Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'
Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l' Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'
82Dermot Keoghmembership. 4 The Irish Permanent Representation to the Commission was notestablished until 1963. Up to that point the Ambassador to Belgium, Francis Biggar,had the responsibility playing a dual diplomatic role. 5 He was assisted byEamonn Gallagher, Department of External Affairs. Dr Donal O'Sullivan, secondedfrom the Department of Industry and Commerce, also played an important role inthe 1961/2 application process. 6 The country's civil service generally was poorlyprepared to cope with the new challenge thrown up by the decision to ‘go into'Europe. There were exceptions, the Secretary of the Department of Finance, DrKenneth Whitaker and the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, ConCremin, being among the most prominent. 7This article first establishes the general historical context in which the Irishdecision to enter Europe was first made – a debate which involved the movementaway from economic protectionism towards free trade. The decision to apply forfull EEC membership marked a decisive defeat for the adherents of Éamon deValera's traditional policy of protectionism. The application for EEC membership,it will be argued, had radical implications for the future of Irish neutrality. Havingdeclined to join NATO in 1949, Dublin retained its wartime policy of neutrality.The Taoiseach [Prime Minister], Seán Lemass, would go further than any otherIrish leader before or since in signalling that his government was not wedded toneutrality. Although never explicitly stated, this article will argue, the Six expressedvarying degrees of concern to the Irish about the admission of a non-NATO memberinto the EEC. The unambiguous response of Lemass on neutrality finally convincedthe Six that a non-member of NATO would not constitute a problem. Ireland,he would argue, was prepared to join any military defence arrangementorganised by the member states of the EEC.4. The names which feature most frequently in this article are the following: Seán Lemass (1899-1971),the Taoiseach [Prime Minister] and leader of the Fianna Fáil government; Frank Aiken (1898-1983),Minister for External Affairs; Dr Ken Whitaker (1916), Secretary, Department of External Affairs;Cornelius Cremin (1908-1987), Secretary, Department of External Affairs; Hugh McCann (1916-1981), Ambassador to the Court of St. James; Denis McDonald (1910-1986), Ambassador to Paris;Brian Gallagher (1909-1968), Ambassador to the Netherlands up to 1962 and then Ambassador toGermany; and Thomas J. Kiernan(1897-1967), Ambassador, United States.5. The Irish government had acquired a building to house the permanent representation in 1962. It remainedunoccupied until 1963 when Biggar took over the position as Permanent Representative tothe EEC. The failure to open the permanent representation earlier may be attributed to administrativeinfighting to determine which department would have the responsibility.Source: Conversation in July 1996 with Mr Noel Dorr, former secretary of the Department of ForeignAffairs.6. The Irish government, which first considered joining the EEC in 1960, did not transfer additionalstaff abroad in anticipation of the need to prepare the ground in the capitals of the Six for the formalapplication when it was submitted on 31 July 1961. Neither did any of the Irish embassies in the EEC,including Brussels, receive any additional staff to help deal with the obstacles which arose in relationto entry to negotiations.7. I had the good fortune to know Cornelius Cremin well during his retirement and I interviewed him anumber of times during the 1980s. I interviewed Dr Ken Whitaker for this article in July 1996.
The Diplomacy of ‘dignified calm’ 83Historical Background – From Protectionism toward Free TradeIreland's decision to apply for full membership of the European Economic Community(EEC) on 31 July 1961 was symbolic of the significant domestic politicalvictory which the Taoiseach, Seán Lemass, and a section of the civil service hadenjoyed over the traditionalists in the ruling Fianna Fáil party and in the civil service.The latter were still wedded to the idea of protectionism – a policy which hadbeen pursued since Éamon de Valera first came to power in 1932. Up to the latter'sretirement from politics in 1959 at the age of 77, Fianna Fáil had been in office fortwenty one of those twenty seven years. De Valera's departure did not so much precipitatethe change from protectionism to free trade as facilitate the acceleration ofa process which had been initiated by the untenable nature of the status quo. Thedecade of the 1950s was characterised in Ireland by high unemployment and massemigration. 8 In 1957, the worst year of emigration during the decade, the net lossof population was 54,000 people. The total for the decade, 1951 to 1961, was a lossof 400,000 people. By 1961, the population had declined to 2.8 million, a drop offive per cent on the figure at the foundation of the state in 1922. At its peak, therewere 78,000 out of work in 1957. 9Ireland was wholly dependent on the British market with 81 per cent of herexports going there in 1956.[That figure had dropped to 66 pc in 1969.] The country'sdismal economic record stands in contrast to the relative prosperity in neighbouringBritain, in Scandinavia and in the countries of the Six.The orthodoxies of protectionism had become deeply entrenched in the civilservice, particularly in the upper echelons of the Department of Industry and Commerce,of which – paradoxically – Seán Lemass was minister until his appointmentas Taoiseach in 1959. 10 But, as Brian Girvin has shown, all the major departmentswere slow to move away from the comfort of the old orthodoxies. Confronted bythe emergence of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), the dilemma of the Irishcivil servants and politicians was evident and they continued to opt for “the primacyof traditional policy”. 11 The more heterodox among the civil servants hadstruck a‘damned if we do and damned if we don't’ policy stance. But that was topostpone the inevitable.Outside government circles, between 1957 and 1959, influential economistslike Professor Patrick Lynch, University College Dublin and W.J. Louden Ryan,Trinity College Dublin, had signalled the need for a change in policy. In the intimateworld of Dublin's minuscule policy-making elite, the thinking in academic,8. D. KEOGH, Twentieth Century Ireland – Nation and State, Dublin 1994, pp. 64-242.9. See B. WALSH, “Economic Growth and Development, 1945-70”, in J. LEE (ed.), Ireland 1945-1970, Dublin 1979, pp. 28-29.10. For general background to the history of that department, see M. E. DALY, Industrial Developmentand Irish National Identity, 1922-1939, Dublin 1992. For one of the best overviews of the periodsee, B. GIRVIN, Between Two Worlds – Politics and Economy in Independent Ireland, Dublin 1989,pp. 169-201; See also J. LEE, Ireland 1912-1985 – Politics and Society, Cambridge 1989, pp. 329-410.11. B. GIRVIN, Between Two Worlds, pp. 190-192.
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82Dermot Keoghmembership. 4 The Irish Permanent Representation to the Commission was notestablished until 1963. Up to that point the Ambassador to Belgium, Francis Biggar,had the responsibility playing a dual diplomatic role. 5 He was assisted byEamonn Gallagher, Department <strong>of</strong> External Affairs. Dr Donal O'Sullivan, secon<strong>de</strong>dfrom the Department <strong>of</strong> Industry and Commerce, also played an important role inthe 1961/2 application process. 6 The country's civil service generally was poorlyprepared to cope with the new challenge thrown up by the <strong>de</strong>cision to ‘go into'Europe. There were exceptions, the Secretary <strong>of</strong> the Department <strong>of</strong> Finance, DrKenneth Whitaker and the Secretary <strong>of</strong> the Department <strong>of</strong> External Affairs, ConCremin, being among the most prominent. 7This article first establishes the general historical context in which the Irish<strong>de</strong>cision to enter Europe was first ma<strong>de</strong> <strong>–</strong> a <strong>de</strong>bate which involved the movementaway from economic protectionism towards free tra<strong>de</strong>. The <strong>de</strong>cision to apply forfull EEC membership marked a <strong>de</strong>cisive <strong>de</strong>feat for the adherents <strong>of</strong> Éamon <strong>de</strong>Valera's traditional policy <strong>of</strong> protectionism. The application for EEC membership,it will be argued, had radical implications for the future <strong>of</strong> Irish neutrality. Having<strong>de</strong>clined to join NATO in 1949, Dublin retained its wartime policy <strong>of</strong> neutrality.The Taoiseach [Prime Minister], Seán Lemass, would go further than any otherIrish lea<strong>de</strong>r before or since in signalling that his government was not wed<strong>de</strong>d toneutrality. Although never explicitly stated, this article will argue, the Six expressedvarying <strong>de</strong>grees <strong>of</strong> concern to the Irish about the admission <strong>of</strong> a non-NATO memberinto the EEC. The unambiguous response <strong>of</strong> Lemass on neutrality finally convincedthe Six that a non-member <strong>of</strong> NATO would not constitute a problem. Ireland,he would argue, was prepared to join any military <strong>de</strong>fence arrangementorganised by the member states <strong>of</strong> the EEC.4. The names which feature most frequently in this article are the following: Seán Lemass (1899-1971),the Taoiseach [Prime Minister] and lea<strong>de</strong>r <strong>of</strong> the Fianna Fáil government; Frank Aiken (1898-1983),Minister for External Affairs; Dr Ken Whitaker (1916), Secretary, Department <strong>of</strong> External Affairs;Cornelius Cremin (1908-1987), Secretary, Department <strong>of</strong> External Affairs; Hugh McCann (1916-1981), Ambassador to the Court <strong>of</strong> St. James; Denis McDonald (1910-1986), Ambassador to Paris;Brian Gallagher (1909-1968), Ambassador to the Netherlands up to 1962 and then Ambassador toGermany; and Thomas J. Kiernan(1897-1967), Ambassador, United States.5. The Irish government had acquired a building to house the permanent representation in 1962. It remainedunoccupied until 1963 when Biggar took over the position as Permanent Representative tothe EEC. The failure to open the permanent representation earlier may be attributed to administrativeinfighting to <strong>de</strong>termine which <strong>de</strong>partment would have the responsibility.Source: Conversation in July 1996 with Mr Noel Dorr, former secretary <strong>of</strong> the Department <strong>of</strong> ForeignAffairs.6. The Irish government, which first consi<strong>de</strong>red joining the EEC in 1960, did not transfer additionalstaff abroad in anticipation <strong>of</strong> the need to prepare the ground in the capitals <strong>of</strong> the Six for the formalapplication when it was submitted on 31 July 1961. Neither did any <strong>of</strong> the Irish embassies in the EEC,including Brussels, receive any additional staff to help <strong>de</strong>al with the obstacles which arose in relationto entry to negotiations.7. I had the good fortune to know Cornelius Cremin well during his retirement and I interviewed him anumber <strong>of</strong> times during the 1980s. I interviewed Dr Ken Whitaker for this article in July 1996.