Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

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70Mikael af Malmborgwhich the four “underdeveloped” countries actually were. There was also the riskthat accommodating Finnish points of view would mean tearing up already concludedagreements and would make it even more difficult to reach an agreementwith the Six. The Scandinavian reply was that Finland, in contrast to the underdevelopedcountries, aimed at full membership without any major exemption clauses.When the decisive ministerial meeting was about to open, additional problemsoccurred. Pravda declared that for a small country like Finland it could be dangerousto “come under the influence of those powers, whose sole concern is tostrengthen their own economic and political positions”, especially if those “powers”were NATO-countries. Finnish participation in “closed economic groupings”could be a hazard to Finno-Soviet trade. At the same time a planned visit of NikitaKhrushchev to Helsinki was cancelled and there were speculations about this bearinga relation to Finland’s interest in EFTA. 18Therefore, due to both Soviet and British opposition, a direct Finnish membershipof EFTA was out of the question. Thus it was agreed that the Finnish Ministerof Trade, Ahti Karjalainen, would come to Stockholm during the meeting and,without formally participating, be kept posted about the discussions. He was alsogiven the opportunity to explain the Finnish point of view at the meeting, where heconfirmed Finland’s ambition to become a full member of EFTA, but added thatthis had to be achieved in a way compatible with Finnish foreign policy, existinginternational treaties (the Friendship treaty), and bilateral trade relations. The complicatingfactor was that Finland’s trade agreement with the Soviet Union containeda most-favoured-nation clause, which implied that the removal of trade barrierswithin EFTA would automatically extend also to the USSR. This also was the casefor the bilateral trade agreements of the Seven with the Soviet Union, but the differencewas that Finno-Soviet trade was much more extensive.There could be no doubt about the heavy Swedish commitment to Finland’scause. Considerable diplomatic and political efforts were made to fight for theFinnish cause, notably vis-à-vis the British. 19 Swedish and British archive materialsshow quite clearly how Sweden repeatedly tried to convince the UK to acceptFinland’s participation. The British took up an unsympathetic attitude towards thiscommitment and could not understand why the Swedes were so “hot, bitter andobstinate about Finland.” A Swedish official explained that: “This was the crucialmoment in which Finland could be lost or gained for the West.” 20In a speech at the ministerial meeting in July, Erlander paid great attention toFinland. Addressing the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in September,Lange characterised it as a common European interest to satisfy Finland’s18. A Swedish translation of the article is to be found in: SFO, H 92 A, Vol. 2, see also Engzell to deBesche, Helsinki, 23 July, 1959.19. SFO, H 92 A, vol. 2, PM, Stockholm July 17, 1959; two Aides Mémoires, British Embassy, StockholmJuly 18, 1959; vol. 3, PM angående Finland och de yttre sju, Stockholm August 3, 1959; vol. 5,von Celsing to Undén, Helsingfors September 24, 1959; and I. HÄGGLÖF, Drömmen, pp. 199-202.20. Public Record Office (PRO), FO 371/142496, Bretherton to Foreign Office, September 9, 1959.
Swedish Neutrality, the Finland Argument 71demands in this matter. 21 Sweden could count on full support from Denmark andNorway, and, during autumn, the British changed their minds and accepted an associationagreement with Finland. This solution also was approved by Switzerland,Austria and Portugal. 22 In November the US Government also expressed their supportfor Finnish adherence to EFTA. In Washington it was regarded as an essentialpolitical element that the Seven took responsibility for Finland on behalf of theWestern world. 23 By now it was quite clear that Moscow was suspicious about thepolitical motives of EFTA and disliked Finland’s openly declared willingness toadhere. 24The meeting of ministers in Stockholm in November 1959 that decided uponEFTA agreed to open discussions with the Finnish government on a suitable formof association. When the association agreement with Finland (FIN-EFTA) wassigned on 27 March 1961 it stated the same conditions for Finland’s trade with theSoviet Union as with the Seven. 25The Finland Argument against the Reform of the OEEC/OECDThe raison d’être of EFTA was twofold. Firstly there were considerable gains to bemade from the removal of trade barriers between the Seven; secondly the organisationalso was supposed to serve as a bridge-building platform towards the EEC.However, before the EFTA treaty even had come into force, the French and theAmericans had decided to eliminate what was supposed to serve as a frameworkfor bridge building. At the end of 1960 the purely European OEEC was transformedinto the Atlantic OECD, including the USA and Canada. Mainly on Frenchadvice the new organisation had the scope of its activities narrowed down to twomain responsibilities: consultation on economic policy and co-ordination of developmentaid to the rapidly increasing number of independent states in the ThirdWorld. Trade regulation would henceforth not be dealt with in the OECD. 26Sweden, together with Switzerland, turned out to be the main defender of theold system. Both wanted to preserve as much of the established system as possible.The OEEC had been wide enough to allow expansion of foreign trade, but had been21. SFO, H 92 A, vol. 2, Speech by Tage Erlander, July 20, 1959; Press release July 21, 1959; vol. 5,speech by Mr Lange, supplement to letter by de Besche to Bergenstråle, Stockholm, October 5,1959.22. SFO, H 92 A, vol. 4, Anteckningar från sjumaktsförhandlingarna i Stockholm, September 12, 1959.23. SFO, H 92 A, vol. 7, PM from de Besche, Stockholm, November 6, 1959.24. SFO, H 92 A, vol. 8, PM concerning Soviet attitudes towards European integration efforts (basedon report by Ambassador Sohlman), November 19, 1959.25. SFO, H 92 A, vol. 5, Proces verbal of the Meeting of Ministers in Stockholm on 19th and 20th November,1959, for the Establishment of a European Free Trade Association, and I. HÄGGLÖF,Drömmen, pp. 203-204.26. A trade competency was ultimately accepted but in a watered down form, see R. T. GRIFFITHS(ed.), Explorations in OEEC History, Paris 1997.
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