Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

Dieses Dokument wurde erstellt mit FrameMaker 4.0.4.Swedish Neutrality, the Finland Argument 63Swedish Neutrality, the Finland Argumentand the Enlargement of “Little Europe”Mikael af MalmborgDo states care about other states? The general answer to that question is ‘no’. Relationsbetween states, however, are likely to change in the course of time. There issomething unique about every historical case and each relation has its own specificinterdependencies. The purpose of this article is to analyse the consequences ofEuropean integration for the relations between the Nordic countries. Special attentionwill be paid to the Swedish concerns for Finland’s position as they affected thebroader relations with Western Europe as the founding of the EEC in 1958 and thefirst attempts at enlargement in the 1960s. I will try to explain what motivated theSwedish Government’s demand for special treatment in relations with the EEC,and why association on Swedish terms was strongly rejected by the Six and theUSA.*The special relationship between Sweden and Finland has taken various expressions.First of all there is a strong historical underpinning. For six centuries Finlandhad been an integral part of the Swedish Realm. The Russian conquest of the “Easternhalf of the Realm” in 1809 broke the political ties, although commercial contactscontinued. For a long time, the balance of power made Finnish independenceunthinkable, but there could be no doubt that when Finland gained her independencein 1917 this was greatly welcomed in Sweden. Finland’s independence hadentailed the most considerable improvement of Sweden’s security position for along time.The Second World War showed both the extents and limits of Sweden’s engagementfor Finland. Under the slogan “Finland’s cause is ours”, Swedish societygranted considerable financial, material and moral support, but Sweden as a statemade no direct military commitment. Yet, at the outbreak of the Finnish Winter War1939-40, Sweden for the first time since the mid-nineteenth century had officiallydeviated from its position of neutrality and had declared herself “non-belligerent”.In the postwar world relations with the Nordic countries were a matter of prestige,and with regard to Finland also a matter of security. The high status of Finlandin Swedish foreign policy is reflected in the fact that relations with Finland weremainly the concern of the Prime Minister. Traditionally the first visit abroad of anewly elected Prime Minister was always paid to Finland, and vice versa. In thecold war era Finland’s independence was regarded by many as a necessary preconditionfor Sweden’s non-alignment and one can reasonably argue that anything thatcould be done to ease Finland’s precarious position was also of immediate gain forSweden. Sweden’s concern for Finland thus was a relationship built upon both* I would like to thank Ambassador Krister Wahlbäck, Ambassador Mats Bergquist, and Dr. WolframKaiser for helpful comments on the manuscript to this article.