny on the Globe:<strong>The</strong> Fatal Voyage <strong>of</strong> SamuelComstockBy Thomas Fare!BloomsburyHeffernanPublishingS<strong>of</strong>tcover. 280 pages$ 29.95Reviewed by Doug Steele.I'll be honest. When 1 was first handed a copy <strong>of</strong> this book andread the description on the back cover - 'a fascinating event inNantucket's whaling history' - I thought it looked a bit dulland obscure. Nonetheless. I gave it a go and I'm glad that Idid. I was immediately drawn into a story that is part MobyDick, part Robi.ison Crusoe, and part Mutiny on the Bounty,but what made it all the more engaging is that it is historicalfact. For me. history is at its most fascinating when itdemonstrates how fact can be stranger than fiction.In Mutiny on the Globe Heffernan tells the story <strong>of</strong> SamuelComstock. a young man from 'rugged stock' who was eerilyinsensitive to physical pain, seemingly incapable <strong>of</strong> emotion,a risk taker, a liar, a womaniser who became obsessed with theidea <strong>of</strong> 'native nymphs', and most <strong>of</strong> all. a buddingpsychopath. In a scenario reminiscent <strong>of</strong> Francis FordCoppola's Colonel Kurtz' in Apocalypse Now. Samuel wasobsessed by the idea <strong>of</strong> living the rest <strong>of</strong> his life as the onlywhite man among natives <strong>of</strong> a Pacific island. Samuel believedhe would quickly be elected King, and "once in power hewould make the island a pirate kingdom, launching a nativenavy that would capture everything in sight. His exploitswould turn him into a fable; he would gain immortality as theterror <strong>of</strong> the South Seas." <strong>The</strong> plan devised by Samuel wentlike this: join a whaling ship, sail for the Pacific, kill theCaptain and <strong>of</strong>ficers, take it over, land at an island inhabitedby savages, murder the rest <strong>of</strong> the crew, become king, and turnthe natives into a private army. Simple.Heffernan does a good job <strong>of</strong> tracing the influences onSamuel and his formulation <strong>of</strong> the idea. He then describes inquite gory detail how Samuel goes about conducting themutiny, including how the Captain, <strong>of</strong>ficers and noncooperativecrewmembers all met extremely violent deaths.<strong>The</strong> mutineer's use <strong>of</strong> oversized whaling tools to do the jobis, to say the least, horrifyingly innovative.Having reached the pivotal point in Samuel's grand planfor realising his 'destiny', the remainder <strong>of</strong> the story followsthe consequences for Samuel and the remaining crew.Needless to say. this is where things went awry. Havingreached the Mili Atoll in the Marshall Islands, the mendiscover that the natives' temperament is quite different toSamuel's romantic conception. All but two are killed, and thesurvivors are kept as a mixture between a slave and a pet untila daring rescue almost two years later.Heffernan's treatment <strong>of</strong> the wider historical context inwhich the events took place is an intriguing aspect <strong>of</strong> thisbook. This was a time when growing up in New York wasunimaginably miserable; stagnant and squalid, with anightmarish fire hazard and no reliable water supply. I foundit interesting how Manhattan had an inland lake that had to bedrained and filled when effluents, rubbish, and the dumping<strong>of</strong> dead animals had irreversibly polluted it (while Broadway,on the other hand, was lined by poplars and four-storyhomes). It was a time when harsh reality forced youth tomature quickly: as his Schoolmaster prepared to give Samuel- aged six - the equivalent <strong>of</strong> the cane as punishment formisbehaving, Samuel defiantly warned him "Ah! FriendMark, it will be <strong>of</strong> no use; father has used up a whole poplartree on me. already; but to no purpose." And it was also a timewhen the Pacific was viewed with the same sense <strong>of</strong>immensity, adventurism, mystery, awe and inherent dangerthat we now ascribe to the depths <strong>of</strong> space. Of course, prolificstories nbout remote islands populated by 'vivacious nativegirls' who swam out to meet ships clothed only with 'a largegreen leaf' that was 'generally lost by swimming any length<strong>of</strong> the way' only served to fan the flames in many a youngmai.'s mind.In the end the psychopathology <strong>of</strong> Samuel Comstockovershadows everything else in the Globe story. Describingthis book as 'a fascinating event in Nantucket's whalinghistory' simply does not do it justice. Heffernan deals with thecontributing historical, social, and psychological (or is thatpsycho-pathological?) factors in such a way that the readercan clearly see the storm clouds gathering. Delusion,frustration and deep-seated aggression are clearly conspiringto drive an already unbalanced Samuel <strong>of</strong>f the rails. Andwhen it does happen, it happens in spectacular fashion - andproves that truth really can be stranger than fiction.Notice is hereby given that theANNUAL GENERAL MEETING<strong>of</strong>THE NAVY LEAGUE OF AUSTRALIAwill be held at the Brassey Hotel, Belmore Gardens, Barton, ACTOn Friday, 15 November <strong>2002</strong> at 8.00 pmBUSINESS1. To confirm the Minutes <strong>of</strong> the Annual General Meeting held in Canberra on Friday 16 November. 20012. To receive the report <strong>of</strong> the Federal Council, and to consider matters arising3. To receive the financial statements for the year ended 30 June <strong>2002</strong>4. To elect Office Bearers for the <strong>2002</strong>-2003 year as follows:- Federal President- Federal Vice-President-AdditionalVice-Presidents (4)Nominations for these positions are to be lodged with the Honorary Secretary prior to the commencement<strong>of</strong> the meeting.5. General Business:-To deal with any matter notified in writing to the Honorary Secretary by 5 November. <strong>2002</strong>-To approve the continuation in <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> those members <strong>of</strong> the Federal Council who have attained 72 years <strong>of</strong>age. namely John Bird (Vic), Joan Cooper (Tas). Arthur Hewitt (WA). Gwen Hewitt (WA), John Jeppesen(NSW). Tom Kilburn (Vic) and Andrew Robertson (NSW).ALL MEMBERS ARE WELCOME TO ATTENDBy order <strong>of</strong> the Federal CouncilRay Corboy, Honorary Federal Secretary, PO Box 309, MtWaverley VIC 3149Telephone (03) 9888 1977 Fax (03) 9888 108334 VOLI NO 4THE NAVYTHE NAVY VOL M NO 4 35


S I \ I I Ml \ I <strong>of</strong> |»< )l l( \<strong>The</strong> strategic background to <strong>Australia</strong>'s security haschanged in recent decades and in some respects becomemore uncertain. <strong>The</strong> <strong>League</strong> believes it is essential that<strong>Australia</strong> develops capability to defend itself, payingparticular attention to maritime defence. <strong>Australia</strong> is. <strong>of</strong>geographical necessity, a maritime nation whose prosperitystrength and safety depend to a great extent on the security<strong>of</strong> the surrounding ocean and island areas, and on seabornetrade.<strong>The</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> <strong>League</strong>:• Believes <strong>Australia</strong> can be defended against attackby other than a super or major maritime power andthat the prime requirement <strong>of</strong> our defence is anevident ability to control the sea and air spacearound us and to contribute to defending essentiallines <strong>of</strong> sea and air communication to our allies.• Supports the ANZUS Treaty and the futurereintegration <strong>of</strong> New Zealand as a full partner.• Urges a close relationship with the nearer ASEANcountries. PNG and the Island Stales <strong>of</strong> the SouthPacific.• Advocates a defence capability which isknowledge-baseu with a prime consideration givento intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.• Advocates the acquisition <strong>of</strong> the most modernarmaments and sensors to ensure that the ADFii'aintains some technological advantages overforces in our general area.• Believes there must be a significant deterrentelement in the <strong>Australia</strong>n Defence Force (ADF)capable <strong>of</strong> powerful retaliation at considerabledistances from <strong>Australia</strong>.• Believes the ADF must have the cap: ,h 'lny toprotect essential shipping at considerable distancesfrom <strong>Australia</strong>, as well as in coastal waters.• Supports the concept <strong>of</strong> a strong modern Air Forceand highly mobile Army, capable <strong>of</strong> island andjungle warfare as well as the defence <strong>of</strong> Northern<strong>Australia</strong>.• Supports the development <strong>of</strong> amphibious forces toensure the security <strong>of</strong> our <strong>of</strong>fshore territories and toenable assistance to be provided by sea as well as byair to friendly island states in our area.• Endorses the transfer <strong>of</strong> responsibility for the coordination<strong>of</strong> Coastal Surveillance to the defenceforce and the development <strong>of</strong> the capability forpatrol and surveillance <strong>of</strong> the ocean areas all aroundthe <strong>Australia</strong>n coast and island territories, includingthe Southern Ocean.• Advocates measures to foster a build-up <strong>of</strong><strong>Australia</strong>n-ow ned shipping to ensure the carriage <strong>of</strong>essential cargoes in war.• Advocates the development <strong>of</strong> a defence industrysupported by strong research and designorganisations capable <strong>of</strong> constructing all neededtypes <strong>of</strong> warships and support vessels and <strong>of</strong>providing systems and sensor integration withthrough-life support.As to the RAN. the <strong>League</strong>:• Supports the concept <strong>of</strong> a <strong>Navy</strong> capable <strong>of</strong> effectiveaction <strong>of</strong>f both East and West coasts simultaneouslyand advocates a gradual build up <strong>of</strong> the Fleet toensure that, in conjunction with the RAAF. this canbe achieved against any force which could bedeployed in our general area.• Is concerned that the <strong>of</strong>fensive and defensivecapability <strong>of</strong> the RAN has decreased markedly inrecent decades and that with the paying-<strong>of</strong>f <strong>of</strong> theDDGs. the Fleet will lack air defence and have areduced capability for support <strong>of</strong> ground forces.• Advocates the very early acquisition <strong>of</strong> the newdestroyers as foreshadowed in the Defence WhilePaper 2.• Advocates ihe acquisition <strong>of</strong> long-range precisionweapons to increase the present limited powerprojection, support and deterrent capability <strong>of</strong> theRAN• Advocates the acquisition <strong>of</strong> the GLOBAL HAWKunmanned surveillance aircraft primarily forolTshore surveillance.• Advocates the acquisition <strong>of</strong> sufficient <strong>Australia</strong>nbuiltafloat support ships to support two naval taskforces with such ships having design flexibility andcommonality <strong>of</strong> build.• Advocates the acquisition at an early date <strong>of</strong>integrated air power in the fleet to ensure that ADFdeployments can be fully ucfcndcd and supportedfrom the sea.• Advocates that all <strong>Australia</strong>n warships should beequipped with some form <strong>of</strong> defence againstmissiles.• Advocates that in any future submarineccnstruction program all forms <strong>of</strong> propulsion beexamined with a view to selecting the mostadvantageous operationally.• Advocates the acquisition <strong>of</strong> an additional 2 or 3updated Collins class submarines.• Supports the maintenance and continuingdevelopment <strong>of</strong> the mine-counter measures forceand a modern hydrographic/oceanographiccapability.• Supports the maintenance <strong>of</strong> an enlarged, flexiblepatrol boat fleet capable <strong>of</strong> operating in severe seastales.• Advocates the retention in a Reserve Fleet <strong>of</strong> Navalvessels <strong>of</strong> potential value in defence emergency.• Supports the maintenance <strong>of</strong> a strong NavalReserve to help crew vessels and aircraft in reserve,or taken up for service, and for specialised tasks intime <strong>of</strong> defence emergency.• Supports the maintenance <strong>of</strong> a strong <strong>Australia</strong>n<strong>Navy</strong> Cadets organisation.<strong>The</strong> <strong>League</strong>:Calls for a bipartisan political approach to nationaldefence with a commitment to a steady long-term build-upin our national defence capability including the requiredindustrial infrastructure.While recognising current economic problems andbudgetary constraints, believes that, given leadership bysuccessive governments. <strong>Australia</strong> can defend itself in thelonger term within acceptable financial, economic andmanpower parameters.VOI. <strong>64</strong> NO 4THKNAVY


<strong>The</strong> guided missile destroyer l)SSO'KANE (DDG-T7) launches an SM-2standard missile from in forward Verticall aunch System (Vl.S) during exercise•Kim <strong>of</strong> Ihe Pacific' (RIMPAC) <strong>2002</strong>. <strong>The</strong>guided missile frigate USS CROMMELIN(FFG-37) (right) and the Spruance-classd-strover I'SS PAl I. F. FOSTER (DD 9<strong>64</strong>1(centre) follow in formation. RIMPAC <strong>2002</strong>is designed lo improve tactical pr<strong>of</strong>iciencyin a wide array <strong>of</strong> combined operations atsea. while building cooperation andfostering mutual understanding betweenparticipating nations. Countries thatparticipating this year were: <strong>Australia</strong>.( anada. Chile. Peru, Japan, the Republicor Korea and the I niled States. (l!SN)


* * *• * ** ¥ *AJERRY BRUCKHEIMER prodcctton * 4 *_ AMICHAELMFILM + + ¥PEARL HARBORTHE DIRECTOR'S CUT 15+ * * *<strong>The</strong> most extensive exploration <strong>of</strong> movie making ever presented.* * 4Dili comprehensive historically drivenBooklet contains insights, is will asinformative introductions into thewealth ol materia: found in thisgroundbreaking OVDFranklin 0 Roosevelt s address tocongms December 8 1941Pearl Harbor <strong>The</strong> Director sCut Movie60 NEW ACTION scenes completethe film as never beloreDolby 5.1 Digital Surround SoundWidescreen (2.35:1 > - enhanced lor16i9 televisions.3 selectable audio commentaries(1) Director Michael Bay and JeamneBasinger (2) Jerry Bruckheimer AlecBaldwin. Ben Affleck and JoshHartntfl (3) Cinematographer JohnSchwaftzman. Production DesignerNigel Phelps and Costume DesignerMichael KaplanHours ol outstanding special features eiplonngIhe historic event and the making <strong>of</strong> the lilm101 production diaries (1) Airfield Attack(2) 8a|a Ginbal (3) Battleship Row |4) Done Miller|S| DUD Bomb |6) Mechanics Row |7) Nuht StrafingID Sandbag Stunt |9) Doolittle Raid |10| Arizona DiveEihaustniely detailed interactive timeline documentarytracing the culture clashes and political struggles whichgave nse to the Japanese attackSuper 8mm montage by creative advisorMark PalanskyHistory recollection interview with Nurse Ruth EncksonFaith Hill music videoOne Hour Om Tokyo History Channel' documentaryMulti-angle multi audiointeractive attack sequence lookin incredible detail at the creationand production ol the film s mostexciting sequence from 4-cameraand 6-audio anglesOeconslruction Destruction aconversation about visual etlectswith Michael Bay and Eric BrevigAnimetic Attack scene conceptsIrom Michael BayBoot Cimp segments ol theactor s preparationStill Galleries never-belore-seenphotos Irom the set* 3 disc DVD*over12hours^60newr <strong>of</strong> outstandingspecial featuresacMon scenesiU i i\Available<strong>The</strong> 6 hottest Jerry Bruckheimer action titles in a special collectiblepackaged box set Limited release Available only while stocks lastVV \ll Mil 1 VI H U M V\l n 11 III K I I MUM. I A I > KM VII I Ms


PLEASE NOTETHIS MATERIALWAS FILMED ATA REDUCTIONRATIO OF 23.5xSOME PAGES MAY CONTAINPOOR PRINT, TIGHT BINDING,FLAWS AND OTHERDEFECTS WHICH APPEARON THE FILM

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