Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

78Mikael af Malmborgalso helped to release Finland from her tense position. It was furthermore arguedthat once associated with the EEC Sweden would serve as a link for Finland toWestern Europe. If Sweden was excluded from the Common Market she would bedamaged economically and be less able to give moral, material and political supportto Finland. This line of argument was also used by the British in defence of theSwedish case. It was known that President de Gaulle and other French army leadershad considerable sympathy and admiration for Finland because of her stand againstthe Soviet Union during the Winter War and Swedish diplomats and politicianswere not slow to try and profit from this fact in discussions with the French. 48The Finnish argument, however, might also rebound on Sweden. The Americanswere not convinced by it and tended to turn it upside down: i.e. if Swedenwere associated with the European Community, then Finland would really be left ina precarious position. As a matter of fact, the Finlanders themselves seemed to reasonin the same way. They were aiming at a satisfactory arrangement with the EECwithout antagonising the Russians, and this would be easier if Sweden remainedoutside the Common Market. Finland wanted Sweden to stay out. In this respectFinnish policy coincided with that of the United States. The maintenance of Finland’smarkets in Europe would present fewer difficulties if she were able toreceive the same sort of treatment from the EEC as Sweden, since the latter wasFinland’s main competitor in international trade. 49Neither Nordek nor SkandekAfter France’s second veto in 1967 the Nordic market was given a last chance,while waiting for a solution with the EEC. A plan for a Nordic economic communitywas worked out by a Danish Social Democratic Government, led by Jens OttoKrag, and actively launched by the newly elected Prime Minister Hilmar Baunsgaardand his non-socialist government at a Nordic Council meeting in February1968. This so called Nordek plan drew more on the binding EEC model than previousattempts, and comprised a customs union for industrial goods, fishery and agriculturalproduce, and common industrial, monetary, and fiscal policies.This time from the beginning the Finlanders participated fully in the negotiations.The Swedish interest rose markedly after de Gaulle’s withdrawal as Presidentin April 1969. Notably Olof Palme, who succeeded Erlander as Prime Minister inAutumn, pushed the issue. Palme was himself quite pro-European, and he was anx-48. E.g. reference to a conversation between the Swedish Ambassador to France, Ragnar Kumlin, andCharles de Gaulle at the Elysée Palace, PRO, FO 371, vol. 164701 (615/76) Sweden and the EEC,Gallagher to FO, February 23, 1962; cf. I. Hägglöf, p. 250.49. PRO, FO 371, vol. 164714 (615/325) Note by Mr Barrington on talk with Mr Talvitie of the FinnishEmbassy, Foreign Office, June 13, 1962.