24Wolfram Kaisertariff calculations from the combination with the low-tariff countries Norway, Swe<strong>de</strong>n,Denmark and Switzerland, which helped significantly to portray EFTA as themore liberal tra<strong>de</strong> bloc. Moreover, Britain's remaining Commonwealth preferencesand the highly protectionist national agricultural policies <strong>of</strong> most <strong>of</strong> its EFTA partnerswere just as incompatible with free tra<strong>de</strong> rhetoric as was the EEC's evolvingCAP.TABLE 2: Average Weighted Tariffs on Industrial Products in Per Cent <strong>of</strong> Import Value(Dates for 1960, 1967 and 1972 Allow for Intra-EFTA and Intra-EEC Reductions)1960 1967 1972 MFN 1.1.1973EFTAAustria 18.0 13.6 8.3 11.2Denmark 5.4 2.9 1.9 3.8Finland 6.9 3.5 2.0 4.4Norway 4.1 1.9 1.2 2.6Swe<strong>de</strong>n 6.6 3.9 2.4 4.2Switzerland 4.5 3.7 2.2 2.8UnitedKingdom14.8 11.4 7.0 9.3EECW. Germany 6.1 4.5 2.6 7.4France 12.6 4.9 1.9 7.4Italy 13.8 5.6 2.2 7.4Benelux 7.4 4.0 2.0 7.4Source: B.S. AAMO, “Die Resultate <strong>de</strong>r EFTA. 20 Jahre Han<strong>de</strong>lszusammenarbeit”, EFTA Bulletin 21/3(1980), pp.9-11 (10).Yet, EFTA's liberal rhetoric exerted consi<strong>de</strong>rable pressure on the Six in the early1960s to prove to the United States that it was not building an economic fortressEurope, but instead would behave cooperatively in tra<strong>de</strong> matters, and thus to retainthe prestige the EEC had in American eyes chiefly for its political content. Thecompetition from EFTA was one reason why the EEC <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d to combine the earlyintroduction <strong>of</strong> the common external tariff with its reduction by 20 per cent, a stepthat was greatly facilitated by the positive <strong>de</strong>velopment <strong>of</strong> the French economyafter the <strong>de</strong>valuation and subsequent convertibility <strong>of</strong> the French franc in December1958. The primary external reason for the 20 per cent cut was without doubtincreasing American pressure on the <strong>European</strong>s in view <strong>of</strong> their mounting balance-
Challenge to the Community 25<strong>of</strong>-payments problems to reduce tariff barriers, a policy that eventually led theKennedy government to introduce the Tra<strong>de</strong> Expansion Act and subsequently to theKennedy Round <strong>of</strong> the GATT <strong>of</strong> 1963-7, 72 but EFTA clearly provi<strong>de</strong>d an additionalexternal stimulus.The creation <strong>of</strong> EFTA also initiated a <strong>de</strong>bate among the Six about their longtermeconomic interests and political aims in Western Europe, particularly in theFe<strong>de</strong>ral Republic where <strong>European</strong> integration turned into the dominant domesticpolitical issue <strong>of</strong> the early 1960s. Within the government and the governing ChristianDemocratic Union (CDU), Erhard <strong>–</strong> continuing his long-standing argumentwith A<strong>de</strong>nauer about German <strong>European</strong> policy that went back at least to the Messinainitiative and Plan G in 1955-6 <strong>–</strong> led the campaign for a wi<strong>de</strong>r tra<strong>de</strong> settlementbetween the EEC and EFTA in the form <strong>of</strong> a FTA or a customs union. 73 In 1959 hewent public yet again when the Economics Ministry paid for advertisements in thenational press. Employing the slogan “6+7+5=1”, they argued that a tra<strong>de</strong> settlement<strong>of</strong> the Six, the Seven and the OEEC peripherals was indispensable. 74 Erhardsubsequently opposed acceleration, and when this proved impossible to pushthrough the cabinet against A<strong>de</strong>nauer, who gave absolute priority to strengtheningthe EEC's cohesion, they negotiated the compromise formula which the Council <strong>of</strong>Ministers eventually adopted in July 1960.The <strong>de</strong>bate in the Fe<strong>de</strong>ral Republic <strong>of</strong> Germany, however, was not confined tothe government and the political parties. Increasingly, the German industry fe<strong>de</strong>ration,the Bun<strong>de</strong>sverband <strong>de</strong>r Deutschen Industrie (BDI), and individual industrialistsand bankers, who were mostly close to the CDU, intervened in the <strong>de</strong>bate aboutSixes and Sevens. 75 BDI Presi<strong>de</strong>nt Fritz Berg, for example, wrote to A<strong>de</strong>nauer inSeptember 1959 that the forthcoming creation <strong>of</strong> EFTA was greatly increasing theanxieties among German exporters about the continued absence <strong>of</strong> a wi<strong>de</strong>r FTA.Berg conclu<strong>de</strong>d:“Die EWG mit ihrer politischen und wirtschaftlichen Zielsetzung muß als Kern <strong>de</strong>reuropäischen <strong>Integration</strong> erhalten bleiben; sie ist aber nur lebensfähig, wenn siedurch <strong>de</strong>n größeren Zusammenschluß mit <strong>de</strong>n übrigen OEEC-Staaten ergänztwird.” 7672. On the external economic policy <strong>of</strong> the Eisenhower and Kennedy governments see W.S. BORDEN,“Defending Hegemony: American Foreign Economic Policy”, in: T.G. PATERSON (ed.),Kennedy's Quest for Victory, Oxford 1989, pp.57-85 and T.L. ILGEN, Autonomy and Inter<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce.U.S.-Western <strong>European</strong> Monetary and Tra<strong>de</strong> Relations, 1958-1984, Totowa 1985.73. On the confrontation between A<strong>de</strong>nauer and Erhard see D. KOERFER, Kampf ums Kanzleramt.Erhard und A<strong>de</strong>nauer, Stuttgart 1987.74. U. LAPPENKÜPER, “Ich bin wirklich ein guter Europäer”. Ludwig Erhards Europapolitik 1949-1966”, in: Francia 18/3 (1991), pp.85-121 (88).75. On the BDI's <strong>European</strong> policy in the 1950s see W. BÜHRER, “German Industry and <strong>European</strong> <strong>Integration</strong>in the 1950s”, in: C. WURM (ed.), Western Europe and Germany. The Beginnings <strong>of</strong> <strong>European</strong><strong>Integration</strong> 1945-1960, Oxford 1995, pp.87-114, first published in German as “Der BDI unddie Aussenpolitik <strong>de</strong>r Bun<strong>de</strong>srepublik in <strong>de</strong>n fünfziger Jahren”, in: Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte40/2 (1992), pp.241-61.76. Berg to A<strong>de</strong>nauer: BA B136/2553 (30 September 1959).