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Churchill’s suggestion that March mightbe a key to Franco, and described the$10 million allocated for bribing Spanisharmy officers to promote Spain’s continuedneutrality, in his Churchill WarPapers, published between eight andsixteen years ago. However, Gilbertrelated, Churchill ultimately relied onCaptain Hillgarth for the effort. (See“Leading Churchill Myths” on page 10.)2.. RUTH IVE’S BOOKLONDON, OCTOBER 22ND— Ruth Ive,the wartimeclerk who listenedto andonce censoredChurchill’strans-Atlanticphone calls toRoosevelt, whospoke about herexperiences atthe 2002Churchillconference, haspublished a book, The Woman WhoCensored Churchill (History Press,£18.99), reports Val Hennessy of TheMail Online. Before each caller was connected,even if it were the King, her dutywas to tell them: “The enemy isrecording your conversation and willcompare it with previous information inhis possession. Great discretion is necessary.Any indiscretion will be reported bythe censor to the highest authority.”Ive, now 90, monitored all VIPtransatlantic calls, but the ones betweenWSC and FDR were the most interesting.Her job was to cut them off at thefirst sign of inadvertent leaks of sensitiveinformation,” since the British knew theGermans were intercepting the calls.Although Churchill has been accused of“leaking like a sieve,” Ive said “he was alltoo aware of the risks of speakingfrankly...however late the hour, andhowever well he had dined, I can say thatit never impaired his judgment of whatwas proper to mention.”Only once did she “pull the plug”on Churchill, late in the war when,understandably upset about a devastatingV2 rocket attack, he began to hint aboutits damage. Hitting the “off” switch,Ruth said: “I must remind you, sir, thatthere should be no mention of anydamage suffered from enemy aircraft.Would you like your call reconnected?”After an “acknowledging grunt,”Churchill resumed: “Anthony, thismorning...” and she cut him off again!“He sounded so upset, but I had nooption other than to disconnect himagain and warn him of the dangers.” Sheexpected a blast of anger, “but the worstbombing incident to hit London sincethe Blitz seemed to have temporarilyknocked the stuffing out of the normallybellicose statesman.”As Mrs. Ive related in Finest Hour,Churchill ended all his top-level conversationswith the phrase “KBO,” whichshe didn’t understand. With someembarrassment her boss explained that itmeant “Keep Buggering On.” Ruth iscertain that Roosevelt didn’t understandthe phrase either.Ruth Ive never met Churchill inperson, Hennessy writes, “but lookingback on her war work she now seesherself as ‘greatly privileged’ to have beenin a position to listen to his conversations.She realised even then, young asshe was, that this was a man with anexceptional personality, an amazingcapacity for work and a gift for languageand oratory which could inspire thenation and lead it to victory.”3. WSC’S DEATH LETTERLONDON, OCTOBER 22ND— A letter tobe shown at “Last Post,” a World War Iexhibit at the Churchill Museum in theCabinet War Rooms in November“reveals” that Churchill would have lefthis wife £3000 in savings (£195,000today), and enough shares to pay off hisdebts. But what the Mail, Express,Mirror and Sun all find remarkable wasfirst published thirty-six years ago by SirMartin Gilbert in Companion VolumeIII, Part II to Winston S. Churchill, theofficial biography (page 1098).Although millions of men goingoff to war wrote similar letters to beopened in the event of their death,Churchill’s message to Clementine (17July 1915) is well worth reading for itslyrical prose and poignant reflections. Itwas written at a time when his politicalambitions lay shattered, following hisouster from the Admiralty in the midstof a Cabinet crisis and an anxious battlefor the Gallipoli Peninsula—an imaginativeidea Churchill had not invented, buthad championed all too blindly assupport among his colleagues fell away.“I am anxious that you shd getFINEST HoUR 141 / 7hold of all mypapers,” he wroteher: “...some dayI shd like thetruth to beknown.Randolph willcarry on thelamp. Do notgrieve for me toomuch. I am aspirit confidentof my rights.Death is only anincident, & notthe most importantwh happensto us in this stateof being. On thewhole, especiallysince I met youmy darling one Ihave been happy,& you have taught me how noble awoman’s heart can be. If there is anywhereelse I shall be on the look out for you.Meanwhile look forward, feel free, rejoicein life, cherish the children, guard mymemory. God bless you. Good bye. W.”4. PEREGRINEGOES A’FALCONINGLONDON, OCTOBER 22ND— WinstonChurchill would only have been great ifhe had atoned for his warmongering,wrote Peregrine Worsthorne in the onlinemagazine The First Post (http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk). All wars are evil,writes Mr. Worsthorne (who once wrotefor the Daily Telegraph), but World WarII was the worst of them all becauseHiroshima and Nagasaki “legalisedmurder on a massive scale.”Odd. Didn’t Stalin and Hitlerlegalise more mass-murder (at least sevenmillion each) than the Atomic bomb(70,000)? Do The Thoughts ofChairman Mao contain atonement?Churchill said in 1945: “We must indeedpray that these awful agencies will bemade to conduce to peace among thenations, and that instead of wreakingmeasureless havoc upon the entire globe,may become a perennial fountain ofworld prosperity.....The bomb broughtpeace, but men alone can keep thatpeace, and henceforward they will keep itunder penalties which threaten the survivalnot only of civilization but ofhumanity itself.” >>

S A R A H C H U R C H I L L L I T H O G R A P HD AT E L I N E SWORSTHORNE...Undeterred, Mr. Worsthorne plunges on:“...seldom has there been a statesman asgood at glorifyingwar, and as indecentlyeager to wagewar as WinstonChurchill. All hisworks demonstratehis love of war,glamourise itsglories and minimiseits horrors.”Here is Churchill glamourizing warin 1944: “Remember we have a missinggeneration, we must never forget that—the flower of the past, lost in the greatbattles of the last war....There ought tobe another generation of men, with theirflashing lights and leading figures. Wemust do all we can to try to fill thegap...” And in 1947: “In each of [the twoWorld Wars] about thirty million menwere killed in battle. In the last one sevenmillion were murdered in cold blood,mainly by the Germans. They madehuman slaughter-pens like the Chicagostockyards. Europe is a ruin. Many of hercities have been blown to pieces bybombs....It may well be that an evenworse war is drawing near.”Worsthorne continues: “Yet yearafter year shoals of books about Churchillappear—Andrew Roberts’s Masters andCommanders is the latest one—whichtotally ignore how low under Churchill’sleadership Britain had to stoop toconquer. Churchill’s refusal to shoulderhis burden of guilt is a huge disqualificationfor his place in this country’spantheon.”How many refutations do we need?Churchill, 1897: “Looking at theseshapeless forms, coffined in a regulationblanket, the pride of race, the pomp ofempire, the glory of war appeared but thefaint and unsubstantial fabric of adream...” 1901: “A European war cannotbe anything but a cruel, heartrendingstruggle.... 1909: “Much as war attractsme & fascinates my mind with itstremendous situations—I feel moredeeply every year—& can measure thefeeling here in the midst of arms—whatvile & wicked folly & barbarism it all is.”1929: “The only test by which humanbeings can judge war responsibility isAggression; and the supreme proof ofAggression is Invasion.” 1930: “War,which used to be cruel and magnificent,AROUND & ABOUTActress Billie Piper gave birth in October to a 6 lb.11 oz. son whom she and her husband, actorLaurence Fox, named Winston James. “It’s a goodname, isn’t it?” said Mr. Fox. According to The Press Association,“Winston” derives from an expression meaning “joyful stone.” BothSir Winston and Laurence Fox, who belongs to an acting dynasty that includeshis father James and uncle Edward, went to Harrow School.kkkkkA columnist for the Daily Telegraph (London) posted another of thosecolumns suggesting that G.W. Bush is not like Winston Churchill(http://xrl.us/osbtf). Fair point, but too easy—it’s like saying thatMadonna is not like Mother Theresa. The column drew this comment onthe Telegraph chatlist: “Comparisons and contrasts? Drunk most of thetime. Wanted to use chemical weapons. Started the bombing of civiliantargets. And that’s just off the top of my head. Had the alternative mediabeen around, Churchill’s reputation might not be written in stone.”Given this chance to shoot fish in a barrel (and armed with Prof. DavidFreeman’s review, FH 139:16), this was just too good to resist:“Drunk most of the time”: None of his family or colleagues ever sawhim the worse for drink.“Wanted to use chemical weapons”: Wanted to use tear gas. It wasHimmler who fancied Zyklon B. There is a difference.“Started the bombing of civilian targets”: Presumably the writer hasnot heard of Rotterdam, Warsaw and Guernica; and what were Zeppelinsdoing over England in the Great War?“And that’s just off the top of my head:” We take that as his excuse.“Had the alternative media been around, Churchill’s reputation mightnot be written in stone”: It’s around now, why isn’t it busy? See “LeadingChurchill Myths” (xrl.us/fk6by). Maybe that’s not alternative enough. ,has now become cruel and squalid.”Worsthorne: “When the war wason, and for some decades thereafter, venerationof Churchill was absolutelyunderstandable; part of the legitimateself-justification of a righteous nationfighting a necessary war.”So it was after all a righteous andnecessary war? If so, Churchill is supposedto atone for what, exactly?Worsthorne: “Churchill’s refusalever to recognise the mote in his owncountry’s eye or to shoulder the burdenof his own individual guilt strike me as amajor disqualification [sic] in thisChristian country’s pantheon. AbrahamLincoln, who didn’t hesitate to do publicpenance on both scores after the CivilWar, puts Churchill to shame.”Er, when, during the week betweenthe Civil War’s end and his own assassination,did Lincoln do “public penance”?Lincoln, who would have done anythingFINEST HoUR 141 / 8to win the Civil War, admitted that if hecould have saved the Union withoutfreeing a single slave he would have doneso. Churchill would have done anythingto win World War II: “Once you are sounfortunate as to be drawn into a war,no price is too great to pay for an earlyand victorious peace.” (1901)Winston Churchill was the onlyleader on either side of WW2 actually toquestion strategic bombing: “Are webeasts? Are we taking this too far?”(1943). The only one. He even arguedwith Air Marshal Harris over the horrorbeing inflicted on Germany. Dresden, forwhich he is frequently blamed, wasbombed at Soviet request by Attlee.Worsthorne: “Truth to tell, warmongeringis a far more damaging andinfantile folly than is pacifism, and it isonly by dimming Churchill’s fame thatthis truth can ever again shine forth.”Refuting such claims is too easy.

Omit Churchill’s quests for peace beforeWorld War I (thwarted by a war-mongerin Berlin); before World War II(thwarted by the refusal of peacefulnations to see the obvious); and afterWorld War II (thwarted by Eisenhower’srejection of his call for a “summit” withStalin’s successors). Consider only thethemes of the argument—in the words ofProfessor Warren Kimball:“...the themes are repetitivelyevident: war is bad, regardless of thecauses; bombing civilians is evil, regardlessof the circumstances; anti-Semitismis unacceptable, particularly as practicedby Churchill and the Roosevelts; pacifistsare invariably perceptive.....This ischildish (as opposed to childlike) reasoningthat throws up pie-in-the-skyidealism without the slightest genuflectiontoward practicality, unintendedconsequences, or common sense: a selfrighteousprimal scream against physicalevil that blames just the bombers. Nobombing—absolutely none—would havehappened except for Hitler and theNazis, so let us keep our focus where itbelongs, on first causes.”It is wisely observed that the onlytwo countries where World War II is stillbeing fought are Britain and Russia. Sooutbursts by British iconoclasts are to beexpected. But scholarly thought has longsince relegated Churchill’s “war mongering”to the fever swamps of theunread and the illiterate. Churchill mademany mistakes, but on the key questionof his time he was right:“…if you will not fight for theright when you can easily win withoutbloodshed; if you will not fight whenyour victory will be sure and not toocostly; you may come to the momentwhen you will have to fight with all theodds against you and only a precariouschance of survival. There may even be aworse case. You may have to fight whenthere is no hope of victory, because it isbetter to perish than live as slaves.” (TheGathering Storm, 1948).FUNERAL VAN LOSESSWANAGE, DORSET, SEPTEMBER 15TH—Many have asked for an update on theSwanage Railway Trust’s plans for theChurchill van, which was successfullyreturned last year to the UK from theUSA and which has since been subject toa Heritage Lottery Fund bid (FinestHour 129:6 and 133:8).Unfortunately, the Lottery Fundhas declined to support the Trust’s£50,000 bid to restore the Churchillfuneral van and use it to house amuseum focusing on the role of railwaysin the Second World War. Swanage Trustwas disappointed by this decision, whichmay reflect the reduced funds availablefor heritage projects following the diversionof resources to the Olympic games.The Railway Trust thanks themany people who have helped to securethe return of the car from California,where its future was uncertain. Specialthanks go to the Heritage RailwayAssociation, the Imperial War Museum,The Churchill Centre & Museum, TheDuke of Marlborough, Dorset CountyCouncil and many others for their enthusiasticsupport.The Trust is now seeking alternativefunding for the project. Offers ofsupport and further details of the projectare available from Steve DoughtyFINEST HoUR 141 / 9The funeral van in 1965, above,and at its former California home.(stephen.doughty1@btopenworld.com),Deputy Chairman Swanage RailwayTrust, tel (44) 7860-108754.ERRATUMFinest Hour 139, page 45, reJapanese aircraft: the G4M “Betty” is thetop picture and the G3M Nell is at thebottom. Thanks to Gene Lassers for this,and for advising us: “In reading up onthe situation, the majority of planes usedin the attack were G3M Nells.”DON CARMICHAELHANOVER, N.H., OCTOBER 6TH— DonaldScott Carmichael died today at the fineage of 96, leaving his wife Mary of 67years, two daughters and four grandchildren.He studied at Harvard, where hewas editor of the Crimson, and at theUniversity of Michigan School of Law.Don’s career included senior executivepositions at Stouffer Foods, Schrafts, andDelaware North Corporation, owner >>

DON CARMICHAEL...of the Boston Bruins. A lifelongDemocrat, he was a member of PresidentJohnson’s Task Force on the War AgainstPoverty, a delegate to the 1960 and 1964Democratic conventions, and served onthe Ohio Civil Rights Commission. Heserved on the boards of the NationalConference of Christians and Jews andthe Cleveland United Negro CollegeFund, and was president of KaramuHouse, an interracial cultural settlementhouse in Cleveland.I knew Don as a collector ofRoosevelt and Churchill memorabilia,from first editions and autographs to thecommemorative souvenirs he referred toas “bric-a-brac,” which I eventually soldfor him through my former business. Mycolleague Glenn Horowitz sold many ofDon’s Roosevelt and Churchill booksand holographs, the catalogues for whichwere themselves unique. But Don’s interestswere broader yet. For instance, hehad a collection of letters exchanged withthe exiled Kaiser Wilhelm, in which Donand the Emperor pondered what mighthave happened had Germany acceptedChurchill’s idea for a “naval holiday,”and stayed out of war in 1914....When Don began looking for aretirement home in 1987 I nominatedNew Hampshire, kidding him that hisparty hadn’t yet managed to overburdenthe tax structure as it had in neighboringVermont. Don replied that I must be aRepublican, and I said I was really a 19thcentury Federalist, now become an anarchist.He bought that and raised me one,saying he thought I fit the 18th centuryeven better. He and Mary found lovelySugartop Farm in Lyme, hard by theConnecticut River near Dartmouth.The following year they were atour Bretton Woods Conference to hearAlistair Cooke...and then-Governor JohnSununu—Bush I’s campaign manager inthe 1988 presidential campaign. Doneven smiled when Paul Robinson,Reagan’s Ambassador to Canada,thanked the Governor by saying:“There’s no secret where my sympathieslie.” Paul then diplomatically suggestedthat Canadians present vote for BrianMulroney in the upcoming Canadianelection, and Sununu whispered: “Theregoes the 3000-mile undefended border.”Don and I laughed about it later becausehe was that kind of person.Leading Churchill Myths (16)“Leslie Howard Kept Spain Out of the War”(Or: “The Brain in Spain was Mainly Off the Plane”)Leslie Howard:not a spy.On 6 October the Daily Telegraph(London) reported that British actorLeslie Howard (Gone with the Wind,Berkeley Square, Scarlet Pimpernel,Never the Twain Shall Meet), whoseplane was shot down returning to Britainfrom Spain via Portugal in June 1943,was returning from a secret mission onbehalf of Churchill, to prevent Spanishdictator Francisco Franco from joiningthe Axis powers (http://xrl.us/ot49n).Spanish author José Rey-Ximena haspublished a book claiming that LeslieHoward, with the help of his formerlover, Conchita Montenegro, secretly metwith Franco. He interviewed Montenegrobefore her death in 2007 at the age of 96. She claimed she had had an affair withHoward after the pair starred together in the 1931 film Never the Twain ShallMeet. She later married a senior member of the far-right Falangist party and, usinghis influence, arranged the meeting. But Howard was unable to report back whenhis plane was shot down by the Luftwaffe. “He has never been recognised as eithera spy or as a hero,” said Rey-Ximena.This reminded us of the recent story about Churchill’s “secret peace offers toMussolini,” which alas are in letters at the bottom of Lake Como, where nobodycan read them. To be sure, we asked the opinion of two oracles.David Stafford, the leading scholar of Churchill and Intelligence, replied: “Imyself would never trust an aging ‘luvvie,’ however glamorous and seductive a pastshe enjoyed, as an independent historical source. Besides, by 1943 Franco neededno persuading not to join Hitler; the Allies had landed in North Africa inNovember 1942 and the wily Franco could see the way the pendulum wasswinging. I think this is complete fantasy.” (Professor Stafford’s view is shared byJohn Grigg in 1943 and by Richard Lamb in Churchill as War Leader, who notethat the concerns about Franco bolting in 1943 were mainly those of theAmericans.)Sir Martin Gilbert replied: “It is the year that is wrong. In Volume I of myFrequently since, as the years passed, we would know that anissue of Finest Hour had trickled out through the ether whenDon would call to express delight with a cover or an article,particularly those that develed into the remarkablerelationship between his two greatest heroes. I shall miss thosecalls, for there never was a dull one.David Dilks wrote of his old friend Bill Deakin: “Hisinterests were legion, his friends to be found the world over. Hishospitality, not least of the mind, was boundless, and hiscompany an enduring delight.” And Churchill wrote of JosephChamberlain: “One mark of a great man is the power ofmaking lasting impressions upon people he meets.” RMLFINEST HoUR 141 / 10

Churchill War Papers (page 161, footnote 2), I identify Juan March, in a note from Churchill to Admirals Phillips andGodfrey, as capable of playing an important role “in bringing about friendly relations with Spain....” The note anticipatedChurchill’s meeting with Juan March at 5pm that afternoon. But the date was 26 September 1939! Churchill's main manin Spain was Hillgarth.” (See page 7.)Captain Alan Hillgarth, Naval Attaché in Madrid 1939-43 and Chief of British Naval Intelligence, Eastern Theatre,1944-46, has several index entries in the War Papers, Volume III. On 29 April 1941 Churchill minuted Eden: “The basisof Captain Hillgarth’s policy is of the most secret character, and cannot possibly be mentioned.” Gilbert’s footnote explainsthat “Hillgarth had been personally charged by Churchill, at the end of May1940, with the task of keeping Spain out ofthe war. To this end Churchill had allocated $10 million...for the necessary payments to Spanish officials, primarily seniorarmy officers” (569). The Hillgarth references clearly show that Churchill’s concern about Spain joining Hitler peaked in1939-41, and was virtually nonexistent by 1943.Rey-Ximena’s theory doesn’t even pass the logic test. Given the ongoing role of Hillgarth, if Churchill wantedsomeone to pry Franco loose from an unexpected lurch to the Axis in 1943, why would he send a film actor?The implication that Howard’s aircraft was shot down because the Germans had somehow caught onto his spy missionis as absurd as the notion that it was downed because the Germans mistook Howard’s bodyguard, Chenhalls, forChurchill—or the claims of Linda Stokes, Churchill’s bodyguard’s great-niece, that Howard and Chenhalls, were “doubles,”used to throw the Germans off Churchill’s movements (he was returning from North Africa at the time; see FH 131:6).In the letters column of Finest Hour 133, Professor M.R.D. Foot, the Oxford author of SOE: An Outline History,offered “a more banal but more plausible” reason for the destruction of Leslie Howard’s aircraft: “Another of the passengersin Howard's plane, also killed, was Wilfred Israel, the Jewish owner of a large department store in prewar Berlin, who happenedto have a British as well as a German passport, and had so escaped from Germany. He had been in Lisbon, pursuingwork to rescue Jewish children from the Nazis' clutches. He had long been on the Gestapo's black list. German secretservice officers watched all departures from Lisbon airport from the airport cafe, which overlooked the boarding point. It isnot hard to assume that one of them recognised Israel and rang up a friend in the Luftwaffe.”Churchill himself summarized the Franco worry of 1940 in a speech in the Commons on 24 May 1944: “When ourpresent Ambassador to Spain, the Rt. Hon. Gentleman the Member for Chelsea [Sir Samuel Hoare], went to Madridalmost exactly four years ago to a month, we arranged to keep his airplane waiting on the airfield, as it seemed almostcertain that Spain, whose dominant party were under the influence of Germany because Germany had helped them so vigorouslyin the recently-ended civil war, would follow the example of Italy and join the victorious Germans in the waragainst Great Britain. Indeed, at that time the Germans proposed to the Spanish Government that triumphal marches ofGerman troops should be held in the principal Spanish cities, and I have no doubt that they suggested to them that theGermans would undertake, in return for the virtual occupation of their country, the seizure of Gibraltar, which would thenbe handed back to a Germanized Spain. This last would have been easier said than done.“There is no doubt that if Spain had yielded to German blandishments and pressure at that juncture our burdenwould have been much heavier. The Straits of Gibraltar would have been closed, and all access to Malta would have beencut off from the West. All the Spanish coast would have become the nesting-place of German U-boats. I certainly did notfeel at the time that I should like to see any of those things happen, and none of them did happen. Our Ambassadordeserves credit for the influence he rapidly acquired and which continually grew....But the main credit is undoubtedly dueto the Spanish resolve to keep out of the war. They had had enough of war, and they wished to keep out of it.”**Robert Rhodes James., ed., Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches (New York: Bowker, 1974), 8 vols., VII: 6035. ,NEW AFFORDABLE EDITIONS OF THE OFFICIAL BIOGRAPHYSupport Hillsdale College in its noble republishing of all past official biography volumes and all sevenof the new companion volumes.The Official Biography now being completed is already the longest ever published and the ultimateauthority and sourcework for every phase of Churchill’s life and times. Thanks to Hillsdale, it is nowtruly affordable by everyone.Not only are these books an incredible buy (Biographic volumes $45, Companions $35) butHillsdale College Press will sell you all eight Biographics for $36 each and all twenty-one (eventually)Companion Volumes for $28 each by subscription. Better yet, if you subscribe for all thirty volumes,you get the Biographic volumes for $31.50 and the Companions for $24.50. That includes theupcoming, 1500-page Companions to Volume V, first editions of which are trading for up to $1000each! How can you not afford these books? Order from:www.hillsdale.edu/news/freedomlibrary/churchill.asp or telephone toll-free (800) 437-2268. ,FINEST HoUR 141 / 11

1 2 5 - 1 0 0 - 7 5 Y E A R S A G O125 YEARS AGO:Winter 1883-84 • Age 9“Rather greedy at meals...”by Michael McMenaminOn 5 December, 1883, Winstonwrote to his father with news ofschool: “We had gymnastic trials yesterday.I got 39 marks out of 90. I beatsome of the boys in two classes above me.The play room is getting ready forconcert we are learning to sing for it. It isabout 75 feet long and 20 broad andlighted by 920 cp [candlepower] lamps itwill show a very bright light wont it.”During the first term of 1884 atSt. George’s, Churchill was beginning toimprove his marks, especially in mathematics.French was not so good: “Fair—does not learn the grammar with sufficientcare.” History and geography werebetter but not always: “Very erratic—sometimes exceedingly good.” Theoverall report from his Headmaster wasunderwhelming, if not ad hominem: “Heis, I hope, beginning to realize thatschool means work and discipline. He israther greedy at meals.”Winston did not react well toauthority at St. George’s and we knowfrom his autobiography My Early Lifethat he detested the canings, which eventuallyled his mother to remove him fromthe school. We do not know precisely atwhat age Churchill created the followinglegend at St. George’s, recounted byMaurice Baring in a 1922 memoir:Dreadful legends were told aboutWinston Churchill, who had beentaken away from the school. Hisnaughtiness appeared to have surpassedanything. He had been flogged fortaking sugar from the pantry, and sofar from being penitent, he had takenthe Headmaster’s sacred straw hat fromwhere it hung over the door andkicked it to pieces. His sojourn at thisschool had been one long feud withauthority. The boys did not seem tosympathise with him. Their point ofview was conventional and priggish.100 YEARS AGO:Winter 1908-09 • Age 34“Gigantic dodge to cheat the poor”As President of the Board of Trade,Churchill had much to say about theeconomic crisis which—like the 2008version—began in the U.S. and quicklyspread throughout the world. Creditbecame scarce. Churchill believed thatGreat Britain handled the panic betterthan its commercial competitors, theUnited States and Germany. In a speechto the Leicester Chamber of Commerceon 14 January, 1909, he said:The public at large is, I think, inclinedto take too gloomy a view of thegeneral situation at the presentmoment. A reaction in the volume oftrade always follows years of abnormalactivity, and what is happening now isno more that what was foreseen bymany who were best able to judge. Inthe other great commercial countries ofthe world, in the United States and inGermany, the reaction has been inmany respects more marked than it hasbeen with us, and in those countries,in the United States especially, it hasentailed a severe financial crisis. Herein England at the end of 1907 therewere high rates of money, but therewas no sign of panic, no breakdown incredit. Commerce was not denied itsusual accommodation, and I do notthink any bank restricted its loans tothe legitimate trader who had goodsecurity to offer. When we rememberthat in the United States at the close of1907 there was practically a generalsuspension of specie payment, and thatin Germany in the beginning of 1908the monetary stringency and pressurewere so great that—so I aminformed—credits were very largelywithdrawn from the commercial enterpriseof the country, I think we areentitled to derive considerable satisfactionfrom the evidences of financialstrength and stability which GreatBritain has very notably displayed.A general election was thought lessthan a year away. Churchill was often onthe attack against the Conservative Partyfor their “Tariff Reform” proposals whichwere, in fact, protectionist tax increasesby any other name—a fact Churchill wasonly too happy to draw to the public’sattention. As he said at a politicalmeeting in Nottingham on 29 January1909:If the Conservative party win the election,they have made it perfectly clearthat it is their intention to impose acomplete protective tariff, and to raisethe money for ambitious armamentsand colonial projects by taxing thepoor. They have declared, with a franknesswhich is at any rate remarkable,that they will immediately proceed toput a tax on bread, a tax on meat, a taxon timber, and an innumerableschedule of taxes on all unmanufacturedarticles imported into the UnitedKingdom; that is to say that they willtake by all these taxes a large sum ofmoney from the pockets of the wageearnersby making them pay more forthe food they eat, the houses they livein, and the comforts and convenienceswhich they require in their homes; andthat a great part of this large sum ofmoney will be divided between thelandlords and the manufacturers in theshape of increased profits, and eventhat part of it which does reach theExchequer is to be given back to thesesame classes in the shape of reductionsin income tax and in direct taxation.Do not allow yourself to be drawnfrom this plain view of what is calledFINEST HoUR 141 / 14

the Tariff “Reform” movement byingenious sophistries which have oftenbeen exposed, by appeals to sentimentof a cheap and false character, or bydelusions about taxing the foreigner.(Cheers.) Such treacle is scarcely fit tocatch flies with (laughter)—and if youface the policy with which we are nowthreatened by the Conservative partyfairly and searchingly, you will see that,stripped of its disguises and stripped ofits ornaments, it is nothing less than adeliberate attempt on the part ofimportant sections of the propertiedclasses to transfer their existing burdensto the shoulders of the masses of thepeople, and to gain greater profits forthe investment of their capital bycharging higher prices. (Cheers.)Churchill took delight all his life inusing ridicule to poke fun at opponents,but they tended not to enjoy it nearly asmuch as he did. Many of his victimsaccused him of engaging in what todayin the United States would be called“negative attacks.” Here was Churchill’sreply to such sensitive feelings:I must say I have never heard of aparty which was in such a jumpy,nervous state as our opponents are atthis present time. If one is led in thecourse of speaking, as I sometimes am(laugher and cheers), to speak a littlefirmly and bluntly about theConservative Tariff “Reformers,” theybecome almost speechless with indignation.(Laughter.) They are always ina state of incipient political apoplexy,while as for the so-called LiberalUnionists, whenever they are criticizedthey run off whining and complainthat it is unchivalrous to attack themwhile Mr. Chamberlain is disabled.(Laughter and cheers.) Sorry I am thathe is out of the battle, not only on personalbut on public grounds. Hisfiercest opponents would welcome hisre-entry into the political arena, if onlyfor the fact that we should then have aman to deal with and someone whosestatement of the case for his side wouldbe clear and bold, whose speecheswould be worth reading and worthanswering, instead of the melancholymarionettes whom the wire-pullers ofthe Tariff Reform League are accustomedto exhibit on provincialplatforms. (Laughter.) But I hope youwill not let these pretexts or complaintsmove you or prevent you from callinga spade a spade, a tax a tax, a protectivetariff a gigantic dodge to cheat thepoor….The newlywed Churchills had beenliving in Winston’s old, cramped quartersat 12 Bolton Street. The lease for thatexpired in February 1909 and theysigned a new eighteen-year lease for 33Eccleston Square. They promptly beganrenovations which included lots of bookcases,Winston writing in a letter toClementine that “All the bookcases are inposition (I have ordered two more for theside window of the alcove).”75 YEARS AGO:Winter 1933-34 • Age 59“A new situation has been created”As winterapproached,the Nazi partyhad obtainedan iron grip onGermany in anastonishinglyshort period. AsMartin Gilbertwrote inVolume V ofthe OfficialBiography: “Bymid-November in Germany, there wereat least 100,000 opponents of the Naziregime in concentration camps, and morethan 50,000 Germans had fled abroad insearch of refuge. On November 12 aGeneral Election was held at which onlythe Nazi Party was allowed to canvass,with the result that it secured 95% of thevote.Churchill addressed the dire implicationsof this in a speech on defense inthe Commons on 7 February, 1934:I remember in the days of the lateConservative Administration…that wethought it right to take as a rule ofguidance that there would be no majorwar within ten years in which weshould be engaged....No one couldtake that principle as a guide today. Iam quite certain that [no] Cabinet…however pacific and peace-loving couldpossibly arrange the basis of their navaland military organisation upon such anassumption as that. A new situationhas been created, largely, I fear…by thesudden uprush of Nazism in Germany,with the tremendous covert armamentswhich are proceeding there today....Weare vulnerable as we have never beenbefore.Churchill returned to the subjecton 8 March 1934, lamenting that thegovernment was proposing to spend onlyan extra £130,000 in its attempt toachieve air parity:It is not to be disputed that we are in adangerous position today. This is a verygood White Paper. The opening paragraphsets forth a most admirabledeclaration, but what is there behindit? £130,000. Very fine words. It musthave taken the Cabinet a long time toagree to them—with the Air Ministerdrafting them and passing them round.They give great paper satisfaction. Butwhat is there behind them? £130,000.It is not the slightest use of concealingthe facts....We are only half thestrength of France, our nearest neighbour.Germany is arming fast, and noone is going to stop her. That seemsquite clear. No one proposes a preventivewar to stop Germany breaking theTreaty of Versailles. She is going toarm, she is doing it, she has been doingit. I have not any knowledge of thedetails, but people are well aware thatthose very gifted people, with theirscience and with their factories, withwhat they call their “Air Sport,” arecapable of developing with greatrapidity a most powerful air force forall purposes, offensive and defensive,within a very short period of time.Churchill’s speech took on its mostominous tone when he added thatGermany was now controlled by “ahandful of autocrats who are the absolutemasters of that gifted nation...”;I dread the day when the means ofthreatening the heart of the BritishEmpire should pass into the hands ofthe present rulers of Germany. I thinkwe should be in a position whichwould be odious to every man whovalues freedom of action and independence,and also in a position of theutmost peril for our crowded, peacefulpopulation, engaged in their daily toil.I dread that day, but it is not, perhaps,far distant. It is, perhaps, only a year,or perhaps eighteen months, distant.Not come yet—at least, so I believe, orI hope and pray. But it is not fardistant. There is still time for us totake the necessary measures, but it isthe measures we want. Not this paragraphin this White Paper; we want themeasures. It is no good writing thatfirst paragraph and then producing£130,000. We want the measures toachieve parity. ,FINEST HoUR 141 / 15

Churchill and the RhinelandRICHARD M. LANGWORTH“After three years, I believe that, withthe present day, the struggle for Germanequal rights can be regarded asclosed....we have no territorial claimsto make in Europe.” 1—Adolf Hitler, 7 March 1936“Churchill would have called Hitler’s bluff, buthe was in no position to do so. All he could do wasvirtually to shriek in the press, concerning the‘hideous drift’ to war, ‘Stop it now!’” 2—Manfred Weidhorn, 29 October 1994“Churchill said nothing about theRhineland—nothing at all. He washoping for Cabinet office and so hekept quiet. 3—Sir Robert Rhodes James,29 October 1994“The Rhineland, in western Germany, is washed bythe River Rhine in the east and bounded byFrance and the Benelux countries in the west. Itincludes the industrial Ruhr Valley, and such famous citiesas Aachen, Bonn, Cologne, Düsseldorf, Essen, Koblenz,Mainz, Mannheim, Wiesbaden and Wuppertal.At the end of World War I the Rhineland, alongwith a number of bridgeheads into Germany proper atplaces like Cologne, was militarily occupied by the victoriousAllies. Though the occupation was to last through1935, troops withdrew in 1930 as a good-will gesture tothe Weimar Republic following the Locarno Treaties,signed in 1925 to normalize relations with Germany. 4But, quite unacceptably to Germans, the Allies wereauthorized to reoccupy the Rhineland any time Germanyviolated provisions of the Versailles Treaty.On Saturday, 7 March 1936, a few thousandGerman troops reoccupied the Rhineland as a rejoicingpopulace waved swastika flags. They had orders to “turnback and not to resist” if challenged by the all-dominantFrench Army. Hitler later said that the forty-eight hoursDÜSSELDORF, MARCH 1936: Residents welcome the Wehrmacht.In Britain it was being said, “After all, they’re only marching into theirown back garden” (Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz).The Rhineland was a watershed in history—theevent which divides Ian Kershaw’s two masterly volumesof Hitler biography. Though he defended it on severalgrounds, the coup marked Hitler’s first foray into territorywhere he was not legally permitted. Churchilladmirers correctly cite the Rhineland as first proof ofChurchill’s warnings about Hitler since 1933; but debatecontinues over what Churchill proposed to do about it.Typically, Churchill early recognized the crisis tocome, predicting Hitler’s move to his wife 6 on 17 January1936: “The League of Nations Union folk, who havedone their best to get us disarmed, may find themselvesconfronted by terrible consequences.” 7following his action were the most tense of his life. 5 FINEST HoUR 141 / 16This article is dedicated to the memory of the late Sir Robert Rhodes James, with whom the author shareda spirited discussion of Churchill and the Rhineland from different perspectives. —RML

GENESISChurchill’s expectations were well-founded. Hitlertoo was thinking of reoccupying the Rhineland andanxious for ways to justify it, according to Joachim vonRibbentrop, who later became Hitler’s foreign minister:…it occurred to me that it might help a peacefuloutcome if we declared ourselves willing to return to theLeague of Nations [which Germany had left inNovember 1933]. I made a note and put it on the table.In the morning the Führer rang me quite unexpectedly:he wanted to come to see me to discuss something veryimportant. When he arrived he said: “Ribbentrop, itoccurred to me last night how we can occupy theRhineland without any friction. We return to theLeague!...I took up my note from the table and showed itto him....Is there not such a thing as telepathy? 8At Ribbentrop’s suggestion Hitler marched on aSaturday, while the French and British were enjoying theweekend (a tactic he would employ frequently), andissued a diplomatic memorandum defending his action:France has replied to the repeated friendly offers andpeaceful assurances made by Germany by infringing theRhine Pact through a military alliance with the SovietUnion exclusively directed against Germany. In thismanner, however, the Locarno Rhine Pact has lost itsinner meaning and ceased in practice to exist.Consequently, Germany regards herself for her part as nolonger bound by this dissolved treaty. 9Hitler balanced his bitter pill with a sweet: the offer of asecurity system establishing “a real pacification of Europebetween states that are equal in rights, and Germany’sreturn to the League of Nations provided she eventuallygot back the colonies she had been deprived of atVersailles.” Yet Hitler had “personally given his assuranceabout Locarno” to Eden in 1934. 10REACTIONThe question turned on how France would react.Would she march? Would she demand Britain march withher? Would she demand intervention by the League ofNations? Or just dither and do nothing? Eden, Churchillbelieved, favored action:In a determined speech he declared that England wouldstand by France in the future, and he insisted upon “StaffConversations” being proclaimed. This was the most hecould wring from the Baldwin Cabinet, and it was a gooddeal more than anyone else could have got. 11Unfortunately for “staff conversations,” the Frenchmilitary was led by Gustave-Maurice Gamelin, a formeraide to Marshal Joffre who would later lead the Anglo-French armies to perdition following the Germanonslaught of 1940: “…in mufti he was just another nondescriptfonctionnaire…under pressure he becameeverything a commander ought not to be: indecisive, givento issuing impulsive orders which he almost always countermanded,and timid to and beyond a fault.” 12 The rot inFrance had already gone a long way: the French governmentmay have yearned for a way to stop Hitler invadingother places; French generals were more worried aboutstopping him from invading France herself. 13The bulk of opinion was that France was unwillingto act, with or without Britain. But was she? Notaccording to Churchill, describing the resolve of Pierre-Etienne Flandin, the French foreign minister, who arrivedin London on 11 March:He told me that he proposed to demand from the BritishGovernment simultaneous mobilisation of the land, sea,and air forces of both countries, and that he had receivedassurances of support from all the nations of the “LittleEntente” [Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia, supportedby France] and from other States. He read out animpressive list of the replies received. There was no doubtthat superior strength still lay with the Allies of the formerwar. They had only to act to win. 14Heartened by Flandin’s attitude, Churchill urgedhim to demand a meeting with the Prime Minister,Stanley Baldwin, who, as Churchill saw it, handed him adusty response:Mr. Baldwin explained that although he knew little offoreign affairs he was able to interpret accurately the feelingsof the British people. And they wanted peace. M.Flandin says that he rejoined that the only way to ensurethis was to stop Hitlerite aggression while such action wasstill possible. France had no wish to drag Great Britaininto war; she asked for no practical aid, and she wouldherself undertake what would be a simple police operation,as, according to French information, the Germantroops in the Rhineland had orders to withdraw ifopposed in a forcible manner. Flandin asserts that he saidthat all that France asked of her Ally was a free hand. 15Churchill realized that Flandin was putting his ownspin on the situation: “How could Britain have restrainedFrance from action to which, under the Locarno Treaty,she was legally entitled? In the event, however, Baldwin’sanswer ended any chance of French resistance. Flandin,Churchill wrote, returned to Franceconvinced, first that his own divided country could not beunited except in the presence of a strong will-power inBritain, and secondly that, so far from this being forthcoming,no strong impulse could be expected from her.Quite wrongly he plunged into the dismal conclusion thatthe only hope for France was in an arrangement with anever more aggressive Germany. 16 >>FINEST HoUR 141 / 17

HEART OF THE MATTER: TheGerman State between 1919 and1938. One can see at a glancewhy the Rhineland was demilitarizedafter World War I, and why itsreoccupation troubled France. Itbordered the Low Countries,Luxembourg, Holland and Belgium,which the Wehrmacht would use tocharge into France from the northin 1940. Thus it bypassed theMaginot Line, which the Frenchthought protected them from anyGerman invasion. This map by J.F.Horrabin also shows Hitler’s laterdemands: Austria, which handilydefeated a Nazi coup in 1934 butwould be less lucky in 1938; theSudeten German regions ofCzechoslovakia, which Hitler woulddemand and get at the MunichConference; and the PolishCorridor including the Free City ofDanzig (today Gdansk), territoryprized from Germany and given tothe new Polish state at Versailles.The Corridor effectively dividedGermany proper from East Prussia.Churchill’s account was far more positive than thereality, according to Maurice Ashley, WSC’s literary assistant.All Flandin actually proposed to Baldwin, Ashleywrote, was to convene the League Council, and perhaps toadopt “sanctions by stages.” 17But Churchill does accurately record StanleyBaldwin’s judgment of the mood of Great Britain. Thepressure to avoid a confrontation with Germany wasimmense. At a dinner of ex-servicemen in Leicester, aChurchill ally in the rearmament debate, Leo Amery, gavea fiery speech declaring that Britain’s very existence wasthreatened. To the amazement of an observer, the formerservicemen sided with the Germans, saying in effect,“Why shouldn’t they have their own territory back; if theyget it, it’s no concern of ours.” 18CHURCHILL’S ACTIONSAlthough Hitler’s timing was certainly not based onany concern for Churchill’s reaction, he had neverthelesschosen a moment particularly inconvenient to WSCpolitically. Churchill recognized the strategic implicationsof the Rhineland’s occupation, and agreed with AustenChamberlain, who warned that Austria was next onHitler’s list. But when he addressed the Commons on 10March, wrote Robert Rhodes James, Churchill spokemildly, and was far from bellicose:He subsequently wrote that “I was careful not to derogatein the slightest degree from my attitude of severe thoughfriendly criticism of Government policy, and I was heldto have made a successful speech.” The friendliness ismore evident than the severity. Neville Chamberlainrecorded that Churchill had “suppressed the attack hehad intended and made a constructive and helpfulspeech.” 19In a discussion of Churchill actions in 1994, SirRobert maintained that Churchill made “no direct referencewhatever” in his 10 March speech to the Germanreoccupation of the Rhineland.” 20 This may be true in thetechnical sense, but Churchill was certainly referring tothe Rhineland when he spoke of “the last few days,” andrecommended a ministry of supply or defence:If what we have seen in the last few days is the mood of apartially armed Germany, imagine what the tone will bewhen these colossal preparations are approaching theirzenith…. Let us never accept the theory of inevitable war;neither let us blind our eyes to the remorseless march ofevents. 21Later, at a meeting of the House of Commons ForeignAffairs Committee, Churchill urged a “coordinated plan”under the League of Nations to help France challenge theGerman action. Sir Samuel Hoare replied for theGovernment, saying the participants in such a plan were“totally unprepared from a military point of view.” That,one observer noted, “definitely sobered them down.” 22On March 12th, five days after Hitler’s coup, PrimeMinister Baldwin did two things which disappointedChurchill: He announced, not a new Minister of Defenceor Supply, which Churchill had been urging, but aFINEST HoUR 141 / 18

“Minister for the Coordination of Defence,” somethingless entirely; and he gave the job to his Attorney General,Sir Thomas Inskip, who knew nothing of the subject.Inskip might “excite no enthusiasm,” NevilleChamberlain wrote, but at least “he would involve us inno fresh perplexities.” A British general wrote: “ThankGod we are preserved from Winston Churchill.” 23Baldwin’s appointment had an electrifying effect onChurchill, who, hoping to be called to office, had carefullybeen avoiding criticizing the government:Mr. Baldwin certainly had good reason to use the lastflickers of his power against one who had exposed hismistakes so severely and so often. Moreover, as a profoundlyastute Party manager, thinking in majorities andaiming at a quiet life between elections, he did not wishto have my disturbing aid. He thought no doubt that hehad dealt me a politically fatal stroke, and I felt he mightwell be right. 24On March 13th Churchill, having decided that if hecould not have office he would at least have audience,began a series of fortnightly articles on foreign affairs forthe Evening Standard.In the first article, “Britain, Germany and Locarno,”he renewed his call for League of Nations action. The followingevening in Birmingham, Churchill soundedconciliatory toward Hitler when he argued that there werepeaceful ways to determine if Germany was justified inher action:The Germans claim that the Treaty of Locarno has beenruptured by the Franco-Soviet pact. That is their case andit is one that should be argued before the World Court atThe Hague. The French have expressed themselveswilling to submit this point to arbitration and to abide bythe result. Germany should be asked to act in the samespirit and to agree. If the German case is good and theWorld Court pronounces that the Treaty of Locarno hasbeen vitiated by the Franco-Soviet pact, then clearly theGerman action, although utterly wrong in method, cannot be seriously challenged by the League of Nations. 25This is not the familiar voice of defiance whichChurchill was soon to become. He was insisting that itwas a matter for international action—much as opponentsof the 2003 Iraq War insisted that the UnitedNations should determine what action was necessary. ButChurchill did not accept international inertia: If theLeague of Nations failed, and no other action was taken,he warned, it would cause events to “slide remorselesslydownhill towards the pit in which Western civilizationmight be fatally engulfed.” Opponents of war in 2003didn’t tend to consider the perils of inaction.On 26 March in the Commons Churchill warmlyapplauded Anthony Eden’s “great speech” in which Edenhad said that “the appeasement of Europe” was the aim. 26Let us suppose that any one of us were a German andliving in Germany, and perhaps entirely discontentedwith many things that he saw around him, but thinkingthat here is the Führer, the great Leader of the country,who has raised it so high—and I admire him for that—able to bring home once again a great trophy. One year itis the Saar, another month the right to have conscription,another month to gain from Britain the right to buildsubmarines, another month the Rhineland. What will itbe next? Austria, Memel, other territories and disturbedareas, are already in view. If we were Germans, and discontentedwith the present regime, nevertheless onpatriotic grounds there is many a man who would say,“While the Government is bringing home these trophiesI cannot indulge my personal, sectional or party feelingsagainst it”…. last August, I said that we must do our dutyunder the Covenant of the League, but that we shouldnot press France unduly, and that we should not gobeyond the point where we could carry France. 27Robert Rhodes James noted in Churchill: A Study inFailure 1900-1939, that Churchill had said, later in thisspeech, “Agree with thine adversary quickly, whiles thouart in the way with him” (Matthew 5:25). But he didn’tquote the full context. Churchill preceded this by saying—as he very frequently did when it came to negotiating withadversaries—that Germany must be confronted withoverwhelming strength and resolution:I desire to see the collective forces of the world investedwith overwhelming power. If you are going to depend ona slight margin, one way or the other, you will have war.But if you get five or ten to one on one side, all boundrigorously by the Covenant [of the League] and the conventionswhich they own, then you may have anopportunity of a settlement which will heal the woundsof the world. Let us have this blessed union of power andof justice: “Agree with thine adversary quickly, whilesthou art in the way with him.” 28Churchill was still urging international adjudicationwhen his next Evening Standard article “Stop It Now!”was published on April 3rd. The title did not refer to militarilychallenging Hitler, but to prevarication and lack ofresolve. This was no task for France or Britain, or theLocarno Powers, Churchill declared. It was a task for all:“There may still be time. Let the States and peoples wholie in fear of Germany carry their alarms to the League ofNations at Geneva.” 29Speaking in the Commons three days later, nowmore critical of the government, Churchill was no lessresolved on international action; and he remindedMembers that it ought to include Italy, which the Britishand French had alienated with fruitless sanctions followingMussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia:The Government ask for a Vote of Confidence. They donot ask it because they have done exceptionally well. They>>FINEST HoUR 141 / 19

will no doubt get the Vote of Confidence, but I hope theywill not make the mistake of thinking that it is a testimonial,or a bouquet, or that it arises from long-pent-upspontaneous feelings of enthusiasm which can no longerbe held in check….Here you have strong nations bandedtogether by solemn treaties, armed most powerfully,whose vital interests are affected; here you have nationssmall in numbers who, individually, may be helpless, butwho, organized and united under the authority of theLeague, may exert a very great power indeed. 30Churchill, more than Baldwin, was attempting tosee matters from the French viewpoint. The French were“afraid of the Germans,” he wrote to The Times; yetFrance had joined the sanctions against Italy, and theestrangement of Italy had given Hitler an opportunity:He struck his blow, and the safety of France suffered aninjury so grievous that we are actually at this momentmaking our war plans, although we have virtually noarmy to defend France and Belgium if they should beattacked. In fact Mr. Baldwin’s Government, from thevery highest motives, endorsed by the country at theGeneral Election, has, without helping Abyssinia at all,got France into grievous trouble which has to be compensatedby the precise engagement of our armed forces.Surely in the light of these facts, undisputed as I deemthem to be, we might at least judge the French, withwhom our fortunes appear to be so decisively linked, witha reasonable understanding of their difficulties, which inthe long run may also be our own. 31CONCLUSIONSChurchill had the ability to look far ahead. As theanti-appeaser Bob Boothby put it,The military occupation of the Rhineland separated Francefrom her allies in Eastern Europe. The occupation of Austriaisolated Czechoslovakia. The betrayal of Czechoslovakia bythe West isolated Poland. The defeat of Poland isolatedFrance. The defeat of France isolated Britain. If Britain hadbeen defeated the United States would have been given trueand total isolation for the first time. 32Churchill certainly would have supported, as HenryPelling suggested, French military reoccupation, even justthe bridgeheads in places like Cologne. 33 But with Franceunwilling, he fell back on the League. He never urged unilateralBritish action, but he did believe and insist thatfirmness would produce results.Churchill was certain that Hitler, at least in thoseyears, would recoil if confronted with united, overwhelmingforce. And there was an example whichsuggested he was right. It was Austria’s defeat of anattempted Nazi coup in July 1934, under its Vice-Chancellor Ernst Rüdiger Starhemberg: an event ignoredby Anglo-French leaders in the slow, sorry drift to war.Austria’s resistance caused Hitler to recoil:Hitler felt he had not only been defeated in the confrontation,but personally humiliated by the unexpectedstrength of Austrian resistance and the bold move byMussolini to support Austria. He immediately made a U-turn, and stopped all further political interference inAustria’s internal affairs. Not only was the Nazi propagandacampaign abandoned but the murders and bombattacks were abruptly ended. 34Some historians, such as Donald Watt, posit thenotion that the Rhineland caused Churchill to turn to theRussians: He “fell into the clutches of Ivan Maisky, theSoviet ambassador in London. In April 1936 we find himwriting to Viscount Cecil [of Chelwood] of the need to‘organise a European mass, and perhaps a world masswhich would confront them, overawe them, and perhapslet their peoples loose upon them.’” 35John Charmley believes that Churchill knew allalong that the League was toothless: “Espousal of theLeague was a flimsy cover for his balance-of-power conceptionof foreign policy; but where the political leftwould excoriate the latter view, they were more likely tosupport Churchill if he covered the nakedness of hisRealpolitik with the veil of the League. 36But Churchill’s tune did not suddenly change in1936. It had evolved from the principles of collectivesecurity he had declared as early as 1933:I believe that we shall find our greatest safety in cooperatingwith the other Powers of Europe, not taking aleading part but coming in with all the neutral States andthe smaller States of Europe which will gather togetheranxiously in the near future at Geneva. We shall make agreat mistake to separate ourselves entirely from them atthis juncture. Whatever way we turn there is risk. But theleast risk and the greatest help will be found in recreatingthe Concert of Europe through the League of Nations,not for the purpose of fiercely quarrelling and hagglingabout the details of disarmament, but in an attempt toaddress Germany collectively, so that there may be someredress of the grievances of the German nation and thatthat may be effected before this peril of [Nazi Germany’s]rearmament reaches a point which may endanger thepeace of the world. 37As John Charmley wrote: “The lack of concerted responsefrom the Versailles Powers revealed what was alreadyapparent, that where the threat of defeat had broughtunity, the reality of peace had engendered disunion.” 38EPILOGUESir Robert Rhodes James maintained to the end thatChurchill said and did nothing about the Rhineland, evenin the weeks after he had been denied office: “He keptwell clear of the uproar over Abyssinia, being an admirerof Mussolini, and, although fearful of German rearmament,was writing with admiration about Hitler until lateFINEST HoUR 141 / 20

in 1937. None of this derogates from his essential greatness,but the record of March 1936 is unassailable, andfully justifies my protest at Professor Weidhorn’s inaccurateversion in his paper.” 39That wasn’t quite the case. Professor Weidhornnever connected the “Stop It Now!” article as meaningBritain must stop the German occupation of theRhineland. What Churchill wanted to stop was “thehideous drift to war.” Churchill did say much about theRhineland. But what it amounted to was appealing foraction under the League of Nations—which Sir Robertdescribed as “hardly a clarion call.” 40Maybe so. But Churchill did say something, andwhat he said favored action, despite the inertia of theFrench and Baldwin. The Rhineland did lead toChurchill’s abandonment of hope in the League ofNations, and hastened his calls for secure collective securitythrough “a coalition of the willing” (to use a morerecent and perhaps uncomfortable phrase). ManfredWeidhorn and Robert Rhodes James were both right:Churchill did not demand war; but he did want action.ENDNOTES1. Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis (New York:Norton, 2000), xxxv.2. Manfred Weidhorn, “A Contrarian’s Approach to Peace,” inJames W. Muller, ed., Churchill as Peacemaker (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1997), 50.3. Robert Rhodes James, “Churchill as Peacemaker”: ChurchillCentre symposium in conjunction with the Woodrow Wilson Center,Washington, D.C., 1994.4. Richard M. Langworth, Churchill by Himself (New York:Public Affairs, 2008), 438.5. Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris (New York: W.W.Norton, 1999), 588.6. Martin Gilbert, In Search of Churchill (London:HarperCollins, 1994), 144.7. Martin Gilbert, Churchill: The Wilderness Years (Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 1992), 145.8. Michael Bloch, Ribbentrop (New York: Crown, 1993), 84.9. Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators (London: Cassell,1962), 339.10. Ibid., 330.11. Winston S. Churchill, “The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden,”Strand Magazine, August 1939, reprinted in The Collected Essays ofSir Winston Churchill, vol. III, Churchill and People (London:Library of Imperial History, 1975), 345.12. William Manchester, The Last Lion: Winston SpencerChurchill, vol. II, Alone 1932-1940 (Boston: Little Brown, 1988), 581.13. A.J.P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1970), 387-88.14. Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (London:Cassell, 1948), 152.15. Ibid., 154.16. Ibid., 154.17. Maurice Ashley, Churchill as Historian (London: Secker &Warburg, 1968), 163.18. Ronald Tree, When the Moon Was High (London:Macmillan, 1975), 64.RHINELAND, MARCH 1936: “Die Fahne hoch! Die Reihen festgeschlossen!...Bald flattern Hitlerfahnen über Barrikaden.”Announced by delirious rejoicing, the long nightmare had begun.19. Robert Rhodes James, Churchill: A Study in Failure 1900-1939 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970), 262-63.20. Robert Rhodes James to the author, 15 November 1994.21. Robert Rhodes James, ed., Winston S. Churchill: HisComplete Speeches 1897-1963, 8 vols. (New York: Bowker, 1974),V: 5701.22. Martin Gilbert, Churchill: A Life (London: Heinemann,1991), 552.23. Study in Failure, 262-63.24. Gathering Storm, 157.25. Jewellers’ Association Annual Dinner, Birmingham, 14March 1936, in Complete Speeches, VI: 5704-05.26. Study in Failure, 262.27. Winston S. Churchill, Arms and the Covenant (London:Harrap, 1938), 296-97.28. Arms and the Covenant, 301.29. Winston S. Churchill, “Stop it Now!” Evening Standard, 3April 1936, reprinted in Step by Step (London: ThorntonButterworth, 1939), 17; London: Odhams, 1947), 5.30. Arms and the Covenant, 306, 313, 314.31. WSC to The Times, 20 April 1936, in Martin Gilbert,ed., Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume V, Part III, TheComing of War 1936-1939 (London: Heinemann, 1982), 101.32. Robert Boothby, Recollections of a Rebel (London:Hutchinson, 1978), 93.33. Henry Pelling, Winston Churchill (rev. ed., Ware:Wordsworth, 1999), 375.34. Richard Lamb, The Drift to War 1922-1939 (London:Bloomsbury, 1991), 103.35. Donald Cameron Watt, “Churchill and Appeasement,” inRobert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis, eds., Churchill: A Major NewAssessment of His Life in Peace and War (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1993), 205. Watt musquotes Churchill; his correct words havebeen supplied (Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, vol. V, 721).36. John Charmley, Churchill: The End of Glory (London:Hodder & Stoughton, 1993), 307.37. Speech of 7 November 1933, in Arms and the Covenant,102-03.38 John Charmley, Chamberlain and the Lost Peace (London:John Curtis, 1989), xiii.39. Robert Rhodes James to the author, 15 November 1994.40. Robert Rhodes James to the author, 24 May 1995.,FINEST HoUR 141 / 21

CHURCHILL IN CONTEXTPreemptive Use of Force:DAVID JABLONSKY“This idea of not irritating the enemy didnot commend itself to me.…Good,decent, civilised people, itappeared, must never themselvesstrike till after they have been struck dead.”—WSC, The Gathering Storm, 1948“The Rhineland crisis was a sufficientbasis, Churchill believed, to provide domesticand international legitimacy for the preventiveuse of force....At the same time, based on hisexperiences in the Cold War,Churchill would acknowledge howproblematic deterrence is as a tool inpreventing a nation from acquiringnuclear capability.“the ChurchillExperienceand the BushDoctrineWinston Churchill died in 1965. The so-calledBush Doctrine was born in 2002 in response tothe terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001.The most controversial part of the doctrine involved a newapproach to the use of force under unprecedented circumstancesdealing with events that seem a quantum leap fromthe issues that Churchill addressed in his lifetime.Nevertheless, the insights Churchill developed in his longcareer offer a basis, however conjectural, for discussion ofthe type of judgment and advice he might offer on thenature of the use of force outlined in the Bush Doctrine.THE BUSH DOCTRINEA new precept on the use of force evolved in a seriesof speeches by President Bush in the wake 9/11. Theemerging declaratory policy was brought together in theSeptember 2002 National Security Strategy and was thenreaffirmed in the next iteration of the document in March2006. 1 A major component of the threat outlined in the2002 strategy was that “traditional concepts of deterrencewill not work against a terrorist enemy whose…so-calledsoldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potentprotection is statelessness.” Nor were the concepts neces-Col. Jablonsky, USA (ret.), a Churchill Centre academic adviser, is aDistringuished Fellow of the U.S Army War College where he wasProfessor of National Security Affairs. He is the author of five booksdealing with European history and international relations, includingChurchill, the Great Game and Total War.sarily effective against rogue states, since deterrence “basedonly upon the threat of retaliation” was less likely to workagainst leaders of such states, who were “more willing totake risks of gambling with the lives of their people andthe wealth of their nations.”As a consequence, and given the potential for cata-FINEST HoUR 141 / 22

strophic terrorism, the document proposed adopting “theconcept of imminent threat to capabilities and objectivesof today’s adversaries,” because America “cannot let ourenemies strike first.” The idea was elaborated more graphicallythat same month by the President’s NationalSecurity Adviser, who stated that “we don’t want thesmoking gun to become a mushroom cloud.” 2 To forestallsuch attacks, the administration declared that while “theUnited States will constantly strive to enlist the support ofthe international community, we will not hesitate to actalone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense byacting preemptively….” 3Criticism of the new doctrine’s approach to the useof force was not long forthcoming, particularly after thebeginning of the Iraq war in March 2003. 4 One majorissue was the conflation by the administration of preemptivewith preventive use of force. The Pentagon defines thepreemptive use of force as an “attack initiated on the basisof incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack isimminent.” Preventive use of force, on the other hand, is“initiated in the belief that military conflict, while notimminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involvegreat risk.” 5Thus, although the Bush Doctrine presents theargument for acting preemptively, if necessary, it actuallymoves from imminent threat to the concern withinevitable threat that is the basis for the preventive use offorce. The greater the threat, the 2002 National SecurityStrategy concluded, “the…more compelling the case fortaking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even ifuncertainty remains as to the time and place of theenemy’s attack.” 6The problem cited by critics of the Bush Doctrine isthat the preventive use of force has no legal sanction, sinceit is responding to a “threat” that is neither certain norimminent and is based on an assumption of inevitablehostility and the perceived need to strike before the militarybalance becomes less favorable. By expanding theright of self-defense to include the preventive use of forceagainst threats from terrorists and rogue states before, inthe President’s words, they are “fully formed,” the doctrineconstitutes a major departure from internationallyagreed rules under the United Nations (UN). 7 Thatorganization limits the use of force to self-defense againstan armed attack as defined in Article 51 of the UNCharter or to military actions authorized by the UNSecurity Council under Chapter 7 of the Charter.In response to the Bush Doctrine, the UNSecretary-General appointed a high-level panel, whichconcluded that states have the right to defend themselvesnot only against actual threats, but imminent ones as well.It also determined that the preventive use of force mightbe appropriate to deal with such latent threats as weaponsproliferation and terrorism, but only if authorized by theUN Security Council. As for the concept of a unilateralFINEST HoUR 141 / 23state decision to exercise the preventive use of forceimplicit in what the Bush administration labeled anticipatoryself-defense, the panel concluded that it would resultin international anarchy: “Allowing one to so act is toallow all.” 8THE CHURCHILL EXPERIENCEIt is reasonable to suppose that Churchill wouldunderstand the dilemmas associated with the BushDoctrine. To begin with, he was familiar with both preemptiveand preventive use of force. On 3 July 1940, heordered a preemptive strike against the Vichy French fleetanchored in Oran, which killed 1299 French sailors.Vichy was nominally independent, and Churchilllacked proof that Admiral Darlan, the Vichy Minister ofWar, intended to turn his fleet over to the Nazi regime.But after the fall of the French Premier Paul Reynaud on17 June, Darlan refused to send the ships to British,American or French colonial harbors. For Churchill thethreat was imminent. “The addition of the French Navyto the German and Italian fleets, with the menace ofJapan measureless upon the horizon,” he wrote, “confrontedGreat Britain with mortal dangers….It was Greektragedy. But no act was ever more necessary for the life ofBritain....” 9 The “hateful decision” against a former allytook immense courage. It would have been far easier, inRoy Jenkins’ estimation, “to have let sleeping ships lie,and [to have] hoped vaguely for the best.” 10As for the preventive use of force, Churchill wasaware that British doctrine for centuries had been basedon the idea that a single power should not be allowed todominate the European continent. Thus, the War of theSpanish Succession (1701-14), fought to prevent theunion of the French and Spanish kingdoms, was a preventivewar. The conflict did not begin with an attack onBritain. But as Churchill chronicled in Marlborough, ifBritain in alliance with Holland and the Austrian Empirehad not declared war and allowed the two countries tounite, the “widest empire in the world” would have addedits resources to France’s: “with Spain not only the Indies,South America and the whole of Italy, but the cockpit ofEurope—Belgium and Luxembourg.” 11Churchill also understood that the preventive use offorce required both domestic and international legitimacy.He may not have been aware of the problems thatGerman Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had in the 1880swith his senior General Staff officers, who were clamoringfor preventive war against France before that countryincreased in military might. The German statesman’sreply at the time was that preventive war was like committingsuicide to keep from dying.But by 1911, long after Bismarck had left the scene,Churchill certainly realized that the military strategistswere dominating the policy makers in Berlin with the vonSchlieffen Plan, that blunt either-or instrument of >>

CHURCHILL IN CONTEXTCONTRASTING APPROACHES: Churchill took the “hateful decision” to attack the French fleet at Oran on 3 July 1940 (left), not trustingVichy France to keep the ships out of German hands (Euronet.nl). During the 1948 Berlin blockade, WSC suggested that President Trumanthreaten to drop the atomic bomb. Truman sent aircraft (right), but they carried supplies instead (Bildarchivpreussischer Kulturbesitz).preventive war that would bring about the first total conflictof the 20th century. Germany “had long anddeliberately committed herself” to the invasion of France,an extremely hazardous preventive use of force, Churchillconcluded, “flying in the face of world opinion, openlyassuming the role of the aggressor….” 12Churchill returned to the preventive use of force inthe 1930s after the rise of Adolf Hitler to power. Themajor lesson for him from this period was that the Westhad waited too long to stand up to Nazi Germany andthat, in fact, appeasement prevented dealing with thatthreat while it was manageable. As a consequence, WorldWar II was “the unnecessary war,” and the theme of thefirst volume in his history of that conflict was focused onthe preventive use of force:HOW THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLESTHROUGH THEIR UNWISDOMCARELESSNESS AND GOOD NATUREALLOWED THE WICKEDTO REARM 13THE RHINELAND CRISISChurchill’s theme was based on the traditionalBritish argument that dangers had to be dealt with beforethey grew larger—an argument to which he returned afterGermany occupied the Rhineland (previous article).For four hundred years the foreign policy of England hasbeen to oppose the strongest, most aggressive, most dominatingPower on the Continent….I know of nothingwhich has occurred to alter or weaken the justice,wisdom, valour, and prudence upon which our ancestorsacted. I know of nothing that has happened to humannature which in the slightest degree alters the validity oftheir conclusions. 14The Rhineland crisis was one of a series of Hitler’s“March surprises” throughout the 1930s, consistently inviolation of the Versailles Treaty, a sufficient basis,Churchill believed, to provide domestic and internationallegitimacy for the preventive use of force. Britishappeasers considered Nazi Germany to be just a revisionistpower seeking to overturn the 1919 agreement. Churchillmaintained that any faults in that treaty did not renderGermany morally equal to the democracies; neither did itprovide justification for Hitler’s use of force. This appliedeven more to the Rhineland crisis, he pointed out, sincethe German action violated the Locarno agreement as wellas the Versailles treaty. Moreover, he also understood thatthe correlation of forces in March 1936 was quantifiablyagainst Germany, as Hitler was well aware. “We had noarmy worth mentioning,” the Nazi leader recalled later;“at that time, it would not even have had the fightingstrength to maintain itself against the Poles.” 15Throughout the remainder of the decade as Europestumbled toward war, Churchill’s championing of preventiveforce took on increasingly frustrated tones. InOctober 1938, he abstained from voting on a motion toapprove the results of the recent Munich conference,which he called “a total and unmitigated defeat,” as“silent, mournful, abandoned, broken, Czechoslovakiarecedes into the darkness.” Referring to the reign of KingEthelred the Unready, who squandered the strong positionBritain had gained under the descendents of KingAlfred, the British statesman lamented “all the opportunitiesof arresting the growth of the Nazi Power which havebeen thrown away….” 16In a similar manner, Churchill’s frustration wasalmost palpable when he addressed the 31 March 1939British guarantee to Poland almost a decade later in hismemoirs of World War II. “[I]f you will not fight for theright when you can easily win without bloodshed,” hewrote; “if you will not fight when your victory will be sureand not too costly; you may come to the moment whenyou will have to fight with all the odds against you andonly a precarious chance of survival.” 17FINEST HoUR 141 / 24

That moment came later, as W.H. Auden noted(from the safety of his New York refuge), Britain was theonly actor in a “low dishonest decade”:In the nightmare of the darkAll the dogs of Europe bark,And the living nations wait,Each sequestered in its hate;Intellectual disgraceStares from every human face,And the seas of pity lieLocked and frozen in each eye. 18CHANGE AND CONTINUITYBased on his interwar experiences, Churchill wouldappreciate in this new century how difficult the preventiveuse of force is politically. The very nature of such use oftenmeans that there is ambiguous evidence or intelligenceand that, as a consequence, there will be countervailingarguments. This was the case with his failure in theappeasement decade to garner domestic legitimacy bylinking German capabilities with intentions until Hitler’sactions could leave no doubt.Thus, even if he had succeeded, and Britain andFrance had gone to war with Germany before 1939, muchof the public might have believed it to be an unnecessaryconflict. “We know,” one analyst has concluded, “giventhe nature of academics, that had the democracies heededChurchill’s advice, generations of ungrateful professorswould still be writing tomes complaining about preventivewar and exonerating Hitler as a legitimate folknationalist.” 19Moreover, in an increasingly interdependent worldthreatened by terrorists with a global reach and byweapons of mass destruction (WMD), Churchill, whoalways was conscious of the link between changes in technologyand means of war, would probably agree that thedistinction between an imminent threat and a latent onehas lost much of its relevance. Certainly the nuclear equationwould play an important role in the Britishstatesman’s approach. As he knew, preventive actionagainst nascent nuclear adversaries had been contemplatedby governments in the Cold War.In 1948, while the United States enjoyed a nuclearmonopoly, Churchill recommended that the TrumanAdministration threaten the use of atomic weapons ifStalin refused to withdraw Soviet troops from Berlin andEast Germany. His view, the American ambassador toBritain reported, was “that when and if the Soviet [sic]develop the Atomic bomb, war will become a certainty.” 20By 1954, in his last full year as Prime Minister,Churchill had retreated considerably from this position.The Soviets had broken the American nuclear monopolyin 1949, and the 1 March 1954 U.S. detonation of a hugethermonuclear device at Bikini demonstrated that thebombs were becoming infinitely more powerful, even toFINEST HoUR 141 / 25the extent of obliterating small islands. “You can imaginewhat my thoughts are about London,” he wrote PresidentEisenhower. 21By then, preventive first strike attacks were emergingas staples of U.S. and Soviet nuclear doctrine, influencingthe development of the strategic triad and counterforcecapabilities. The Truman administration had considered,then rejected, the option of preventive war against theSoviets in its 1950 National Security Strategy (NSC 68).Nevertheless, the massive buildup of U.S. militarypower during the Korean War was designed to support apolicy of forcing the nuclear issue with the Soviets beforeit was too late—“to lay the basis,” as the author of NSC68 described it, “for taking increased risks of general warin achieving a satisfactory solution of our relations withthe USSR while her stockpile of atomic weapons was stillsmall.” 22 Both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy seriouslyconsidered preventive action to keep the SovietUnion and then Communist China from establishing asubstantial nuclear capability. At one point early in hisadministration, as he contemplated the cost for the U.S.to remain “constantly ready” in the Cold War, Eisenhowerwondered “whether or not our duty to future generationsdid not require us to initiate war at the most propitiousmoment that we could designate.” 23From all these experiences, Churchill would understandwhy legitimacy for the use of force against terrorismand rogue states is still appropriate in situations thatclearly come under Article 51 of the UN Charter for retaliatoryaction, such as the invasion of Afghanistan; andwhy legitimacy claims are less credible with preemptiveforce and weakest when force is used for preventive objectivessuch as regime change. The paradox is the same thatChurchill faced in the 1930s. Preventive use of force islikely to be most effective, but also to be perceived as leastlegitimate; and when force is perceived as most legitimate,there are the greatest questions concerning its efficacy.Churchill also understood why the procedural legitimacyof the UN was desirable for the use of force, just asit had been with the League of Nations. In the newcentury, however, he would recognize that the UN systemof his era is not well-equipped to deal with the new threats.There are two principles that evolved on his watchas the basis for the use of force in the UN Charter. Thefirst was that states are sovereign and equal; the second isthat states should not interfere in the internal affairs ofother states. But new actors ranging from terrorists andnuclear technology traffickers to international criminalcartels now have nothing to do with sovereignty—exceptto erode that legal doctrine. Many failed or failing statesare simply not strong enough to resist such inroads, or tocontrol actions within their own borders. “The events ofSeptember 11, 2001,” the President stated, “taught usthat weak states…compose as great a danger to ournational interests as strong states.” 24

CHURCHILL IN CONTEXTTHE WAY AHEADChurchill might begin a critique of the BushDoctrine by acknowledging that the use of force is part ofa panoply of options in the National Security Strategyranging from non-proliferation to global economicgrowth. But given his experiences, it is not far-fetched toconjecture that he would question a fundamental assumptionof the doctrine that deterrence would not workagainst terrorist or rogue states.As a young officer on India’s northwest frontier withAfghanistan, and in the Sudan, Churchill was very muchaware that deterrence was an integral part of what theBritish War Office termed “small wars” on the peripheryof the Empire. “For it might be well also to remember,”Churchill reminded the readers of The Story of theMalakand Field Force, “that the great drama of frontierwar is played before a vast, silent but attentive audience,who fill a theater that reaches from Peshawar to Colomboand from Karachi to Rangoon.” 25However, based on his experiences in the Cold War,Churchill would acknowledge how problematic deterrenceis as a tool in preventing a nation from acquiringnuclear capability. Moreover, he would likely admit thatthe concept of deterrence has grown more complex indealing with catastrophic nuclear terrorism by groups orindividuals outside the bounds of normal means-endsinstrumental rationality. But he would also understand,from dealing with developments at the dawn of theatomic age, that it is virtually impossible for individuals orgroups to create nuclear material, since producing plutoniumor enriching uranium requires a large andscientifically knowledgeable labor force as well as significantindustrial resources. Consequently, states or sub-statemilitary or scientific organizations will have to beinvolved tacitly or overtly in providing nuclear material toterrorist groups.This would likely mean for Churchill that even ifthe West is unable to deter terrorists, there are incentivesthat can be created for these other actors to prevent terroristacquisition of nuclear materials. Moreover,improvements in nuclear forensics, by enhancing theability to give a home address for any nuclear device, havethe potential to improve the basis for deterrence strategiesagainst any rogue states that might assist terrorists for anuclear attack.Leaders of such states can often seem irrational intheir dealings with other international actors. But asChurchill understood from the British experience withHitler, such displays in many cases are nothing more thanrational combinations of fanaticism and calculation. TheNazi leader, for example, often played up his reputation asa Teppichfresser, a “rug chewer,” given to ungovernablerages. At no time was this calculated irrationality betterillustrated than on 23 August 1939, when the BritishThe reader may have been struck, in“the account of the fighting in theMàmund Valley, with the vigour withwhich the tribesmen follow up aretreating enemy and press an isolatedparty. In war this is sound, practical policy. But thehillmen adopt it rather from a natural propensitythan from military knowledge. Their tactics are theoutcome of their natures. All their actions, moral,political, strategic, are guided by the same principle.The powerful tribes, who had watched thepassage of the troops in sullen fear, only waitedfor a sign of weakness to rise behind them. Aslong as the brigades dominated the country, andappeared confident and successful, their communicationswould be respected, and the risingslocalised; but a check, a reverse, a retreat wouldraise tremendous combinations on every side.If the reader will bear this in mind, it willenable him to appreciate the position with whichthis chapter deals, and may explain many othermatters which are beyond the scope of thesepages. For it might be well also to remember thatthe great drama of frontier war isplayed before a vast, silent but attentiveaudience, who fill a theatre thatreaches from Peshawar to Colomboand from Karachi to Rangoon.—Winston S. Churchill,The Story of the Malakand Field Force 1897,Chapter 13, “Nawagai” (London: Leo Cooper,1989, 152-53. First published, London: LongmansGreen, 1898).“ambassador presented him a note from Prime MinisterChamberlain indicating Britain’s readiness to honor itsPolish guarantees, while holding out hope for negotiation.Hitler responded by working himself into a frenzy,launching a violent tirade against the British. “To allappearance,” the historian Allan Bullock noted, “Hitlerwas a man whom anger had drawn beyond the reach ofrational agreement.” And yet, as one German officialrecorded that day: “Hardly had the door shut behind theAmbassador than Hitler slapped himself on the thigh,laughed and said: ‘Chamberlain won’t survive that conversation;his Cabinet will fall this evening.’” 26So it is reasonable to suppose that Churchill wouldencourage efforts to improve deterrence of rogue states.He would undoubtedly agree that Bush was correct toidentify a catastrophic nuclear 9/11 as the most dangerousthreat to U.S. national security, and that the doctrine pro-FINEST HoUR 141 / 26

CONCLUSIONSChurchill would regret, I think, that the Iraq war,now in its sixth year, has raised doubts not only in U.S.claims to legitimacy in its use of force, but the efficacy ofsuch efforts against terrorism. From this perspective, hewould hope that the struggle in Iraq would not dampendiscussion and movement on the new approaches to theuse of force raised by the Bush Doctrine in response to theprivatization of war in a rapidly changing globe. In termsof future U.S. presidents, internal conditions of states areas likely as cross-border aggression to threaten internationalpeace and stability, whether it is human rightsviolations and attendant refugee problems or failed statesthat become tempting targets for terrorists.At the same time, WMD proliferation in a growingnumber of states increases the possibility that the normsagainst the use of such weapons will be eroded. Thechances of this occurring rise dramatically as authoritarianor unstable governments acquire WMD capability. This,in turn, increases the chances that WMD will be used orthat such weapons will find their way into the hands ofterrorists.Given these threats, Churchill would urge redoubledefforts to overcome the legitimacy-efficacy paradoxin the use of force by working to establish norms for preventiveforce among the major powers, if not theinternational community. He might also remindAmerican leaders that terrorism does not achieve its goalsthrough its acts, but through the response to its acts. As aconsequence, while it is prudent to prepare for threats, itis also prudent to avoid hesitation.Certainly as Churchill well understood, beforeleaders embark on war, it is incumbent on them to considercosts, risks and unintended consequences in relationto the imminence of the threat if they are to acquire themoral basis of legitimacy for their action. “Few facts are soencouraging to the student of human development,”Churchill observed in his account of the 1898 “small war”in the Sudan, “as the desire, which most men and all communitiesmanifest at all times, to associate with theiractions at least the appearance of moral right.” 28Equally important, as Churchill learned from theAnglo-Boer War in 1899, improvements in communicationand transportation meant a growing linkage betweendomestic and international legitimacy for Britain’srecourse to and conduct of war. As the Boer conflictdragged on and British forces initiated increasingly harshmeasures in the evolving guerrilla war waged by the Boers,international disapprobation was matched by growingcriticism on the part of the British public directed notonly at the conduct of the war, but the motivation for itas well. Looking back on these developments in his 1930vides a useful service as a catalyst for reexamining the useof force against this threat. But he would also agree withcritics that the Bush National Security Strategy, inresponding to this threat, has unnecessarily confused theissue by conflating preemptive and preventive use of forcein its brief presentation of the subject.Equally, Churchill would likely understand whysome object to the tone of unilateralism in the BushDoctrine, with its implicit motivation being the difficultyin getting consensus for the use of force against inevitablethreats. He would acknowledge the doctrine’s focus onstrengthening alliances and developing agendas for cooperativeaction. But he would also question the extremearticulation in the strategy document concerning thelegitimacy of unilateral action—an unnecessary referencethat could detract from the role of government inrecruiting allies, a vital mission for him in the two totalwars of the 20th century.In any event, he might point out that unilateralismis not the only alternative to the UN Security Council,even while cautioning that in many cases there is a falsedichotomy between multilateral paralysis and unilateralU.S. action when it comes to the use of force. He, ofcourse, would recognize the primacy of national interestsin ultimately determining America’s approach to the useof force.The UN, like the League of Nations, had alwaysbeen a useful adjunct for Churchill, but not a substitutefor traditional realist balance-of-power diplomacy. Fromthis perspective in the wake of World War II, he hadacknowledged America’s hegemony in the West, a dominancemuted deliberately by the U.S. involvement inmultinational endeavors ranging from the Bretton Woodsagreement to the NATO treaty.Based on this experience, he might recommend thatthe U.S. create once again such a consensual Americanhegemony. The first step in this effort could be simply totake the innovative but thin and confusingly presentedargument for force employment in the Bush Doctrine,and, with appropriate elaboration and discussion, beginto build agreed standards for the preventive use of power.Once that was accomplished, the nextstep could be to establish these standards in an effectiveinstitution, whether regional in nature or a coalition ofdemocratic states. In keeping with this approach, hemight emphasize that the U.S. cultivate allies and maintainlarge coalitions in order to secure desired behavior inother actors, to minimize cost, and to use their help tomanage a rapidly changing, complex and contentiousinternational environment. The U.S. may be in “a positionof unparalleled military strength,” as President Bushnoted in the 2002 National Security Strategy; but asChurchill understood from British history, even a hyperpowerrisks military overextension without allies. 27 onates today in a new era of “small wars”:autobiography, Churchill issued a warning that still res->>FINEST HoUR 141 / 27

CHURCHILL IN CONTEXTLet us learn our lessons. Never, never, never believe anywar will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarkson that strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricaneshe will encounter. The Statesman who yields to warfever must realize that once the signal is given, he is nolonger the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeableand uncontrollable events. Antiquated War Offices,weak, incompetent or arrogant Commanders, untrustworthyallies, hostile neutrals, malignant Fortune, uglysurprises, awful miscalculations—all take their seat at theCouncil Board on the morrow of a declaration of war. 29ENDNOTES1. The National Security Strategy of the United States ofAmerica (Washington, D.C.: White House, September 2002, hereafterNSS 2002) and The National Security Strategy of the UnitedStates of America (Washington, D.C.: White House, March 2006,hereafter NSS 2006).2. NSS 2002, 15 and Ivo H. Daalder, “Beyond Preemption:An Overview” in Ivol H. Daalder, ed., Beyond Preemption,(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2007), 5.3. NSS 2002, 15-16.4. See for example, Ivo H. Daalder, Beyond Preemption;Robert Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine,” Political ScienceQuarterly, Vol. 118, No. 3 (Fall 2003), 365-88.; Robert Jervis, “Whythe Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained,” Political Science Quarterly,Vol. 120, No. 3 (Fall 2005), 351-77; and the astonishingly prescientanalysis in Jeffrey Record, “The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq,”Parameters, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (Spring 2003), 4-21.5. U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary of Militaryand Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.:Department of Defense, 12 April 2001), 333, 336.6. NSS 2002, p. 15. The National Military Strategy continuedthe conflation of the two terms by referring (12) to “preventive missions”while stating (2) that the “potentially catastrophic impact of anattack against the United States, its allies and its interests may necessitateactions in self-defense to preempt adversaries before they canattack.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of theUnited States of America (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff,2004). The current NSS uses the same preventive use of force languagewhile stating that the “place of preemption in our nationalsecurity strategy remains the same.” NSS 2006, 23, 18.7. NSS 2002, ii.8. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, AMore Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (New York: UnitedNations, December 2004), 63-64.9. Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Boston: HoughtonMifflin, 1949), 231-32.10. Roy Jenkins, Churchill (New York: Farrar, Straus &Giroux, 2001), 624. See also Churchill’s 4 July 1940 speech to theCommons on the “Destruction of the French Fleet,” Rhodes James,Robert., ed. Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches 1897-1963, 8 vols. (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974), VI:6241-47, for which he received a standing ovation, “a scene uniquein my own experience.” Churchill, Finest Hour, 238.11. Churchill, Winston S. Marlborough: His Life and Times,6 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1932-38), II: 254 andIII: 44.12. Churchill, Winston S. The World Crisis, 1911-1914 (NewYork: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1923), 282.13. Frontispiece, Churchill, The Gathering Storm.14. Ibid., 207-08.15. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, trans. Richard andClara Winston (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 72.16. 5 October 1938, “A Total and Unmitigated Defeat,”Churchill, Complete Speeches, VI: 6007-08.17. Churchill, Gathering Storm, 348.18. W.H. Auden, “September 1, 1939” and “In Memory ofW.B. Yeats,” Edward Mendelson, ed., Selected Poems, (New York:Vintage Books, 2007), 95, 90.19. Robert G. Kaufman, In Defense of the Bush Doctrine(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 91.20. Churchill went on to say that if the Allies made this preventivewar threat, the Soviets would yield. “You know better than I,”the American ambassador reported to Washington, “the practicalinfirmities in the suggestion.” 17 April 1948 message from U.S.Ambassador to Great Britain Lewis Douglas to Under Secretary ofState Robert Lovett, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations ofthe United States 1948 (hereafter FRUS), Vol. III, Western Europe(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1974), p. 90.21. 9 March 1954 letter, Peter G. Boyle, ed., The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1953-1955 (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina, 1990), 123. See also John Lewis Gaddis, We NowKnow: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1997), 91.22. Marc Trachtenberg, “The Bush Strategy in HistoricalPerspective,” in Nuclear Transformation: The New U.S. NuclearDoctrine, James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds., (New York:Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 13. See also James B. Steinberg,“Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Use of Force,” in BeyondPreemption, 23. On the preventive war option in NSC 68, seeThomas H. Etzold, and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., Containment:Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York:Columbia University Press, 1978), 431: “It goes without saying thatthe idea of ‘preventive’ war—in the sense of a military attack not provokedby a military attack upon us or our allies—is generallyunacceptable to Americans.”23. Original emphasis. 8 September 1953, Eisenhower toDulles Memorandum, FRUS 1952-54, Vol. II, National SecurityAffairs (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), 461.24. NSS 2002, ii. See also Steinberg, 20-21 and Daalder, 9-10.25. Winston S. Churchill, The Story of the Malakand FieldForce (London: Longmans, Green: 1901), 223. For the British WarOffice outlook on small wars, see C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: TheirPrinciples and Practice (London: HMSO, 1896).26. Allan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (New York:Harper & Row, 1962), 528. See also Caitlin Talmadge, “Deterring aNuclear 9/11,” in The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2007, 23-24;Paul K. Davis and Brian M. Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence inCounterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda (SantaMonica: RAND, 2002), 39-40; and Steinberg, 26, 28.27. NSS 2002, i; Daalder, 16-17; Ivo H. Daalder and James B.Steinberg, “Preventive War: A Useful Tool,” Los Angeles Times, 4December 2005, M3. See also Joseph Nye, The Paradox of AmericanPower: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2002); G. John Ikenberry, AfterVictory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Orderafter Major War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); andAndrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americansare Seduced by War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).28. Winston S. Churchill, The River War: An HistoricalAccount of the Reconquest of the Soudan, 2 vols. (Longmans, Greenand Co., 1899), II: 389. See also David Fromkin, “The Strategy ofTerrorism,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 4 (July 1975), 692 andBenjamin Friedman, “The Politics of Chicken Littleism,” CatoInstitute, 5 December 2007.29. Winston S. Churchill, My Early Life (London: ThorntonButterworth, 1930), 246.,FINEST HoUR 141 / 28

Admiring Shakespeare“The Bible and Shakespeare stand alone on thehighest platform.” —WSC, 2 November 1949Wit & WisdomMike Robinson asked forChurchill’s thoughts onShakespeare, particularly anycomment on LaurenceOlivier’s performances.Darrell Holley’s Churchill’sLiterary Allusions (1987) says there “isno English author whom Churchillalludes to as often as WilliamShakespeare. Both by formal quotations,some quite lengthy, and by well-knownphrases almost hidden in his text,Churchill makes allusion to many ofShakespeare’s plays.“Somewhat surprisingly, he makesno reference to any of the sonnets. It iscertainly not surprising, however, thatChurchill should allude often to the historiesand tragedies, King John, RichardIII, and Hamlet being referred to most.“Churchill uses Shakespeare invarious capacities: as illustrations in hishistory of England, as embellishments inhis other historical works, and as supportin speeches to Parliament. In variousways he borrows the artist’s words toornament his own ideas.”Holley includes forty-sixShakespeare references and quotesdeployed by Churchill in books andspeeches. Here are some examples:“To defend them or not to defendthem—that was the question.” (Hamlet,in Lord Randolph Churchill).“Age cannot wither her nor customstale / Her infinite variety...” (Antony andCleopatra, in Thoughts and Adventures).“To commit the Navy irrevocably tooil was indeed ‘to take arms against a sea oftroubles’” (Hamlet, in The World Crisis).“Cry havoc, and let slip the dogs ofwar” (Julius Caesar, in The Story of theMalakand Field Force).“Once more unto the breach, dearfriends, once more / Or close the wall upwith our English dead” (Henry V, in AHistory of the English-Speaking Peoples).“...they might easily be induced tothrow in their lot with us and ‘makeassurance double sure’” (Macbeth, inBlood Sweat and Tears / Into Battle).“For God’s sake, let us sit upon theground / And tell sadstories of the death ofKings” (Richard II, in TheGathering Storm).Darrell Holley’sbook is a treasure trove,but he does not claim to be definitive.There are many more Shakespeare quotesin Churchill’s canon.CHURCHILLAND OLIVIERTwo of Martin Gilbert’s volumesin the Official Biography tell us that inOctober 1944 WSC saw Olivier inRichard III; fourteen months later inDecember 1945 he saw Olivier as Mr.Justice Shadow in Henry IV. Alsoaccording to Gilbert, in November, 1944“Churchill, his wife, and their daughterSarah, Marian Holmes, Elizabeth Layton[secretaries], and others of the Chequersentourage, saw Henry V in Technicolor.‘The PM went into ecstasies about it,’Colville noted.”In 1951 Lord and Lady Olivier(Vivien Leigh) stayed at Chartwell.Olivier had played Nelson and VivienLeigh had played Emma Hamilton in the1941 Alexander Korda movie LadyHamilton (That Hamilton Woman inAmerica). In 1955 Olivier received thesupreme honour when Churchill put himup for membership in the Other Club.In his Confessions of an Actor,Laurence Olivier recalled a droll experienceat a Bernard Shaw play:“The first time we realized that hewas honouring us was at a performanceof Caesar and Cleopatra. In the interval,I was hovering about in my dressingroom,wondering what the great man wasthinking of us, when my door openedand that immortal head with the wonderfulblue eyes came round it. I was toomuch taken aback to say anything, buthe said at once, ‘Oh, I’m so sorry, I waslooking for a corner.’ Realizing his need,I took him back through the outer office,and indicated to him exactly where to goand how to get himself down the stairsagain, where there would be someoneFINEST HoUR 141 / 29waiting to take him back through thepass-door to his seat. He always allowedhimself the extravagance of buying threeseats, one for himself, one for his muchloved daughter Mary, and one for his hatand coat; I thought this one of the mostsensible extravagances I had ever heardof. A little later Mary told me that,returning to his seat and sitting himselfnext to her, he had said, ‘I was lookingfor a luloo, and who d’you think I raninto? Juloo.’”Apparently Churchill frequentlywandered about in search of public conveniencesbetween acts. Kay Halle’sIrrepressible Churchill (WorldPublishing, 1966), 95-96, contains asimilar incident with Richard Burton,who related it on the Jack Paar Show inthe 1953-54 season.The Director of London’s Old VicTheatre had advised Burton before a performanceof Hamlet, “Do be goodtonight because the Old Man’s out therein the front row.” In Britain, Burtonsaid, “the Old Man is only one person,and that’s Churchill. I panicked. But Iwent onstage and started to play Hamlet.I heard a dull rumble from the front rowof the stalls. It was Churchill speakingthe lines with me, and I could not shakehim off. I tried going fast; I tried goingslow; we did cuts. Every time there was acut, an explosion occurred. He knew theplay absolutely backward; he knowsperhaps a dozen Shakespeare plays intimately.Generally you can’t keep him formore than one act. When the firstcurtain came down I looked through thespyhole. He got up from his seat and Ithought: That’s it; we’ve lost him. But afew minutes later he appeared in mydressing room, saying, ‘My Lord Hamlet,may I use your lavatory?’ And he did.”—PHC, JRL, RML ,

HISTORY DETECTIVESRed Herrings: Famous WordsChurchill Never CoinedMICHAEL RICHARDSThe Oxford English Dictionary defined“red herring” as a metaphor todraw pursuers off a track...thetrailing or dragging of a deadCat or Fox (and in case ofnecessity a Red-Herring) three or fourmiles…and then laying the Dogs on thescent….To attempt to divert attentionfrom the real question.…”Finest Hour answers hundreds ofemails to The Churchill Centre asking us toverify quotations, a lot of which turn outto be red herrings. Many remarks whichChurchill used originated with others(e.g., “Democracy is the worst system,except for all the other systems”). Hedeployed his favorites frequently, but notalways with attribution, or even quotemarks, because he assumed his listeners wouldrecognise them instantly. In his time, sadly, peoplewere simply better read than they are today.Here are some of the most popular, referenced inChurchill by Himself, the new book of quotations by theeditor (reviewed on page 49).• “I am a man of simple tastes—I am quite easilysatisfied with the best of everything.”This remark is frequently said to have been made tothe manager of the Plaza Hotel in New York City onChurchill’s 1929 or 1931 visit. Sir John Colville, WSC’slongtime private secretary, credits it to Churchill’s closefriend F.E. Smith, Lord Birkenhead: “Winston is easily satisfiedwith the best.” But since publication of Churchill byHimself (page 49), Robert Pilpel has informed us that theoriginator was George Bernard Shaw. In Shaw’s play MajorBarbara (1905), Lady Britomart says (act 1, scene 1): “Iknow your quiet, simple, refined, poetic people likeAdolphus—quite content with the best of everything!”Of course Churchill may have learned the phrasefrom Shaw or Smith, and adapted it later.• “I like pigs. Dogs look up to us. Cats lookdown on us. Pigs treat us as equals.”Sir Anthony Montague Browne, WSC’s private secretary,1952-65, quotes the more likely version: “Dogs lookup to you, cats look down on you. Give me a pig! He looksyou in the eye and treats you as an equal.” Several othervariations exist, Sir Anthony’s is the mostauthentic. A version posted at Chartwell,which doesn’t sound like WSC’s style,reads: “...Cats look down on humanbeings, dogs look up to them, butpigs just treat us as human beings.”• “Success is the ability to go fromone failure to another with no lossof enthusiasm.”No attribution. A number ofsources credit this to AbrahamLincoln, but without attribution. Acorrect substitute: “Success alwaysdemands a greater effort.” (WSC toAustralian Prime Minister RobertMenzies, 13 December 1940, publishedin Their Finest Hour, 1949.)• “Courage is the first ofhuman qualities because it is thequality which guarantees all others.”Correctly: “Courage is the first of human qualitiesbecause, as has been said, it is the quality...” etc. (“Alfonsothe Unlucky,” Strand Magazine, July 1931; reprinted inGreat Contemporaries, 1937. “As has been said” likelyrefers to Samuel Johnson’s “Sir, you know courage is reckonedthe greatest of all virtues; because, unless a man hasthat virtue, he has no security for preserving any other.”• “We make a living by what we get; we make alife by what we give.”Reiterated in many sources including a 2005 TV adby Lockheed Martin. An old saw put in Churchill’s mouth.• “Play the game for more than you can afford tolose....only then will you learn the game.”No attribution found. A correct substitute: “It is afine game to play the game of politics and it is well worth agood hand before really plunging.” (WSC to his mother,Aldershot, 16 August 1895.)• “You have enemies? Good. That means you’vestood up for something, sometime in your life.”No attribution. Substitute: “The spectacle of anumber of middle-aged gentlemen who are my politicalopponents being in a state of uproar and fury is really quiteexhilarating to me.” (House of Commons, 21 May 1952.)FINEST HoUR 141 / 30

• “There is no such thing as a good tax.”No attribution. Substitute: “Taxes are an evil—a necessaryevil, but still an evil, and the fewer we have of themthe better.” (House of Commons, 12 February 1906.)• “Continuous effort is the key to unlocking ourpotential.”No attribution found. Here is a substitute, not originalto Churchill (it’s from Longfellow, “The Ladder of StAugustine,” stanza 10); but frequently repeated both byWSC and his son Randolph:The heights by great men reached and keptWere not achieved by sudden flight,But they, while their companions slept,Were toiling upward in the night.• “I drink a great deal. I sleep a little, and Ismoke cigar after cigar. That is why I am in twohundred-percentform.”Close but, er, no cigar. The correct version, whenGeneral Montgomery declared, “I neither drink nor smokeand I am 100 percent fit.” is: “I drink and smoke and I am200 percent fit.”(Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery,1958; FH 86.)• “An empty car drew upand Clement Attleegot out”....“He is a sheep insheep’s clothing!”Allegedly said but unverified.According to RalphKeyes, editor of The QuoteVerifier (2006), wrote: “Britishquote maven Nigel Reesthought the comment mighthave originated with newspapercolumnist J.B. Morton [1893-1979] in the 1930s.”• “Smoking cigars islike falling in love; first youare attracted to its shape; youstay for its flavour; and you must always remembernever, never let the flame go out.”Published without attribution in The AmericanSpectator, July–August 2005. Editor R. Emmett Tyrrellquestioned the attributor, who said it was reported byRandolph Churchill in a 1953 conversation, but “of courseRandolph was drunk at the time.” A little dubious.• “Well, dinner would have been splendid if thewine had been as cold as the soup, the beef as rare asthe service, the brandy as old as the fish, and the maidas willing as the Duchess.”No attribution. Along the lines of the quote above,Churchill did not make smutty gags.• “The heaviest cross I have to bear is the Crossof Lorraine.”This reference to de Gaulle was actually by GeneralSpears, WSC’s military representative to France, 1939–40.• Birth: “Although present on that occasion I have noclear recollection of the events leading up to it.”Remarkably, this famous and oft-quoted expressiondoesn’t track. It is not among Churchill’s published wordsand appears only in The Last Lion by William Manchester,whose notes do not lead the reader to its origin.• “The best argument against Democracy is afive-minute conversation with the average voter.”No attribution. Though he sometimes despaired ofdemocracy’s slowness to act for its preservation, Churchillhad a more positive attitude towards the average voter.• “I am going to make a long speech today; Ihaven’t had time to prepare a short one.”If he ever said it, he was quoting Blaise Pascal in 1656.• “A fully equipped duke costs as much to keepas two dreadnoughts; and dukes are just as great aterror and they last longer.”Lovely, but it was Lloyd George, not Churchill.• “Jaw, jaw is better than war, war.”Credit Harold Macmillan, notChurchill, who said, “Meeting jawto jaw is better than war.”• “Don’t talk to meabout naval tradition.It’s nothing but rum,buggery [sometimes‘sodomy’] and the lash.”Specifically denied byWSC. An old naval saw.• “This is the kind ofarrant pedantry up withwhich I will not put.”On ending sentences with prepositions. Fred Shapiro(Yale Book of Quotations) tracks it to the Strand Magazine,1942, but no Churchill connection has been tracked.• “You are my fifth favourite actor. The first fourare the Marx Brothers.”• “If you’re going through hell, keep going.”• “The young sow wild oats, the old grow sage.”• “If a man is not liberal in youth he has no heart.If he is not conservative when older he has no brain.”• “However beautiful the strategy, you shouldoccasionally look at the results.”No attribution is found for any of the above. Readers,please contact us if you can provide reliable sources. ,FINEST HoUR 141 / 31

HISTORY DETECTIVESCOVENTRY, 15 NOVEMBER 1940: Winston Churchill visiting the ruins of CoventryCathedral. Photograph by Capt. Horton, War Office, Crown Copyright released.Coventry:What ReallyHappenedMARTIN GILBERTIT IS ENDLESSLY REPEATED THAT CHURCHILLLET COVENTRY BE DESTROYED TO PROTECTSECRET INTELLIGENCE. FH ASKED HISBIOGRAPHER FOR HIS FINAL CONCLUSIONS.On the night of 14 November 1940, three hundredGerman bombers dropped 500 tons of explosives,33,000 incendiary bombs and dozens of parachutemines on the industrial city of Coventry. Duringthe raid, 507 civilians were killed and 420 wereseriously injured. 1A recent play at the Belgrade Theatre in Coventry,One Night In November, repeated the frequently madeFINEST HoUR 141 / 32claim that Winston Churchillknew of the attack several days inadvance, but that he held back theinformation to protect themost important secret of the war:the breaking of the GermanEnigma code at Bletchley Park. Inthe words of the press publicity:“...the play examines the idea thatWinston Churchill had advancewarning of the attack. WasCoventry sacrificed for the greatergood? Or to provoke America intothe war?” 2The truth about the bombing ofCoventry is very different.On 12 November 1940, Enigmadecrypts made it clear that amajor German bombing raid wasimminent. Its code name,Moonlight Sonata, had been readin the decrypts. But the decryptsgave no clue as to the destinationof the German bombers.The Air Intelligence report thatthe Prime Minister was given on 12November gave, on the basis of thelatest intelligence, five possible targets: Central London,Greater London, the Thames Valley, or the Kent or Essexcoasts. 3 A German pilot who had been shot down on 9November had, under interrogation, suggested that twocities—Coventry and Birmingham—would bothbe attacked in a “colossal raid” between 15 and 20November (after the actual raid, which was on the 14th.)The senior Air Intelligence Liaison officer at Bletchley,Squadron Leader Humphreys, noted, in contrast to this,that there was “pretty definite information that the attack isto be against London and the Home Counties.”The Intelligence analysts at Bletchley considered theGerman pilot’s information “doubtful,” as it was earlierthan the information available to Squadron LeaderHumphreys. 4Churchill was sent a summary of these reports on themorning of 14 November; he read them just after midday,on his return from Neville Chamberlain’s funeral. Thesummary informed him that whatever the target, the usualcounter-measures had been prepared since early thatmorning, and would be activated as soon as the precisetarget was known.In the Air Ministry summary, Churchill read that thetarget area would be “probably in the vicinity of London.”Sir Martin Gilbert CBE has been Sir Winston Churchill’s officialbiographer since 1968. Although Finest Hour has covered this subjectbefore (see for example http://xrl.us/bjaep), we asked Sir Martin forhis assessment based on his most recent research.

“Churchill went to the underground Central WarRooms...but became so impatient for the impendingattack that he spent the night on the Air Ministry roof,waiting for it to begin. Over London, it never did.”If, however, “further information were to indicateCoventry, Birmingham or elsewhere,” it was hoped that thestandard “Cold Water” instructions for counter-measurescould be got out in time. 5 These were instructions to rushfire engines and civil defence personnel to the area indicatedfrom all the surrounding towns in a wide arc.That afternoon, Churchill prepared to leave DowningStreet by car to spend the weekend at Ditchley Park, northwestof Oxford. As his car was about to leave, John Martin,his Principal Private Secretary, handed him a top-secretmessage in a locked box. As the car reached the AlbertMemorial, Churchill read the message. It was the latestintelligence from Brigadier Menzies—“C”—head of theSecret Intelligence Services. Churchill immediately toldhis driver to return to Downing Street, explaining toMartin that he was not going to spend the night peacefullyin the country while the capital was “under heavy attack.” 6That there would be an attack was known,Churchill’s Junior Private Secretary Jock Colville noted inhis diary that night, “from the contents of these mysteriousbuff boxes, which the PM alone opens, sent every day byBrigadier Menzies.” Colville did not know the contents; allhe knew was that, of that particular night’s raid, “its exactdestination the Air Ministry say they find it difficult todetermine.” 7Early that evening Churchill waited at DowningStreet for the expected attack on London, sending the twoduty private secretaries that evening, John Colville andJohn Peck, to the underground shelter at the disusedDown Street underground railway station on the PiccadillyLine, telling them: “You are too young to die.” 8 He alsogave instructions for the “Garden Room Girls”—the typistsat 10 Downing Street—to be sent home. 9Churchill went to the underground Central WarRooms (now known as the Cabinet War Rooms), to awaitthe Moonlight Sonata, but became so impatient for theimpending attack that he spent the night on the AirMinistry roof, waiting for it to begin. 10 Over London, itnever did.The moment that German radio beams made it clearthat Coventry was the target, the Air Ministry orderedeight British bombers to bomb the aerodromes—south ofCherbourg—from which the attackers were expected totake off. A continuous fighter patrol was maintained overCoventry itself, and the “Cold Water” defence preparationswere activated. 11 These brought fire engines and civildefence personnel into Coventry from a wide area around.The defences of Coventry had recently been strengthened.Following a German air raid on 2 November—thesixteenth on Coventry in a month—Ernest Bevin, theMinister of Labour responsible for factory production, hadcomplained to Churchill about the poor state of the city’sprotection. 12 In response, Churchill had given instructionson 7 November to strengthen Coventry’s anti-aircraftdefences. 13 These instructions had been carried out. AroundCoventry on the night of 14 November were five times asmany anti-aircraft guns per head of the population as therewere around London, and one hundred British fighterswere airborne. 14 But that could not save the city from thefirestorm created by the incendiary bombs.On November 12th, Enigma had revealed a raid inprospect, but not the target. At the moment on November14th when the German radio directional beams revealedthe target, all possible counter measures had been takenwithout delay.ENDNOTES1. A larger number of civilians—545—had been killed in theCoventry-Birmingham area in the previous month. The number ofdead in London for that same month was 5090. (Premier papers,3/108, folios 39-43).2. “The Belgrade Theatre presents One Night in November byAlan Pollock.” See http://xrl.us/owr4j.3. A1 1(W). Memorandum to Directorate of HomeOperations, 12 November 1940: Air Ministry papers, 2/5238.4. A1 1(W). Memorandum to Director of Air Intelligence, 12November 1940: Air Ministry papers, 2/5238.5/ Air Staff summary, 14 November 1940: Air Ministrypapers, 2/5238.6. Sir John Martin, letter to The Times, 26 August 1976, published28 August 1976.7. John Colville diary, 14 November 1940.8. Ibid.9. Sir John Martin, private letter, 24 February 1983.10. John Colville diary, 14 November 1940.11. War Cabinet No. 289 of 1940, 15 November 1940:Cabinet papers, 65/10.12. Letter marked “Urgent.” 7 November 1940: Premierpapers 3/108, folios 47-8.13. “Action this Day,” Prime Minister’s Personal Minute,D114, 8 November 1940: Premier papers, 3/108. Folio 45.14. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Secretary of State for Air, toChurchill, 15 November 1940: Premier papers, 3/22/3, folio 199. ,FINEST HoUR 141 / 33

COVER STORYChurchilland Lloyd’sAN ENDURING RELATIONSHIPFONDLY REMEMBEREDDAVID BOLERSir Winston Churchill has well-knownconnections with many British institutions,but perhaps one that has receivedlittle attention has been his associationwith Lloyd’s of London, the 300-yearoldinsurance market situated in LeadenhallStreet in the City of London. By coincidence,this association indirectly began in the year ofhis birth, 1874, for it was at this time thatClementine Hozier’s father, Colonel Sir HenryHozier, became Secretary of Lloyd’s, a post heheld with distinction until 1906. But it wasChurchill’s appointment as First Lord of theAdmiralty in 1911 that brought him into a clearawareness of Lloyd’s and its historical relationshipwith the Royal Navy.Towards the end of the 17th Century,Edward Lloyd established one of the then many fashionablecoffee houses close to the pool of London. Theproximity to the River Thames, to the busy Londondocks, and to the emerging financial centre of the Cityof London, attracted ship captains and ship owners,merchants and traders; as a consequence, a market forinsurance was established. Edward Lloyd introducedvarious facilities for the developing underwriters andtraders, including his own newspaper, Lloyd’s News,reporting mainly on shipping movements. This becameLloyd’s List, established in 1734 and considered to beBritain’s oldest national newspaper.By the early 1900s the British Empire dominatedworld trade and Britain had the biggest shipbuildingindustry and largest merchant fleet. Unlike its competi-This piece, originally published in Finest Hour 67 in 1990, was tohave run in our previous, 40th Anniversary number—but when wereceived the Cooper portrait in radiant color we had never seenbefore, we knew it must be our next cover. David Boler, a member ofthe Churchill Centre Board of Trustees, has an extensive backgroundand association with Lloyd's of London, by whose courtesy theirEgerton Cooper portrait of Sir Winston Churchill is published here.HE LIKES THIS ONEAnother portrait of Sir Winston Churchill has beenpainted: and this is one that he likes. It has beenpresented to Lloyd’s by the Lloyd’s Insurance Brokers’Association. Mr. Egerton Cooper painted the portrait, andwe have it on his authority that Churchill approves. “SirWinston said he liked the picture very much,” says Mr.Cooper. At present the portrait is on view to members ofLloyd’s in the library there. It is leaning against a wall.When their new building is completed a special place willbe prepared to hang it. Sir Winston is depicted sittingbeneath an oak tree at Chartwell, his home in Kent. Mr.Cooper began it six years ago. He finished the head atthe time; the rest of the picture has been filled in later.Churchill has a cigar in his left hand. Mr. Cooper madesketches and drawings from life at Chartwell, thenpainted the portrait in his Chelsea studio. It is a little overfive feet tall and four feet wide. Cooper—“I am well over60”—has painted many famous men. This is his third portraitof Churchill: one hangs in the Carlton Club, one inthe Junior Carlton. Mr. Cooper painted King George VItwice. —Lloyd’s List, 1954FINEST HoUR 141 / 34

tors, Lloyd’s of London had always provided insurancecover against war risks, sorely tested by the U-boat perilsin both world wars.The first visit to Lloyd’s by Churchill that I cantrace occurred in 1936, although it is more than possiblethat he visited earlier. According to Lloyd’s List he wasentertained at luncheon by the Chairman, Mr. NevilleDixey, and afterwards made a tour of the UnderwritingRoom, the Library and the Nelson Collection: “Themany documents and other objects illustrating the careerof the great sea commander naturally attracted the closeattention of one who filled the office of First Lord of theAdmiralty during perhaps the most critical period of ournaval history.”Members of Lloyd’s happy to applaud his WorldWar I leadership soon had another reason to thankChurchill: the victory of the Allied Navies in the Battleof the Atlantic during World War II. The cost of defeatwould have been ruin—and the death of Lloyd’s.Perhaps it was also for this reason (and her relationshipto Col. Hozier) that the Lloyd’s community respondedso generously to Clementine Churchill’s “Aid to Russia”fund appeal during the war, contributing over £18,000in 1940s money.In 1944 Lloyd’s showed its gratitude by electingChurchill an Honorary Member of their Society. He wasonly the fifth person unconnected with Lloyd’s so honoured.He was in illustrious company, his predecessorsbeing Marconi, his old friend Admiral Beatty, Lord Haigand Admiral Sturdee.In 1954, several paintings were commissioned tocommemorate Churchill’s 80th birthday. It is goodfortune that Lloyd’s were responsible for sponsoring onethat he actually liked. Unlike the infamousParliamentary commission by Graham Sutherland, thispainting survives and is proudly hung in the NewLloyd’s Building. For many years it dominated thefamous “Captains Room.” The artist, Alfred EgertonCooper, depicts Sir Winston sitting under an oak tree atChartwell. It is the inspiration behind this article.Lloyd’s List has its own piece of history to add tothis story. As is well known, there was a London newspaperstrike at the time Sir Winston announced hisretirement as Prime Minister and, consequently, none ofthe Fleet Street papers carried this story on the morningof 6 April 1955. (The strike began on March 25th anddid not end until April 21st.) However, and in companywith the Manchester Guardian, Lloyd’s List appeareddaily in spite of the strike and alone among Londonnewspapers carried the momentous news on themorning of Wednesday, 6 April 1955.The day following Sir Winston’s death, onMonday, 25 January 1965, Lloyd’s rang the famousLutine Bell as a mark of respect for their illustriousPORTRAITS BY ALFRED EGERTON COOPERCooper was one of the most prolific painters ofChurchill, producing no fewer than four portraits of hishard-to-please subject from 1942 through 1965.Above left (cover, Finest Hour 95): Presented tothe Junior Carlton Club (now Carlton Club), 1950.Above right: The final effort, begun in 1953,finished in 1965, owned by Cadbury Schweppes plc.Below (cover, Finest Hour 75): The first work,“Profile for Victory,” presentedto the Carlton Club in1948, had an interestinginception. One evening in1942, while Cooper was atthe Arts Club playingbilliards, sculptor WilliamReid Dick said he was goingto sculpt the Prime Minister.Cooper excitedly asked to goalong as Dick’s assistant.During the session at DowningStreet, Cooper sketchedChurchill’s profile for Dickand, inspired by the result, asked if he might use it as partof a “Profile” series for the Observer. Churchill puffed andgrumbled, remarking that Cooper was not a sculptor andmust have therefore come under false pretenses. But hesoon calmed down and consented to sit for Cooper,who considered the result his finest work.—Jeanette Gabriel in Finest Hour 95 ,Honorary Member. This bell, salvaged from a Frenchsailing frigate, La Lutine, has traditionally been rungonce for bad news, and twice for good. In the years followingthe war, it had only been rung on ceremoniousoccasions—except for the deaths of Sir WinstonChurchill and the man who conferred on him honorarycitizenship of the United States of America—PresidentJohn F. Kennedy. ,FINEST HoUR 141 / 35

CHURCHILL PROCEEDINGSSheriffs and Constables:Churchill’s and Roosevelt’sPostwar WorldCHURCHILL FREQUENTLY DISMISSED PROPOSALS FOR POSTWAR PLANNING. HIS THOUGHTON SUCH MATTERS HAS TO BE CONSTRUCTED FROM SNIPPETS OF SPEECHES ANDCONVERSATIONS. ROOSEVELT, THOUGH RENOWNED FOR MASKING HIS THOUGHTS,SPOKE CLEARLY AND OFTEN ABOUT PLANNING. JUST HOW CLOSE HE AND CHURCHILLCAME IN THEIR THINKING ABOUT THE POSTWAR ORDER IS ILLUSTRATED BY A PHRASEFROM WSC’S 1946 FULTON SPEECH: “COURTS AND MAGISTRATES MAY BE SET UPBUT THEY CANNOT FUNCTION WITHOUT SHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES.” 1WARREN F. KIMBALLIllingworth in the Daily Mail, 28 January 1942, following WSC’s visit to FDR (labels slightly modified by Barbara Langworth).This is a drastically, even uncomfortably, abbreviated version of my two papers at Hyde Park, New York: a Franklin and EleanorRoosevelt Institute conference on FDR’s postwar legacy in 2005; and a FERI/Churchill Centre conference on the joint legacy ofFDR and Churchill in 2007. All too often I can only allude to legacies and cannot discuss them. For more discussion, at least on oneside of the ledger, see my “The Sheriffs: FDR’s Postwar World” in David Woolner, David Reynolds, and Warren F. Kimball, eds.,FDR’s World: War, Peace, and Legacies (New York: Palgrave, 2008). My original title was “the Sheriff and the Gunslinger,” but I hadsecond thoughts. The cartoon above notwithstanding, Churchill was not a “gunslinger,” whatever his popular reputation. WFKFINEST HoUR 141 / 36

William Henry Chamberlain, a biting andbitter critic of Franklin Roosevelt’s foreignpolicies, sarcastically warned in 1940 that “Iam anticipating the day when possession ofTibet and Afghanistan will be represented asvitally necessary to the security of Kansas and Nebraska.”“Nothing short of eerie,” observed one historian. 2Whatever those eerie echoes in today’s world, FDRwould have been appalled by the very concept. His visionof the postwar world order specifically excluded using militarypower for political goals, and envisaged a regionalapproach that would limit the direct policing and persuadingrole of the United States to the westernhemisphere. But Winston Churchill, the dedicated stewardof Britain’s international role (and that is a great deal largerand more expansive than merely “empire”), never questionedthat Tibet and Afghanistan mattered.FDR’s and Churchill’s legacies? All these legacies areinterconnected. The Second World War created a tabularasa of sorts that allowed Churchill and Roosevelt to distillthe mix of what they inherited and what they foresaw intoa world order or system that has lasted for sixty years—though not everything came out as they intended.What were and are Roosevelt’s legacies for the world?There are two broad ones, although the subcategories makeit a bit more complex.1. “Regionalized cooperative internationalism” orglobalism, which includes the “scrapping” of so-called isolationism(a.k.a. unilateralism), the dominant role of thegreat powers (the four-or-so policemen), the establishmentof an international organization to facilitate great powercollaboration, the everlasting American crusade for economic“liberalism,” the creation of an atmosphere intowhich “containment” could comfortably fit, and raising theissue of decolonization—although that fits also in thesecond great legacy, which is:2. Americanism: shorthand for everything besidesFranklin Roosevelt’s geopolitical thinking: the internationalizationof the New Deal, Roosevelt’s conviction thatleadership and persuasion were the means to create peacefulrelationships, and his calm and unshakable belief in theAmerican democratic tradition combined with the awarenessthat the results were far from perfect (as EleanorRoosevelt constantly reminded him).There are a number of mythical or non-legacies thatserve as defining antonyms for Roosevelt’s shadow:• Roosevelt was a believer in and practitioner ofrealpolitik, or, contradictorily, Roosevelt madeWilsonianism the American foreign policy tradition.• Roosevelt sought to establish the kind of internationalorganization that emerged at the end of the SecondWorld War—the United Nations Organization.• Roosevelt caused the precipitate decolonization ofEuropean empires.• Roosevelt became a “cold warrior” before his death.All these statements are myths, or exaggerations, ordistortions.Winston Churchill’s legacies often paralleled FDR’s,but there were distinct and fundamental points of departure.Two broad categories embrace Churchill’s patrimony.One is globalism, or universal internationalism. The otheris the “Anglo-American special relationship,” a phrase thatneeds a good deal of decoding.1. “Regionalized cooperative internationalism” is nota phrase that fits comfortably around Sir Winston. He wasindeed an internationalist, and preferred a regional structure,especially in continental Europe, where the effect ofBritish influence depended on persuasion and cooperation.But the history of the British Empire made his internationalismand his regionalism different from Roosevelt’s.Empires are, by definition, international. But the vastEuropean commercial and political empires of the threecenturies before World War II were global as well. ForChurchill that meant Britain should be a (if not “the”)regional power in places like India, East Africa, the MiddleEast, even China. At the same time, that global instinct,stimulated by 300+ years of empire, was modified by thereality of a relative loss of geopolitical clout as the UnitedStates, and later the Soviet Union, became more powerful.2. All that neatly segues into the second legacy: the“special relationship.” Roosevelt could assume that theUnited States was a world power. Churchill had consciouslyand constantly to ensure that Britain would have that statusin the postwar world. He placed most (though not all) ofhis faith in a “special relationship” with the United States.That relationship had, after all, not only worked for Britainduring World War II, but it had developed and persistedover the preceding century. This was no new notion forChurchill. His History of the English-Speaking Peoples,largely written before the Second World War, was notfocused exclusively on the United States, but without theAmericans it would have been shorter.But the special relationship was often awkward. Oneexample: Churchill and Roosevelt agreed that control ofatomic energy (economics) and the bomb (geopolitics)should rest with them. Yet the Americans constantlydragged their feet about sharing Manhattan Project researchwith the British. Eventually Great Britain developed anatomic bomb on its own, and the special relationship survived.But it was an uncomfortable and humiliating (butperhaps not educational) experience for the British.There are a number of mythical or non-legacies thatserve as defining antonyms for Churchill’s shadow:• Churchill was a reactionary Tory.• Churchill was a believer in and practitioner ofrealpolitik.• Churchill thought the British Empire could bemaintained as it was.• Churchill was mulishly consistent.• Churchill was a prescient, early “cold warrior”• Churchill was a prisoner of the “special relationship.”• Churchill “loved” war.These too are myths or exaggerations that haveunfairly captured Churchill’s public image. >>FINEST HoUR 141 / 37

CHURCHILL PROCEEDINGSSHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES...But before digging a little bit into the minds ofRoosevelt and Churchill, before trying to assess their internationallegacy in the postwar world, we need a briefreminder of the legacies that helped shape their thinking.The popular judgment, and FDR’s oft-repeatedclaim, is that his “great crusade” was against “the isolationists.”But what Roosevelt fought before the Second WorldWar was not “isolationism,” no matter how useful he foundthat label. The real issue was American complacency, overconfidence,and even indifference regarding Hitler’sGermany. Just when Roosevelt started that fight is debatable,but what he had to fight was the persistent Americanconviction that the United States was always right and thatwhat was “right” was invincible. He had to contend withthe popular sentiment that the USA could “go it alone” inthe world—something the founding fathers had rejectedout of hand 165 years earlier. To the end of his days, FDRfeared a resurgence of what he called isolationism, but hecould not have foreseen that it would re-emerge in its truecharacter—unilateralism.Roosevelt’s early thinking on international affairs andstructure came, according to most historians, from two presidents:his uncle, Theodore Roosevelt, and WoodrowWilson, the man who brought FDR onto the national politicalscene. TR brought “realism” and great power politics tobear; Wilson offered, well...Wilsonianism, that idealisticcombining of belief in an American-style political economy(although Roosevelt denied he was a Wilsonian) with amission, a duty to proselytize, all wrapped neatly in ablanket labeled “international cooperation.”Churchill likewise inherited a mix of concepts. Somewere from Britain’s long and storied history. Others weremore recent, particularly the experience of the First WorldWar—the “Great War” until World War II came along.Britain’s tradition of “splendid isolation” was even less isolationistthan the American version. Centuries ofAnglo-French maneuvering and warfare had convincedBritish leaders to rely on alliances and control of the seas toprotect and forward the nation’s interests. With a vast colonialand commercial empire to tend, British policies hadtried to move away from military involvement on the continent.But threats of any dominant power in central orwestern Europe had repeatedly drawn Britain into warsacross the Channel, and the last of those wars had drainedGreat Britain of its economic and military strength.Unlike FDR, Churchill helped to create part of thelegacies he inherited as prime minister. The ongoing, futileattempt to hold on to a traditional colonial empire distractedChurchill and sometimes his government frommore important strategic goals during the war—forexample, his preoccupation with the Mediterranean, andwith retaking Singapore with “European” troops. 3As Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1924-29, he understoodthe parlous state of British finances, a reality thatforced the government (and Churchill) to ignore dreams of aSingapore “fortress” and which forecast hard times to come.As he ruefully wrote in 1939: “Money—above all, readymoney. There was the hobble which cramped medievalkings; and even now it counts somewhat.” 4The place to start any analysis of both Churchill’sand FDR’s thinking is where they started—with theassumption that great wars are generated by great powers.Everything else proceeded from that premise. The grandmyth held by twentieth century American warriors hasbeen that a peaceful world would be the happy and legitimizingoutcome of a vast military conflict. Roosevelt wasno exception. He dreamily mused about worldwide disarmament,once blithely stating that “the smaller powersmight have rifles but nothing more dangerous.” The greatpowers were exempted, of course, for he knew they wouldnot disarm. But he decriminalized that exemption bycalling the great powers “policemen”—an idea he broachedeven before the United States entered the Second WorldWar. He mentioned it to Churchill at their first meeting inAugust 1941, and a few weeks later casually spoke during adinner party about the need for Britain and America “topolice the entire world.” He quickly went on to describe“police procedures”: the key was “trust,” not the applicationof “sanctions” or force. 5Crucial to understanding Roosevelt’s postwar visionis his consistent emphasis on the regional role of thepolicemen, which by the 1943 Teheran conference includedthe USSR and China. One journalist, writing with FDR’sapproval and assistance about that first big three meeting,related how Roosevelt had conducted a “seminar”for Stalinon the good neighbor policy in the western hemisphere. 6But how are such “policemen” to avoid the Orwelliantemptation of creating a sphere of influence in their region?How is such a region different from a Pax Britannica, aRussian empire, or a Monroe Doctrine? Roosevelt perceiveda difference; but it was one of many apparent contradictionsthat he never clarified. 7Churchill’s vision was clearer. Great Britain had been,in some ways, the world’s policeman for over a century. Butthe Second World War had changed that. Establishment ofa regional structure that Britain could manipulate withoutbeing an integral part of it would amplify British power,just as it had done for nearly two centuries. Britain asbalance-weight in Europe while joined with America in aspecial relationship seemed the best guarantee for the UK(not a Churchillian term) to retain its role as a great power.Britain was “in” but not “of” Europe. As historian MaxBeloff put it:nothing could have been further from his [Churchill’s]thoughts than the emergence of a European super-state presentingexactly those pretensions to executive authority whichChurchill regarded as the prerogative of the nation-state. . . .During his absence from the seats of power between 1945 and1951, the essential components of a new Europe began toemerge; to Churchill, the Victorian, they were strange indeed.He was in no sense their prophet. 8For Churchill, an Anglo-American condominiumseemed both sensible and possible. Yet, in October 1942,FINEST HoUR 141 / 38

concern about the Soviet Union prompted him to suggestcreation of a postwar European council. “It would be ameasureless disaster,” he wrote Eden, “if Russian barbarismoverlaid the culture and independence of the ancient statesof Europe.” A “United States of Europe” would, presumably,include Russia, but a Russia safely neutralized within a“council consisting of...the former great powers, withseveral confederations...which would possess an internationalpolice and be charged with keeping Prussiadisarmed.” Rarely did the Prime Minister so bluntly statehis feelings and fears about the Soviets. Normally he wasmore cautious, putting the burden of anyrift on the shoulders of theBolsheviks.Yet, heleft thedoor opento postwarcooperationwith theSovietUnion, albeiton carefulterms. FDRwas not aWilsonianidealist; norwas Churchill,for he too had“problems toresolve.” 9Half a yearlater, Churchilltold Roosevelt anda group ofAmerican leadersthat after the war hefavored a “worldcouncil” that lookedlike what FDR calledhis four Policemen—Great Britain, Russia,the U.S. and (unenthusiastically)China. Onestep lower in the politicalpecking order would beregional councils, which in Europe could include nationstatesand confederations for places like the Balkans, or a“Danubian federation” to replace the Austro-HungarianEmpire. At the same luncheon meeting, the Prime Ministercalled for a “fraternal association” between his nation andthe United States; perhaps even common passports and a“common form of citizenship.” 10 For him, Britain was thenatural and necessary bridge between Europe and theUnited States.Churchill never clarified his vague and very unofficialremarks, leaving the Americans little to go on beyondForeign Office papers and statements. Harry Hopkins,FDR’s principal adviser, expressed the American concernswhen he warned the British against any attempt to establisha European council (based, of course, in London) for fear itwould result in American “isolationists” doing the samething in the western hemisphere. Regionalism was not tobe exclusive, which was where British proposals seemed tolead. FDR’s regional groupings could not exclude any ofthe great powers lest that setone region (and onepoliceman) againstanother. 11 The GoodNeighbor policy andU.S. relations withCanada both illustratedwhat FDR had inmind. Leadership—which combinedpersuasion, power,and especiallypatience—wouldprevent local crisesfrom morphinginto global confrontations.At the start ofthe war,Roosevelt hadviewedEuropeanpower politicsand colonialismas thegreatestthreats topostwarpeace. Butby 1943,he recognizedthat theSoviet Unionhad become a newmajor player on the scene andParrish in the ardently anti-Roosevelt Chicago Tribune, 19 January 1945: The Red Armywas advancing across Poland and the Big Three were anticipating the Yalta conference.could, if it so chose, be an even greater threat. ThePresident had no intention of fighting the Second WorldWar in order to get ready for the Third, so bringing theUSSR into a cooperative relationship with the other greatpowers became the priority. From the outset, Stalin hadbeen unequivocal about having “friendly” governmentsaround the Soviet periphery in Eastern Europe, andRoosevelt’s (and an occasionally dubious Churchill’s)dreams of persuading Stalin to be a cooperative participantin the postwar world required that the Soviet leader feelsure of Anglo-American reliability. But since self-determinationmeant independence for the Balts and theestablishment of an anti-Soviet government in Warsaw,how then to avoid the obvious? >>FINEST HoUR 141 / 39

CHURCHILL PROCEEDINGSSHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES...Both Roosevelt and Churchill had tried to create agood postwar relationship with the Soviet Union evenbefore the Stalingrad victory, in February 1943, demonstratedthe likelihood of Red Army occupation of theterritory Stalin demanded. What recourse was left toLondon and Washington? Military confrontation was nooption, at least not with Anglo-American forces still strugglingin North Africa and fifteen months away from aninvasion of western Europe. More to the point, what longtermhope for peace if the United States and Britain choseto confront the Russians? More frightening and apparentlypossible, what if playing diplomatic hardball promptedStalin to cut adeal with Hitler?Then there wasJapan waiting inthe wings.Rather thanfruitlesslyopposing anyexpansion ofSoviet power ineastern Europe,the Anglo-Americans optedto continue topromote longtermcooperation. Asthe Americanstold BritishForeign SecretaryAnthony Eden,“the real decisionsshould bemade by theUnited States,Great Britain,Russia andChina, whowould be thepowers for manyyears to comethat would have“Just Perfect Harmony”Tom Webster in Courier,Winter 1943to police the world.” Self-determination would, quite obviously,be bestowed by the Big Four, assuming they couldagree on the details. 12What then, of the legacy of Churchill’s andRoosevelt’s policies towards the Soviet Union? Some haveargued that it was a horrible, unhappy legacy that“appeased” Stalin’s insatiable appetite for expansion intoeastern Europe and beyond. Roosevelt and the British concludedearly on that Stalin was “a political descendant ofPeter the Great rather than of Lenin.” 13 But how couldconfrontation solve that dilemma?There is truth in what historian Arthur Schlesingerwrote: “it was the deployment of armies, not words onpaper, that caused the division of Europe.” 14 That is certainlythe case for events from summer 1944 to war’s end.But timing is everything. The fundamental postwar agreements(concessions if you prefer a critical phrase) betweenthe Soviet Union and the Anglo-Americans came beforemid-1944, largely during or after the Teheran conference inDecember 1943. FDR and Churchill assumed, conceded orsacrificed the Baltic nations and much of eastern Europe toSoviet “liberation” well before the great offensives in theeast and the west began in June 1944. Given Stalin’s (andChurchill’s and Roosevelt’s) axiom, “whoever occupies aterritory imposes on it his own social system,” the postwarpolitical resultswere a foregoneconclusion. Butthen that wasalso true forplaces like WestGermany, Italy,and Greece.Churchill’sversion ofStalin’s axiomwas moregrandiloquent:“the right toguide the courseof history is thenoblest prize ofvictory.” 15 Betterto acknowledgethat reality thanto wait forpotential disagreementstoarise. TheNormandy invasion,quicklyfollowed by themassive offensivein the east thatStalin had promised,ensuredthat the Russianswould not be tempted to roll all the way to the Atlantic,though there is not a shred of evidence that Stalin everthought, planned, and even dreamed in such terms.Which brings us to an issue of candor and honesty—the Yalta agreements, a document that is less of a legacythan its reputation suggests. The real problem about Yaltawas not the nature of the agreements, but the matter oftransparency and expectations. Neither Churchill norRoosevelt believed they could admit to their publics ortheir political opponents that they had consigned the Balticnations, Poland, and much of the south Balkans to thetender mercies of Soviet control. Neither could admit thatFINEST HoUR 141 / 40

CHURCHILL PROCEEDINGSthey had made concessions in northeast Asia that restoredRussian economic and political influence in Manchuria andnorthern Korea. In each case the reasons were mixed—ensuring Soviet entry into the war against Japan, shoringup Chiang’s regime in China, the reality of Soviet occupationof much of eastern Europe—but establishing acooperative rather than a confrontational relationship withthe Soviet Union was the overriding motive.It was sometimes a case of making a silk purse out ofa sow’s ear, especially in places like the Baltic, but betterthat than playing dog-in-the-manger and getting suspicionand enmity in return. The Declaration on LiberatedEurope, agreed to at Yalta, called for the kind of opennessand political freedom enjoyed in the United States andBritain. But that was no rhetorical “victory” over the SovietUnion, nor was it intended as such. It expressed a hope nota reality, and thus served to raise expectations for the war’soutcome to unrealistic levels. When those expectations weredashed, American and British frustrations and disillusionmentwould, as after the First World War, intensifytensions. Only this time it became the Cold War. 16Neither Churchill nor Roosevelt created the tensionsbetween the Soviet Union and their nations. Churchill andRoosevelt were, each in his own way, less ideological thantheir successors. Despite Churchill’s angry anti-Bolshevikrhetoric when out of office, as prime minister he neverchose between a Russia as classic great power to the east, ora Soviet Union as threat to British and American democraticand economic principles. He seemed to speak ofRussia when geopolitics were at issue, and Bolshevismwhen ideology was afoot.FDR bragged that the New Deal had saved capitalism,but he routinely avoided referring to the SovietUnion in ideological terms. Despite his conscious attemptsto avoid the mistakes Woodrow Wilson made after WorldWar I, Roosevelt repeated one of the major errors by promisinga just and fair settlement to the war that would bringpeace. Neither man promised either “a war to end allwars,” or a “to make the world safe for democracy,” 17 butdomestic politics, their own hopes, and their search for afavorable historical verdict combined to prompt both toexaggerate the success of what today we would call the“peace process,” which inaccurately came to be labeled the“Yalta agreements.” Once again, overblown rhetoric createdgreat expectations that, when unmet, led to an atmospherethat heightened the intensity and depth of the Cold War.The over-analyzed Anglo-American special relationshipis the most powerful example of Roosevelt’s andChurchill’s overlapping shadows. Since 1945, Great Britainand the United States have almost always found that, aftercareful consideration and sometimes considerable argumentation,their interests and desires coincided. The mostobvious exceptions are the Vietnam war, where Britainsteadfastly refused to support American policy, and theSuez War, where the opposite occurred. But those exceptionsdid not break the pattern, which has lasted throughtoday and the Iraq War and occupation. There are forcefularguments, particularly among British commentators,about how the “special relationship” has dragged theirnation into unwise and even immoral conflicts, but claimsthat the “special relationship” did not exist are ahistoricalpolitical wishes. 18The precedent of working with allies set by Churchilland Roosevelt lived on, through and beyond the Cold War,but in a way fundamentally different from what they imagined.Instead of globalism (regionalized cooperativeinternationalism), unilateral (formerly isolationist) nationalismreturned to rule the roost. What Roosevelt feared themost, what he believed to be the basic cause of the SecondWorld War, once again threatened the peace of the world.Stalin, responding to Churchill’s musings about federationsin Eastern Europe, warned Churchill that “after this war allStates would be very nationalistic.” 19 The Soviet leaderignored his own advice, spreading the Soviet empire westward,but he was on the mark. Over the half-centuryfollowing World War II, East European nationalism intensified,largely in response to Soviet domination. Eventuallythat nationalism triumphed, and the Soviet imperial systemcollapsed of its own weight.As for Churchill, his retro-focus on reconstructing aversion of the world of Franz Joseph with the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a buffer (hardly a bulwark) againstRussian expansion apparently blinded him from recognizingthe intensity of nationalism in Europe—just as heunderestimated it in Britain’s colonial empire. FDR’s warningsabout colonial uprisings in the European coloniessuggests that he sensed the power of nationalism, but all hecould hope for in eastern Europe was that the Russianswould act with caution.Fittingly in the post-WW2 world, the last legacy toaddress is The Bomb. Prompted by warnings and advicefrom Albert Einstein and other scientists about Germanresearch into atomic energy, the British and Americans,early in the war, pooled their knowledge and resources intowhat became the Manhattan Project. Time, strategicbombing, and sabotage ensured that the Germans wouldnot succeed in reaching a similar goal before their defeat.Anglo-American scientific success came too late for theatom bomb to be used against Germany, but two weredropped on Japan, seeming to shorten the war. 20But a most unhappy outcome of Roosevelt’s andChurchill’s work together is the absurd, jejune dream thatthe Anglo-Americans could maintain monopolistic controlover atomic energy and nuclear weapons. Whatever thestrategic advantages or entrepreneurial benefits, it was adream doomed to failure—a dream that became a nightmare.Proposals to create international controls over atomicenergy failed when the “policemen”—Britain, the USSRand the USA—all opposed the plan. That it could haveworked is uncertain, but certainly monopoly did not. Sohere we are in 2009, scrambling in vain to hold on to theatomic secret, even as membership in the nuclear “club”(one of those “soft” words that seem to legitimize nuclearweapons) continues to grow. >>FINEST HoUR 141 / 41

CHURCHILL PROCEEDINGSSHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES...Since World War II we have experienced a halfcenturyof meetings, conferences, back-stairs diplomacy,and back-channel parleys. Even Dwight Eisenhower, themost intense and committed Cold Warrior of all the presidents—hespoke of the Soviet Union in terms of evil longbefore Ronald Reagan—ignored his own hyperbole andused back-channel diplomacy and negotiations (too slowlyfor Churchill) within the informal structure FDR had fostered.It was precisely what Roosevelt expected, even ifChurchill was more cautious. They created the unwritten“system,” the informal structure that channeled Cold Wartensions into regional confrontations between proxies, notglobal ones between the Great Powers. That offers smallconsolation to those whose land and societies have beendevastated, but it was arguably better than World War III.Whatever their other (undiscussed) legacies, theworld “system” (a word that evokes too strong a sense oforder and structure) that Churchill, Roosevelt—andStalin—established proved a powerful, long-lasting patrimony.Undemocratic, unfair, and often unjust, it hit upona certain practicality that enabled the world to avoid disaster.At least for a while.ENDNOTES1. Churchill once commented, “There is therefore wisdomin reserving one’s decisions as long as possible and until all thefacts and forces that will be potent at the moment are revealed.”Churchill to Eden, 4 January 1945, in Winston S. Churchill,Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), 351.For FDR, see U.S. Dept. of State [Harley A. Notter], PostwarForeign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 (Washington: USGPO,1950) and Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: StateDepartment Records of Harley A. Notter [microform] (Bethesda,Md.: 1987).2. Mark Stoler, “Avoiding American Entry into World WarII (Feature Review),” Diplomatic History 27:2 (April 2003), 286.3. But see Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, "TheImperialism of Decolonization," The Journal of Imperial andCommonwealth History, 22:3 (September 1994), 462-511: a persuasiveargument that the Cold War, and American support,preserved the British Empire as a military and political informalempire.4. As quoted in Warren F. Kimball, “The Most UnsordidAct”: Lend-Lease, 1941 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1968), 91.5. Discussion of the policemen, and the quotations, arefrom my Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the SecondWorld War (New York: Morrow, 1997), esp. 201-05. See also myThe Juggler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), esp.chapters 5 and 6.6. The approval process is made clear in a letter from thejournalist Forrest Davis to Steve Early, 23 March 1944, Rooseveltpapers, Official File (OF) 4287 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library,Hyde Park, New York). Davis, “What Really Happened atTeheran,” Saturday Evening Post 116 (13 and 20 May 1944);Kimball, The Juggler, 96, 110.7. I shamelessly quote and paraphrase myself from TheJuggler, 96ff. But also see Lloyd C. Gardner, Spheres of Influence(Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1993).8. An excellent detailed examination of Churchill’s thinkingabout Britain and Europe is Klaus Larres, Churchill’s Cold War(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002). A briefbut stimulating analysis is Max Beloff, “Churchill and Europe,” inChurchill, Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis, eds. (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1993), 443-55. The quotation fromBeloff is on 454-55.9. Churchill minute to Eden, 21 October 1942, M.742/2[T8/8/11], Churchill Archives, Churchill College [emphasisadded]; Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 561-62. Martin Gilbert, Road toVictory (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986), 239-40, substitutesRussia for Prussia and thus erroneously quotes Churchill callingfor “keeping Russia disarmed.” That mistake apparently ledGilbert to assume that Churchill excluded Russia from the UnitedStates (Council) of Europe, which does not appear to beChurchill's intent, although his phrase “former Great Powers”could be so interpreted. Foreign Office thinking at this time ispresented in Woodward, British Foreign Policy, V, 1-21. FDR’sdenial of Wilsonianism is quoted in Kimball, Forged in War, 201.10. Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence,W. F. Kimball, ed. (3 vols.; Princeton: Princeton University Press,1984), II, 222-27 [C-297/1].11. Kimball, The Juggler, 96.12. U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates (Washington: GPO, 1862-, 1943), III 39.13. The comment about Stalin as Peter the Great is that ofBritish Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden; Eden to Halifax, 22January 1942, FO 954/29xc/100818, Public Record Office (nowthe British National Archives).14. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., foreword to My Dear Mr Stalin:The complete correspondence of Franklin D. Roosevelt andJoseph V. Stalin, Susan Butler, ed. (New Haven and London: YaleUniversity Press, 2005), xiv.15. As quoted in Kimball, Forged in War, 209-10.16. This echoes the persuasive argument of Eric Alterman,When Presidents Lie (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), esp. 59-82, who points out that “in refusing to reveal the truth about theaccords, the administration only aided and abetted the Yalta conspiracy-mongers...”(62).17. Wilson’s request to Congress for a declaration of waragainst Germany on 2 April 1917 included the justification that“The world must be made safe for democracy.” The call for WorldWar I to be “a war to end all war(s)” is frequently attributed toWilson [try “Googling” it], but I have not found a citation. Aninterview with British Foreign Secretary Lord Grey was reportedon 14 May 1916 under the headline “ALLIES FIGHT TO END ALLWAR, SAYS GREY” but the closest Grey came to that phrase was,“Unless mankind learns from this war to avoid war, the strugglewill have been in vain.” New York Times, 14 May 1916.18. I have participated in that over-analysis. See my"Dangerously Contagious? The Anglo-American SpecialRelationship,” a debate with Alex Danchev, in The British Journalof Politics and International Relations 7:3 (August 2005), 437-41,excerpted in comments by the editor on an abstract of Danchev’sargument in “Whence the Anglo-American Special Relationship?”Finest Hour 129, Winter 2005-06, 40-41. “The ‘Special’ Anglo-American Special Relationship: ‘A fatter, larger underwater cable,’”Journal of Transatlantic Studies 3:1 (Spring 2005), 1-5. The SuezCrisis strained relationships at the very top, but at the next levelBritish policymakers agreed that the invasion was ill-considered.19. Minutes of the TOLSTOY Conference as quoted inGilbert, Road to Victory, 1026.20. I have graced or sullied the pages of Finest Hour 137with ruminations about that world-shaping event (at least geopolitically).This paraphrases what I wrote there. ,FINEST HoUR 141 / 42

CHURCHILL PROCEEDINGSFrom Disaster to Deliverance:Churchill and the War in SoutheastAsia, 1941-1945JAMES BOUTILIERCP: Res should hold but let meknow. RLSINGAPORE, 15 FEBRUARY 1942: The British command under a flag of truceis led by a Japanese to negotiate capitulation. “It may well be that we shall never havea formal pronouncement by a competent court upon the worst disaster and largestcapitulation in British history.” —WSC, The Hinge of Fate, 1951Paradoxically, while the Second World War inSoutheast Asia had profound political ramifications,Churchill thought it a sideshow, faced as he was witha strategic dilemma of how to be strong in far-flungregions. What British wartime planning there was wasbased on wishful thinking, self-delusion and flawed perceptions.Ironically, Japanese militarists succumbed to the samefatal mixture, relying on improvisation and false hopes oncetheir Asian blitzkrieg had run its course. For London andTokyo, the fate of British possessions in Southeast Asia—Singapore, Malaya, and Burma—was of secondary importanceDr. Boutilier is Special Adviser (Policy), Canadian Maritime ForcesPacific Headquarters. He addressed our Vancouver Conference on 14September 2007. This article has been reduced considerably from theoriginal in view of previously published Pacific War papers (FH 138-40). The original is available by email from the editor. The viewspresented in this paper are those of the author only and do notrepresent the official policy of the Department of National Defence.to safeguarding India (for Britain) or conquering China (forJapan). British Southeast Asia, and more precisely Burma, wasthe key to those ambitions. The British fought to save theirempire, only to lose it. The Japanese fought to gain an empire,only to fail disastrously.The bitter and deadly struggle in the rain-soddenjungles of Southeast Asia revealed the inherent hollowness ofimperial pretensions. Despite a brief respite in the mid-1940s,the British lost India, the great barrack of Asia. Japan’s effortin China was an unalloyed failure and the Sino-Japanese conflictset in train forces that would result in the emergence of anew great power, the People’s Republic of China.Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty and then asPrime Minister, assigned primacy to the Mediterranean.Underpinning this strategy were two flawed premises. First, inMarch 1939, Churchill drafted a memo which embodied theconventional wisdom of the day, namely, that the submarinethreat had been mastered and that airpower would “not >>FINEST HoUR 141 / 43

CHURCHILL PROCEEDINGSDISASTER TO DELIVERANCE...prevent [the] full exercise of … superior seapower,” 1 in short,surface vessels. Second, Churchill thought that even if Italyentered the war, the Royal Navy could clear the Mediterraneanand be poised to redeploy in defence of Southeast Asia,Singapore in particular. This was a grand and optimistic visionof British seapower at work. The reality would prove different.Compounding this best-case scenario was the hope,excruciatingly thin at times, that in the event of Japanese hostilities,the United States would come to Britain’s aid. ButChurchill doubted that the Japanese would ever undertakesuch a long-range venture as an attack on Singapore. Even ifthey did, Singapore’s great guns could surely hold the ImperialJapanese Navy at bay until the Royal Navy dispatched reinforcements.The British were also scathingly dismissive of thefighting capabilities of Japanese pilots and infantrymen. Theformer, they said, had eyes ill-suited to night fighting; thelatter were unable to make their way through tropical jungles.Whatever the case, British strategy was to give theJapanese no occasion for offence in the hope that Tokyowould not embark on a military campaign outside China,where they had been bogged down for years, fighting bothChiang Kai-shek and the ragged battalions of Mao Tse-tung.If the Japanese could be appeased, even by the sacrificial forfeitureof Hong Kong, Britain could get on with defeating theItalians and focus on the real threat, Nazi Germany.Singapore” was the metaphor for Britain’sfatal proclivity for strategic delusion in the interwar“Fortressyears. Commenced in the 1920s, its great navalguns were thought to have rendered Britain’s strategic outpostimpregnable. But as Singaporean strategists will tell you, theisland’s first line of defence, then as now, is halfway up theMalay Peninsula. Here the Navy was not available; British airpowerwas inadequate; and the Army, to which ultimateresponsibility was destined to shift, was woefully unprepared.As to the comforting reassurance that the Japanese could neveradvance swiftly through Malay jungles, someone had forgottenthat Malaya boasted some of the best roads in the Empire.Worse, indeed much worse, the great rifles at Sembawang hadarmour-piercing shells designed to subdue enemy warships,not high-explosive munitions designed to shatter Japanesearmy formations. Thus, the stage was set for disaster.On 11 November 1941, the Japanese enjoyed a serendipitouswindfall. The German raider Atlantis boarded the steamerAutomedon in the Indian Ocean and discovered a BritishChiefs of Staff appreciation stating that “in the event of warwith Japan, it would be impossible to hold Hong Kong,Malaya, or Singapore.” 2 This was relayed to the Japanese navalattaché in Berlin, and plans were laid accordingly.Some observers were prescient enough to appreciateSingapore’s vulnerability. The same day that Admiral Nagumoreceived the order to attack the American fleet at Pearl Harbor,HMS Prince of Wales, HMS Repulse and four destroyersarrived in Singapore. Curiously, this squadron, commanded byVice-Admiral Sir Tom Philips, was designated Force Z, whileNagumo’s First Air Fleet had been designated Operation Z. 3Prince of Wales and Repulse were the alpha and omega ofBritish seapower; the former was the Royal Navy’s mostmodern battleship, the latter one of its oldest battlecruisers.On hand to see the warships arrive was Lady DianaCooper, a society beauty who had just landed (with 100 suitcases)in Singapore with her husband, Alfred Duff Cooper,whom Churchill had dispatched to report on Southeast Asia.“Today,” she wrote, “a little fleet arrived to help....a lovelysight but on the petty side.” 4Duff Cooper wrote a scathing report about Singapore.To begin with, the command structure was hopelessly confused.The Commander-in-Chief Far East was Air ChiefMarshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, whom the Coopersuncharitably labelled “old Pop-off.” 5 He had no authority overthe Navy or the civil administration in Malaya. The governorof Singapore and the High Commissioner for the FederatedMalay States was Sir Thomas Shenton, dismissed derisively, onthe basis of his colonial service in Africa, as “Tom Tom”Shenton. Malaya’s civilian defence secretary, C.A. Vlieland,asserted throughout 1940 that “the army was deluded by ‘theinvention of the imaginary fortress of Singapore.’” 6Another commentator was General Archibald Wavell,Commander-in-Chief India. Wavell had been the celebratedhero of British resistance in North Africa, but his professionalcareer had come dangerously unstuck in the aftermath of thedebacle in Crete and Churchill had shipped him off to NewDelhi. In India, Wavell embarked on a “liaison” or factfindingmission to Southeast Asia. He was “horrified” by whathe discovered in Burma, where there was a “complete lack oforganization, of military intelligence, and of planning generallyto meet any Japanese attack.” 7 Wavell knew from his timein the War Office in the 1920s about Singapore’s reputationas the Gibraltar of the Far East, but Major-General ArthurPercival, the General Officer Commanding, MalayaCommand, warned that the Japanese might very well “burgleMalaya by the back door,” 8 thereby laying Singapore open toattack. But Wavell misread the situation, reporting on 8November 1941 that “I should think the Jap has a very poorchance of successfully attacking Malaya and I don’t think,myself, that there is much prospect of his trying.” 9A month later, the Japanese crossed into northernMalaya and Admiral Philips led his ships up the east coast ofthe Malay Peninsula in an effort to interdict Japanese trooptransports. Bereft of airpower, Prince of Wales and Repulsewere quickly sunk by Japanese aircraft (see Singapore papers,FH 139: 40-49). “The relentless demonstration of Japanesetechnological prowess,” Christopher Bayly and Tim Harperobserved, “did more to break civilian and military resistancethan any other factor.” 10There was an iconic quality about the event. It captured,tragically, the inadequacy of the British response and thedangers inherent in underestimating your opponent. The goodnews for Churchill was that come what may, he had avoidedone of the conditions that he feared almost more than anythingelse: he was not obliged to lead his nation against theJapanese without American support. The bad news was thatthe strategic landscape had suddenly become far morecomplex. American entry into the war in the Pacific meantthat the fate of British Southeast Asia and India had becomeinextricably linked with American efforts to aid Chiang Kaishekin China against the Japanese. In the dark days ofDecember, Churchill was confronted with managing theincreasingly asymmetrical politics of allied warfare.FINEST HoUR 141 / 44

CHURCHILL PROCEEDINGSThe Japanese carried everything before them as theymarched or bicycled down the peninsula towards Singapore.British troops lacked resolution and found themselves beingswept along with thousands of panic-stricken residents “carryingpersonal effects such as carpets, rattan chairs, golf clubs,tennis rackets, and even canaries in cages.” 11 When the Britishblew up part of the causeway leading to Singapore to inhibitthe Japanese advance, the explosion was heard at RafflesCollege some miles away. When the headmaster enquiredwhat the sound was, one of the students piped up, “[t]hat isthe end of the British Empire.” 12 The young Chinese lad wasnone other than Lee Kwan Yew, first prime minister of theRepublic of Singapore in 1959-60. Five days later the garrisonof over 85,000 surrendered to an assault force of roughly30,000 Japanese. 13 President Roosevelt had referred to 7December 1941 as the “day of infamy.” The Japanese appliedthe same description to 15 February 1942, because they saw itinfamous that an army still able to fight should surrender.What was astonishing was that the myth of British superiorityand invincibility had survived for as long as it did; thata handful of planters, traders, district officers, and missionarieshad managed to exercise power over millions who had succumbedto the notion that they were inherently inferior andneeded to be led. It was surely one of the greatest triumphs ofpsychology that the world had ever seen.What was Churchill’s responsibility? Many of thedecisions regarding the fortification of Singaporewere made while he was out of office in the 1930s,but as Chancellor of the Exchequer in the mid-1920s, he hadhacked away at appropriations for the Senior Service and theSingapore base, writing in 1924 that there was not “theslightest chance of [war with Japan] in our lifetime.” 14When Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in1939, it was arguably incumbent upon him to inform himselfabout Singapore’s defences. But he still imagined that, inextremis, capital ships could be deployed to deter or defeat theenemy. In his memoirs he conceded that “[m]y advisers oughtto have known and I ought to have been told, and I ought tohave asked.” But “the possibility of Singapore having no landwarddefences no more entered into my mind than that of abattleship being launched without a bottom.” 15In Churchill’s defence, the perilous strategic landscape—Francefallen, German submarine offensives in theAtlantic, the dismal outlook in North Africa—was such thatno individual could have successfully coped with such an arrayof assaults. But there are limits to this line of defence. And theJapanese did play into his hands in the sense that they, and theGermans, committed the ultimate blunder of declaring war onthe United States. When asked on 23 December 1941, whilevisiting the White House, whether Singapore was “the key tothe whole situation” in the Far East, Churchill replied, “[t]hekey to the whole situation is the resolute manner in which theBritish and American democracies are going to throw themselvesinto the conflict.” 16It was just like him, in the midst of disaster, to be contemplatingthe road to deliverance; but deliverance came at aprice. Churchill’s conduct of the war in Southeast Asia hadnow become increasingly subject to Washington’s prioritiesand to the vagaries of America’s war efforts in the Pacific.The arrival of the Japanese constituted an acute, perplexing,and even mortal dilemma for the subjectpeoples of Southeast Asia, whether hill tribesmen inBurma, Indian rubber planters in Malaya, or Chinese shopkeepersin Singapore. Were the Japanese really liberators? Didthey dare cast their lot in with their fellow Asians?The local Chinese and Indians sensed opportunity. Theformer were obliged to pay a vast sum of protection money tothe invaders, but they drew inspiration from Chaing Kaishek’sresistance in far-off Chungking and from local membersof the Malayan Communist Party. The Indians, soon to beinspired by the charismatic, even Churchillian leader, SubhasChandra Bose, saw an alliance with Japan as a way of positioningthemselves to overthrow British rule in India.But the Japanese ran out of ideas after their lightningconquest of Southeast Asia between December 1941 and May1942. They had gained access to the much-needed raw materials,but having thrown up a huge defensive perimeter, theywere uncertain how to continue prosecuting the war. Theirachievement was almost negative in character, because theysaw themselves bargaining away some of their gains in order toachieve a negotiated peace with their opponents. However, nosuch offer was forthcoming. They began to move into Burma,but India remained an ill-defined objective.The Second World War was more truly a “world” warthan any other war in history. Developments in far-off placeshad a direct bearing on the fate of the British Empire inSoutheast Asia. In June 1942, the Americans, materiallyassisted by their mastery of the Japanese Purple Code, inflicteda crushing defeat on the Imperial Japanese Navy, sinking threeof its front-line carriers off the mid-Pacific islet of Midway.Later in the year, amid the paralyzing conditions of a Russianwinter, Soviet forces beat the German 6th Army to its knees inthe rubble of Stalingrad. These were the great turning pointsof the war. From then on the possibility of German andJapanese forces meeting somewhere in South Asia became apipe dream, and Japan’s best hope was to hold what they had.The war in Southeast Asia had, of course, to be seenwithin the larger context of the global effort, of scarceresources, and competing demands from other theatres. InEurope, Churchill continued to promote the primacy of campaigningin the Mediterranean but bit by bit he was obliged torecognize Britain’s diminished stature and the fact that theAmericans, by virtue of their plethora of personnel andweapons, were determining who should enjoy senior commands.British admirals and generals tended to be assignedsecondary and supporting roles, or were appointed to lessimportant theatres.Another embarrassing failure of arms occurred in Burmain 1943. Churchill reflected the prevailing pessimism aboutattacking Burma when he observed colourfully that it was like“eating the porcupine quill by quill.” 17 Instead, he favouredsome sort of seaborne assault against Japanese positions inSoutheast Asia but conflicting demands for ships and landingcraft meant that nothing came of his scheme.A major appointment in 1943 was that of Lord LouisMountbatten, a young admiral with impeccable royal connections,as Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia(SEAC). Mountbatten, whom American General Stilwell dismissedas a “matinee idol,” was the product of a bargain >>FINEST HoUR 141 / 45

CHURCHILL PROCEEDINGSSURRENDER: An actual photoof the capitulation shows a muchmore sombre scene than theJapanese propagranda illustration,right. Lieutenant GeneralTomoyuki Yamashita (seated,foreground), was hanged in Manila in February 1946. Hislast words expressed respect for his former foes and theAmerican military court that had convicted him.struck between the British and Americans, whereby the formergot a marginal theatre in return for the latter securing the ultimateappointment, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.While the Americans, motivated by anti-imperial sentiments,referred to SEAC as “Save England’s Asian Colonies,” theyhad to concede that Mountbatten was energetic and charismatic.These were the very traits needed to combat thedemoralization and defeatism prevalent in the India of the day.Happily for the Allies, the Japanese had begun tosuccumb to those conditions themselves. So also had EmperorHirohito, who, on hearing that the Americans were about tooust Japanese forces from the Solomon Islands, explodedangrily, “isn’t there some place where we can strike the UnitedStates? When and where are you people [his commanders]ever going to put up a good fight? And when are you evergoing to fight a decisive battle?” 18Japan’s last rolls of the dice were the battles of Imphaland Kohima in Northeast India between March and July1944. The British, to Japanese dismay, did not fall back asthey had always done before, and the Japanese were beatenback into Burma. The Japanese remained as quick, flexibleand innovative as always, but they were now facing a muchmore confident and well-equipped opponent. While the warwas due to last another year, the rest was an extended afterward.The struggle increasingly became a political one for boththe Japanese and the British in their former colonies.The war in Southeast Asia unfolded on a huge canvas.The old order was swept away, collapsing ignominiouslybefore the invaders. The peoples of Singapore, Malaya, andBurma were left confused and uncertain as they saw British,Australian and Indian forces melt away, defeated by a relentlessfoe. Those soldiers, sailors, and airmen were the haplessvictims of imperial arrogance, faulty planning, and fatal selfdelusion.As Wavell observed, the Japanese prevailed by“combining the fanaticism and mobility of the savage withmodern weapons and training.” 19Field Marshal Slim called the flight out of Burma “thelongest retreat in military history.” 20 Burma was truly thepivot. Sustain the Allied position in northern Burma and youensured the survival of British India.But the war in Southeast Asia had become less and less aBritish war. Increasingly, the fate of Burma was determined byAmerican and Allied victories elsewhere. Churchill was at theheart of the global processes, rallying the people of Britain,urging American support, and trying desperately to guaranteeBritain’s place in the postwar world. He was an indomitablefigure, a leader of gargantuan proportions. And he was alsointensely human: irascible, childish, inspired and inspiring,petulant, demanding, pugnacious, prescient.At the same time he was a romanticist, a soldierstatesmanwho saw the war in 18th century terms: a world offortresses, ships-of-the-line, heroic commanders. The grandeurof empire ran in his blood. While he strove to defend India hewas dismissive of the Indians. He was economical with thetruth, attempting to obscure the extent of his knowledge ofsuch matters as the fatal unpreparedness of Singapore.Despite the enormous cost in human suffering,Churchill was right in assessing Southeast Asia as less criticalthan Europe. Europe was where the mortal threat lay;Southeast Asia by comparison was perceptually and practicallya world away. Of course, Australians and New Zealanders sawmatters differently; but that is another story.Fortunately for Britain, the Japanese were not invincible.But having overseen their defeat, Churchill was left withan even greater challenge: how, in opposition and in power, tooversee the dismantling of the empire he had fought so hardto preserve. Thus, the road from disaster to deliverance provedto be the harbinger of another age, bereft of the oratoricalcadences and grand certainties of the Churchillian era.ENDNOTES1. David Reynolds, In Command of History (London:Penguin Books, 2005), 115.2. Martin Gilbert, The Second World War (Toronto: Stoddart,1989) 140.3. Ibid., 268.4. Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Armies:Britain’s Asian Empire and the War With Japan (London: PenguinBooks, 2005), 112.5. Ibid.6. Ibid., 109.7. Victoria Schofield, Wavell: Soldier and Statesman (London,John Murray, 2006) 222-23.8. Ibid., 223.9. Ibid., 224.10. Bayly and Harper, 118.11. Ibid., 131.12. Ibid, 130.13. Ibid, 146.14. Reynolds, 104.15. Ibid, 296.16. Martin Gilbert, Churchill and America (Toronto:McClelland and Stewart, 2005), 248.17. John Kennedy, The Business of War: The War Narrative ofMajor-General Sir John Kennedy (London: Hutchinson, 1957), 338.18. Bayly and Harper, 358.19. Schofield, 282.20. Ibid., 265. ,FINEST HoUR 141 / 46

THE CHURCHILL QUIZJAMES R. LANCASTEREach quiz includes four questions insix categories: contemporaries (C), literarymatters (L), miscellaneous (M),personal (P), statesmanship (S) and war(W), with the easier questions first. Canyou reach Level 1?Level 4:1. Who was the Prime Ministerwho referred to Churchill, in October1914, as having a “zigzag streak oflightning in the brain”? (C)2. 18 June 1940. “Upon thisbattle depends the survival of Christiancivilization.” To which battle didChurchill refer? (W)3. Complete WSC’s aphorism:“Some men change their principles tofit their parties; others change theirparties to fit their ———.” (S)4. In The River War, WSC writes“The earth burns with the quenchlessthirst of ages, and in the steel-blue skyscarcely a cloud obstructs the unrelentingtriumph of the sun.” Whichcountry is he describing? (L)5. “This is a very great countrymy dear Jack.” Which country wasChurchill writing about to his brotheron 15 November 1895? (L)6. WSC to his wife 18 April1912: “I cannot help feeling proud ofour race & its traditions as proved bythis event. Boatloads of women & childrentossing in the sea...and the rest,Silence. Honour to their memory.” Towhat event did he refer? (M)Level 3:7. Who wrote the speech in the1941 film Lady Hamilton (ThatHamilton Woman in the U.S.) in whichNelson says: “You cannot make peacewith dictators. You have to destroythem”? (L)8. What does WSC mean by thechapter heading “In Durance Vile” inMy Early Life? (L)9. When Winston tried to jointhe 1898 Tirah expedition, who “cooperatedenergetically from her end....she left no wire unpulled, no stoneunturned, no cutlet uncooked.”? (P)10. Who was the sculptor mostadmired by Churchill? (M)11. Churchill cabled Roosevelton 10 January 1945: “I do not see anyother way of realizing our hopes aboutWorld Organization in five or six days.Even the Almighty took seven.” Whichupcoming meeting was he talkingabout? (S)12. What was WSC’s reply whenCharlie Chaplin told him he was goingto play Jesus Christ in his next film? (C)Level 2:13. What did Churchill describein a speech to the House of Commonson 5 October 1938 as “a total andunmitigated defeat”? (S)14. In which town did Churchillsay, during an election campaign in1906, “Fancy living in one of thesestreets, never seeing anything beautiful,never eating anything savoury, neversaying anything clever”? (P)15. In which campaign wasWinston Churchill first mentioned indespatches? (W)16. Which war was Churchillreferring to when he wrote in My EarlyLife: “Colonel Byng and I shared ablanket. When he turned over I was inthe cold. When I turned over I pulledthe blanket off him and he objected.He was the Colonel. It was not a goodarrangement.” (W)17. Which constituency didWSC stand for as an IndependentAnti-Socialist in March 1924? (M)18. Who pronounced thesewords about WSC: “WHEREAS he hasby his art as an historian and his judgmentas a statesman made the past theservant of the future...”? (C)Level 1:19. Of whom did WSC writefrom Blenheim in 1905, “No smoothpath of patronage was opened to him.No glittering wheels of royal favouraided and accelerated his journey”? (P)20. How old was Winston whenhe first had a letter published in thenational press? (P)21. “Do not underrate England.She is very clever. If you plunge us allinto another Great War, she will bringthe whole world against you like lasttime.” To whom, in 1937, didFINEST HoUR 141 / 47Churchill give this advice? (S)22. Who was the American, closeto Roosevelt, whom Churchill referredto as “Lord Root of the Matter”? (C)23. What did Churchill call theperiod from 3 September 1939 to 10May 1940? (M)24. In what year did WSCwrite: “Let it not be thought for amoment that the danger of anotherAnswers(19) His father, Lord RandolphChurchill. (20) Nineteen, in theWestminster Gazette on 19 October1894, a Liberal journal which startedin 1893. (21) Ribbentrop, GermanAmbassador to Britain, 1936-38. Hewas hanged at Nuremberg, October1946. (22) Harry Hopkins. (23) TheTwilight War, aka “Phoney War.” BookII of The Gathering Storm is “TheTwilight War.” (24) September 1924,in “Shall We All Commit Suicide?”published in Pall Mall, reprinted inThoughts and Adventures / AmidThese Storms in 1932.(13) The Munich agreement. (14) InManchester, conversing with his secretary,Eddie Marsh. (15) The Malakandaction of 16 September 1898.“Brigadier-General Jeffreys has…praised the courage and resolution ofLieutenant W.L.S. Churchill, 4thHussars, the correspondent of thePioneer newspaper with the force, whomade himself useful at a criticalmoment.” (16) The Second Anglo-Boer War. (17) The Abbey Division ofWestminster. (18) President John F.Kennedy when declaring Churchill anhonorary citizen of the United Stateson 9 April 1963.(7) Winston Churchill. (8) Prison,quoting Robert Burns: “In durance vilehere must I wake and weep.” (9) Hismother. (10) Oscar Nemon. (11) Yalta.(12) “Have you cleared the rights?”(1) H.H. Asquith (1852-1928). (2)The Battle of Britain. (3) principles.(4) The Sudan. (5) America. (6) Thesinking of the Titanic.

The premise of this new feature issimple: A periodic review of historicalnovels and thrillers where Churchillappears as a character. After all, it isimportant that he be portrayed accurately,even if the story is otherwiseimprobable.Each review will ask two questions:(1) Is Churchill portrayed accurately andas something more than a plot device?(2) Is the book otherwise worth reading?Two questions, answered with one tothree stars, are Portrayal of Churchill(H= inaccurate; HH= accurate; HHH=very good) and Worth reading (H=probably not; HH=good read; HHH=really good read. So, unless a bookreceives at least four stars from these twoquestions, don’t waste your time.In future columns, I will reviewone post-2000 book and one publishedbefore 2000. I encourage readers to sendme [mcmenamin@walterhav.com] theirown selections, for good or ill. Use therating system above and tell me why yougave the rankings you did. If I review abook you referred, I’ll mention that andgive you credit in the column, along withwhether I agree with your rankings.Dreamers of the Day,by Mary Doria Russell(Random House,2008).Portrayal HHHWorth reading HHHRussell is a criticallyacclaimed writer,mostly of sciencefiction, who has written a delightful novel.Agnes Shanklin is a 40-year-old spinsterschool teacher from Cleveland who, afterBooks, Arts& C uriositiesChurchill as a Literary CharacterMICHAEL McMENAMINWorld War I, takes a trip of a lifetime tothe Holy Land and arrives in Egypt just asthe Cairo Peace Conference begins. Shealready knows T.E. Lawrence (wonderfullyand accurately rendered) who introducesher to a condescending Gertrude Bell and,of course, Churchill. She also meets afictional German spy with whom she hasa brief affair.Agnes is with Churchill on anumber of adventures, including theGaza riots and his visit to Jerusalem. Sheaccompanies WSC on a painting expeditionwhich is taken straight fromInspector Thomson’s memoirs as well asPainting as a Pastime. Winston has a lotof time on stage and much dialogue. Hispuckish sense of humor comes throughon many occasions. It is one of the bestfictional portrayals of Churchill I haveever read. In the famous camel partyphoto (this issue, page 13), Agnes is “thefigure at the far left side of the photo.”Russell also gives an accurate rendition ofthe ins and outs of the peace conferencewhich resulted in modern Iraq, the consequencesof which are with us still. Readthe book. You won’t be disappointed.Pearl Harbor, by NewtGingrich and WilliamForstchen (St. Martin’sPress, hardcover 2007,trade paperback, 2008).Portrayal HHWorth reading HHHere is a poor man’sWinds of War. It spansthe period 1934 to 7 December 1941and, like Herman Wouk’s masterfulwork, it covers that period with characters—British,Japanese and American—who are involved in great events.The book’s British character, CecilStanford, taught English at the JapaneseNaval Academy on Hiroshima Bay, and itis primarily through his eyes that we seeChurchill, who appears in two chapters:one in 1936 at Chartwell where WSCsuggests Stanford become a correspondentin the Far East and serve as a sourceof information for him on events there;one at the Cabinet War Rooms inOctober 1941, where Stanford delivers areport on events in Japan. There is also abrief scene between Roosevelt andChurchill on 12 August 1941 which thewriters unfortunately place at “ArgentinaBay,” Newfoundland. I know it’s only atypo and they meant Argentia the town;but “Argentia Bay” would be wrong too,because it was “Placentia Bay”.While I give Gingrich and Co. twostars for the accuracy of their portrayal ofChurchill, I do so grudgingly. Littlethings destroy verisimilitude. WSC drankJohhny Walker, not single malt; he wouldnever have poured “two good fingers ofscotch” for a guest and “nearly twice asmuch for himself”; and he wouldn’t havesaid, if a guest refused ice, “Good man,can’t see why anyone would water downa proper single malt.” Churchill’s studyat Chartwell is inaccurately described ashaving “overstuffed leather chairs” and a“typical painting of battle” over the fireplace.Mostly, though, Churchill justdoesn’t come to life here, as he does inDreamers of the Day. The dialoguedoesn’t sound like WSC, who is only aprop serving to bring out informationfrom Stanford on Japan that the authorswant us to have. He says “my friend” sooften he begins to sound like JohnMcCain. I even have doubts thatChurchill would have met Stanford inthe bunker in 1941.Don’t get me wrong. I enjoyed thebook. Other historical characters appearand U.S. ambassador to Japan JosephGrew is one who is well-realized. So areseveral Japanese characters, AdmiralYamamoto among them, who allow us tosee the situation from Japan’s point ofview. But don’t buy the book for its portrayalof Churchill. It’s not worth it. ,Mr. McMenamin is the co-author with CurtZoller of Becoming Winston Churchill: TheUntold Story of Young Winston and hisAmerican Mentor, a trade paperback of whichwill be published by Enigma Books in 2009.FINEST HoUR 141 / 48

BOOK REVIEWSWSC’s Heights of Sublimity:A Landmark in Churchill StudiesMANFRED WEIDHORN“What a drill sergeant of words he was; what an outrage tolet someone like him loose to embarrass and humiliatethe rest of us mere mortal users of the language!”Churchill Centre Book ClubManaged for the Centre by ChartwellBooksellers (www.churchill-books.com),which offers member discounts up to25%. To order contact Chartwell Booksellers,55 East 52nd Street, New York,New York 10055, email info@chartwellbooksellers.comtelephone (212) 308-0643,facsimile (212) 838-7423Churchill by Himself:The Life, Times andOpinions of WinstonChurchill in HisOwn Words, RichardM. Langworth,editor. Public Affairs,620 pages, illus.,hardbound, $29.95.Member price $24.When one reads a book or legal brieffor the purposes of teaching orscholarship or rebuttal, the usual procedureis to highlight important passages.Richard Langworth has done just thatwith the vast corpus of Churchill’s writingsand speeches. Within the covers ofone thick volume, our Happy Reaper hasgathered Churchill’s witticisms, maxims,and ripostes, as well as a rich selection ofhis scintillating prose passages. Thesource for each passage is scrupulouslygiven (including the occasional uncertainty).And, at long last, those fewfamous utterances which Churchill, likeYogi Berra, did not really make are isolatedin a limbo. No more should therebe inquiries as to whether or whereChurchill said this or that, and a departmentin Finest Hour can be shut downfor good. Now, as Casey Stengel used tosay, “You can look it up.”Here is a distillation of Churchillthe writer and orator at his best in thevarious periods of his uniquely longcareer—as a callow youth seeking bothfame and vocation, as a fire-breathingyoung radical, as a superb “triphibian”military expert, as a Cassandra warningabout India (alas!) and Hitler (cheers!), asDr. Weidhorn is Guterman Professor ofEnglish at Yeshiva University and the authorof four books on Churchill, including theseminal Sword and Pen (1974).the greatest war leader of a democracy inperil (with apologies to LG and FDR), asa prudent Cold Warrior (“jaw” rather than“war”), and, finally, as a sage in the era ofMutually Assured Destruction, unwillingto surrender hope despite the many ambiguitiesof technological progress which hehimself had often noted.What other political leader, livingthrough so many phases and tackling somany different issues, possessed so muchcuriosity in so many areas, so much eruditionand such a consistentlymesmerizing style? Ah, but what otherleader was a professional writer? This collectionalso reminds us of Churchill’sFalstaffian side—the corpulent man wholikes his drink and who is seeminglynever at a loss for a quip just when othersthink they have him trapped.Though he trended through thedecades from a severe criticism of laissezfairecapitalism to a severe criticism ofsocialism (which he brilliantly called“Queuetopia”), he, unlike most knee-jerkanti-communists, understood the complexityof life: “Bolshevism is a great evil,but it has arisen out of great social evils”(147); this insight he would also apply toHitler and Nazism, though not so succinctly.He had a jarring warning forknee-jerk radicals, as well: “Those whotalk of revolution ought to be preparedfor the guillotine” (394).Such observations are based on anunderstanding of the past: “Studyhistory!” (18), and reading this bookindeed reminds us of some of the fatefuljunctures of history. Not just that in1931 he had a near-fatal street accidentin New York City that almost lost usWorld War II but also that, in 1929, atthe eerily arithmetical midpoint of hiscareer, he was toying with the idea ofretiring from politics and even emigratingto Canada (155). The letterexpressing such velleities suggests that hisFINEST HoUR 141 / 49My Early Life, being written at that time,was a valedictory memoir and that hissadly unfulfilled career might well havebecome a mere footnote in history, a“study,” as Robert Rhodes James put it,“in failure.” But he stayed on, and compellingare the selections from thespeeches of the 1930s, on the rearmingof Germany and the flaccidity of theBaldwin-Chamberlain response.Juxtaposed with each other in thisanthology, these passages create a chill inthe reader, as he temporarily suspends hisawareness of the ultimate happy thoughcostly outcome.With such a wealth of material (15million words) on such a wide range oftopics, Langworth faced a major decisionabout organization: Would he go byalphabet, or chronology, or topic? Toughcall. In the end, he arrived at a happycompromise: Broad topics (though in noinevitable pattern); alphabetically orderedsubdivisions within them; chronologywithin the latter. As warranted, heallowed himself variations and exceptions.It is not always a perfectsolution—for example, one ofChurchill’s greatest sentences, the oneabout being turned out after five years’success, is hard to track down, as is thefascinating question of when he firstexpressed the ambition to become PrimeMinister, or when he spoke of being shotat without result (the index needsredoing; it simply cannot perform all thatis asked of it)—but the result is betterthan that of all those other schemata thathave been tried from time to time.Greatly helpful are the cross referencesamong the famous utterances.These are part of the editor’s sage interventions,as after every two or three items,Langworth provides brief comments(footnotes, as it were) which clarify, correlate,quote, refer, contextualize, andsometimes take a wider view. >>

BOOK REVIEWSCHURCHILL BY HIMSELF...When necessary, he glances atrecent or current events and tendencies,but in an objective, non-partisan fashion.One cannot tell—rightly so—whether heis a Left or Right Churchillian, only thathis erudition is immense. With thesejudicious notes, Langworth is the Virgilto the reader’s Dante. And that image isnot far-fetched, for the journey takes usthrough vast tracts of Hell and Purgatoryand even proffers (beyond Virgil’s power)glimpses of heaven—or at least of peaceand relatively good times.This book reminds the reader that,not only does Churchill’s prose (in anyperiod of his career, unlike the poetry ofthe gradually maturing Shakespeare) rollas smoothly as the Mississippi, but,except for occasional boilerplate aboutpatriotism, duty, and morality—valuesnecessary in a leader’s rhetorical arsenalbut often overdone by lesser politicians—it shows little of the Victorian purplerhetoric that some “modern” (asChurchill might have said with a sneer)literary critics have complained about.Passage after passage demands tobe read aloud for the sheer aural andverbal effects. Churchill’s brilliance indiscursive reasoning and expository proseis there right at the beginning, as in, forexample, his prescient and eloquent argumentin 1901 that future European wars(which seemed to have become obsoleteor unthinkable) would be dreadful (504).Churchill’s is a unique way ofexpressing himself, whether in rollingperiod, in careful or stimulating choice ofwords, in surprising twist of thought, ininspired use of concrete detail. Just noteone example of the many amusing wayshe had of asserting that a political opponentwas wrong or untruthful (or thatthe opponent had only by chance stumbledupon the truth): “An uncontrollablefondness for fiction forbade him toforsake it for fact.” (232) Where inAmerican politics, since that lovableSenator Everett Dirksen in the 1960s—though he was often more windbag thanChurchillian—do we have anybody likethat? For shame, inarticulate Americans!But no less stunning is the eruptionof the homely simile or metaphor thatbrings the discussion home to even thedullest mind. To wit, many people haveobserved that the opposite extremes ofCommunism and Fascism actually meet;but only Churchill comes up with the aptanalogy of the North and South Poles,equally cold and barren (384). Otherexamples: “China, as the years pass, isbeing eaten by Japan like an artichoke,leaf by leaf” (157). Warning against the“great folly” of extending the Korean Warinto China, he said, “It would be like fliesinvading fly-paper” (437). Or take thispaean to democracy: “The alternation ofParties in power, like the rotation of crops,has beneficial results”(110). Or his poetic,patriotic, and mischievous praise of theAmerican constitution: “...no constitutionwas written in better English” (127).Then there is his unprecedentedand risky injection of humor in speechesduring dire situations: “We are waitingfor the long-promised invasion. So arethe fishes” (160). On discontinuing theplan to ring church bells to warn of aGerman landing: “...I cannot help feelingthat anything like a serious invasionwould be bound to leak out” (297).Hitler, in forgetting about the Russianwinter, “must have been very loosely educated….Ihave never made such a badmistake as that” (347). Or take theearthy way he has in making the pedestrianmilitary observation that Hitler haslost air power superiority: “Hitler made acontract with the demon of the air, butthe contract ran out before the job wasdone, and the demon has taken on anengagement with the rival firm” (207).But to cite these examples is tobetray hundreds of equally great ones.What a drill sergeant of words he was;what an outrage to let someone like himloose to embarrass and humiliate the restof us mere mortal users of the language!Legend has it that when Milton’sParadise Lost was published, JohnDryden, the greatest poet of the nextgeneration, said to fellow poets, “Thisman cuts us all out, and the ancientstoo.” In the same way, all those collectionsof the “Wit and Wisdom ofChurchill” are now rendered automaticallyobsolete. Indeed it is hard to thinkof a “Wit and Wisdom” vade mecumdevoted to anyone (other than perhapsShakespeare)—Pope, Twain, Wilde,Shaw, Proust, Lincoln—that is notdiminished by the scope of this book, thevolume of memorable utterances, thehelpful commentary. As a trove of profoundobservations, rolling periods,amusing—often hilarious—one-liners, itthreatens the hegemony of Bartlett’sFamiliar Quotations. Who could havethought that any one man had so manywonderful things to say? He makes thevalue of the other merchandisers ofsagacity seem inflated.Langworth’s previous Churchillwork was A Connnoisseur’s Guide to theBooks of Sir Winston Churchill, a definitivework of interest only to that class ofharmless eccentrics known as book collectors.Churchill by Himself (nice title,too) is, however, of interest to anyonewho loves English—nay loves languageitself—for its evidence of how this puny,featherless, two-legged creature calledman can use his invention of words toreach heights of sublimity. In short,although not conventional scholarship orcriticism, which advances a new interpretationor reveals obscure documents orconnects the dots in a revisionist fashion,this book is nothing less than a landmarkin Churchill studies. Indeed, thanks toLangworth’s efforts, some academicscoundrel will no doubt spare himself thetime-consuming task of readingChurchill’s forty or so books and ratheruse just this one volume in order to writea credible monograph on “Churchill’spolitical philosophy” or “Churchill’sProse Style” or “Churchill and...” anynumber of topics. Churchill was certainlyright to have his doubts about “progress.”A compliment: the editor hasplaced the inevitable errata (mostly hiswords not Churchill’s) on the web, whichreaders can consult and even add to,pending the next printings. A cavil: Theillustration of Churchill for the dustjacket of the British edition is an “unmitigateddefeat,” while the U.S. edition is asmashing success. Poor Britons! ,Editor’s note: In my advancingdecrepitude I mistakenly commissioneda second review of this book byProfessor David Dilks (and two reviewsof Peter Clarke’s book opposite). Itwould be churlish to drop one for theother, and presumptuous to run themback to back and be accused, as I will beanyway, of promoting my own book.The best I can do is to publish thesecond reviews of each work in the nextFinest Hour. I am sorry for this lapse.Also, the errata Professor Weidhornrefers to are at http://xrl.us/j2uc8. RMLFINEST HoUR 141 / 50

Empire’s End:Churchill’s CentralityDAVID FREEMANThe Last ThousandDays of the BritishEmpire: Churchill,Roosevelt, and theBirth of the PaxAmericana, by PeterClarke. BloomsburyPress, 560 pp., hardbound,$35.Member price $28.Aformer professor of Modern BritishHistory at Cambridge Universityand Master of Trinity Hall, Cambridge,Clarke is a biographer of Sir StaffordCripps and the final volume in thePenguin History of Britain. Thus he iswell qualified to consider British military,imperial, diplomatic and economichistory from the Second QuebecConference in August 1944 to the independenceof India in 1947: the lastthousand days when Britain functionedas a major player in world affairs. Formost of them, Clarke observes, Churchillis “the central figure in the story.”The recurring metaphorical themeis that first Churchill and then Attleewere (in Attlee’s own words) “playing thehand they were dealt.” But this alsopoints out the book’s primary weakness:its narrow focus. Clarke does not get intohow the British came to be dealt thehand they were playing. The deal tookplace before the time covered in his text,and readers interested in this aspect ofBritish Imperial history will have to lookelsewhere—such as former ChurchillArchives Centre Keeper Piers Brendon’sThe Decline and Fall of the BritishEmpire (2007), which covers the periodfrom 1781 to 1997. Still, for a virtualday-by-day account of the Empire’s “finaldays,” this book can’t be beat.The day-by-day aspect is important.These were hectic times. Thenumber of issues and decisions that hadto be grappled with each day and theirProfessor Freeman teaches history atCalifornia State University, Fullerton.complex interconnectednesswere monumental.Economic, political andmilitary realities circumscribedthe decisionmakingprocess—a fact overlooked inrevisionist histories that focus on singletopics such as Palestine, India or theorigins of the Cold War. With the luxuryof time and hindsight, too many historianshave inquired into “what shouldhave been done,” instead of understandingthe context in which importantdecisions were made.Clarke avoids the revisionist trapby relying heavily on the diaries andpapers of the major figures of the era toillustrate their concerns, and how theyattempted to maneuver under the circumstancesthey faced. Churchilldominates the first two-thirds of the narrative,as Clarke shows “how intractablyBritain’s postwar problems were rootedin precisely those wartime commitmentsthat had brought victory.”If Churchill was the architect ofvictory, Clarke concludes, “he was surelyto this extent also the author of Britain’sANTOINE CAPETBlood, Toil,Tears and Sweat:Dire Warning,Churchill’s FirstSpeech as PrimeMinister, by JohnLukacs. BasicBooks, 2008,148 pp., $24.Member price$19.The idea of writing books on particularevents or days in world historyis not new: France used to have a verysuccessful series entitled “Ce jour-là…”(on that day…). The format seems to beenjoying a revival, with for instance PeterStansky’s book on The First Day of theBlitz and John Lukacs’ latest offering,Dr. Capet is Head of British Studies at theUniversity of Rouen, Mont-Saint-Aignan, FranceFINEST HoUR 141 / 51post-war distress” (xvii). “Victory at allcosts” was promised and delivered. Yetwithout victory, Churchill rightly prophesied,there would have been no survival.Clarke illustrates how Churchill himselfappreciated Britain’s declining positionin the closing months of the war andattempted to salvage what he could onthe economic front through Lend-Leasenegotiations; on the Imperial front bytrying to delay Indian independence; andon the international front by his dealwith Stalin to keep Greece free of communism.The postwar Attlee governmentsimply wound up the process with the1946 American loan (paid off in 2006),withdrawal from India and Palestine, andtransfer of responsibility in Greece andTurkey to the new Western superpower.Clarke’s facing of the facts head-on doesnot diminish Churchill’s greatness.Instead, Clarke depicts a great man atwork making decisions both right andwrong but always respecting the institutionsof parliamentary democracy andworking for what he saw as the bestinterests of his country. ,No Contradiction Acceptedostensibly on Churchill’s famous speechof 13 May 1940, now known as the“Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat” speech,coming after his Five Days in London.No reader reasonably well versed inChurchill scholarship will expect to findnew information on that speech, but Iexpected an extensive commentary full ofexciting insights and novel visions: whywrite a book (in fact a lengthy essay, withall the tricks of the trade—double spaces,large font, blank pages—to make it intoa marketable book) if you have no newdocuments or ideas to justify its existence?By contrast the Levenger Pressbook Their Finest Hour, on the equallyfamous speech of 18 June 1940, has aforeword on how Churchill wrote it andthe events of the day, and a facsimileholograph of the actual speech notesfrom the Churchill Archives Centre.This new book’s reason for beingonly begins to appear in a footnote in thelast two pages—in cauda venenum:Lukacs is out to refute David >>

BOOK REVIEWSBLOOD, TOIL, TEARS AND SWEAT...Reynolds’s argument, in his In Commandof History, that Churchill had privatedoubts behind the brave face he putbefore the public. “This is worse than amistaken attribution of motive. It isentirely wrong,” Lukacs concludes on thefinal page and the final words of his book(147). I was somewhat taken aback,because I remembered Reynolds’ discussionas full of nuance and subtlety. I alsoremembered his impressive examination ofthe question in his older essay, “Churchilland the British ‘decision’ to fight on in1940: Right policy, wrong reasons.”Unfortunately, because of the“popular” format of Lukacs’s essay, thereare no references (and no index). So Ireached for my copy of In Command ofHistory and after a few false tracks Ifound the incriminated passage:Churchill’s public rhetoric [in TheSecond World War] is not an exactguide to his private policy in 1940.Whatever he said to raise morale, hisbest hope at this time was an eventualnegotiated peace with a non-NaziGerman government. His worst fear,despite his innate confidence, was thathe would not live to see it. (Lukacs.147; Reynolds, 173.)And reading the quotation in contextprovided the give-away: Lukacs was infact settling accounts with Reynolds who,in his pages 170-73, tried to distancehimself from Lukacs:Halifax’s biographer, Andrew Roberts,has attacked as “simplistic and unhistorical”the tendency to depict this in“the black and white of the treacherousHalifax versus a heroic Churchill.” Onthe other side, John Lukacs has dramatizeda fundamental clash between the“visionary” Churchill and the “pragmatist”Halifax on which “the fate ofBritain” and even “the outcome of theSecond World War” largely hinged.Apparently, Lukacs does not acceptany contradiction to the suggestion,which dominates his Five Days inLondon, that Churchill was the hand ofGod incarnate. Thus he wrote Blood,Toil, Tears and Sweat to confound hiscritics and reiterate his view of Churchillas a providential hero, somehow enlistingChurchill’s retrospective description ofhis mood as he went to bed on 10 May(“I felt as if I were walking withDestiny”) in The Second World War. Hiscentral thesis is that Churchill’s magnanimitytowards Chamberlain after 10May (e.g., allowing him to stay inDowning Street) brought “providentialresults”—the most evident one being thata grateful Chamberlain did not thencombine with Halifax to sap Churchill’sauthority over the conduct of the warand organise opposition to the eventualDAVID FREEMANdecision to fight on.It is never pleasant to have to criticizethe work of a senior colleague, butthis writer is unfortunately forced to concludethat Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat isa gravely flawed history: Manichaeismand Providentialism do not belong withthe toolbox of the historian, but withthat of the propagandist and proselyte. ,Pioneer of Secret Intelligence‘Blinker’ Hall,Spymaster: TheMan WhoBrought Americainto WorldWar I, byDavid Ramsay.Spellmount,320pp., illus.,hardbound,$37.95. Memberprice $34.At the start of the First World War,Captain Reginald “Blinker” Hall(1870-1943) retired from sea duty owingto failing health. Fortuitously he wasgiven a desk job as Director of NavalIntelligence (DNI). This placed him inthe Admiralty in direct contact with theFirst Lord, Winston Churchill. Hallquickly set about organizing a crack teamof civilians and sailors who operated outof “Room 40,” the prototype for theBletchley Park code-breaking operationin the Second World War.Hall’s team had some luck at capturinglost German code books, but theywere equally adept at cracking Germannaval and diplomatic codes. Fortunatelyfor the Allies, the arrogant Germanscould not conceive the idea of their codesbeing penetrated, and Room 40 providedan invaluable stream of intelligencethroughout the war.Churchill played a key role inapproving Hall’s request to set up asignals intelligence (SIGINT) network.Since 80 percent of the world’s cablelines were then under British control, theGermans had to rely on wireless communicationto communicate with theiroverseas embassies. Radio communicationwas new to naval warfare, andGerman U-boats provided regularupdates on their whereabouts to theirhome ports. Thanks to Churchill’ssupport and Hall’s genius for organization,virtually all of this information wasintercepted, decoded and frequently putto good use.One of the more astonishingcatches of the war was confirmation thathigh officials of the Turkish governmenthad been willing, for a consideration, tomake a separate peace with the Allies atthe time of the Dardanelles assault in1915. Churchill and Admiral Fisherordered Hall to break off his negotiationsin the belief that the fleet would force itsway through the Dardanelles on its own.Some historians have been skepticalabout the sincerity of the Turkish offer,but David Ramsay shows that the intelligencewas genuine and that Churchillmissed a golden opportunity to achievehis objective without the ensuing disasterthat nearly destroyed his career.At the center of this book,however, is the remarkable story of theZimmerman Telegram, perhaps thegreatest “own goal” (score against yourself)in history. Many accounts have beenwritten about this clumsy attempt byGermany to draw Mexico into the waragainst the United States and induce theJapanese to switch sides; but the natureof espionage is such that it takes manydecades for all of the facts to becomeclear. Ramsay has produced what is nowthe most up-to-date account, and indeedprobably the last word, on Admiral Hall’sgreatest coup.Intercepting and decoding thetelegram was the easy part. That wasdone by Room 40, but it was Hall whohad to determine how to handle theinformation in such a way as to draw theFINEST HoUR 141 / 52

United States into the war, keep Mexicoout, prevent Japan from bolting, andprotect the source of his information. Allof these goals he achieved.After the war Hall, by then aknighted admiral, retired from the navyand entered politics as a ConservativeMP. In Parliament, Hall’s great momentcame during the 1926 General Strikewhen he again placed his organizationalskills at Churchill’s service, this time atthe British Gazette, which Churchilledited on behalf of the government.Ramsay notes that the success of thenewspaper was due to two ingredients:“editorial excellence, which Churchillhad provided in full measure, and effectiveand timely distribution, for whichHall must bear much of the credit.”Prime Minister Baldwin recognized hisindebtedness to Hall by offering him apeerage, which was declined.Late in life, “Blinker” Hall—heowed his moniker to an eye conditionthat caused excessive blinking—providedvaluable advice to those ramping upintelligence operations in the SecondWorld War. Indeed, many of Hall’s 1914recruits found their way to Bletchley Parka quarter century later. Admiral SirReginald Hall must surely rate as one ofthe great spymasters of all time. ,A Life in Easily Readable BitsCHRISTOPHER H. STERLINGBest LittleStories from theLife and Timesof WinstonChurchill, byC. Brian Kelly.CumberlandHouse, 420 pp.paperback,$16.95. Memberprice $14.The author ofeight “BestLittle Stories” books, a journalist andpart-time teacher of news writing at theUniversity of Virginia, Brian Kelly providesa great present for anyone(especially a young person) who’s justbeen introduced to Churchill, but can’tface the massive tomes on which moreseasoned students rely. It’s a ready way ofdipping into a gripping life, in a formatmade for picking up and putting down,just right for busy modern lives.Arranged in chronological orderand providing a glimpse of differentaspects of Churchill’s story, the severaldozen tales told here are based on avariety of sources (many listed in theback), but avoiding footnotes that aresometimes so off-putting to casualreaders. Many quotes are identified in theDean Sterling teaches communications at TheGeorge Washington University.text (Martin Gilbert is often cited). Basedin part on Kelly’s series of lectures, sponsoredby the University of Virginia, anddelivered at Oxford in the summer of2007, the readable stories incorporate adegree of familiarity (the subject isusually identified as “Winston”) thatsome readers may find odd. Kelly’sspouse, Ingrid Smyer-Kelly, provides afifty-page informal biography of LadyRandolph, Churchill’s American mother(mistakenly identified as “LadyChurchill”). But the account is reliable,falling for none of the unproven andprurient stories that surround Lord andLady Randolph.For the most part, the book avoidstypical Churchill pitfalls, thanks to thesources and people Kelly has relied upon,including The Churchill Centre andsome of its authorities. While most of thestories concern Churchill himself, a fewfocus on such important figures asClementine, American AmbassadorGilbert Winant, Lord Mountbatten, evenChurchill’s wartime transport pilots.Some sections focus on places, such as aone-pager on the background of TenDowning Street. Many stories are followedby an “additional note” which fillsin details or provides further context.Kelly writes well and to the point.His collection of stories is a fast andenjoyable read. While these pages maynot offer new insights, providing a ready“point of entry” for newcomers to theChurchill story is service enough. ,FINEST HoUR 141 / 53Damned withNo PraiseMICHAEL McMENAMINChurchill, TheGreatest BritonUnmasked, byNigel Knight.David &Charles, 400pp., $23.80.Ithink it wasCarlyle whowrote that “Nobook that willnot improve by repeated readingsdeserves to be read at all.” That prettymuch sums up Nigel Knight’s new oneon Churchill. If you want to read aChurchill book that is unreservedly negativeon almost all aspects of his career,pick up Clive Ponting’s biographyinstead. Or even David Irving’s. Really.You’ll thank me for it.Two-thirds of Knight’s book isdevoted to World War II (which theAllies won despite Churchill’s best effortsto give the game away). Chapter 7’s title,“Dunkirk: Churchill’s Defeat,” lets youknow where Knight is coming from. Thelast paragraph in the book tells youwhere he ends up:[I]t was Hitler who made Churchill ahistorical figure. If it had not been forHitler, Churchill...would be largely forgottentoday. It is because ofChurchill’s role in World War II...thatwe remember Churchill, above all else,for Hitler’s defeat. Hitler, however, isremembered for himself.No, I’m not making this up. That’sthe last sentence in the book. What doesit mean? You tell me. I can think ofseveral explanations.First, maybe Nigel just isn’t thatgood a writer. I almost didn’t make itpast the first page after reading this sentence:“In 1895 Churchill endured thedeaths of both his father and his childhoodnurse, to whom he had been veryattached as his American mother, Jennie,had ignored him.”Of course, Jennie hadn’t ignored >>

EMINENT CHURCHILLIANSJay Piper: Throwing a Line to a Fellow SailorLARRY KRYSKEJay Piper, twenty-six years a CCmember, discovered Churchillwhile recovering from open heartsurgery in 1984. A friend gavehim William Manchester’s The LastLion as a get-well present. Jayrecounted that “a lot of people havefeet of clay, but Sir Winston Churchillin my eyes was a genuine hero.”Jay had seawater in his blood. Heserved in the U.S. Navy from 1955until 1974 aboard nineteen shipsranging from aircraft carriers to cruisersand destroyers. And he had music inhis soul. He played with several Navybands and served as bandmaster at anumber of commands. His tours ofduty included serving as bandmasterfor the Commander, Cruiser DestroyerFlotilla 12 and for Commander, U.S.Second Fleet. His favorite tour was aspart of Admiral Briscoe’s U.S. NavalForces, Europe, home ported inNaples, Italy. Jay rose through theranks to Command Master Chief atthe U.S. Naval Hospital in Bremerton,Commander Kryske, USN (ret.) was M.C.at the 1988 Bretton Woods Conference andruns Churchillian leadership programs atwww.yourfinesthour.com in Plano, Texas.Washington, and alsoserved as bandmaster forthe 13th Naval Districtin Seattle.In 1969, Jay was aco-founder of the NavyAlcohol RehabilitationProgram, which helpedover 500,000 sailors overthe next thirty-nineyears. After he retiredfrom the Navy he wasinvolved with varioushospital interventionprograms in San Diego and at ScrippsInstitute in La Jolla. His marketing andpublic relations expertise made him avaluable promoter of those programs.Jay later became the director ofthe Farragut Brass Band in Bremerton,Washington, where he also played solotenor plus French horn in the localsymphony. In September 1994, theFarragut Brass Band played the ceremonyfor the 50th anniversary of theend of World War II aboard the battleshipUSS Missouri, where GeneralDouglas MacArthur had accepted theJapanese surrender in Tokyo Bay (seeFinest Hour 140:73).Churchill’s magnanimous naturehas served as a powerful inspiration toJay Piper. In 2005, Hurricane Katrinaclaimed over 600 books and 50 videosabout Churchill belonging to thiswriter, then living in Pascagoula on theMississippi Gulf Coast. Jay was lookingfor a good home for his Churchill collectionof over one hundred books. Hedecided to “throw Commander Kryskea line” and donated his entire collectionto him. Jay’s kindness andbig-heartedness were certainly inkeeping with the finest traditions ofWinston Churchill, who onceobserved, “Compassion, charity andgenerosity are noble virtues...” ,GREATEST BRITON UNMASKED...him and Churchill certainly wasn’t “veryattached” to his father. Perhaps Knightonly meant Churchill was attached toMrs. Everest, his nurse “Woomany,” andnot his father as well? The sentencedoesn’t say that, but I gave him thebenefit of the doubt and read on.A second explanation is thatKnight just doesn’t know much aboutHitler or the Nazis—a flaw which tendsto put a Churchill biographer at a disadvantage.I confess that I didn’t make itpast Chapter 3, “Disarmament:Weakening Britain’s Defence in the1920s” before I started skimming. Hey,what’s good enough for Carlyle is goodenough for me.Knight’s thesis is that whenChurchill was at the Exchequer inBaldwin’s first government from 1924 to1929, “Churchill’s desire for disarmamentin the 1920s weakened nationaldefences just at the time when the threatfrom the active Nazi movement inGermany was becoming apparent.”(There’s also a hint of this in Boutilier’sarticle on page 45, column 1. —Ed.)Give me a break. Apparent towhom? Hitler was in jail during 1924when Churchill became Chancellor ofthe Exchequer and the Nazi Party wasbanned in Germany as a result of itsfailed putsch in Munich the year before.Hitler began to rebuild the party in 1925and was so miserably unsuccessful at itover the next four years that the partyreceived only 2.6% of the vote in the1928 Reichstag elections, good for apaltry twelve seats. By the spring of1929, the Conservatives and Churchillwere out of power. The “threat from theactive Nazi movement in Germany”didn’t become apparent to anyone until14 September 1930 when, thanks to theworldwide depression, the Nazis wentfrom 2.6% and twelve seats to 18.3%and 107 seats, making them the secondlargest party in Germany.With this level of scholarship, Iwasn’t about to give Knight any more ofmy time than necessary to write thisreview. (The editor says we must covereverything.) If he can get one thing sospectacularly wrong, in order to fit hisprejudices, why trust him on anything else?So, you’ve been warned. If despiteall this, you’ve got to have this book tocomplete your collection, don’t payretail! The price is sure go down. ,FINEST HoUR 141 / 54

PHILATELY“The King’s Ships Were at Sea”HISTORY IN CHURCHILL-RELATED STAMPSMAX E. HERTWIG55a R,crop blankspace atbottomslightly to fitSince its inception in 1968 the Winston ChurchillStudy Unit promoted collecting “Churchill-related”stamps alongside Churchill commemoratives tocreate philatelic biographies. Here are three pages whichillustrate the dramatic naval events of 1914 using fourChurchill stamps and fifteen “Churchill-related.”At the end of July 1914, Churchill as First Lord ofthe Admiralty sent the Fleet to its battle station in ScapaFlow, “eighteen miles of warships running at high speedin absolute blackness” up the English Channel (right).On 1 November the Royal Navy lost two capitalships and 1500 lives to German Admiral von Spee’ssquadron off Coronel, Chile. But Churchill orderedAdmiral Sturdee to pursue von Spee around Cape Horn,and in December, when he sailed into the Atlantic, allbut one of his ships were sunk. At lower left is Spee’sroute across the Pacific, with German, British andFrench stamps postmarked along the way. Stamps atlower right show a map of the area and commemoratethe victory in the Battle of the Falkland Islands. ,55C55bR no cropsR no cropsFINEST HoUR 141 / 55

BOOK COLLECTING: THE COHEN CORNERColonial Library Issues of theMalakand Field ForceRONALD I. COHENAfellow bibliophile, MarcKuritz, wrote to say thathe had an 1898 copy ofChurchill’s first book,The Story of theMalakand Field Force 1897 (togive it its longest title) which didnot seem to fit into any of the“A1” sub-entries in myBibliography. Marc loaned methe volume to examine.While I was pleased tofind that I had indeedincluded it in theBibliography, I had only everseen a single copy of thisextremely rare variant. (Theother is in the New ZealandNational Library.) It is thescarcest appearance ofChurchill’s first title, oneof only forty-six copies ofdomestic sheets transferredto the ColonialLibrary issue (CohenA1.2.f). But I amgetting ahead of myself.I will deal with thatcopy’s characteristicsanon.Most Churchill collectors aregrateful to own any edition of the LongmansMalakand, domestic or colonial, because there were sofew. The book was first published on 14 March 1898.The second (Silver Library) edition, with hundreds ofrevisions, was published on 1 January 1899; the lastprinting was in February 1901 and sales trickled outuntil June 1912, when 663 copies of that printingremained on hand at the House of Longmans.Mr. Cohen, of Manotick, Ontario, is the author of the seminalBibliography of the Writings of Sir Winston Churchill (Continuum,2006), the standard bibliography of Churchill’s work. All “A”numbers (“A1.2.f,” etc.) refer to the Cohen bibliography.The First EditionPrinted on rather thick, white wove paper for thedomestic market, and much thinner,white laid paper for thecolonial markets, thefirst edition was producedin twodifferent forms—forgood reason. The laidsheets were both thinnerand lighter, whichreduced the size of thecolonial copies, makingthem more economical toship to far-off places thanthe larger domestic copies.The domestic issue(A1.1.a) was published in asolid moderate yellowishgreen binding case. Casedcopies of the Colonial Libraryissue (A1.2.a), on the otherhand, had a much more elaborate,illustrated front cover.Printed blackish blue on agreenish grey background, itdepicted a schooner at sea (theLongmans’ logo) over a fancifulseaweed or floral design at thefoot. There was also a softboundissue in wrappers.Churchill, stationed in India atthe time of publication, had askedhis uncle, Moreton Frewen, to proofread the book beforepublication. Frewen’s ineffective effort is evident in the“gross & fearful” blunders found by Churchill in theproofs he read in India eight days after publication.When the young author finally saw a finished copyof the book after publication, he described a number ofthe errors as “unpardonable” and referred to a “greatnumber of emendations [by Frewen] which have mademy blood boil.” He cabled the publisher but he was ofcourse too late; his only recourse was to have errata slipsprinted and inserted in the volumes.FINEST HoUR 141 / 56

An example of laid paper, showing a typical laid pattern in the sheets.There were two printings of the colonial issue inMarch 1898: the first, numbering 2000 copies, and thesecond, numbering 1000 copies. Although I have examinedmany copies of the Colonial Library issue, I havebeen unable to discover any characteristics that woulddistinguish first and second printing copies.Consequently, all observations in this article applyto all printings of the Colonial Library issue of the firstedition.The Errata SlipsThere were two styles of errata slips. The first wasprinted in India, at Churchill’s anxious behest, on orabout 7 April 1898 (see A1.2.c). That slip includedsixteen errata and was printed on white laid watermarkedpaper. There are no details regarding the numberof such slips printed, but they are only found inColonial Library copies sold in India. Churchill wasreimbursed 20 rupees for his expenses, about 40 percentof what he had claimed from his British publisher.A1.2.d: The second errata slip with thirteen errata printed in London.The second errata slip was printed by LongmansGreen in London on 19 April 1898 (see A1.2.d). About1700 of these were inserted in both the domestic andColonial Library copies that remained on hand as of thedate of their availability.The Variant Page 231Some colonial copies, but no domestic volumes Ihave encountered, have a page number 231 in which the“1” is raised. The level of the “1” migrates above thebase level of the three digits which comprise the pagenumber, as though the type had shifted in the course ofprinting. The movement of the slug seems to have beenprogressive: the distance from the descender line of the“3” to the mean line at the top of the “1” varies betweenjust over 3 mm to as much as 5.7 mm.A1.2.c: The Indian errata slip with sixteen errata on white laid paper.The variant page 231, probably produced by an errant “slug,” isencountered in only a handful of copies. It has a raised or superscript“1” in the page number. Nor is it at only one particular height; rather,it varies from 3 to 5.7 mm from the descender line of the “3.”FINEST HoUR 141 / 57

BOOK COLLECTING: THE COHEN CORNERLeft: A1.2.e, The Canadian Colonial Library Issue, cased like the other colonials but with Copp Clark of Toronto on the title page.Right: A1.2.b, the Colonial Library issue in paper wrappers. Better than half of the 3000 Colonial Library Issue were published in wrappers,but the soft binding provided little protection in colonial climes, and most of them have disappeared.The Canadian Colonial Library IssueThere was a Canadian issue of the Colonial Librarysheets, cased, and easily distinguished by the name of theCanadian publisher, Copp, Clark Co., Limited, on thespine and the title page (A1.2.e).The Wrappers IssueThere was also a Colonial Library issue in paperwrappers, printed dark purplish blue on pale green(A1.2.b) to a uniform design used on other Longmanscolonial titles in wrappers. Although the majority of thecolonial issue, 1675 of the 3000 copies printed, were“sewn” rather than “cased,” their perishable format hasmade them very rare today.The Prize of Prizes: the Colonial LibraryIssue of Domestic SheetsOn 13 October 1898, Longmans Green apparentlyhad a small surplus of domestically-destined sheets andan urgent need for colonial copies. So the publisherassigned forty-six sets of the domestic sheets to theColonial Library (A1.2.f). They were bound in casesidentical (in a design sense) to those of the standardColonial Library issue, but they are 30 percent thicker(39.1 rather than 30.6 mm) in order to accommodatethe thicker domestic sheets. The paper is, of course, thewhite wove paper of the domestic sheets but the pagesize has been trimmed from 191 x 127 mm to 183 x121 mm.It was of course necessary to provide these copieswith a new title page, since the books were intended forsale in the Colonies, and the new title page was printedon wove paper to match the domestic sheets in feel and(subtle) appearance. It is, however, surprising (to me, atleast) that the middle initial “L.” was dropped from theauthor’s name (although it remained on the front coverof the volume). This also matched the title page of thefirst printing of the Silver Library edition in 1899,although the excised letter “L.” returned to the title pageof the 1901 second printing of the Silver Libraryedition.FINEST HoUR 141 / 58

Above: The Colonial Library standard issue of the first edition compared with the bulkier domestic issue. If you have a Colonial Library Issue thatbulks as thick as the domestic issue (but stands less tall), you own the third Colonial Library issue in domestic sheets known to exist.Since the title page was replacing the domestic titlepage, already integrally included in the first signature ofthe domestic copies, the original title page was “cancelled”and replaced by the Colonial library leaf, which istipped directly onto the leaf that is pp. v/vi. (A “cancel” isa replacement sheet, glued or pasted to the “stub” of thesheet it replaces.)Given the date of transfer of these domestic sheetsto the Colonial Library, all such copies will include thedomestic errata slip (tipped onto page 1 of the Kuritzand New Zealand National Library copies).The Silver Library Colonial IssueThere were two printings of the Colonial Libraryissue of the second edition (Silver Library) of theMalakand (A1.4.a and A1.4.b). These are cased in the“Longmans’ Colonial Library” boards rather than themaroon casings that distinguish the domestic SilverLibrary editions. These too are extremely rare issues. Ihave discovered no aberrations or variants in thesecopies, other than the restoration of the “L.” in theauthor’s name in the second (1901) printing, and thechange of date on the title page. ,FINEST HoUR 141 / 59

CHURCHILLIANAChurchill on PostcardsTHE MOST “CARDED” POLITICIAN OF HIS TIME?Picture postcards appeared in Britain in 1894 and quickly became as popular for communications asemail is today. In the early days the cost of postage in Britain was a halfpenny (equal to about 0.1 ofa current penny) and only the address could be written on the reverse. Messages were written above,below, or even on the picture; blank space was often provided for this. Picture postcards caught on,became a craze, then a cult. Collecting postcards became a significant hobby, rivalling and possibly evensurpassing postage stamps, which had a fifty-year head-start. The pastime is known as Deltiology and hasspread across the world. Most collectors specialise in a particular subject, and one of the most popular isWinston Churchill. These examples are from the collection of the editor and late Douglas Hall, formerFH features editor, who first wrote about Churchill postcards in Finest Hour 86, Spring 1995. ,60A RNC60B RNCAbove: WSC was a popular figure as World War I broke out (left); the allied flags are Belgium, France, Russia, Serbia, Britain andMontenegro. Ditto World War II, especially after he became PM (right; unfortunately this is one of those two-fingered salutes he usedinterchangeably with the V-sign!). Below: A trio from WW2. Left, a tattered Belgian, her shackles broken, exclaims “à W Churchill, laBelgique reconnaissante” (to W Churchill [from] grateful Belgium). Middle, a French card, which we think is pro-WSC, with the heartsand all—but he’s in bed in an ashtray wearing a 4th Hussars cap much too big—hmm. Right, a “Photochrom” card by the prolific AgnesRichardson, who combined photos of WSC and Union Flag with her unique cherubic children. This one is postmarked 13 August 1944.60C RNC60D RNC60E RNCFINEST HoUR 141 / 60

61A RNC61B RNCAbove: The message (left) is unclear from a caption, “Adolf’sfuture being decided by the Big Four.” The nurses or matronsare Eden, WSC, Chamberlain (holding baby) and anotherfigure who is unknown. The only time the three were togetherin government was May 1940 until November whenChamberlain died. Right: A Belgian postcard postmarked 17May 1900 is captioned “La Guerre Anglo-Boer. Arrivée àPretoria des prisonniers du train blindé d’Estcourt (LordChurchill [sic] à gauche en casquette.” Below: Churchill’sappearance as Home Secretary at the Siege of Sidney Street(left) received massive publicity. “I understand what the photographerwas doing,” Arthur Balfour said, “but what was theRt. Hon. gentleman doing?” Churchill’s engagement toClementine Hozier (right) had more uniform approval; thisCortenberg card gives a wider view than the more commonValentine’s and Rotary engagement cards. Bottom of page: Apair of recent Valentine’s photographic postcards containing afine illustration of the House of Commons (with the “blood, toil,tears and sweat” quote); and views of Blenheim Palace. ,Above: A great fan of Charlie Chaplin, WSC is pictured herewith Chaplin (seated ahead of him) and his co-star VirginiaCherrill, at the premiere of “City Liights”, 27 February 1931.61C RNC61D RNC61E RNC61F RNC61G RNCFINEST HoUR 141 / 61

AMPERSAND&Churchill andHenry George“Gentlemen, where are wegoing to get the money?”—A frequent speech by Representative Robert H. Rich,U.S. Congress (Pennsylvania), 1929-42, 1945-51In “Ampersand” (FH 139:58) youquote Churchill’s 1928 speechexplaining “why Henry George failedin his single tax proposal.” Churchill, thenChancellor of the Exchequer, said that“almost before the ink was dry” onGeorge’s 1879 book, Progress andPoverty, “it was apparent that therewere hundreds of different ways of creatingand possessing and gaining wealthwhich had either no relation to the ownershipof land or an utterly disproportionate orindirect relation. Where there were 100 casestwenty years ago there are 10,000 cases now.”Unfortunately, Churchill did not favor his listenerswith any examples of the 100 or 10,000 cases he claimsexisted. That was as impossible in 1928 as it is today, forwe are all “land animals” from birth to death, and everyactivity we engage in, wealth-producing or not, takesplace on some land somewhere, “land” in economicsmeaning all freely-provided gifts of nature—water; minerals;the electronic spectrum; solar, wind and tidalpower; on rural and urban sites. George saw that thevalue of this “land” is community-created and thus theappropriate source of public revenue, making possible theabolition of all taxes on production.The fact that the United States and the Westernworld now face a financial crisis brought on by the collapseof speculative real-estate (land) values is only oneexample of the accuracy of Henry George’s economicanalysis. Despite having changed his position on theSingle Tax, Churchill is probably best known byGeorgists for the following quotation, from a speechdelivered at King’s Theatre, Edinburgh on 17 June 1909:“It is quite true that land monopoly is not the onlymonopoly which exists, but it is by far the greatest ofmonopolies; it is a perpetual monopoly, and it is themother of all other forms of monopoly.”CATHERINE ORLOFFFORMER DIRECTOR, HENRY GEORGE SCHOOL OFNORTHERN CALIFORNIA, PROVIDENCE, R.I.Henry George(1839-1897)FINEST HoUR 141 / 62Editor’s response: I did not know Georgists stillexisted, and am glad they do. I admire Henry George’sfree thinking, and Churchill, as a fighting Liberal inthe early 1900s, for taking the trouble to develop asynoptic understanding of George’s theories.But as the late Labour MP Andrew MacLarenargued in our original article (“The People’s Rights:Opportunity Lost?,” Finest Hour 112:42), by the 1920sGeorge’s “Single Tax” became inadequate as the basis ofrevenue: “Under the cruel heel of war and unemployment,Britons came to value security more and independenceless. The emphasis in social advance shifted to themassive provision of public benefits, and theincreasing intervention of the State in almost everyarea of human activity.” To say this has continuedsince 1928 would be an understatement.Churchill in his speech was arguing for“rating relief” (tax reduction) to sorely taxed industries.He was searching for sources of revenuewhich would better distribute the tax burden,specifically in this case a tax on petrol—nodoubt one of his 10,000 new “taxation cases”(cars didn’t exist in 1879). Here’s more of his1928 speech (Complete Speeches V: 4420-21):The idea that we could use the rating of site values asa substitute for this powerful, fruitful fiscal engine ofthe petrol tax is one of the greatest delusions. If we hadto enter into a long discussion at present upon sitevalues, that would be the surest way of obstructing allpractical creative reform in the direction of the relief ofrates on industry, and the rest of this Parliament wouldbe spent in very exciting but utterly sterile argumentson the subject of land values, and on the principleswhich you should apply to their rating or taxation, andwe should not make the slightest progress towards thevery solid, serious task we have set ourselves to accomplish.Therefore I do not intend to make more than onegeneral observation upon the question of site values,except to say that it is the best method of stopping therating relief of industry.President Reagan once shocked his listeners bysuggesting that corporations really don’t pay taxes—theyjust pass them along to consumers in the form of higherprices. (The United States has the second highest corporatetaxes in the industrialized world.) Henry Georgedeclared there was no right to untaxed ownership ofland, air, water and sunshine (at a time when 400 familiesowned most of the land in Britain). Well, here I sitworking at my computer, which is on a table, mountedon a floor, set in a house, anchored to a foundation, on aparcel of land. And though I pay land taxes, I have difficultyunderstanding how I could be taxed on the air thecomputer and I breathe, although I am sure our rulersare working on this. RML ,

Churchill Centre Regional and Local OrganizationsFor procedures required in becoming a formal affiliate, please contact the appropriate national office (page 2).,AFFILIATES ARE IN BOLD FACERt. Hon. Sir Winston Spencer ChurchillSociety of Calgary, AlbertaMr. Justice J.D. Bruce McDonald500-323 - 6 Ave. SE, Calgary AB T2G 4V1Rt. Hon. Sir Winston Spencer ChurchillSociety of Edmonton, AlbertaDr. Edward Hutson, Pres.(jehutson@shaw.ca)98 Rehwinkel Rd., Edmonton AB T6R 1Z8tel. (780) 430-7178Rt. Hon. Sir Winston Spencer ChurchillSociety of AlaskaJudith & Jim Muller(afjwm@uaa.alaska.edu)2410 Galewood St., Anchorage AK 99508tel. (907) 786-4740; fax (907) 786-4647Churchill Centre ArizonaLarry Pike (lvpike@chartwellgrp.com)4927 E. Crestview Dr.Paradise Valley AZ 85253tel. (602) 445-7719; cell (602) 622-0566Rt. Hon. Sir Winston Spencer ChurchillSociety of British ColumbiaChristopher Hebb, Pres.(cavellcapital@gmail.com)1806-1111 W. Georgia St., Vancouver BCV6E 4M3; tel. (604) 209-6400California: Churchillians of the DesertDavid Ramsay (rambo85@aol.com)74857 S. Cove Drive, Indian Wells CA92210; tel. (760) 837-1095Churchillians-by-the-BayRichard Mastio (rcmastio@earthlink.net)2996 Franciscan Way, Carmel CA 93923tel. (831) 625-6164Churchillians of Southern CaliforniaLeon J. Waszak (leonwaszak@aol.com)235 South Ave. #66, Los Angeles CA90042; tel. (818) 240-1000 x5844Churchill Friends of Greater ChicagoPhil & Susan Larson (parker-fox@msn.com)22 Scottdale Road, LaGrange IL 60526tel. (708) 352-6825Colorado: Rocky Mountain ChurchilliansLew House, President(lhouse2cti@earthlink.net)2034 Eisenhower Dr., Louisville CO 80027tel. (303) 661-9856; fax (303) 661-0589England: TCC-UK Woodford/EppingBranch. Tony WoodheadOld Orchard, 32 Albion Hill, LoughtonEssex IG10 4RD; tel. (0208) 508-4562England: TCC-UK Northern BranchDerek Greenwell, Farriers CottageStation Road, GoldsboroughKnaresborough, North Yorks. HG5 8NTtel. (01432) 863225Churchill Centre North FloridaRichard Streiff (streiffr@bellsouth.net)81 NW 44th Street, Gainesville FL 32607tel. (352) 378-8985Winston Churchill Society of GeorgiaWilliam L. Fisher(fish1947@bellsouth.net)5299 Brooke Farm Rd., Dunwoody GA30338; tel. (770) 399-9774www.georgiachurchill.orgWinston Churchill Society of MichiganMichael P. Malley(michael@malleylaw.com)3135 South State St., Ste. 203Ann Arbor MI 48108tel. (734) 996-1083; fax (734) 327-2973Churchill Round Table of NebraskaJohn Meeks (jmeeks@wrldhstry.com)7720 Howard Street #3, Omaha NE 68114tel. (402) 968-2773New England ChurchilliansJoseph L. Hern (jhern@fhmboston.com)340 Beale Street, Quincy MA 02170tel. (617) 773-1907; bus. tel. (617) 248-1919Churchill Society of New OrleansJ. Gregg Collins (jgreggcollins@msn.com)2880 Lakeway Three3838 N. Causeway Blvd., Metairie LA 70002Churchill Society of Greater New YorkGregg Berman (gberman@fulbright.com)c/o Fulbright & Jaworski666 Fifth Ave.New York NY 10103; tel. (212) 318-3388North Carolina ChurchilliansCraig Horn (dcraighorn@carolina.rr.com)5909 Bluebird Hill LaneWeddington NC 28104; tel. (704) 844-9960www.churchillsocietyofnorthcarolina.orgChurchill Centre Northern OhioMichael McMenamin (mtm@walterhav.com)1301 E. 9th St. #3500, Cleveland OH 44114tel. (216) 781-1212Churchill Society of PhiladelphiaBernard Wojciechowski(bwojciechowski@borough.ambler.pa.us)1966 Lafayette Rd., Lansdale PA 19446tel. (610) 584-6657South Carolina: Bernard Baruch ChapterKenneth Childs (kchilds@childs-halligan.net)PO Box 11367, Columbia SC 29111-1367tel. (803) 254-4035Tennessee: Vanderbilt UniversityYoung Churchill Club; Prof. John English(john.h.english@vanderbilt.edu)Box 1616, Station B, Vanderbilt UniversityNashville TN 37235North Texas: Emery Reves ChurchilliansJeff Weesner (jweesner@centurytel.net)2101 Knoll Ridge Court, Corinth TX 76210tel. (940) 321-0757; cell (940) 300-6237Churchill Centre South TexasJames T. Slattery (slattery@fed-med.com)2803 Red River CreekSan Antonio TX 78259-3542cell (210) 601-2143; fax (210) 497-0904Sir Winston Churchill Society ofVancouver IslandMary Jane Shaw, Pres. (gordmj@shaw.ca)57-530 Marsett Place, Victoria BC V8Z 7J2tel. (205) 658-0771Washington (DC) Society for ChurchillDr. John H. Mather, Pres.(johnmather@aol.com)PO Box 73, Vienna VA 22182-0073tel. (240) 353-6782Churchill Centre SeattleSimon Mould (simon@cckirkland.org)1920 243rd Pl., SW, Bothell WA 98021tel. (425) 286-7364www.churchillseattle.blogspot.com

Throwing the Baby out with No Bath WaterA political postcard from the collection of James Lancaster, produced by Delittle, Fenwick & Co., York,posted in Rochester, Kent, the birthplace in 1833 of Churchill’s nanny Mrs. Everest. The postmark is6 May 1906, although the argument depicted dated back two years, to when Churchill left theConservatives over Free Trade. The “Great Joe” Chamberlain had come out for protective tariffs withinthe Empire, while Tory leader Arthur Balfour had carefully ridden the fence. Churchill(“All babies look like me”) had made their political lives miserable—so out he went! ,