Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

The Diplomacy of ‘dignified calm’ 91disappointment that the question of her application had not been placed on theagenda for the Council meeting on 5 March, and it was to be hoped that that wouldnot exclude the possibility of the Council dealing with it. 50A meeting of departmental secretaries on the same day – 1 March – agreed withDr Whitaker:“a tactful and moderately-worded approach should be made as soon as possible bythe ambassador in Paris to Couve de Murville in his capacity as chairman of the EECCouncil of Ministers, the approach to take the form of a personal message from theTaoiseach to the effect that he had learned from our mission in Brussels that Irelandwas not included in the formal agenda for the meeting of the Council, that he wassomewhat disappointed by this development as he had understood from the meetingof 18th January that our approach would be before the March meeting of the Council.”Cremin was to so inform McDonald in Paris. Ambassador Biggar in Brusselswas to approach Calmes to advise him of Dublin's overture to Couve de Murville.At the same meeting, Whitaker – worried by the divisions within Dáil Éireannon membership of NATO – told his fellow secretaries that they had to keep clear intheir minds“(...) that, while membership of NATO may not be a sine qua non for entry into theEEC, we would be committed to participate in the common defence arrangementsand foreign policy of the Community. While European Ministers would, no doubt,understand political difficulties presented by a name or by certain formalities, hethought there was considerable danger that our present attitude would be understoodin Community circles to mean that we could not join in any defence system withBritain.”Whitaker's emphasis clearly revealed his grasp of the EEC as a community inthe process of evolution; Ireland was not joining a static organisation. Therefore, inretrospect, it is important to point out the secretary of Finance's ability to contextualisethe NATO question which was not on the table. But even if only made semiexplicit,it was not an abstract consideration. 51As the session concluded, Dr Whitaker returned to the suggestion that he hadmade at an earlier meeting; he felt that it was time to “straighten these matters outby means of an objective, logical statement on the political implications of membershipof the EEC.” 52That logical statement may have partially come in the form of an interview on15 March with Dr Garret FitzGerald on Telefis Éireann, “Topic at Ten” programme.Lemass first stressed the need for full membership. He then went on togive full reassurance regarding the Irish position“Personally, I regard this coming together of western European countries as thegreatest, most hopeful event of this century, and enormous in its potential for good,not merely for the peoples of Europe but for the whole world.”50. Whitaker to Cremin, 1 March 1962, D/T, S17246D, NAI.51. The above lines is my interpretation of Whitaker's position.52. Minutes of departmental secretaries' meeting, 1 March 1962, D/T, S17246D, NAI.