Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'
Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l' Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'
42Markus Schultefall below the 1953-58 trend line in some EFTA markets seems to have been balancedby slight increases in others. When exports to the important Swedish marketbegan to stagnate at the beginning of 1961, the level of exports to Italy was surpassingthat of exports to Sweden and it was evident that exports to France would dothe same soon. The Netherlands remained the single most important market forGerman exports of electrical products and the increases in exports to the Netherlandsabove the trend alone compensated for the “loss” incurred in exports to Sweden.The overall picture does not allow the conclusion that opportunity costs on theEFTA markets would have been visible at all before 1961 when exports to Francehad picked up considerably. Thus from mid-1960 onward the combined exports toEEC and EFTA remain with one exception above the 1953-58 trend.Imports of Electrical ProductsGerman imports of electrical engineering and other electrical products are consistentlyabove their 1953-58 trend for both EFTA and the EEC. As far as the importsfrom the other EEC member countries are concerned, they begin to rise above thetrend already before the EEC takes effect at the beginning of 1959. These increasesin imports occur for all EFTA and EEC members even though slightly later forEFTA countries. The level of imports from the EEC surpasses that of imports fromEFTA very markedly by 1960. The only exception to this marked increase is Belgium-Luxembourg.Imports from there only start to rise above the trend at the endof 1962. There is an astonishing peak in imports in the final quarter of 1963 whichis likely to have been due to some important investment programme, in the FederalRepublic. While imports for all countries rise above the trend without exception,there remain large fluctuations in imports from Britain. The very general rise inimports of electrical products might suggest that it reflected to some extent the generalgrowth of the German economy and the corresponding demand in a field ofadvanced production technology as well as for consumer durables.While imports rose markedly more steeply above their 1953-58 trend thanexports, Germany still exported more than twice the value of its imports even in thelast quarter of 1963, when imports showed a remarkable peak. On the whole Germanexports were almost three times greater than imports even toward the end ofthe period in question. It is more than obvious from this that the German electricaland electronic industries did not have to fear serious competition anywhere inEurope and that the stagnation which occurred in the Swedish market, most likelydue to British cost advantages there, was almost compensated by growing exportsto other EFTA members and easily outweighed by the increasing exports to theother EEC members, mainly to France. It is therefore hardly conceivable that theindustry should have been aware of the opportunity costs that were undoubtedlyincurred in the Swedish and the British markets due to the fact that German exportsmet with tariff discrimination there and that hence Swedish and British productsmight have gained cost advantages.
Industrial Interest in West Germany´s Decision 43Chemical Products – ExportsThe German chemical industry was among the potential winners from a Europewidefree trade area as well as from a British accession to the EEC which wouldhave secured the industry tariff free access to the markets of the Seven. While theindustry was aware of increased competition with its British counterpart, the overallexpectations were positive and the attitudes very favourable for these projects.The quantitative evidence supports these views. It shows that the German chemicalindustry increased its exports to all EEC and EFTA markets (except the small Norwegianmarket) at a higher rate than the 1953-58 trend. This suggests that its exportperformance in the EFTA markets would have been even better, if the trade discriminationbetween the two blocs would not have developed or could have beenovercome at an early stage by the Europe-wide solution or by the accession of Britainand the association of the other EFTA members to the EEC. The quantitativeevidence further shows that chemical exports to the EEC were no more importantin value than those to EFTA and that unlike in other sectors the relative importanceof the EEC as an export market for German industry did not increase. The increaseof exports above the 1953-58 trend to the EFTA countries is mainly due to exportsto Britain and Switzerland. In both cases quarterly exports more than doublebetween 1958 and 1964. For the smaller export markets in EFTA (with the exceptionof Norway) exports continue pretty much to grow according to the trend.Figure 2.3: Exports of chemicals to the EEC compared to the 1953-58 trend800000700000t 53-58EECDM 1000600000500000400000300000200000100000053-153-354-154-355-155-356-156-357-157-358-158-359-159-360-160-361-161-362-162-363-163-364-164-3quartersGiven that exports to the more important export markets did not decline butincreased substantially, the chemical industry could hardly have been induced totake action supporting the free trade area and British accession with more empha-
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Industrial Interest in West Germany´s Decision 43Chemical Products <strong>–</strong> ExportsThe German chemical industry was among the potential winners from a Europewi<strong>de</strong>free tra<strong>de</strong> area as well as from a British accession to the EEC which wouldhave secured the industry tariff free access to the markets <strong>of</strong> the Seven. While theindustry was aware <strong>of</strong> increased competition with its British counterpart, the overallexpectations were positive and the attitu<strong>de</strong>s very favourable for these projects.The quantitative evi<strong>de</strong>nce supports these views. It shows that the German chemicalindustry increased its exports to all EEC and EFTA markets (except the small Norwegianmarket) at a higher rate than the 1953-58 trend. This suggests that its exportperformance in the EFTA markets would have been even better, if the tra<strong>de</strong> discriminationbetween the two blocs would not have <strong>de</strong>veloped or could have beenovercome at an early stage by the Europe-wi<strong>de</strong> solution or by the accession <strong>of</strong> Britainand the association <strong>of</strong> the other EFTA members to the EEC. The quantitativeevi<strong>de</strong>nce further shows that chemical exports to the EEC were no more importantin value than those to EFTA and that unlike in other sectors the relative importance<strong>of</strong> the EEC as an export market for German industry did not increase. The increase<strong>of</strong> exports above the 1953-58 trend to the EFTA countries is mainly due to exportsto Britain and Switzerland. In both cases quarterly exports more than doublebetween 1958 and 1964. For the smaller export markets in EFTA (with the exception<strong>of</strong> Norway) exports continue pretty much to grow according to the trend.Figure 2.3: Exports <strong>of</strong> chemicals to the EEC compared to the 1953-58 trend800000700000t 53-58EECDM 1000600000500000400000300000200000100000053-153-354-154-355-155-356-156-357-157-358-158-359-159-360-160-361-161-362-162-363-163-364-164-3quartersGiven that exports to the more important export markets did not <strong>de</strong>cline butincreased substantially, the chemical industry could hardly have been induced totake action supporting the free tra<strong>de</strong> area and British accession with more empha-
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