Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'
Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l' Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'
116Fernando Guiraohave had an immediate impact on domestic industrial development and modernisation.Even if the trade deficit was covered by earnings from tourism and remittances,this did not reduce the seriousness of the conflict, it only distracted publicattention. The truth was that the Spanish economy was more dependent than everbefore on the EEC, as export market as well as source of supply.The deterioration of bilateral Spanish-EEC trade and the prospect of effectivediscrimination against agricultural exports brought to the forefront the frustratingresults of earlier efforts to find export markets outside the EEC. That Spain couldreduce its export dependence on the Six had been the official attitude back in1957. 39 After a few years the reality turned out differently (Table 4).TABLE 4: Geographical distribution of Spain´s export trade, 1956 & 1960Total exports: 1,353,283(in gold pts)Geographical distribution:1956 196043,564,292in (´000pts)EEC: 391,917 (28.96 %) 16,725,672 (38.39%)EFTA: 344,929 (25.49) 11,276,681 (25.89)Rest of Western Europe: 49,972 (3.69) 947,333 (2.17%)Eastern Europe: 0% 1,212,250 (2.78%)Asia: 48,424 (3.58%) 1,661,451 (3.81%)Africa: 56,890 (4.20%) 2,194,972 (5.04%)USA: 180,805 (13.36%) 4,132,521 (9.48%)Latin America: 171,303 (12.66%) 3,493,682 (8.02%)Rest: 109,043 (8.07%) 2,019,730 (4.63%)Rest of Western Europe includes Andorra, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Malta, Turkey,and the Vatican.No new markets of a significant size were found outside the EEC except, forlow values only, in Eastern Europe. The share of exports to markets in EFTA, Asiaand Africa stagnated. The idea of developing exports to markets on the Americancontinent turned out to be day-dreaming. Spain's traditional exports to the EEC39. As it was exposed by CICE Chairman Minister Gual Villalbí to experts at their first gathering; MAE,Leg. 5476, exp. 12: Minutes of 27 November 1957.
Association or Trade Agreement? 117markets were not easy to redirect: they consisted mainly of raw materials and perishableagricultural products. The harsh evidence was that the most dynamic exportmarkets for Spanish commodity trade were within the Six. In sum, the frustrationsuffered in the effort to reorient foreign trade away from the Six, coupled with therapid deterioration of trade with the EEC, and the need to assure effective advantagesto Spanish traditional exports to encounter the first steps towards import tradeliberalisation, forced the Spanish authorities to design a direct strategy to meet thissituation on a bilateral basis, once the collective approach through OEEC or EFTAhad been rendered completely ineffective.IVThe policies of stabilisation, which were developed by the high echelons of theSpanish administration during the second half of the 1950s and early 1960s, wereconceived to provide new legitimacy to the Franco regime by improving the performanceof the domestic economy. The official request to open negotiations withthe EEC should be considered as part of the international component of stabilisation.It was not accidental that the application to the EEC coincided with the establishmentof the Commissariat for the Development Plan. 40 The working party thattravelled to Paris to prepare bilateral negotiations with French officials in anticipationof the Spanish request to the EEC dealt particularly with the characteristics ofFrench economic planning as much as with EEC matters. 41 Most of the high officialswho were members of the preparatory negotiations committee welcomed therequest of the Commissariat to control the process. For them, both the launching ofthe request to open negotiations with the EEC and the establishment of the DevelopmentPlan were parallel strategies for providing credibility to the new officialpolicy of encouraging economic growth. 42 The EEC option thus was consideredonly as hastening the process of economic, social and political stability in Spainand as furthering the policy of obtaining from the international community a crediblecommitment in favour of the country's future economic development andpeaceful political evolution. 4340. ACMP, box 3007: Cabinet minutes, 26 January 1962.41. MAE, Leg. 10086, exp. 3: Commercial Counsellor to the Director of Economic Relations, Paris, 11February 1962; and Leg. 6658, exp. 5: Embassy to Minister Ullastres, “Remite diversos informesdel Grupo de Trabajo en el Mercado Común”, Paris, 22 February 1962.42. MAE, Leg. 9390, exp. 4: “Acta de la reunión celebrada el 21 de marzo de 1962 en el Ministerio deAsuntos Exteriores por los Subsecretarios o Altos Funcionarios de los Ministerios interesados enmaterias económicas o sociales para tratar de la preparación de las negociaciones con el MercadoComún”. Only the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs resisted the proposal.43. MAE, Leg. 6658, exp. 3: “Razones que han movido al Gabierno español para solicitar negociacionescon la Comunidad Económica Europea”, 2 February 1962.
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116Fernando Guiraohave had an immediate impact on domestic industrial <strong>de</strong>velopment and mo<strong>de</strong>rnisation.Even if the tra<strong>de</strong> <strong>de</strong>ficit was covered by earnings from tourism and remittances,this did not reduce the seriousness <strong>of</strong> the conflict, it only distracted publicattention. The truth was that the Spanish economy was more <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt than everbefore on the EEC, as export market as well as source <strong>of</strong> supply.The <strong>de</strong>terioration <strong>of</strong> bilateral Spanish-EEC tra<strong>de</strong> and the prospect <strong>of</strong> effectivediscrimination against agricultural exports brought to the forefront the frustratingresults <strong>of</strong> earlier efforts to find export markets outsi<strong>de</strong> the EEC. That Spain couldreduce its export <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce on the Six had been the <strong>of</strong>ficial attitu<strong>de</strong> back in1957. 39 After a few years the reality turned out differently (Table 4).TABLE 4: Geographical distribution <strong>of</strong> Spain´s export tra<strong>de</strong>, 1956 & 1960Total exports: 1,353,283(in gold pts)Geographical distribution:1956 196043,564,292in (´000pts)EEC: 391,917 (28.96 %) 16,725,672 (38.39%)EFTA: 344,929 (25.49) 11,276,681 (25.89)Rest <strong>of</strong> Western Europe: 49,972 (3.69) 947,333 (2.17%)Eastern Europe: 0% 1,212,250 (2.78%)Asia: 48,424 (3.58%) 1,661,451 (3.81%)Africa: 56,890 (4.20%) 2,194,972 (5.04%)USA: 180,805 (13.36%) 4,132,521 (9.48%)Latin America: 171,303 (12.66%) 3,493,682 (8.02%)Rest: 109,043 (8.07%) 2,019,730 (4.63%)Rest <strong>of</strong> Western Europe inclu<strong>de</strong>s Andorra, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Malta, Turkey,and the Vatican.No new markets <strong>of</strong> a significant size were found outsi<strong>de</strong> the EEC except, forlow values only, in Eastern Europe. The share <strong>of</strong> exports to markets in EFTA, Asiaand Africa stagnated. The i<strong>de</strong>a <strong>of</strong> <strong>de</strong>veloping exports to markets on the Americancontinent turned out to be day-dreaming. Spain's traditional exports to the EEC39. As it was exposed by CICE Chairman Minister Gual Villalbí to experts at their first gathering; MAE,Leg. 5476, exp. 12: Minutes <strong>of</strong> 27 November 1957.
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