Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

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46Markus Schulteslowly until 1959, catch up to the more “normal” level of import-values from theEFTA members which started off from a much higher level and with a steeper1953-58 trend.ConclusionThe conclusion would be yet again that for trade with EFTA the foundation of thetwo competing trading blocs did not seem to matter for German export performance,whereas the lowering of internal tariffs among EEC members helped realise ahuge potential for trade mainly among the three larger economies of the EEC,France, Italy and Germany. As far as industrial interest and pressure is concerned,the statistical evidence for machinery exports shows that there were no tangiblelosses at all, nor any visible opportunity costs. The prospects for the Germanmachinery, chemical and electrical engineering industries at the end of the 1950swere clear: capturing the huge and previously protected Italian and French markets,while hoping to keep the strong presence on the markets of the Seven. Protectiveinterests on the whole did not exist in these sectors. The fears that the divisionsbetween the EEC and the Seven after the failure of the Maudling negotiationsmight negatively affect German export interests in Europe outside the EEC did notmaterialise. The stagnation in machinery exports from 1958 to 1960 equally concernedEEC and EFTA markets and had thus nothing to do with the coming intoeffect of the EEC but more probably with a general slowdown in economic activityin 1958 which in turn might have negatively affected investment decisions for sometime hitting capital goods sales harder than those in other sectors.The Potential Losers from the FTA and British Accession.Textiles, Non-ferrous Metals and Paper IndustriesThe textile industry and the non-ferrous metals sector were the most vociferouswhen it came to criticising the free trade area project and the planned British accesionto the EEC. They predicted the most dire consequences should either of thesearrangements come about. The same is true for the non-ferrous metal products sector,the paper and paper product industries, as well as for timber and timberprocessing and a number of sectors whose fears and complaints with regard to thenegotiations which have been mentioned. All of these sectors had specific competitorsin mind when setting out to protest against the Europe-wide free trade area orany similar arrangement. For the non-ferrous metal industry, for timber, wood pulp,paper and paper product producers in the Federal Republic, competition fromScandinavia, mainly from Norway, but also from Austria was seen as a seriousthreat which, in their view, could endanger the existence of whole industries. Forthe textile industry the main competitors were India, Pakistan, Hong Kong and Sri
Industrial Interest in West Germany´s Decision 47Lanka, if they were to achieve even the slightest reduction in trade impediments fortheir exports to the European market. For reasons of very advantageous factorendowments or very low labour costs, competition in these sectors was seen asunfair and protection was demanded. The German textile industry assumed that itsown protective interests vis-à-vis the Asian countries mentioned would be sharedby other European industries and that hence agreement on quantitative restrictionsagainst imports from there would easily be reached with the other European countries.During the accession negotiations these Asian countries in fact were grantedlarger quotas on the European market. Apart from the Asian competition the associationsof the textile industry feared that the divisions between EEC and EFTAmight endanger their very important export markets in the Seven and primarily theScandinavian countries.As before, statistical evidence will be used to assess on the one hand whetherthe expectations of the individual sectors were met by the development of trade andon the other hand to what extent opportunity costs and losses were visible and tangiblefor the industry and on which markets these costs and losses occurred.Textiles – ExportsAll European textile producers faced powerful competition from the developingcountries whose sales in Western Europe were entirely controlled by quotas. It wasnot therefore competitiveness that determined their patterns but trade agreements.The problem was that the UK appeared to give the best trade deals to India, Pakistanand Hong Kong. For the West German textile industry combined textileexports to the EEC and EFTA lie consistently below the imports from those countries.Toward the end of the period both imports and exports begin to grow moresteeply than before. These increases are however due only to trade with the otherEEC member countries, while trade with the EFTA countries largely follows the1953-58 trend also during the rest of the period. The value of exports to the EFTAmarkets in the years up to 1963 is persistently higher than those to the EEC. Until1959 exports to EFTA continuously more than double those to the rest of the Community.From 1959 onward exports to the EEC rise sharply to reach and surpass thevalue of exports to EFTA by 1964. Thus the increased export potential offered tothe German textile industry in the common market countries was not at all visibleat the time when the Maudling negotiations were under way. Instead, the fall inexports to both the EEC and the Seven in 1958, with figures remaining below the1953-58 trend well into 1959, did not suggest that there were any improvements onthe horizon, if trade with the Seven should be affected by tariff discrimination.
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