Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'
Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l' Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'
74Mikael af MalmborgWhat was it, then, more precisely that made neutrality and EEC membership soincompatible? The three neutrals Sweden, Switzerland and Austria agreed that neutralitydid not curb participation in economic integration in Europe in the form ofassociation, but neutrality required the following restrictions. Firstly, they could notdelegate sovereignty. This would affect their participation in the common commercialpolicy and their acceptance of institutional control without a veto. Secondly, asa consequence of the above, they must have the right to withdraw. Such a right, sothey hoped, might even be welcomed by the Six with an eye to its usefulness if theCommunity found that its development was hampered by the neutrals. Thirdly, theymust be allowed to take special measures to safeguard essential supplies in case ofwar. In view of the obligations which international law laid on neutral states in wartime,they must frame their policies in times of peace with a view to being as economicallyself-sufficient as possible in time of war. Such measures should not,however, prejudice conditions of competition in the Common Market for productsnot intended for specific military purposes. 34 As regarded the common commercialpolicy, the neutrals could not allow the Community to control their treaty-makingpower nor their relations with third countries, since either might expose them to thepossibility of action incompatible with neutrality and would certainly expose themto the charge of not being able to prevent such actions.The applications of the three neutrals on December 15 all referred to Article 238of the Treaty of Rome as providing a basis for a solution and the need for any suchsolution to be compatible with their neutrality, as well as with the integrity of theEEC. The Swedish government also referred to a speech in the European Parliamentby the President of the Commission, Professor Walter Hallstein, who hadexplained that association was a more flexible solution, open to countries whichcould not for some reason accept the political obligations of full membership.“Association allows the associated country a structural link with the Communitywith retained sovereignty on the political level.” It was wrong, he had said, to dismissassociation as inferior to full membership. 35Little Enthusiasm for Associating NeutralsIn spite of this speech there was little enthusiasm among the Six for the prospect ofassociating neutrals with the Community. There seems to have been a particularlack of sympathy for the Swedish case. The French and the Belgians had gravedoubts about neutrality and the Italians also were reluctant to discuss the issue,devoted as they were to the idea of a united, federal Europe. It was feared that theneutrals could hinder the future development of the Community towards “an evercloser union”. There also was widespread worry that association would turn out to34. Documents ... 1961, pp. 127-137; PRO, FO 371, vol. 164700 (615/46), The EFTA Neutrals and theEEC, Memorandum from the Cabinet Office, February 15, 1962.35. Documents (...) 1961, pp. 128-137, and I. HÄGGLÖF, pp. 248-249.
Swedish Neutrality, the Finland Argument 75be more advantageous than membership, in so far as it would give access to theeconomic advantages of the EEC without imposing the political responsibility thatwent with full membership. 36Paul-Henri Spaak, well known for not being enthusiastic about neutrality, heldthe view, at least unofficially, that both membership and association should beexclusively reserved for those countries which were prepared to accept “les servitudespolitiques”. Frankly speaking, the association of the three neutrals wouldbring no political and very little economic advantage to the Six, whereas the benefitswhich the three neutrals themselves would obtain would be disproportionatelygreat. He also believed that to accept them as associates would involve the Six invery serious difficulties with the United States. 37On this last point at least he was right. The Americans made it perfectly clearthat they did not like the idea of having neutral countries associated with the EEC,and George Ball is said to have regarded the neutrals as assisting the Soviet camp. 38In the American view, such an enlargement would tend to dilute the political contentof the Community and might create an undesirable precedent for other countries.While they tended to look upon Austrian neutrality with some sympathy,since it was a policy imposed on the country by foreign powers, they neverexpressed any understanding of the freely chosen policies of Sweden and Switzerland.A similar attitude was held by the Six. Those among the Six who were anxiousto protect the political features of the Community, e.g. Monnet’s Action Committeefor the United States of Europe, were seriously worried by the prospect of associationfor at least two important reasons. The first argument concerned Germany.They feared that there might be a tendency for Germany to seek more flexible attitudesin political matters, accepting the Community economically, but seeking toescape from its political obligations. Association agreements with the neutralswould encourage some Germans to argue that it was exactly that sort of relationshipwhich Germany ought to have with the Community, since it would facilitate asettlement with the East. Secondly, they were seriously worried by the number ofcountries which were showing interest in the concept of association. They fearedthat if this interest spread, the whole affair would become unmanageable and therewould be a perpetual danger of losing the sense of identity within the Community.39Lange believed that the general world situation would be decisive. If the existingtense relations persisted and the antagonism between east and west continuedto dominate international relations, then nations that did not accept the cold war36. PRO, FO 371, vol. 164698 (615/15) Sir Nicholls to Sir Patrick Reilly, Brussels, January 10, 1962.37. Ibid.38. Sir Patrick Reilly at the Conference “The Brussels Breakdown – Europe Divided or Europe Saved?”,Cambridge, July 1-2, 1993.39. EFTA Archives, FEF/471, Note by Frank Figgures, Some Community Thinking on Association,November 24, 1961.
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74Mikael af MalmborgWhat was it, then, more precisely that ma<strong>de</strong> neutrality and EEC membership soincompatible? The three neutrals Swe<strong>de</strong>n, Switzerland and Austria agreed that neutralitydid not curb participation in economic integration in Europe in the form <strong>of</strong>association, but neutrality required the following restrictions. Firstly, they could not<strong>de</strong>legate sovereignty. This would affect their participation in the common commercialpolicy and their acceptance <strong>of</strong> institutional control without a veto. Secondly, asa consequence <strong>of</strong> the above, they must have the right to withdraw. Such a right, sothey hoped, might even be welcomed by the Six with an eye to its usefulness if theCommunity found that its <strong>de</strong>velopment was hampered by the neutrals. Thirdly, theymust be allowed to take special measures to safeguard essential supplies in case <strong>of</strong>war. In view <strong>of</strong> the obligations which international law laid on neutral states in wartime,they must frame their policies in times <strong>of</strong> peace with a view to being as economicallyself-sufficient as possible in time <strong>of</strong> war. Such measures should not,however, prejudice conditions <strong>of</strong> competition in the Common Market for productsnot inten<strong>de</strong>d for specific military purposes. 34 As regar<strong>de</strong>d the common commercialpolicy, the neutrals could not allow the Community to control their treaty-makingpower nor their relations with third countries, since either might expose them to thepossibility <strong>of</strong> action incompatible with neutrality and would certainly expose themto the charge <strong>of</strong> not being able to prevent such actions.The applications <strong>of</strong> the three neutrals on December 15 all referred to Article 238<strong>of</strong> the Treaty <strong>of</strong> Rome as providing a basis for a solution and the need for any suchsolution to be compatible with their neutrality, as well as with the integrity <strong>of</strong> theEEC. The Swedish government also referred to a speech in the <strong>European</strong> Parliamentby the Presi<strong>de</strong>nt <strong>of</strong> the Commission, Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Walter Hallstein, who ha<strong>de</strong>xplained that association was a more flexible solution, open to countries whichcould not for some reason accept the political obligations <strong>of</strong> full membership.“Association allows the associated country a structural link with the Communitywith retained sovereignty on the political level.” It was wrong, he had said, to dismissassociation as inferior to full membership. 35Little Enthusiasm for Associating NeutralsIn spite <strong>of</strong> this speech there was little enthusiasm among the Six for the prospect <strong>of</strong>associating neutrals with the Community. There seems to have been a particularlack <strong>of</strong> sympathy for the Swedish case. The French and the Belgians had gravedoubts about neutrality and the Italians also were reluctant to discuss the issue,<strong>de</strong>voted as they were to the i<strong>de</strong>a <strong>of</strong> a united, fe<strong>de</strong>ral Europe. It was feared that theneutrals could hin<strong>de</strong>r the future <strong>de</strong>velopment <strong>of</strong> the Community towards “an evercloser union”. There also was wi<strong>de</strong>spread worry that association would turn out to34. Documents ... 1961, pp. 127-137; PRO, FO 371, vol. 164700 (615/46), The EFTA Neutrals and theEEC, Memorandum from the Cabinet Office, February 15, 1962.35. Documents (...) 1961, pp. 128-137, and I. HÄGGLÖF, pp. 248-249.