Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

14Wolfram Kaisermeeting of the Swedish federation that the outer Seven could not remain passiveand should create a small FTA among themselves. Beaver, Kipping and Swedishindustrialists met again in Stockholm on 15-18 January 1959 and on the followingday with representatives of the Norwegian and Danish federations in Copenhagen.29 The FBI leadership subsequently held talks with Maudling and the PermanentSecretary in the Board of Trade, Frank Lee, who both supported the EFTAoption within the British government. 30At the same time, intergovernmental contacts at the official level also increased,with the initiative to consider the EFTA option clearly coming from Swedish officials.The Under-Secretary in the British Treasury, Frank Figgures, who laterbecame the first Secretary General of EFTA in 1960, recollected in May 1958, forexample, that the Secretary General in the Swedish Ministry of Finance, GustavCederwall, had wanted to discuss the Uniscan FTA option as early as January1958. 31 Diplomats from the Swedish Embassy in London intimated to British officialsin February 1958 that Britain, Sweden, Norway and Denmark could form anindustrial FTA among themselves to create pressure on the EEC in the FTA negotiations,and that to advocate such a solution might soon become Swedish governmentpolicy. 32 At that stage, most Whitehall officials strongly believed that it wastoo early “to take the eye off the ball”: the aim of a wider FTA in Western Europe.In January 1958, in a meeting of the European Free Trade Area Steering Group,which was responsible for overseeing the FTA negotiations, Russell Bretherton,Under-Secretary in the Board of Trade, had been alone in arguing that Whitehallshould develop an alternative scheme in preparation for the possible failure of theFTA negotiations. 33 By the time of the breakdown of the FTA negotiations, however,Treasury and Board of Trade officials had become very keen on the EFTAoption. By arguing in their assessment of the likely effects of a Uniscan FTA that it“would be economically viable in its own right”, Treasury and Board of Trade officialsstrongly influenced the evolving attitude of a hesitant cabinet which was initiallyunconvinced of the economic viability of a small FTA and of the diplomaticprospects of concluding possible negotiations successfully, particularly in view ofthe anticipated difficulties over agriculture and fish.By the time British officials submitted their report in December 1958, transnationalcontacts among officials from the outer Seven had greatly intensified.Shortly after the breakdown of the FTA negotiations leading officials, on the invitationof the Director of the Swiss Trade Department, Hans Schaffner, met for talks29. Barclay (Copenhagen) to Foreign Office: PRO PREM 11/2826 (22 January 1959).30. PAUES, p.16. The FBI contacts were primarily with the Treasury and the Board of Trade. The ForeignOffice, which was deeply sceptical about the diplomatic usefulness of the EFTA option, waskept in the dark about the informal consultation between leading industrialists, Treasury and Boardof Trade officials and some ministers. Note Robinson: PRO FO 371/142488/61 (28 January 1959).31. Figgures to Clarke: PRO FO 371/134417/19 (15 May 1958).32. Note Figgures: PRO BT 11/5648 (27 February 1958).33. PRO PREM 11/2532 (3 December 1958).