Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

68Mikael af MalmborgOver the last few years it has been revealed that Sweden collaborated with theWest in fields such as intelligence and defence planning. This indicates that the realUS-Swedish relationship indeed was a kind of “silent partnership”. Even thoughthis was the US policy towards Sweden, there is, according to the findings of arecent Governmental Neutrality Commission, nothing to prove that anyone on theSwedish side was informed about the contents of, for example, the above mentionedNSC document. 12However, the fact that the US government accepted Swedish military neutralitydoes not mean that they respected the requirements of neutrality in other fields ofpolitics. The Nordic balance was not a purely military affair, but also had repercussionson “softer” dimensions of security. Security considerations apparently weredecisive for Sweden’s attitudes towards the formation of the European market andthe Finland argument was frequently employed in the context of European integration.Yet, neither the Americans, nor the Six nor the UK met this argument with anysympathy.Bringing Finland in through the Nordic DoorWhen the UK launched her proposal for a West European Free Trade Area in 1956the Scandinavians accepted the plan with mixed feelings. For Sweden there wereno decisive economic arguments against the British free trade plan, but the proposalhad torpedoed the plans of the Low Tariff Club and could also risk the NordicMarket Plan, in which the Minister of Foreign Trade, Gunnar Lange, was deeplyabsorbed. The Danes and the Norwegians, on the other hand, raised several objections.Since Denmark exported large quantities of agricultural products and was anet importer of industrial goods, the British proposal entailed only disadvantages.For Norway the main concern was the export of fish products which the British alsowanted to keep out of the arrangements. Since the ambition to keep Nordentogether had high priority, Sweden to some degree made an effort to defend Danishagricultural interests. Lange was anxious to prevent Denmark from lining up withthe Common Market and Norway from going alone into a free trade agreementwith the UK. As the Swedish Ambassador Ingemar Hägglöf writes, the Leitmotif ofthe few following years was that “The Danes were fighting for their agriculturalinterests, the Norwegians for their fisheries, and the Swedes to keep Nordentogether”. 1312. Om kriget kommit... Förberedelser för mottagande av militärt bistånd 1949-1969, Betänkande avNeutralitetspolitikkommissionen, SOU 1994:11, Stockholm 1994, p. 116, note 2. “This report isalso available in English (without appendixes): Had there been a war... Preparations for the receptionof military assistance, 1949-1969. Report of the Commission on Neutrality Policy, SOU 1994: 11,Stockholm 1994”.13. I. HÄGGLÖF, Drömmen om Europa, Stockholm 1987, p. 126.