Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

Challenge to the Community 21concerned with securing their political influence in Western Europe and vis-à-visthe United States, which the talks among the Six about political cooperation since1959 – and especially during the Fouchet negotiations of 1961-2 – threatened toundermine even more than the EEC itself. The Macmillan government finallydecided in June 1961 to apply for full EEC membership, 59 a move which exposedthe internal political faultlines within EFTA. 60By this time, the Danish government had been pressing the British for severalmonths to apply at the earliest possible moment. Krag asked the British ForeignSecretary, Lord Home, in April 1961 to give advance warning of a forthcomingBritish EEC application so that his government could announce its intention to jointhe EEC at the same time. 61 At the NATO Ministerial Council meeting in MayKrag actually declared in the presence of all other NATO governments that in theDanish view, British EEC entry was highly desirable because it would increase thepolitical cohesion of Western Europe. 62 Joining the EEC together with Britain wasfor the Danish government the ideal solution. It would safeguard Danish agriculturalinterests and counter growing domestic criticism that the Social Democratshad backed the wrong horse in the West European trade conflict by joining EFTA.On the other hand, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria continued to regard EECmembership as incompatible with their neutrality policy, which excluded a jointapproach by the EFTA states. 63 Their governments initially clung to the idea of amultilateral settlement between the EEC and EFTA, pressed the British to do thesame, and then applied for association according to Article 238 of the EEC Treaty,which caused the British government serious diplomatic problems in its relationswith the EEC and the United States.EFTA's third inherent weakness was the lack of committed economic and politicalleadership by Britain, which first became apparent over tariff acceleration.Unlike the Germans in the EEC, the British were not economically strong enoughor politically prepared to reciprocate fully the advantages they gained from theacceleration of tariff cuts by granting additional concessions to Denmark and Norwayin agriculture and fish. All the Macmillan government finally conceded was anexamination according to Articles 25 and 28 of the EFTA Treaty of ways toincrease trade in agriculture and fish. 64 Later on, the British government was not59. The economic and political motives behind the first British EEC application are discussed in detailin W. KAISER, Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans. Britain and European Integration 1945-63,London 1996, chapter 5 and W. KAISER, Großbritannien und die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft1955-1961. Von Messina nach Canossa, Berlin 1996. For a concise analysis see W. KAISER,“From Laggard to Leader? The United Kingdom's Decision of 1961 to Apply for EEC Membership”,in: DEIGHTON and MILWARD, Acceleration (forthcoming).60. On intra-EFTA consultations prior to the British EEC application see R. STEININGER, “1961:“Europe at Sixes and Sevens”. Die EFTA und Großbritanniens Entscheidung für die EWG”, in:Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 80/1 (1993), pp.4-29.61. Krag to Home: PRO FO 371/158188/70 (14 April 1961).62. Walker (Oslo) to Foreign Office: PRO PREM 11/3555 (10 May 1961).63. The neutrality conceptions of the European neutrals are analysed in a comparative perspective in E.KARSH, Neutrality and Small States, London 1988.64. Cohen (Geneva) to Foreign Office: PRO PREM 11/3262 (16 February 1961).