Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

122Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungenfor EDC in 1953-54, suggesting that Dulles's famous threat of an “agonizing reappraisal”was not the approach Monnet would have recommended (a view that is not borne out in thearchives). The overall opinion of Monnet is of a man who was “eminently realistic” and“the master builder of structures” [DiLeo paraphrasing Ball, p. 164]. But at the root of thisemphasis on Monnet’s dedication to and impact on institutions lies a paradox, for Monnet’sapproach was based overwhelmingly on personal contacts. Monnet not only avoided dealingwith institutions throughout his life, he was “easily perturbed with the more mundane detailsof administration”, according to DiLeo. It was individuals who provided Monnet with ideas,access and influence and while the essays illustrate the instrumentality with which Monnetcould treat personal relationships, none of the authors tackle his oft-cited faith in and commitmentto institutions. Even the institution he himself masterminded could not sustain him.In November 1954 Monnet chose not to renew his mandate as President of the ECSC HighAuthority “in order to be able to act freely”, as he said. The “institution” in which Monnetflourished was, in fact, his network of personal contacts, which were overwhelminglyAmerican. And yet, even this institution was an anachronism, a legacy of an age when internationalpolitics and business were co-ordinated by a small group of elite men who movedseamlessly from the boardroom to the courtroom to the Oval Room. The war not onlybrought national elites increasingly into contact but it also gave them a new lease of life and,for the first decade of the Cold War, gave them an extraordinary degree of influence in theprojects of national reconstruction and European and Western construction.On the whole the essays lean on the side of Monnet’s contribution within each relationship,how he influenced policy-makers and ultimately, US policies. The co-dependencyaspect of Monnet's relationships could have been underlined somewhat more. Contact withUS officials enabled Monnet to gain access to his own government – it was US Ambassadorsto France, Bullitt and Bruce, who brought Monnet together with French politiciansboth before and after the war – as well as to other European governments, as ThomasSchwartz’s treatment of the relationship between Jean Monnet and Jack McCloy (the latterwas US High Commissioner in Germany) shows. Moreover, Sherrill Brown Wells’ interestingessay “Monnet and “The Insiders”: Nathan, Tomlinson, Bowie and Schaetzel” illustrateshow much Monnet depended on more junior US officials for ideas and technicalexpertise in the elaboration and the pursuit of his economic and political projects. His UScontacts did not only open doors to power, they provided pathways to those destinations.In the end, what is most striking about Monnet and the Americans is the extent to whichit is the story of the development of US policy toward Europe. Jean Monnet's relationshipwith and towards the US mirrored the country's emergence from post-World War I isolationto permanent engagement in and leadership of the West European continent. It was theestablishment and maintenance of that involvement that motivated Monnet from his wartimeappeal to the Roosevelt administration to his advocacy of the Grand Design project underKennedy’s presidency. This, surely, is the real reason why the story is one that deserves to betold by itself.Renata DwanSt Anne's College, Oxford