Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

90Dermot KeoghCremin, of External Affairs, tabled a recent report from the Irish ambassador inParis; McDonald had spoken to the director of the Economic Division, OlivierWormser at the Quai d'Orsay and “according to the impression he formed”, saidCremin, “Mr Wormser's attitude to our application was negative”. That must haveworried Cremin in particular. Cremin, who knew Wormser from the early 1950swhen he had served as Irish Ambassador in France, would have agreed with AlainPeyrefitte's view of that distinguished official: “Ce gaulliste de toujours et de premierrang n'a cessé de rendre les plus grands service à de Gaulle”. 46 [His powers ofcartesian analysis would become well known to the British negotiators]. Creminstressed to the meeting the ultimate uncertainty of the political implications ofmembership. Britain, he said, might enter the EEC without being‘allowed’ to jointhe political union. 47 Cremin continued:“If one looked at the Bonn Declaration from that standpoint, it would be seen that,whereas it was interpreted to mean that if a country were to join the EEC it must beready to join in the political union, it was not quite explicit on this point. Theseobservations were, however, highly conjectural, arising out of press comment aboutthe ‘exclusiveness’ of the second French draft [Fouchet plan], and it would beimprudent to assume that willingness to participate in political union was not a prerequisitefor membership of the Community.”Whitaker, who worked closely with Cremin, sought the immediate preparationof a paper on the political implications of Irish membership of the EEC, not only inrelation to NATO but it would also include matters such as the surrender of sovereigntyto Community institutions. Cremin undertook to have a comprehensive documentdrafted on the political implications of membership. 48As senior officials in Dublin sought to interpret the politics of the EEC, the Irishgovernment continued to receive bad news from the ambassador in Brussels duringthe last two weeks in February. Biggar met the Secretary General of the Council ofMinisters, M. Calmes, concerning the probable handling of the Irish application atthe Council meeting on 5 March. Biggar, when told that the application was notformally on the agenda, spoke about the inconvenience of delay. Calmes undertookto speak to Couve de Murville, as France held the presidency of the Council. 49Biggar's report – together with one from the Paris embassy – created a flurry ofuncertainty in Dublin. Dr Whitaker, in contrast, felt it was very important for theIrish to hold their nerve as he told Cremin on 1 March:“It is impolitic to rush them when they have other and more pressing preoccupations.If rushed, they may take up the position suggested by the most negatively-mindedmember, this being the line of least resistance.”Dr Whitaker suggested that it was better in the circumstances to maintain a“dignified calm” and to take action through the Irish ambassadors in Brussels andParis. He suggested that Couve de Murville be made aware that the Irish noted with46. A. PEYREFITTE, C'etait de Gaulle, Paris 1994, pp. 434-435.47. Minutes of meeting of departmental secretaries, 14 February 1962, D/T, S17246A/62, NAI.48. Minutes of meeting of departmental secretaries, 14 February 1962, D/T, S17246A/62, NAI.49. Cremin note on Biggar report, 28 February 1962, D/T, S17246D, NAI.