Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'
Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l' Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'
54Markus Schulteexports to Sweden might have been responsible for the stagnation in Germanexports to that country.All in all the export evidence suggests that the industry could be quite happywith the division between the EEC and EFTA. The fact that exports to France andItaly were those growing the most from mid-1959 is perfectly consistent with thefact that their tariffs on non-ferrous metal products on average were by far the highestin Europe. Hence their lowering within the EEC had a relatively large impact.As far as the specific tariffs of most of the EFTA countries are concerned, it is hardto assess their actual incidence. Yet the fact that their level did not change considerablyvis-à-vis imports from Germany and that the volume of EFTA production wasapparently not sufficient to replace them entirely with imports from Britain or othernon-EEC sources left the German position in these markets essentially untouched.Statistical evidence for imports of non-ferrous metal products from the EEC andEFTA shows very clearly that this branch of German industry was indeed veryhappy not to have to lower its tariffs vis-à-vis the EFTA members. Given that thetariff levels on these products were relatively high in Germany, their lowering visà-visthe other EEC members led to a shooting up of imports from these countriesin the second quarter of 1959. This is not only true for imports from the EEC as awhole, but also for imports from all individual member countries. Imports fromEFTA, which continued to be hit by tariffs of the same order of magnitude, keptfollowing the 1953-58 trend for the rest of the period.Non-ferrous Metal Products – ImportsImports of non-ferrous metal products from the UK stagnated and remained wellbelow the rising 1953-58 trend, while imports from Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark,Austria and Norway exceeded the trend after 1959.The value of imports from these countries remained however relatively low,with the combined imports of the Benelux countries exceeding the total importsfrom EFTA.Given the steep increase in imports from the other EEC member countries, thereduction of tariffs vis-à-vis the Seven would very likely have had a similar effectfor imports from there, mainly from the UK. From the point of view of the Germanindustry, the fact that imports from Britain stagnated and remained very far belowthe 1953-58 trend must have been seen as a major success. There was certainlynothing that could have induced the industry to agree to any changes in tariff protectionvis-à-vis the Seven which might have endangered that advantageous situation.Given that the EFTA countries had low or zero tariffs on the primary products,while the CET rendered them more expensive for the industries within the EEC, anumber of complicated issues would be in the way of any solution that could havebeen agreed to by the German non-ferrous metal processing industry. The creationof a Europe-wide free trade area would not only have resulted in stronger importpressureson the German market, but would surely have reduced the gains that the
Industrial Interest in West Germany´s Decision 55German industry was making in the French and the Italian markets. Hence for theGerman non-ferrous metal processing industry the potential costs of having the freetrade area concerning import pressures in the home market and the likely opportunitycosts for exports to the other EEC markets were both very visible after 1959.Until 1958 the expectation that the UK would be the most important competitorand that Norway might develop its own processing industry within the FTA werequite reasonable assumptions made by the industrial association for non-ferrousmetal processing in Germany 12 . From 1959 the gains in the French and Italian marketsbegan to materialise, while the failure of the Maudling negotiations did notproduce any negative developments for German exports in the EFTA markets.Hence the picture for the respective industrial associations was absolutely clear.Having the EEC and preventing tariff reductions vis-à-vis the Seven was the bestoption available for the industry.Paper and Paper ProductsThe statistical evidence for the paper and paper products industries is very much inline with the trade statistics for the non-ferrous metal products sector. For both sectorsthe formation of the Europe-wide free trade area would have resulted in seriouscompetition from the Seven, while the failure of that project left them with the optimumsituation possible, free access to the EEC markets, while exports to EFTA didnot suffer. In the case of the paper and paper products sector however, the growth ofdemand generally was much higher. This led to large increases of exports to all EECmember countries, in particular to France and Italy. In this situation the foundation ofthe free trade area would not only have had repercussions on the home market, butwould certainly have produced substantial opportunity costs in terms of export opportunitieswithin the EEC and to France in particular. While exports of paper and paperproducts to EFTA were considerably higher than to the EEC throughout the 1950s,exports to the EEC reached and surpassed those to EFTA in 1961/62.From 1959 onward exports to EFTA remained however consistently above the1953-58 trend. While exports to most EFTA markets followed the trend line, thoseto Britain and Switzerland rose above it, in the case of Britain even very markedlyin mid-1959 and in the case of Switzerland less impressively at the end of 1960.12. Bundesarchiv, B102 - 127623: [undated] Fachvereinigung Metallhütten und Umschmelzwerke,Schüller, Stellungnahme der Fachvereinigung Metallhütten und Umschmelzwerke zum BeitrittGroßbritanniens zur EWG.
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54Markus Schulteexports to Swe<strong>de</strong>n might have been responsible for the stagnation in Germanexports to that country.All in all the export evi<strong>de</strong>nce suggests that the industry could be quite happywith the division between the EEC and EFTA. The fact that exports to France andItaly were those growing the most from mid-1959 is perfectly consistent with thefact that their tariffs on non-ferrous metal products on average were by far the highestin Europe. Hence their lowering within the EEC had a relatively large impact.As far as the specific tariffs <strong>of</strong> most <strong>of</strong> the EFTA countries are concerned, it is hardto assess their actual inci<strong>de</strong>nce. Yet the fact that their level did not change consi<strong>de</strong>rablyvis-à-vis imports from Germany and that the volume <strong>of</strong> EFTA production wasapparently not sufficient to replace them entirely with imports from Britain or othernon-EEC sources left the German position in these markets essentially untouched.Statistical evi<strong>de</strong>nce for imports <strong>of</strong> non-ferrous metal products from the EEC andEFTA shows very clearly that this branch <strong>of</strong> German industry was in<strong>de</strong>ed veryhappy not to have to lower its tariffs vis-à-vis the EFTA members. Given that thetariff levels on these products were relatively high in Germany, their lowering visà-visthe other EEC members led to a shooting up <strong>of</strong> imports from these countriesin the second quarter <strong>of</strong> 1959. This is not only true for imports from the EEC as awhole, but also for imports from all individual member countries. Imports fromEFTA, which continued to be hit by tariffs <strong>of</strong> the same or<strong>de</strong>r <strong>of</strong> magnitu<strong>de</strong>, keptfollowing the 1953-58 trend for the rest <strong>of</strong> the period.Non-ferrous Metal Products <strong>–</strong> ImportsImports <strong>of</strong> non-ferrous metal products from the UK stagnated and remained wellbelow the rising 1953-58 trend, while imports from Switzerland, Swe<strong>de</strong>n, Denmark,Austria and Norway excee<strong>de</strong>d the trend after 1959.The value <strong>of</strong> imports from these countries remained however relatively low,with the combined imports <strong>of</strong> the Benelux countries exceeding the total importsfrom EFTA.Given the steep increase in imports from the other EEC member countries, thereduction <strong>of</strong> tariffs vis-à-vis the Seven would very likely have had a similar effectfor imports from there, mainly from the UK. From the point <strong>of</strong> view <strong>of</strong> the Germanindustry, the fact that imports from Britain stagnated and remained very far belowthe 1953-58 trend must have been seen as a major success. There was certainlynothing that could have induced the industry to agree to any changes in tariff protectionvis-à-vis the Seven which might have endangered that advantageous situation.Given that the EFTA countries had low or zero tariffs on the primary products,while the CET ren<strong>de</strong>red them more expensive for the industries within the EEC, anumber <strong>of</strong> complicated issues would be in the way <strong>of</strong> any solution that could havebeen agreed to by the German non-ferrous metal processing industry. The creation<strong>of</strong> a Europe-wi<strong>de</strong> free tra<strong>de</strong> area would not only have resulted in stronger importpressureson the German market, but would surely have reduced the gains that the