Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

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76Mikael af Malmborgformation would be left aside economically as well. A détente, on the other hand,would foster a positive result. 40When the secretary-general of the Swedish Foreign Office, Leif Belfrage, wassent out onto a European tour in order to develop the Swedish case fully to the governmentsof the Six, his journey revealed gloomy prospects. The French and theItalians took the line that there was no place for neutrals in the EEC. MauriceCouve de Murville was very negative and unhelpful and declined to comment onthe position of the neutrals vis-à-vis the EEC. When Belfrage met Monnet the lattergave a ninety minute monologue and then left before giving Belfrage any opportunityto reply. Monnet expressed anxiety that an association of the neutrals wouldonly encourage the Germans not to pursue whole-heartedly the policy of Europeanintegration. He ended with a fairly brutal statement that Sweden was not wanted inthe EEC, either as a member or as an associate, since her admission in either capacitywould hold up the development for which all members were working. 41In the Quai d’Orsay the political branch remained as opposed as ever to associationfor the neutrals, and on the economic side there was a feeling that the longerthey could put off negotiations with the neutrals, the better the position to squeezethem to make concessions. Neither the Swiss nor the Swedes would want to be heldresponsible for a breakdown in the UK/EEC negotiations. 42 Furthermore, throughunofficial channels the French Government made it clear that in their eyes Swedenhad been more negative towards European integration than any other country,including the other neutrals, and that they therefore had little understanding ofSwedish demands. 43 From Danish sources it also becomes clear that the FrenchGovernment held a more severe attitude towards Sweden than towards Denmark.Couve de Murville explained that: “Les suédois sont les durs”, and characterisedLange as “abominable”. 44During the preparatory talks between the three neutrals in spring 1962, considerationsfor Finland appeared in the discussions. Even when Finland was not mentionedexplicitly, the reference nevertheless was quite clear. This was so, forinstance, when Swedish officials argued that the neutrals must avoid committingthemselves in advance to any action which the Community might take and musthave freedom to take any action which a special situation of the state concernedmight require in the event of a disturbance in a neighbouring state, such as thatwhich occurred in Hungary in 1956. The neutrals must, additionally, remain enti-40. Speech by the Minister of Commerce in the First Chamber of the Riksdag during the general politicaldebate; 23rd January, Documents ... 1962, Stockholm 1963, pp. 125-126.41. PRO, FO 371, vol. 164704 (615/130) Report on conversion with Ambassador Hägglöf, Sir PatrickReilly, March 21, and Coulson to FO, March 23, 1962, and vol. 164707 (615/185) UK EFTA-delegationto FO, Geneva, April 13, 1962.42. PRO, FO 371, vol. 164707 (615/194) Butler to FO, Paris, April 12, 1962.43. I. HÄGGLÖF, p. 250. On attitudes towards the neutrals among the Six, and criticism against theAdenauer line in the FRG, see also W. KAISER’s article in this volume.44. Danish Foreign Office, letter from the Ambassador to France to the Foreign Ministry, Copenhagen,October 3, 1962.
Swedish Neutrality, the Finland Argument 77tled to negotiate and sign an agreement with a third country, notably in the Easternblock. Problems could arise if the common commercial policy was used for politicalpurposes, particularly against the Soviet block. 45The Swedish government expected that the Six would respect the delimitationmade necessary by neutrality, as they respected the efforts aimed at bringing aboutpolitical unity by the Six, even though Sweden could not herself participate inthem. There were, however, suspicions that Sweden advanced arguments connectedwith the policy of neutrality for purely economic motivations. In the Swedish presentationsin the Council of Ministers on July 28, Gunnar Lange therefore had toemphasise that “it is not, and has never been, the intention of the Swedish Governmentto try to dilute, slow down or otherwise interfere with this political process.”He furthermore rejected accusations that Sweden was trying to make the best ofboth worlds, by assuring his audience that Sweden did not intend to use the neutralityargument to gain economic advantages. The Swedish government aimed at “anextensive, close and durable economic relationship with the Community...”. Therewere, however, a few important features of membership which were not compatiblewith the policy of neutrality, and Lange mentioned three exemptions which wouldbe required. Firstly came trade policy towards third countries. Although Swedenwas prepared to co-ordinate her tariff and trade policy closely with that of the Community,she would have to keep “a certain liberty of action” and to reserve theauthority to negotiate and sign agreements with third countries in her name. Thesecond point related to the safeguard of certain supplies vital in wartime, i.e. inaddition to war materials certain supplies of pharmaceuticals and vital foodstuffs.Thirdly, Sweden needed to be able to take, or abstain from, measures according tothe requirements of neutrality. This might involve the temporary, complete or partial,suspension of the agreement, if not its denunciation. Finally, the institutionalarrangements should be such as to safeguard “both the integrity of the Communityand the identity of the associate.” 46The neutrals did not succeed in convincing the Six that their attitudes towardsassociation were reasonable and constructive. Particularly the demand for an optoutclause together with the piecemeal application of the common external tariffseemed to be thoroughly incompatible with the Community idea. While the Austrianposition seems to have been understood, the Six did not see why Swedenshould not accept the Treaty of Rome as a full member. 47In this awkward situation the Swedish Government again resorted to the Finlandargument when explaining their foreign policy to the French and the Americans.It was underlined that Swedish neutrality was not only good for Sweden, but45. PRO, FO 371, vol. 164705 (615/144) Everson to FO, Stockholm, March 26, 1962; vol. 164709(615/240) Meeting with Officials from the Three Neutral Members of EFTA, May 3-4, 1962. Noteby Foreign Office.46. Speech by the Minister of Commerce before the EEC Council of Ministers; 28th July, in Documents ...1962, pp. 146-155.47. This was noted by the British, and e.g. the First Secretary of the British delegation to the BrusselsConference, Christopher Audland, openly expressed that he shared the view of the Six, EFTA Archives,Ray Colegate to Frank Figgures, Brussels, October 14, 1962.
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