Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

Swedish Neutrality, the Finland Argument 65and instead they both chose to join the Atlantic Pact in April 1949. The result was aparticular Nordic security pattern which was subsequently called the Nordic Balance.The Nordic Balance was based on three factors: 41. Denmark and Norway became NATO members, but with restrictions onallied military bases and exercises. This was later supplemented by a general provisoagainst having nuclear weapons on their territory.2. Sweden, in the middle, clung to her traditional policy of non-alignment, apolicy which gained general recognition and was made credible by a substantialSwedish defence effort.3. The Soviets exerted special restraint in dealing with Finland, allowing her topursue a policy of “neutrality and friendly relations with the Soviet Union”.Finland was in too precarious a position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union to participateeither in the Marshall Programme or in the Scandinavian defence and economicdiscussions. On 8 April 1948, only a few weeks after the Brussels Pact had beenconcluded, Finland signed a treaty of friendship, cooperation and assistance withher eastern neighbour. From the earliest days of the Cold War the central aims ofSwedish foreign policy consisted in preventing Finland, the immediate neighbourto the east, from falling fully under Soviet influence. This concern reinforced thealready strong Swedish will to keep military alliances out of the North. The Swedishgovernment persistently refused any explicit link to the Western block, andeven more so membership of the Atlantic Alliance, because they feared that theSoviet Union would respond to a Swedish move westwards by tightening its gripon, or even occupying, Finland. Conversely, one reason for the USSR to limit itsinterference in Finland was that this might provoke Sweden to join the Westernblock.Sweden had everything to gain from facilitating Finland’s position vis-à-vis theUSSR. During the cold war Finland played the role of an “alarm clock” making itpossible for the Swedish Army to rely on mobilisation. With a Soviet occupation,or only a tightened Soviet grip on Finland, Sweden would immediately have lostthis advantage, and the Swedish defence effort would have had to be increased considerably.A Soviet occupation of Finland would furthermore have created a rangeof difficult problems in the civil sphere, such as a vast stream of refugees. 5 Morethan anything, this burden would have fallen on Sweden.The role of the Finland argument in Swedish security policy however was complexand had also more subtle dimensions than the question of Sweden’s formalrelation with Western alliances. The position of Finland was a factor that had to betaken into permanent consideration at various political levels. A crucial problem4. The Nordic Balance thinking was first suggested by the Swedish ambassador to London, GunnarHägglöf, see Se G. HÄGGLÖF, Fredens vägar, 1945-1950, Stockholm 1973, pp. 203-206; andK. MOLIN, Omstridd neutralitet. Experternas kritik av svensk utrikespolitik 1948-1950, Stockholm1991, pp. 55-66 and note 130. The first systematic analysis was made by the Norwegian scholar ArneOlav Brundtland, see: A. O. BRUNDTLAND, “The Nordic Balance”, in Cooperation and Conflict.Nordic Studies in International Politics, Vol. 2, 1966, pp. 30-31.5. A.O. BRUNDTLAND, “The Nordic Balance”, p. 39.