Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

80Mikael af MalmborgGermany might turn its political attention to the east and thus convulse the integrityof the Western World in general and of European unity in particular.That is how the Americans and the Europeanists perceived reality. Their Communitythinking was utterly incompatible with the balance thinking of the Nordicstates, and, therefore, in the heyday of the cold war Swedish officials and politicianswere incapable of convincing Paris, Bonn and Washington to accept associationon Swedish terms.What about the Finland argument in this context? To refer to concerns foranother state when justifying ones own policy is hardly convincing in a world ofsovereign states, and might cause problems for the future. The Finland argumentwas, therefore, employed with moderation in public, and in diplomatic contactsmainly at a later stage of deliberations or in overt crisis situations.Would it have been possible for Sweden to forget about Finland and the NordicBalance and seek security in NATO and market access by full EEC membership?The Americans seem to have thought so, and the Six, it seems, were simply tooanxious about their own stability to consider any nuances of the Nordic securitypattern. At least in some cases, the employment of the Finland argument seems tohave reinforced an already strong impression that neutrality was mainly a device tocatch a free ride.Even if this criticism was partly legitimate, there can be no doubt that therepeated concern for Finland was a serious element in the construction of Sweden’sforeign policy. The consolidation of Finland’s independence vis-à-vis the SovietUnion was perceived as an integral part of Sweden’s national interest. This concernwas mainly a matter of military security, but eventually also extended to marketformations.With some distance it becomes clear to what degree Nordic cooperation was aproject contingent on the Cold War. Nordism could certainly draw on much morefavourable cultural, linguistic and historical conditions than European integration.Culture, however, rarely is a sufficient explanation. Even though the EFTA experienceshowed that there were considerable gains to be made from increased intra-Nordic trade, economic considerations cannot fully explain the quest for a separateNordic market. What placed the Nordic project high on the political agenda was thebipolar structure of the postwar world.Mikael af Malmborg