Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

88Dermot Keogh“Nobody has yet told us that this is a condition. (...) On the other hand, nobody soloves us as to want us in the EEC on our own terms”. 36 Whitaker's memorandumdid have an influence and led to a number of significant changes in the text ofLemass's speech. 37The Taoiseach, keen to counteract the view that Ireland was only half-heartedabout her application, told the Brussels' meeting:“While Ireland did not accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, we have always agreedwith the general aim of the Treaty. The fact that we did not accede to it was due tothe special circumstances and does not qualify in any way our acceptance of theideal of European unity and of the conception, embodied in the Treaty of Rome andthe Bonn Declaration of 18 July last, of the duties, obligations and responsibilitieswhich European unity would impose.” 38Lemass covered all the major areas in his presentation. The overall impact wasfavourable according to Ambassador Biggar who spoke about the visit to officialsin the Netherlands, Swedish and Norwegian delegations. However, AmbassadorMcDonald in Paris was not able to ascertain with any degree of precision the reactionof the French who had taken over the EEC Council presidency in January. 39Senior officials in Dublin knew that, doubts lingered among the Six and in theCommission about the weak state of the Irish economy. There were also concernsover the country's non-membership of NATO. 40Domestic Concern over NATO and‘Political Union’Domestic reaction to the Irish application had been broadly very positive. Lemassreceived praise from his Fianna Fáil colleagues while the opposition Fine Gaelparty broadly agreed with the government's EEC strategy. The Labour Party and anumber of independent backbenchers were more agnostic; questions were asked inDáil Éireann about the country's neutral status in the light of the application formembership of the EEC. Were the political dimension of the EEC to become thesubject of internal political controversy, there would be a danger that such newswould only reinforce doubts already expressed in a number of the European capitalsover the bona fides of the Irish case. With the undoubted private promptings of36. “Whitaker keen to exclude NATO option from EEC talks”, Irish Times, 1/2 January 1993.37. Dr Whitaker, who made no claim to have been responsible for the changes, did mention one changein particular which was made to the text in relation to neutrality.38. D. J. MAHER, The Tortuous Path, pp. 375-376. [Maher reproduces the entire text.]39. Biggar to Cremin 30 January 1962 [dated 1961 in error] and Ambassador MacDonald, 31 January1962, D/T S17246A/62, NAI.40. The economic counselor at the Irish embassy in Brussels, Dr Donal O'Sullivan, heard from Van Costenof the Netherland's mission that the feeling in The Hague was “it will now be difficult for anymember government to justify opposition to your being accepted as full members”. Dr O'Sullivanto Cremin, 29 January 1962, D/T S17246A/62, NAI.