Fujitani, Imperialism and Post-World War II Japan

concept and a tangible figure was significant in terms of the development of Japanesenationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.The significance of the emperor as a symbol of Japan remains to some extent in thepostwar years. The emperor system remains intact despite Japan’s defeat in the PacificWar. While it is true that the survival of the imperial institution was mainly due tooccupation authorities’ fear that chaos would follow should the emperor system beabolished altogether, 47 and while the emperor has now been made merely ‘the symbol ofthe state and of the unity of the people,’ 48 the significance of the emperor system as aconcept and what it meant for contemporary Japanese society cannot be ignored.Firstly, the imperial institution has been important in terms of how contemporaryJapanese themselves remember the past. In other words, it has become a significantconcept in public memory. 49 In the 1970s and 1980s, Carol Gluck argues, there existedtwo parts to the narrative of the Showa period: one which focused on the early Showayears characterised by militarism and war, and the other on postwar Showa marked byrecovery, democracy, and prosperity. 50 In this sense Showa as a concept has become ayardstick by which the past, the pre-war years, and the present, the postwar years, areseparated. Gluck also notes that there have been two interpretations, in the ‘post-Showadiscourse of public memory,’ as to the monarchy’s role in a supposedly democraticnation. 51 The first interpretation views the imperial institution in ‘constitutional terms’,while the second perceives the monarchy as a cultural symbol as well as a symbol ofnational identity. 52Kosaka Masataka’s views illustrate further the importance of the monarchy inpostwar Japan. He contends that after the Second World War both Japanese andAmerican officials recognised the need to preserve the imperial institution, and thatironically postwar reforms had in effect not only clarified the status of the emperor butalso reinforced the more traditional pre-Meiji imperial institution. 53 Kosaka states:‘The new constitution… far from violating traditional institutions, brought the Japanesesystem into a more faithful conformity with tradition…. The U.S. Occupation…ultimately… brought the status of the emperor into line with traditions that went back tothe thirteenth century and earlier. Emperors were rarely political…. In ceremony, theygave meaning to the nation.’ 54Kosaka further argues that the fact that the emperor system was retained, that is, thesurvival of the most fundamental historical continuity, is the reason why postwarreforms have been successful. 55 He perceives the modified status of the emperor as arepresentation of the difference pre-war Japan and postwar Japan. 56 On the other hand,Herbert P. Bix argues that scholars and the media as well contributed to the constructionof Hirohito’s new image as a peace-loving intellectual. 57 In short, the views as such seemto be in line with the notion that the monarchy has been subjected to constantreinvention, especially in times of socio-political changes and upheavals, as presented inFujitani’s work.Interestingly, the monarchy as both a symbol and a concept continues to be anobject of manipulation in postwar Japan. The only difference between the pre-war4 Graduate Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 1:1 (2003)

extent to the phenomenon of jishuku, for Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru postponedspeaking engagements. 88 Of course there were those who signed the kicho genuinelywishing for the recovery of the emperor, for more than four million signatures had beenobtained. 89The concept of ryosai kenbo is still very much alive in contemporary Japanesesociety, and the monarchy, as in the pre-war years, serves as an exemplar of this ideal.This is illustrated by the fact that the images of the monarchy had been, and still is,constantly crafted to conform to ideals promoted by the state. Fujitani argues that thepractice that women in the imperial household, instead of withdrawing into the privatesphere, emerged as public figures in modern Japan, had been a construction of the Meijiperiod, in emulation of Western monarchies. 90 Undoubtedly this practice still existstoday, for women of the imperial family are often present in photographs in newspapersand magazines. Moreover, that images of the monarchy are constructed is illustrated bythe fact that the Imperial Household Agency was furious about the publication, innewspapers and magazines, of an ‘informal’ photograph of newlyweds Prince Akishinoand Kiko Kawashima in 1990. 91 Barry Hillenbrand’s comments, albeit somewhatstereotypical and odd, reflects the fact that the imperial family serves as a representationof the ideal of ryosai kenbo:'Despite her troubles, Michiko has been an exemplary mother to her three children and aseemingly ideal wife for Akihito, who is devoted to her. During their motor paradethrough the city last week, Emperor and Empress carried on a warm and animatedconversation, acting more like newlyweds than a couple married for more than 30 years.Michiko is an engaging hostess who speaks fluent English and dresses with great flair.' 92Undoubtedly, there still seemed to be a sense of intimacy between the public andthe imperial family, which has very much been an object of public gaze, as illustrated bythe 1959 wedding of Prince Akihito and Michiko Shoda, who was a commoner, whichattracted extensive media coverage. The event was regarded by Japanese youth as arepresentation of the ideal of romantic love and Michiko Shoda herself became anaspiration for young females, although there had also been negative views towards thewedding. 93 Interestingly, the marriage between Prince Akishino and Kawashima as wellseems to have been hailed as one based on love and attracted media attention. 94Nonetheless, the 1959 imperial wedding, along with the kicho, seems to echo the ideathat intimacy between the imperial household and the public had been a creation of theMeiji period, as discussed in Fujitani’s work. 95 This intimacy may be seen as acontinuity that has been maintained from the Meiji period through to the postwar years.At the same time, however, implied in the reconstruction of the Meiji imperialinstitution were paradoxes and ironies, which may be incomprehensible at first glancebut understandable after close examination. Even in the postwar period there areparadoxes resulting from both pre-war and postwar reconstructions of the monarchy.Firstly, towards the middle of the Meiji period the intimacy between the monarchy andthe pubic which was vigorously promoted by the government came to be underminedby the fact that the monarchy had partially withdrawn. 96 Secondly, as Japan began toChun/Fujitani, Imperialism and Post-World War II Japan 7

embark on her mission of empire expansion, the Showa Emperor, who was supposedlya symbol of national unity, actually contributed to disunity within the government dueto his weak character and the fact that he, as a constitutional monarch, was unable tohand down decisions of his own; 97 and yet it has also been argued that at the end of theSecond World War, ironically, the emperor ‘turned out to be the only viable authoritythat could surrender the huge body of armed forces.’ 98 Moreover, the existence of amonarch in a supposedly and practically postwar democratic state is contradiction initself. 99 As Hirohito was dying, although there was extensive media coverage of hishealth condition, the Imperial Household Agency, apparently still embracing theinvented myth that the emperor was divine, was reluctant to say that the emperor wasill. 100 And, lastly, Emperor Akihito himself has in fact not only vowed to protect the newconstitution of Japan, and is thus silencing right-wing activists’ call for a revision of theconstitution, but also complained about the public’s overreaction to his father’s illness. 101In conclusion, the Japanese monarchy is a relatively recent artefact that wascreated as part of the modernisation process, yet under the guise of tradition, in theMeiji period, and has continued to be reinvented in the postwar years, particularly fromthe mid-1970s onwards. It appears that today the monarchy has become more like adiplomat for Japan, rather than a ‘manifest deity’. 102 The imperial institution has been asignificant concept and a tangible symbol in both the pre-war years and the postwaryears, as explained above. In the postwar period there have been various views towardsthe monarchy; these range from outright support to complete apathy and even vigorousopposition. 103 At any rate, Emiko’s Ohnuki-Tierney’s analysis of the flexible Japaneseconcept of kami, although to some extent different from Fujitani’s, 104 may be useful inexplaining why the Japanese monarchy, despite the fact that it had been subjected toconstant reinvention and reconstruction by various groups for different purposes, in thepre-war and postwar years, still exists today. In addition, a government official’scomment on why the imperial institution still remains intact today perhaps illustratesthe most interesting irony:‘People who are indifferent about the emperor are the ones who really sustain thisinstitution…If there were overwhelming public support for the emperor, then therewould also be intense opposition. With our history, it would be a serious problem ifinterest in the imperial family became too strong.’ 1058 Graduate Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 1:1 (2003)

NOTES1The specific chapters of Fujitani’s work which have been focused on in the writing of this essay are the firstand fourth chapters. See Takashi Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan, 1 stpaperback printing, Berkeley, 1998, pp.1-28 and 155-194.2ibid., pp.7-10.3Wilbur M. Fridell, ‘Government Ethics Textbooks in Late Meiji Japan’, Journal of Asian Studies, 29, 4, 1970,pp.823-833.4Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, pp.11-14 and 107.5ibid., p.13.6ibid., pp.12-13.7ibid., pp.20-21.8Stephen S. Large, Emperors of the Rising Sun, Tokyo, 1999, p.30.9Kosaka, Masataka, ‘The Showa Era (1926-1989)’, Daedalus, 119, 3, 1990, pp.27-47.10ibid., p.31.11For details, see Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, p.156.12ibid., p.173.13ibid., pp.173-174. See also Large, Emperors of the Rising Sun, pp.49-51.14For images of the emperor with a militaristic flavour, see, for example, Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and theMaking of Modern Japan, New York, 2000, pp.248-255, Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan,Cambridge, 2000, pp.589-593, and Large, Emperors of the Rising Sun, pp.122-126.15Large, Emperors of the Rising Sun, p.155.16ibid.17Shunsuke Tsurumi, An Intellectual History of Wartime Japan, Reprinted edn, London, 1986, p.25.18Large, Emperors of the Rising Sun, p.48.19Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, pp.176-177.20ibid., p.183.21ibid., p.180.22Kathleen S. Uno, “The Death of ‘Good Wife, Wise Mother’?”, in Andrew Gordon, ed, Postwar Japan asHistory, Berkeley, 1993, pp.293-322.23ibid. For a detailed analysis of Japanese attitudes towards marriage and divorce in different periods, seeFumie Kumagai, ‘Changing Divorce in Japan’, Journal of Family History, 8, 1983, pp.85-108.24Large, Empire of the Rising Sun, p.31.25W.G. Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic, and Social Change since 1850, 3 rd edn, London,2000, pp.185-186.26ibid., p.186.27Stefan Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History, 1 st paperback printing, Berkeley, 1995, p.133.28Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan, p.166.29Mikiso Hane, Modern Japan: A Historical Survey, 2 nd edn, Boulder, 1992, p.259.30ibid, pp.237-238. Between 1927 and 1929 General Tanaka Giichi, as Prime Minister of Japan, adopted anaggressive policy towards China. It was during this period that militarism began to emerge.31ibid., p.259.32Large, Emperors of the Rising Sun, p.156.33For instance, Minobe Tatsukichi’s ‘organ theory’ (tenno kikan setsu) which viewed the emperor as merelyan ‘organ’ of the state, not an absolute manifest deity representing imperial Japan, was rejected by the mid-1930s. On the other hand, Uesugi Shinkichi argued that sovereignty rested with the emperor. See Large,Emperors of the Rising Sun, pp.155-156, and Peter Duus, ‘Socialism, Liberalism, and Marxism, 1901-1931,’ inPeter Duus, ed, The Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 6, The Twentieth Century, reprinted edn, Cambridge,1997, pp.654-710.34John W. Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, New York, 1986, pp.221-222.35Tsurumi, An Intellectual History of Wartime Japan, p.27.36ibid.Chun/Fujitani, Imperialism and Post-World War II Japan 9

37Large, Emperors of the Rising Sun, p.114. See also Stephen S. Large, ‘Emperor Hirohito and Early ShowaJapan’, in Stephen S. Large, ed, Showa Japan: Political, Economic and Social History 1926-1989, London, 1998,pp.239-258, and Tokyo Correspondent, ‘Japan’s $80m Imperial Banzai’, The Economist, 317, 7680, 1990, p.31.38For details, see Masataka Kosaka, ‘The Showa Era (1926-1989)’, Daedalus, 119, 3, 1990, pp.27-47.39Wilbur M. Fridell, ‘Government Ethics Textbooks in Late Meiji Japan’, Journal of Asian Studies, 29, 4, 1970,pp.823-833.40Wataru Kurita, ‘Making Peace with Hirohito and a Militaristic Past’, Japan Quarterly, 36, 2, 1989, pp.186-192.41ibid.42ibid.43Kigensetsu was the national festival day on which the accession to the throne of Jimmu, the first emperor,was commemorated. See Large, Emperors of the Rising Sun, p.30.44ibid.45Tsurumi, An Intellectual History of Wartime Japan, p.27.46Charles Nelson Spinks, ‘Indoctrination and Re-education of Japan’s Youth’, Pacific Affairs, 17, 1, 1944,pp.56-70.47In fact, General Douglas MacArthur believed that it was desirable that the emperor system be retained forthe sake of a smooth occupation, and thus to avoid the need for a larger occupation force for a longer periodof time. Moreover, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) and American officials intendedto utilise the existing form of Japanese government to their advantage. This is evident in Philip R.Piccigallo’s observations: “United States occupation policy intended to ‘use the existing form of governmentin Japan,’ albeit not supporting it. That is, Japanese government was to serve as ‘executor’ of Americanpolicy.” See Philip R. Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East 1945-1951,Austin, 1979, pp.16-17.48Harold S. Quigley and John E. Turner, The New Japan: Government and Politics, Minneapolis, 1956, p.169.49Carol Gluck, ‘The Idea of Showa’, Daedalus, 119, 3, 1990, pp.1-26.50ibid.51ibid.52ibid.53Masataka Kosaka, ‘The Showa Era (1926-1989)’, Daedalus, 119, 3, 1990, pp.27-47.54ibid. (emphasis added)55ibid.56ibid.57For details, see Herbert P. Bix, “Inventing the ‘Symbol Monarchy’ in Japan, 1945-1952”, Journal of JapaneseStudies, 21, 2, 1995, pp.319-363.58John W. Dower’s comments on the implications of the new image and status of the Showa emperor isquite interesting. He argues that the abrupt change of Hirohito’s appearance, from his image as ageneralissimo to that as a ‘human’ emperor among the general populace, represents not only national unitybut also ‘retrospective disunity’, as the militarists ‘who had just yesterday acted in his name abruptlybecame today’s scapegoats and demonic forces.’ And, ironically, the kokutai and the monarchy surviveddespite Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War and the American occupation. See John W. Dower, War WithoutMercy, pp.307-308.59Yoshio Sugimoto, An Introduction to Japanese Society, reprinted edn, Cambridge, 2000, p.216.60ibid.61ibid.62ibid.63Peter Duus, ‘Socialism, Liberalism, and Marxism, 1901-1931,’ in Peter Duus, ed, The Cambridge History ofJapan, Volume 6, The Twentieth Century, reprinted edn, Cambridge, 1997, pp.654-710.\64Large, Emperors of the Rising Sun, p.195.65ibid.66ibid.67ibid., p.197.10 Graduate Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 1:1 (2003)

68Osamu Watanabe, ‘The Sociology of Jishuku and Kicho: the Death of Showa Tenno as a Reflection of theStructure of Contemporary Japanese Society’, in Edward R. Beauchamp, Dimensions of Contemporary Japan: ACollection of Essays, New York, 1998, pp.305-319.69ibid., pp.197-198.70Yugo Suzuki, ‘Hirohito and the Fate of the Emperor System’, The Christian Century, 106, 1, January 4-11,1989, pp.5-7.71Charles Smith, ‘Doubts and Boycotts Usher in a New Era of Peace: At the Crossroads’, Far EasternEconomic Review, 143, 3, January 19, 1989, pp.10-11. Smith also notes that Nakasone’s attempt to ‘attributethoughts to Hirohito’ signified a return to the pre-war practice where political leaders claimed imperialsanction for their own decisions.72Michael Doan, ‘Japanese Royal Family: Anchor to an Ancient Past’, U.S. News and World Report, 100, May12, 1986, p.13.73Tokyo Correspondent, ‘Japan’s $80m Imperial Banzai’, The Economist, 317, 7680, 1990, p.31.74Large, Emperors of the Rising Sun, p.196.75ibid., p.198.76ibid., pp.195-196. It should be noted that in the postwar years prime ministers before Nakasone had in factmade unofficial visits to the shrine on August 15 every year. Nakasone was the first prime minister to visitthe shrine officially.77ibid.78Kantaro Awaya, ‘Emperor Showa’s Accountability for War’, Japan Quarterly, 38, 4, 1991, pp.386-398.79Wataru Kurita, ‘Making Peace with Hirohito and a Militaristic Past’, Japan Quarterly, 36, 2, 1989, pp.186-192.80Osamu Watanabe, ‘The Sociology of Jishuku and Kicho: the Death of Showa Tenno as a Reflection of theStructure of Contemporary Japanese Society’, in Edward R. Beauchamp, Dimensions of Contemporary Japan: ACollection of Essays, New York, 1998, pp.305-319.81ibid.82ibid.83ibid.84ibid.85ibid.86ibid.87ibid.88Takashi Fujitani, “Electronic Pageantry and Japan’s ‘Symbolic Emperor’”, Journal of Asian Studies, 51, 4,1994, pp.824-850.89Yugo Suzuki, ‘Hirohito and the Fate of the Emperor System’, The Christian Century, 106, 1, January 4-11,1989, pp.5-7.90Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, p.183.91Kumiko Makihara, ‘Guarding the Chrysanthemum Curtain’, Time, 136, 48, November 26, 1990, p.15.92Barry, Hillenbrand, ‘Ascending the Throne’, Time, November 26, 1990, 136, 48, pp.12-15.93Jayson Chun, ‘A New Kind of Royalty: The Imperial Family and the Media in Postwar Japan’, in TimothyJ. Craig, Japan Pop!: Inside the World of Japanese Popular Culture, New York, 2000, pp.222-243.94For details, see People Weekly, ‘The Emperor’s Second Son Falls in Love with a Commoner—and so doesthe Rest of Japan’, People Weekly, Sept 18, 1989, 32, 12, pp.54-55.95Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, p.163.96Masao Maruyama, ‘Thought and Behaviour Patterns of Japan’s Wartime Leaders’, in Ivan Morris, ed,Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, London, 1963, pp.84-134.97Marius B. Jansen, ‘The Presidential Address: Monarchy and Modernisation in Japan’, Journal of AsianStudies, 36, 4, pp.611-622.98J.M. Kitagawa, ‘Some Reflections on Japanese Religion and Its Relationship to the Imperial System’,Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, 17, 2-3, pp.129-178, quoted in Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, ‘The Emperor ofJapan as Deity (Kami)’, Ethnology, 30, 3, 1991, pp.199-215.Chun/Fujitani, Imperialism and Post-World War II Japan 11

99Yugo Suzuki, ‘Hirohito and the Fate of the Emperor System’, The Christian Century, 106, 1, January 4-11,1989, pp.5-7.100Brian Moeran, ‘Last Days of the Emperor’, Encounter, 72, 2, 1989, pp.58-62.101Charles Smith, ‘Doubts and Boycotts Usher in a New Era of Peace: At the Crossroads’, Far EasternEconomic Review, 143, 3, January 19, 1989, pp.10-11.102Michael Vatikiotis, ‘Deity to Diplomat: Erstwhile Conqueror searches for a New Regional Role’, FarEastern Economic Review, 154, 40, October 3, 1991, p.38.103See Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, ‘The Emperor of Japan as Deity (Kami)’, Ethnology, 30, 3, 1991, pp.199-215,Tokyo Correspondent, ‘Japan’s $80m Imperial Banzai’, The Economist, 317, 7680, 1990, p.31, and WataruKurita, ‘Enthroning a New Emperor’, Japan Quarterly, 38, 1, 1991, pp.42-49.104Ohnuki-Tierney argues that for a long time the kami have been regarded as both human and deity by theJapanese people, and that historical actors like the military were merely assigning meanings to it ‘like anempty vessel.’ See Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, ‘The Emperor of Japan as Deity (Kami)’, Ethnology, 30, 3, 1991,pp.199-215.105Robert Delfs, ‘Emperor’s Minders: Japanese Agency Keeps Public at a Distance’, Far Eastern EconomicReview, 156, 17, April 29, 1993, pp.21-22.12 Graduate Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 1:1 (2003)