Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

Swedish Neutrality, the Finland Argument 73The Special Requirements of NeutralityThe week after Macmillan’s announcement the Minister for Foreign Affairs, ÖstenUndén, argued that those who suggested that Sweden could join the EEC, maintainingher neutrality, had not fully considered the issue. The Six had alwaysupheld explicit political goals, and these were not compatible with Swedish interests.30In a speech to the Swedish Steel and Metal Workers’ Union on 22 August,Prime Minister Tage Erlander argued that three major arguments spoke againstSwedish membership of the EEC: the policy of neutrality, the will to maintain sovereigntyin various fields of social and economic policy and relations to countriesoutside Europe. The manifest interest of the United States in seeing the UK join theEEC gave rise to suspicions that the Community was primarily a defence organisationagainst communism. Such a strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance was noinducement for Swedish participation, but was instead a strongly restraining factor.31This was the government’s first major statement on the EEC question and anumber of observers were puzzled as to why the Swedish government should havechosen this particular moment to clarify its position. One conclusion was that thegovernment may have thought it possible, by merely invoking – clearly enough –the issue of neutrality, to deter the opposition from any attempts at bringing about apolitical crisis over a question of foreign affairs. 32In the face of the strained international relations in the summer of 1961, however,invoking the issue of neutrality was certainly more than a tactical manoeuvre.In Vienna, the meeting between Krushchev and Kennedy in June had revealedstrong tensions; a new Berlin crisis was emerging and the question of West Germany’srole in NATO remained a source of irritation. In August 1961 the Berlin wallwas built. On 30 October the so called “note crisis” began, when the Soviet Unionproposed military consultation with Finland under the Friendship Treaty. The planningwithin NATO for a joint command for German, Danish and Norwegian navalforces in the Baltic was interpreted by the Soviet Union as if the Bonn “revanchists”were about to achieve peacefully the aims pursued by Nazi Germany duringWorld War II. 33 The risk of confrontation between the two superpowers could certainlynot be ignored.30. M. BERGQUIST, Sverige och EEC, Stockholm 1970, pp. 46-47.31. Speech by the Prime Minister at the Congress of Swedish Steel and Metal Worker’s Union; 22ndAugust, Documents ... 1961, pp. 120-125. Beside neutrality, a number of socio-political argumentswere raised against the EEC in the Swedish debate. For a thorough analysis of the domestic debate,see: M. BERGQUIST, Sverige och EEC. On Sweden’s discussions with the EEC, the UK and theUSA, see M. af MALMBORG, “The Neutral Left in the Cold. Sweden and the First Attempt to Enlargethe European Community”, in R. T. GRIFFITHS and S. WARD (eds.), Courting the CommonMarket. The First Attempt to Enlarge the European Community, 1961-1963, Florence/London 1996.32. This was e.g. the conclusion drawn by the British ambassador Coulson: PRO, FO 371, vol. 159610(W1022/2), Coulson to FO, Stockholm, August 29, 1961.33. A.O. BRUNDTLAND, “The Nordic Balance”, pp. 40-41.