Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

Swedish Neutrality, the Finland Argument 75be more advantageous than membership, in so far as it would give access to theeconomic advantages of the EEC without imposing the political responsibility thatwent with full membership. 36Paul-Henri Spaak, well known for not being enthusiastic about neutrality, heldthe view, at least unofficially, that both membership and association should beexclusively reserved for those countries which were prepared to accept “les servitudespolitiques”. Frankly speaking, the association of the three neutrals wouldbring no political and very little economic advantage to the Six, whereas the benefitswhich the three neutrals themselves would obtain would be disproportionatelygreat. He also believed that to accept them as associates would involve the Six invery serious difficulties with the United States. 37On this last point at least he was right. The Americans made it perfectly clearthat they did not like the idea of having neutral countries associated with the EEC,and George Ball is said to have regarded the neutrals as assisting the Soviet camp. 38In the American view, such an enlargement would tend to dilute the political contentof the Community and might create an undesirable precedent for other countries.While they tended to look upon Austrian neutrality with some sympathy,since it was a policy imposed on the country by foreign powers, they neverexpressed any understanding of the freely chosen policies of Sweden and Switzerland.A similar attitude was held by the Six. Those among the Six who were anxiousto protect the political features of the Community, e.g. Monnet’s Action Committeefor the United States of Europe, were seriously worried by the prospect of associationfor at least two important reasons. The first argument concerned Germany.They feared that there might be a tendency for Germany to seek more flexible attitudesin political matters, accepting the Community economically, but seeking toescape from its political obligations. Association agreements with the neutralswould encourage some Germans to argue that it was exactly that sort of relationshipwhich Germany ought to have with the Community, since it would facilitate asettlement with the East. Secondly, they were seriously worried by the number ofcountries which were showing interest in the concept of association. They fearedthat if this interest spread, the whole affair would become unmanageable and therewould be a perpetual danger of losing the sense of identity within the Community.39Lange believed that the general world situation would be decisive. If the existingtense relations persisted and the antagonism between east and west continuedto dominate international relations, then nations that did not accept the cold war36. PRO, FO 371, vol. 164698 (615/15) Sir Nicholls to Sir Patrick Reilly, Brussels, January 10, 1962.37. Ibid.38. Sir Patrick Reilly at the Conference “The Brussels Breakdown – Europe Divided or Europe Saved?”,Cambridge, July 1-2, 1993.39. EFTA Archives, FEF/471, Note by Frank Figgures, Some Community Thinking on Association,November 24, 1961.