Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

70Mikael af Malmborgwhich the four “underdeveloped” countries actually were. There was also the riskthat accommodating Finnish points of view would mean tearing up already concludedagreements and would make it even more difficult to reach an agreementwith the Six. The Scandinavian reply was that Finland, in contrast to the underdevelopedcountries, aimed at full membership without any major exemption clauses.When the decisive ministerial meeting was about to open, additional problemsoccurred. Pravda declared that for a small country like Finland it could be dangerousto “come under the influence of those powers, whose sole concern is tostrengthen their own economic and political positions”, especially if those “powers”were NATO-countries. Finnish participation in “closed economic groupings”could be a hazard to Finno-Soviet trade. At the same time a planned visit of NikitaKhrushchev to Helsinki was cancelled and there were speculations about this bearinga relation to Finland’s interest in EFTA. 18Therefore, due to both Soviet and British opposition, a direct Finnish membershipof EFTA was out of the question. Thus it was agreed that the Finnish Ministerof Trade, Ahti Karjalainen, would come to Stockholm during the meeting and,without formally participating, be kept posted about the discussions. He was alsogiven the opportunity to explain the Finnish point of view at the meeting, where heconfirmed Finland’s ambition to become a full member of EFTA, but added thatthis had to be achieved in a way compatible with Finnish foreign policy, existinginternational treaties (the Friendship treaty), and bilateral trade relations. The complicatingfactor was that Finland’s trade agreement with the Soviet Union containeda most-favoured-nation clause, which implied that the removal of trade barrierswithin EFTA would automatically extend also to the USSR. This also was the casefor the bilateral trade agreements of the Seven with the Soviet Union, but the differencewas that Finno-Soviet trade was much more extensive.There could be no doubt about the heavy Swedish commitment to Finland’scause. Considerable diplomatic and political efforts were made to fight for theFinnish cause, notably vis-à-vis the British. 19 Swedish and British archive materialsshow quite clearly how Sweden repeatedly tried to convince the UK to acceptFinland’s participation. The British took up an unsympathetic attitude towards thiscommitment and could not understand why the Swedes were so “hot, bitter andobstinate about Finland.” A Swedish official explained that: “This was the crucialmoment in which Finland could be lost or gained for the West.” 20In a speech at the ministerial meeting in July, Erlander paid great attention toFinland. Addressing the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in September,Lange characterised it as a common European interest to satisfy Finland’s18. A Swedish translation of the article is to be found in: SFO, H 92 A, Vol. 2, see also Engzell to deBesche, Helsinki, 23 July, 1959.19. SFO, H 92 A, vol. 2, PM, Stockholm July 17, 1959; two Aides Mémoires, British Embassy, StockholmJuly 18, 1959; vol. 3, PM angående Finland och de yttre sju, Stockholm August 3, 1959; vol. 5,von Celsing to Undén, Helsingfors September 24, 1959; and I. HÄGGLÖF, Drömmen, pp. 199-202.20. Public Record Office (PRO), FO 371/142496, Bretherton to Foreign Office, September 9, 1959.