South Africa's national interest and BRICS

Policy Brief No. 4 Page 1February 2012South Africa’s national interest and BRICS:Towards bandwagoning or balancing?Mxolisi Notshulwana, Development Planning Division, DBSAKeywords: South Africa; BRICS; bandwagoning; balancing; national interest; foreign policyIndex:IntroductionDefining SouthArfica’s nationalinterestInstitutionsand statecollaborationsState collaborationin BRICS:Bandwagoning orbalancing?Synthesisdiscussion onBRICSConclusionsand policyrecommendationsReferences1. IntroductionSouth Africa’s entry into the forum of Brazil,Russia, India and China (BRICS) in 2010has cast the spotlight onto the nature andcharacter of the country’s national andstrategic interests, a focus that originatesfrom the complex nature of the relationshipbetween BRICS countries and their strategicrole in the global economy. This researchbrief looks at the material capacity of BRICScountries to challenge and/or infl uence theexisting global economic order.The key question is what South Africastands to gain from its relationship with theother BRICS countries in terms of its ownnational development and the promotionof regional integration in Africa. An equallyimportant consideration is what unites theBRICS countries in view of the balance offorces in the global economy.Literature on the balance of power ininternational relations and the internationalpolitical economy explains state behaviourand collaboration in two primary ways:• Bandwagoning, which implies thestate’s desire to preserve its nationalinterest by seeking protection throughstronger and powerful states(Cheng & Hsu, 1998).• Balancing, which entails the shifting ofthe status quo distribution away fromthe situation that favours the dominantstate in the global system(Sangtu, 2010).The implication of these two concepts fora state’s national and strategic interests isthat the preference for either balancing orbandwagoning is a dynamic, fluid decision.The dynamism of the process of defi ninga state’s national interest is linked tothe changing nature of the global politicaleconomy, as well as the changing domesticconditions in each country. For South Africa,the debate has been about the actualnature and character of the country’snational interest – an ongoing debate whichhas seen national interest juxtaposed withforeign policy in relation to government.Furthermore, a state’s national interest hasalso been confused with its public interestin regard to the role of the Fourth Estateand other public bodies. The discussionon South Africa’s national interest hastherefore tended to conflate national interestand foreign policy, and “many analystsassume that foreign policy is based onnational interests” (Van Nieuwkerk, 2004).Couched in this dialectical relation in theanalysis of foreign policy and nationalinterest is “the relationship between thedynamics within states and the distributionof power among them” (Rice, 2008).Hence the recently published White Paperon South Africa’s Foreign Policy states that“in a fast changing and interdependentworld, it is essential for South Africa toregularly make an evaluation of its foreignpolicy and to ensure that its nationalinterests are maximised” (RSA, 2011).2. Defining South Africa’s nationalinterestThe challenge faced by most analyses ofSouth Africa’s national interest, as well as bythe Draft White Paper, is the developmentof a more coherent, elaborate statementof the country’s national interest. Withoutsuch an explanation, it is less useful todraw on the notion of the “inextricable linkDevelopment Planning Division

Page 2February 2012Policy Brief No. 4of South Africa’s national interest” (RSA, 2011) withthe region of southern Africa and the continent.The Ten-Year Review of the South African governmentstates that “adeptness at identifying the nationalinterest and pursuing it in a creative way is part ofthe challenge of governance and state leadershipin the current global arena” (RSA, 2003). The majorchallenge, however, is how to develop a discourse onSouth Africa’s national interest that views issues suchas foreign policy, economic diplomacy, public interest,national security and others as subsets of the whole,namely the country’s overarching national interest.This overarching statement of South Africa’s nationalinterest should include the country’s missionand vision that are derived from all sectors ofsociety regarding what and how best its vital interestscan be served. Zakaria (1998) puts the challenge thisway: “Foreign policy is made not by the nation as awhole but by its government. Consequently, whatgovernment can extract for its purposes refl ects theease with which central decision-makers can achievetheir ends.” Foreign policy, therefore, ceases to bethe basis on which national interest is theorised, andrather becomes one of the subsets of the overallnational interest.In the same way that public interest and nationalinterest are differentiated elsewhere (Netshitenzhe,2002), an all-embracing statement of a country’snational interest cannot be derived from just one ofits subsets. While this research brief acknowledgesthat all the elements or subsets of a comprehensivestatement of South Africa’s national interest areevident, the conceptualisation of national interest inpublic discourse and government documents is bothmethodologically fl awed and conceptually narrow inits explanation.For instance, the government’s foreign policy providesan essential yet limited scope for the statement of thecountry’s national interest. The government’s policieson trade, security, energy and immigration, as well asbusiness engagements, civil society engagementsand other institutional and societal networks, areimportant subsets of the overall statement of nationalinterest. Inversely, the sub-narrative here is whetherforeign policy, public interest and national securityso constructed can actually work against a country’snational interest.In an extremely useful discussion, Netshitenzhe(2002) states that “national interest as a concept ismeant to define the aggregate of things that guaranteethe survival and flourishing of nation-state and nation.Usually the national interest is counter-posed to thatof other states”. While he is of the view that nationalinterest “is not decreed … it’s a sixth sense and itevolves with a nation’s history”, his defi nition providesa good framework for constructing an overarchingstatement of South Africa’s strategic interest. Indeed,the relationship between national interest and publicinterest needs to be nurtured through civic dialogueand discourse that rests on the premise that publicinterest “is meant to represent the interests of theaggregate collective of citizens – independent of stateinstitutions. It’s a kind of collective civil interest”.However, Van Nieuwkerk (2004) is critical of thederivative view of national interest and cites theexample of Botswana:Central to our country’s foreign policy are the interestsof Botswana which embrace the preservation ofthe democratic form of government, its institutionsand values, its sovereignty and territorial integrity,brooking no interference in its national affairs, itsrespect for self-determination and independenceof peoples, its non-racialism, its non-alignment, thenon-use of its territory as launching pad for attacksagainst neighbouring states, the non-use of force inthe settlement of disputes and the development andsecurity of its foreign markets.Van Nieuwkerk also posits that an “inverse relationship”exists, with global political economic factors shapingand infl uencing local and domestic state action.The global infl uence is taken as a given and there isno systematic explanation of its causality. However,he does concede invoking a constructivist notionthat “the world is not simply given and/or natural butone of artifi ce – it is constructed through the actions ofother actors themselves” (Van Nieuwkerk, 2004).Hopf (1998) concurs with the above in his elaboratestatement concerning national interest being derivedfrom all the subsystems of a nation:Although any understanding of world politics requiresa theorisation of the domestic and the analysis of thesystemic, there would be no systemic theory of worldpolitics because the world system has no predominant

Policy Brief No. 4 Page 3February 2012system; it has subcultures, each of which can beunderstood only by examining how states constitutethemselves in their societies. The answer to thequestion of who are enemies and friends begins athome. Finding out precisely how a state’s identityaffects the construction of its interests vis-à-visanother state demands that the social context in whichthe state’s collection of identities is being discursivelyconstructed be investigated as deeply and broadlyas possible. This means exploring not only how thestate’s identities are produced in interactions withother states, but also how its identities are beingproduced in interactions with its own society and themany identities and discourses that constitute thatsociety.It is the latter point with which this policy brief isconcerned. South Africa’s national interest is bestconceptualised and derived from how its identitiesare being produced in interactions with its own societyand the many identities that constitute that society.With regard to the proper conceptualisation of SouthAfrica’s national interest, Van Nieuwkerk (2004) iscorrect in proposing the following questions: “What isSouth Africa’s national interest? Who determines it?Can South Africa afford competing interpretations ofthe national interest? Or is contestation inevitable;in fact a normal feature of democratic intellectualdialogue? Most of all, can the concept realisticallyguide South Africa’s foreign policy?”The debate on South Africa’s national interest andforeign policy has been ongoing. This policy briefcontends that the way in which the debate hasdeveloped has tended to place foreign policy abovenational interest, and not vice versa. The dilemma isthat the media has foisted the false, if essentialist,notion of foreign policy in relation to national intereston the debate. For instance, an article in The Starmade the following assertion: “How seriously do theZuma people take foreign policy? This is the questionstill preoccupying the diplomats in Pretoria as well aspolicy experts … as the whole of this administrationare too focused on the vicious quarrels within thetripartite alliance” (Fabricius, 2010). The nationaldebate in the tripartite alliance is important if it ismeant to assist in defi ning national interest, in thesame way that a debate in Afri-Forum on the Afrikaanslanguage is important it terms of how it serves thecountry’s national interest.South Africa therefore needs to conceptualise anddefi ne its national interest better. A country’s nationalinterest is the collective – and, indeed, an aggregation –of all the other interests in all the political, economicand social dimensions of state activity. To defi nethe national interest of a state based on one of itssubsystems is not only incorrect, but also narrowsthe scope of state-society interaction that is requiredto construct an overarching statement of nationalinterest. A great deal of work has been undertakenin each of the subsystems of national interest in SouthAfrica, but what seems to be lacking is a systematic,coordinative discourse towards establishing anoverarching framework.3. Institutions and state collaborationThe debate on state collaboration and internationalcooperation in the global economy has clearlyhighlighted the complex problem that role players face.There is concern about whether global problems canbe addressed without the involvement of institutions,or through loose triangular forums such as BRICS.The complexity of the tension in internationalcooperation is compounded by the need for playersto coordinate their choices through bindinginstitutional arrangements if they are to achievetheir collective goals.For instance, a formal institutional framework couldhelp create a more useful platform where countriescan also compete with each other to assume positionsof infl uence in international policy forums. Indeed,both India and Brazil have called for the expansionof the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), andtheir inclusion in it, although China has objected tothis (Nye, 2011). These differences need to bemediated through an institutional arrangement withinBRICS in order to prevent them from leading tomistrust and suspicion.Clearly, the assumption that international playerscan share the same interests and agendas on aglobal scale outside of an institutional frameworkis tenuous. BRICS collaboration is being defi nedand crafted – although in state-centric and bilateralways – outside of institutionally binding obligations,norms and goals. In the absence of an institutionalstrategic framework, BRICS relations with Africa canonly be conceived through collaboration at the levelDevelopment Planning Division

Page 4February 2012Policy Brief No. 4of individual state action (bilateralism), as has beenthe case thus far. It is this aspect of BRICS’ role inAfrica’s development that provides both challengesand opportunities for South Africa’s crucial position inrelation to:• how the country will balance its national interestas a member of BRICS, and as a key regionalplayer with interests in the region and in Africa.• the ways in which South Africa will be able tomoderate, mediate, facilitate and drive regionalpositions in BRICS’ engagements in order topromote development and continental integration.There will be further discussion on these questionslater. International institutions have been explainedas a combination of “sets of principles, norms, rulesand decision making procedures upon which actors’expectations converge” (Krasner, 1985). The literatureon “realism in international relations” explains therelationship between states in the anarchicinternational system as that of states primarilyconcerned with their national security. For neorealists,international institutions are insignifi cant, in thatpower considerations among states are dominant inthe anarchic system (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer,2003). In this view, collaboration among states willonly be sustainable if states place a high premiumon interaction, have symmetric resources, and areinterdependent.Some neorealists have developed further analysisacknowledging the role of institutions in the internationalsystem, focusing on, for instance, how institutionscan affect the distribution of costs and benefi ts ofstate interaction. Furthermore, neorealistic institutionscan be used as devices to seek and maintainasymmetric gains and, more broadly, to assist incontrolling other players’ behaviour. Neoliberalinstitutionalists have argued for specifi c incentivesfor states to create institutions, as opposed to simplyengaging in ad hoc bargaining. Collaboration is seento be primarily demand driven – that is, players willcreate institutions because they are useful – butthe mechanisms for creating them have not beenspecifi ed (Keohane, 1989). An important angle in theneoliberal institutionalist argument is that institutionsmay constrain future institutional development(Keohane, 1988).A more recent innovation in examining institutions’role in the international political economy is therole played by politicians and experts. Hass (1987)focuses on the efforts of politicians to use linkagesacross various issues to create new “policy planks”in the international policy arena. Constructivism hasfocused on the matter of ideas, arguing that reality is,in fact, constructed in the minds of decision makers.Constructivists argue that “power and interests do nothave effects apart from the shared knowledge thatconstitutes them as such” (Wendt, 1992).Constructivists see norms and values as importantcausal forces. Institutions are not only important inconstraining players, but also essential in altering howthey conceive their basic interests. The establishmentof an effective institutional framework is, therefore,important in getting arrangements and alliancesbetween states to work.4. State collaboration in BRICS: Bandwagoningor balancing?The previous section has sought to provide aninstitutional analysis of state collaboration in theglobal economy through the lenses of the typesof institution. It offers insights into BRICS’ statecollaboration in terms of how these states willcollaborate or coordinate their actions by placingthe premium on their infl uence in changing andtransforming the global economy. Internally, BRICS’state collaboration faces challenges and opportunitiesin respect of “free riding”, an inhibiting factor thatcould lead to some states within BRICS viewingcertain actions as creating instability in their economyor the regional economy. The institutional design ofstate collaboration therefore seeks to find coordinationpoints that will help deal with varying costs andbenefi ts for the participating states, especially in statecollaboration of loose and informal arrangementssuch as BRICS.The involvement of BRICS countries (especially China,India and Russia) in Africa is growing in unprecedentedways. The social, political and economic uncertaintiesthus created require innovative and creative ways tomanage the expanding economic and developmentengagement appropriately. South Africa’s role inthis increasing engagement is critical if the politicaland economic arrangements and opportunities are

Policy Brief No. 4 Page 5February 2012to accrue signifi cant gains in job creation, economicgrowth and greater regional integration in Africa.How this engagement is to be focused in terms ofthe strategic roles that different stakeholders will playin the political economy, and the kind of inputs thateach will bring to the process, is critical.A signifi cant challenge is that the industrial base(in particular, manufacturing) of most African countriesis weak and its contribution to the gross domesticproduct (GDP) is minimal (Hartzenberg et al., 2011).Most countries in southern Africa, for instance, arecharacterised by the predominance of small industrialunits which produce mostly for the national andregional markets. These fundamental differencesin resources, technology and capital endowmentsbetween Africa and other BRICS member countries(such as China, India and Russia) make themcomplementary economic development partners(Fundira, 2011).South Africa’s situation is slightly different to that ofthe rest of the continent due to its expanded anddiverse industrial base. However, “its social fabric isfraying” (Viljoen, 2011).The next section lays the groundwork for establishingpossible coordination points among BRICS countriesthemselves and in their relations with the rest ofthe world.4.1 The realities of rising BRICSThere is concern worldwide about the scope andscale of global challenges, combined with the allegeddecline in the United States’ strategic infl uence in theglobal policy arena. This has spawned vast amountsof literature on the viability of the unipolar system.The emerging new global arena is also bringing aboutchange in the foundations of the global internationaleconomy.This situation was recently underscored by analtercation between American President BarackObama and some Chinese offi cials at the Asia-Pacifi cEconomic Cooperation (APEC) summit. Commentingon the United States’ frustration with China’s stanceon international trade relations, President Obamasaid: “We’re going to continue to be fi rm that Chinaoperates by the same rules as everyone.” It is reportedthat Pang Sen, a Deputy Director-General at China’sForeign Ministry replied: “First we have to knowwhose rules we are talking about. If the rules aremade collectively through an agreement and Chinais part of it, then China will abide by them. If [the]rules are decided by one or even several countries,China does not have the obligation to abide by that”(Mail & Guardian, 2011).While state-driven processes of connecting the worldare still prevalent, most connections in the world arefacilitated through non-state activities and networks.Furthermore, the changing global situation hasbrought into sharp relief the traditional notionsabout the infl uence of formal and informalinstitutional arrangements in the global policy arena.The ascendance of emerging markets and theirrole in the policy space has increased over the pastfew years. This has seen a proliferation of bothformal and informal institutions, including theformation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO),the G20, the G77, the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA)Dialogue Forum, and BRICS.The relationship among the BRICS countries isconsidered below in order to establish the connectionsin these countries’ strategic engagements in theworld, and how they connect with each other andglobally. In short, the objective is to assess whatunites the BRICS countries, and how South Africawill position itself in BRICS.4.1.1 ChinaChina’s emergence as a signifi cant player in theglobal economy has been linked to trends pointingto 2050 that “China will have the largest GDP in theworld, will be the globe’s largest emitter of carbon,will have the largest standing military and will be theworld’s second largest population” (Ikenberry, 2011).The scale of the development path that China hasundertaken both domestically and internationally haspositioned the country as a major strategic playerin the global economic arena. China’s accession tothe WTO in 2001 reassured its proponents that thecountry was prepared to work within the “American-ledliberal hegemonic order” (Mingjiang & Chan, 2010).This pragmatic posture was first generated by China’sconsolidation of its regional multilateralism in EastAsia. In this way, China “believes that multilateralismis a powerful instrument for coping with unipolarityand opposing hegemony” (Mingjiang & Chan, 2010).Development Planning Division

Policy Brief No. 4 Page 7February 2012the past few years following its historical links withdeveloping nations in the Non-Aligned Movement(NAM), the G20, the G77, BRICS and – moreimportantly – within IBSA.4.1.3 BrazilThe Brazilian foreign policy has been anchored ontwo concepts, namely universalism and autonomy.Universalism is linked to the country’s position inthe region, with its diversity and cultural attributesserving as a springboard for parachuting itsnational and regional interests to the rest of theworld. Autonomy relates to Brazil’s ability to engagethe international policy terrain in ways that projectits national and regional interests and those of thedeveloping world. Brazil’s role in the G20 has beenexceptional and “propelled the country to the WTO’sdecision-making core, together with India” (Vigevani &Ramanzini, 2010).The former Brazilian Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim,has acknowledged Brazil’s soft balancing in theinternational terrain as follows: “I would say withoutmodesty that Brazil changed the dynamic of WTOnegotiations. Not Brazil by itself. But Brazil leadsthe G20 and is sought – almost courted. I wouldsay – by the United States, the European Union andJapan, among other countries” (quoted in Vigevani &Ramanzini, 2010).Brazil’s articulation of its role in the internationalpolicy arena – in BRICS, IBSA, the WTO and theG20 – is underpinned by its commitment to regionalintegration in South America and as leader ofMercosur, the Common Market of the South.In relation to the balance of power in the internationalsystem, Brazil’s position is described thus: “Althoughthe United States remains the only superpower in theinternational system, today one can no longer say thatthe world order can be fi tted into a strictly ‘unipolar’model. The political and military resources that theUnited States government and society have at theirdisposal, though virtually unmatchable, do not ensuretheir capacity to defi ne outcomes on a global scale”(Vigevani & Ramanzini, 2010).4.1.4 RussiaThe assumed relative decline of the United States inthe international system has given rise to a significantbody of literature that recasts the positive role ofRussia in the world since the collapse of the SovietUnion almost two decades ago. Hopes are thatRussia’s relationship with China, Brazil, India andSouth Africa will place it at an advantage in relationto the United States. Furthermore, the impendingentry of Russia into the WTO will place the countryprominently in the arena of international economicactivity.Russia’s strategic role in BRICS is to deal with itscontinuing irritation with the United States’ allegedarrogance and disregard for international law,norms and obligations. Rather than seeing itselfas a “responsible stakeholder” in an internationaleconomic system underwritten by the United States,“Russia want[s] the United States to be a responsiblenormal great power in concert with other elite few”(Kuchins & Weitz, 2008).Russia is the only member of BRICS that has raisedsome of the critical intra-BRICS challenges andmistrusts among its fi ve member countries. Russia’sforeign policy posture in BRICS is to balance China’srise and assertiveness. A secret Russian documentis quoted as follows (Skak, 2011):“...special attention must be directed towardsmonitoring the growing role of China in internationalaffairs, including having in mind the consequencesof Beijing’s activities for our regional and globalinterest. We must proceed from the fundamentalimportance of keeping China on a position of actingjointly with us – taking into account the situationaldynamics – within the G20, BRICS, and SecurityCouncil of the UN (in which our support is often ofgreater signifi cance for Chinese than their supportis for us nowadays).”4.1.5 South AfricaSouth Africa’s role and position in the internationalarena have to a large degree derived their legitimacyfrom the democratic and egalitarian values that ledto the collapse of apartheid seventeen years ago.The transition from apartheid to becoming a fullmember of the international community wrought alitany of challenges. On the one hand, there wereexpectations that South Africa was to become abeacon of hope; on the other hand, strategic lapsesaway from its founding values of human rights anddemocracy have led many to believe that the countryhas lost its moral high ground (Baker & Lyman, 2008).Development Planning Division

Page 8February 2012Policy Brief No. 4However, it is in the international political economicarena that the country’s value has been more prominent.South Africa’s predilection for multilateralism andinfl uence in the UN, G20, G77 and WTO has elevatedit to the status of a middle power. This status was atits highest when the country took the lead in standingfor the Global South’s cause; the African agendaincluding championing the establishment of theAfrican Union (AU) and the New Partnership forAfrica’s Development (NEPAD).South Africa’s international position was raisedfurther by its membership of IBSA in 2005, combinedwith its non-permanent status at the UNSC in2007/08. Its ascendance to the BRICS forum in2010 has provided the country with greater scopeto be the “dealmaker” for southern Africa. SouthAfrica will, therefore, have to balance its nationalinterest, regional interest and advancement of theAfrican agenda.South Africa’s national interest in relation to itseconomic diplomacy in state collaboration withinBRICS will present the country with opportunities foritself and for the process of regional integration inAfrica. However, these challenges and opportunitiescan best be addressed once South Africa hasdeveloped a proper statement of and frameworkfor its engagement in BRICS, as derived from itsnational interest. What are the incentives andmotivations for a range of stakeholders in Africafor greater collaboration with BRICS, and whichroles should each stakeholder play in the process?Put differently, what and where are the politicaleconomy areas of win-win situations in the BRICSdevelopment engagement with Africa?5. Synthesis discussion on BRICSState collaboration is not a new phenomenon ininternational political economy. The BRICS forum andthe set of interactions and institutional frameworksthat this relationship will create are not unique ininternational politics. What is unique about BRICS,however, is its rising role as a group of emergingmarkets in the determination of a new, democraticand inclusive economic order or trajectory in the world.The rising power of the BRICS countries is one thing;how these countries will maximise their aggregatepower to change and transform the global economyis another. This will, in the main, be a function of howthe BRICS countries both collectively and individuallybalance and bandwagon with each other and withthe rest of the world, in particular, the United States.In this situation, while hard power is still important,it is less useful and strategic infl uence is moreappropriate.Intra-BRICS differences, mistrust and challenges willform the basis of each BRICS country’s balancing orbandwagoning strategy. For China, the challenge isthe United States’ reassertion of its strategic infl uencein the South-East Asian subregion. The questiontherefore, is whether Asian States will balance againstChina’s rising infl uence or bandwagon with it.So, for instance, “China has moved to assertterritorial claims in the resource-rich but hotlycontested waters near Philippines and Vietnam.Many of the region’s smaller countries have askedWashington to re-engage in the region as a counterweight”(Johnson & Calmes, 2011). China’s upgradingof the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)has drawn serious attention from Washington. On theother hand, Russia is cautiously sceptical of China’srise and “afraid of becoming a raw material andenergy appendage to China” (Danchenko, 2010).In BRICS, China is critical to Russia as it assertsitself in Europe by building alliances and regionalstructures to block the United States.Brazil is also asserting its influence in the Organisationof American States (OAS). The country’s strategicforeign policy posture is to soft-balance the UnitedStates to bring about BRICS’ “long, soft landingin America’s relative decline, not a short, violentcrash” (Jones, 2011). India has immense weight inMyanmar and Iran, and wields strong infl uencein the international policy bodies. India and Brazilhave aspirations of becoming permanent membersof the UNSC and are sceptical of China and Russia’sposition in this regard. The continuation of the IBSAforum alongside BRICS will provide India and Brazilwith a strategic platform to balance their strength inareas in which they have lesser infl uence within theBRICS forum.What will South Africa do in this diffi cult and intenselycompetitive situation? It may be argued that relativelyweaker states such as South Africa are “somewhatmore likely to bandwagon than strong states are.

Policy Brief No. 4 Page 9February 2012Because weak states can do little to affect theoutcome of contest and may suffer grievously in theprocess, they must choose the side that is likely to win”(Walt, 2010).The challenge for South Africa, therefore, is toprioritise the maximisation of its national interest.South Africa has to work on its comparativeadvantage as a “regional power and this gatewaystatus can be exploited at the economic and politicallevel” (Spies, 2010). In relation to BRICS, SouthAfrica will exert both internal balancing and externalbalancing. The former will involve South Africa’sdefi nition of its national interest in relation to BRICSand the country will use this to place the regionand the African agenda at the centre of the BRICSagenda. The latter will involve South Africa’s leveragingof the capabilities and economic strength of otherBRICS countries to expand its strategic infl uence inthe world.The critical matter of South Africa’s balancing act hasbeen described in this way: “The role of South Africa’straditional trading partners – Western countries – hasbeen lessened signifi cantly … China is South Africa’slargest trading partner, and South Africa is the largestdestination in Africa for China’s direct investment …By joining the BRIC countries, South Africa also hopesto become the gateway for the BRIC countries’ entryinto Africa …” (quoted in Bhadrakumar, 2010).Indeed, South Africa’s balancing behaviour willdetermine the extent to which it will be able to infl uenceits fellow BRICS countries to commit to economicdevelopment in Africa. It will also have to do thiswhilst balancing the consolidation of its traditional andhistorical links with the world.6. Conclusion and policy recommendationsThis research brief has sought to analyse theimplications of the BRICS countries’ relationship forSouth Africa. An evaluation of the BRICS countries’foreign policy posture and their position in theinternational policy arena was deemed importantin order to establish the relational strength that theBRICS forum can muster. The relationship amongthe BRICS countries is expected to be complex,with impacts from both within and outside the forum.The positions that BRICS countries will adopt willdepend not only on their internal relationship withinthe forum, but also on the relationship that thesecountries have with the rest of the world. The dynamic,changing character of interactions among states inthe rest of the world will, in turn, also determine thebalancing and bandwagoning behaviour of the BRICScountries.A number of policy areas that BRICS countries willhave to address in order to resolve some of the policyand institutional issues are outlined below. Thesepolicy implications are raised mindful that the BRICS’institutional and relational framework among thesecountries is largely still under construction. Many ofthe policy challenges raised below are open-endedquestions posed in a manner that implicitly providesprobable answers to rather diffi cult areas of collectiveand individual state action.In this situation, South Africa should urgently developa framework for its national interest in BRICS.In the medium to long term, South Africa will need todevelop a comprehensive and coherent statementof its national interest, which places nationaldevelopment, regional integration and the Africanagenda at the core.Policy implications include the following:• Conceptual gap: South Africa needs to defi ne itsnational interest and build a discourse of how itsnational interests are balanced against its fi rstprinciples in the Constitution, regional integration,the African agenda, as well as its internationalvalues, norms and obligations towards the restof the world.• Preference aggregation: State collaboration, morespecifically intra-BRICS collaboration, will revolvearound how each BRICS economy maps its policypreferences and how BRICS as a whole establishesan institutional framework for aggregating thesepolicy decisions into a BRICS Plan or Programme.• Coordination equilibrium: Free riding in intra-BRICS relations will result in a problem of fi ndinga BRICS coordination equilibrium with the restof world with regard to human rights, trade, theUNSC, monetary cooperation and resourceextraction, and how to balance the preponderantstate – the United States.Development Planning Division

Page 10February 2012Policy Brief No. 4• BRICS mediation discourse: The fi ve BRICScountries are regional powers in their respectiveregions. The assumption is that they havemediated their regional interest and strategicpositions, and have secured a regional mandate.For instance, South Africa may refl ect in itsengagements with BRICS and the rest of worldthat it is “the gateway to Africa”.• BRICS expansion: BRICS is a growing forum.The question is: In which ways will the inclusionof Mexico, Turkey, Nigeria, Egypt, Thailand orIndonesia change the relationship among theBRICS countries? How will the balance of powerconfi guration be resolved at BRICS and atregional level?• China extension/expansion: China’s extensionand expansion of its scope and scale of interactionand activities in the world has policy implications.How will BRICS countries fi nd a balancebetween third-party preferences in whichChina will engage (e.g. the EU, ASEANand USA) and those that the BRICS countrieshave with China? Similarly, what and howwill BRICS countries (particularly Chinaand Russia) deal with IBSA’s infl uence onand divergent interest in BRICS?• BRICS knowledge hub: BRICS needs tomanage, organise and disseminate theinformation and knowledge about itsactivities in each country and in the restof the world. Will the BRICS countries adopta hub-and-spokes approach where the specifi ccountry knowledge and information (spokes)are transmitted into the central hub, andwhere will the hub be located amongstthe BRICS?

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