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Swedish Neutrality, the Finland Argument 67Sweden had trouble finding a modus vivendi with the Western block. For the Americansit was of vital interest to ensure the quite substantial Swedish defenceresources being used to increase the Western capability of waging war.From summer 1947 the USA had been vehemently criticizing the Swedish policyof neutrality and had been running a campaign to convince Sweden to joinNATO. 9 With the failure of the Scandinavian defence pact and Denmark’s and Norway’sadhesion to NATO in spring 1949, the Americans changed their attitudetowards Swedish neutrality. In February 1950 the campaign was stopped and thenew Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, accepted the Swedish argument that internationalsecurity in the north was better served by Sweden remaining neutral thanby its joining NATO. Instead of forcing Sweden into the Atlantic Alliance, somevoices within the State Department advocated a “silent partnership”. At this stageSweden had openly declared that her defence plans were based on defence againsta Soviet attack and the government underlined Sweden’s adherence to westerndemocratic values. The struggle against Swedish communism also was intensified.Thus, when the Americans chose to respect Swedish neutrality, it was with the convictionthat they would be in a position to profit from Sweden’s considerabledefence resources in case of war. The new policy also facilitated relations withNorway and Denmark, which, in spite of their NATO membership maintained theirtraditional Nordic orientation. 10During the 1950s US policy towards Sweden developed further along this newline. In the National Security Council Report of 1960 a most remarkable paragraph,Paragraph 28, implied that the US unilaterally committed themselves to includeSweden in the Western defence perimeter. In case of war with the Soviet Union theUSA would “encourage and assist Sweden, without prejudice to US commitmentsto NATO, to resist the Soviet Bloc. In the event of a Soviet Bloc attack againstSweden alone, be prepared to come to the assistance of Sweden as part of a NATOor UN response to the aggression.” 119. G. LUNDESTAD, America, Scandinavia and the Cold War 1945-1949, Oslo 1980, p. 343. For thecontent of the American criticism against neutrality: see the list “Basic fallacies of Swedish thinking”:The Ambassador in Sweden (Matthews) to the Secretary of State, FRUS 1948, Vol. III, pp. 23-24.10. A “silent partnership” was advocated by some people at the Division of Northern European Affairs,see KARLSSON, Handelspolitik eller, pp. 145, 147-148, The change in the US policy is clear fromseveral documents in FRUS, see e.g. 1950, Vol. III, pp. 19-20, and 1952-1954, Vol. VI, part 2,p. 1 759, Memorandum by the Planning Board for the National Security Council to the National SecurityCouncil, Washington, January 8, 1952: “Sweden, (...) while demonstrating the firm intentionto defend her own national independence and integrity, is attached to the concept of ’neutrality’. Asa consequence, although the Swedes are traditionally anti-Russian and ideologically anti-communist,Sweden has not joined in the common defense effort represented by NATO. Although on balance,and primarily because of the advantage to the organization of Scandinavian defense, it wouldbe to our interest to have Sweden in NATO, we must for the predictable future accept as a politicalfact Sweden’s policy of avoiding great power military alliances(...)”.11. National Security Council Report, Statement of US Policy towards Scandinavia (Denmark, Norwayand Sweden), NSC 6006/1, 6 April 1960, in FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. VII, part 2, pp. 672-681. Thisparagraph was approved by the President on November 10, 1960.