Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

28Wolfram KaiserSixes and Sevens in 1959 with their proposal to counteract the pending creation ofEFTA with a special offer for EEC association to induce the Danes to abandon theirprospective EFTA partners. 83IIIUntil the expert talks between British and German, French and Italian officials duringthe winter and spring of 1960-1, the EFTA states were still in principle aimingat the original FTA plan – with possible modifications. However, their applicationsof 1961-2 for full EEC membership or EEC association respectively indicated thatthey were now prepared to accept to a greater extent than hitherto the new realitiesbrought about by the creation of the EEC and to make substantial compromises inorder to safeguard their economic and political interests. This in turn forced theEEC states to clarify their attitudes to a number of key issues of future Europeanintegration, in particular regarding the future role of the neutrals in the integrationprocess and – related to this – the association of third countries and, most importantly,the question of whether and under what conditions they would agree to theEEC's enlargement.The integration debate among the Six during 1961-3 reveals that they not onlydid not give priority to possible arrangements with the neutrals. There was alsoconsiderable hostility to neutrality, which seemed incompatible with what the Sixwere building – namely, a community of states with shared values and interests.Particularly at a time when they were still contemplating increased cooperation inforeign policy and, ultimately, in defence matters, the Six were not keen on EECmembership of neutrals. The German Chancellery and the Auswärtiges Amt, forexample, agreed that – in the words of the State Secretary Rolf Lahr, who in principlestrongly supported enlargement – it should not be the aim of the EEC“möglichst viele Vollmitglieder zu erwerben, sondern eine manövrierfähige Größe,von dem Westen besonders verpflichteter Staaten zu bleiben”. 84 Just how hostilesome among the Six were, especially to the two wealthy neutrals Switzerland andSweden, became obvious when Couve de Murville discussed their associationapplications with the three neutral EFTA states' ambassadors to France in Paris inFebruary 1962. According to a report by the British negotiator, Eric Roll, theFrench Foreign Minister declared“that Swiss neutrality had its reason and basis in Franco-German conflict. The Communityhad put an end to this, and so to the foundation for Swiss neutrality. TheSwiss would surely come to recognise this. With the Swedes, he had taken the linethat it had been a historical accident that the Swedes had not been involved in thetwo world wars. But this was no reason for them to raise neutrality into a principle.”83. “Sieben und EWG”, Hartlieb to Carstens: PA AA/353/Ref. 200-I A2 (18 June 1959), AufzeichnungEmmel, “Beamtenbesprechung Kleine FHZ”: PA AA/353/Ref. 200-I A2 (23 June 1959).84. Aufzeichnung Lahr “Beitritt Irlands zur EWG”: PA AA/289/BStS (22 September 1961).