Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

Challenge to the Community 17undoubtedly be eaten up, one by one, by the Six.” 41 In addition to the defensive aimof reducing the economic magnetism of the EEC, however, the outer Seven – especiallyBritain, Sweden and Switzerland – intended to put counter-pressure on theEEC states. In particular, they hoped that the creation of EFTA would change theattitude of the Germans to the West European trade conflict. German exporterswere still selling slightly more to EFTA states – 27.5 per cent of total exports – thanto their EEC partners in 1958. It was hoped that the creation of EFTA wouldencourage Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard and German industrialists todemand in stronger terms than hitherto a reorientation of German European policy,including diplomatic pressure on the French to agree to a wider trade settlementbetween the EEC and EFTA. 42In the end, none of the outer Seven regarded EFTA as an aim in itself. The neworganisation was conceived as a bridge to the EEC in order to reopen negotiationslater, this time between two trade blocs rather than between the EEC and individualOEEC states, as had been the case during 1957-8. 43 The outer Seven were initiallyunited in their desire to secure equal access to the EEC market through some formof economic association with the Six short of membership. At the initiative of FritzBock, the Austrian Trade Minister, the outer Seven actually stated in the preambleof the EFTA Treaty their aim“to facilitate the early establishment of a multilateral association for the removal oftrade barriers and the promotion of closer economic co-operation between the Membersof the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, including the Membersof the European Economic Community”. 44However, they never explicitly discussed whether the creation of EFTA wouldindeed facilitate an agreement, what price they would be prepared to pay, for exampleby agreeing to a customs union as opposed to a free trade area, or under whatconditions they might consider alternatives should an association between the twogroups prove impossible to be achieved.The political foundation of EFTA was insufficiently defined because its quickcreation was in part the result of a chain reaction due to a lack of alternatives. Whenthe EEC Commission submitted its memorandum on Sixes and Sevens in late February1959, it became obvious that there was no prospect for the original FTA planin the near future. 45 With its emphasis on first strengthening the cohesion of theEEC the memorandum was seen by the Seven as “a very depressing report”, partic-41. Harold Macmillan Diaries (7 July 1959), quoted in H. MACMILLAN, Pointing the Way 1959-1961,London 1972, p.54.42. PRO CAB 128/33/30th (7 May 1959).43. Cf. PRO CAB 130/123/GEN 580/4th (5 March 1959), PRO CAB 128/33/30th (7 May 1959).44. Interview with Fritz Bock (3 March 1992), quoted in M. GEHLER and W. KAISER, “A Study inAmbivalence: Austria and European Integration 1945-95”, in: Contemporary European History6/1 (1997), pp. 75-99. See also “Testimonies: R. Kirchschläger”, in: P. du BOIS and B. HURNI,L'AELE d'hier à demain, Geneva 1988, pp.149-53 (153).45. First Memorandum from the Commission of the European Economic Community to the Council ofMinisters of the Community, Brussels 26.2.1959.