Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

110Fernando GuiraoWith no immediate hope of a successful resumption of multilateral negotiationsto solve intra-European economic disputes, the government was forced to react. 20In late November 1960, the Minister of Commerce together with high-ranking officialsexplained to the British ambassador that Spain might find EFTA more attractivethan the EEC if they ever had to make up their minds about joining one of thetwo. Now that EFTA was on its feet, the Spaniards argued, it could cope more easilywith another member needing special treatment in the same way as Portugal.The absence of political obligations, the problems which agriculture would have tomeet on Spain’s entry into the Common Market, and the close ties with Portugal,were presented as the reasons making EFTA particularly appealing to Madrid. Theambassador concluded that, if the division between the Six and the Seven continuedunabridged, the possibility that “they may therefore want to join EFTA in duecourse (...) cannot be dismissed.” 21 The Spanish cabinet opted to confront the EECfrom the status of possible association with EFTA.Experts had reached the same conclusion. The voluminous analysis of theimpact of European integration on the Spanish economy, which was initiated in1950, concluded in February 1961 with the proposal to join EFTA as a first andpreparatory step to other more ambitious goals. 22 This position was based on theneed to obtain a long transitional period, i.e., twenty-four years for tariff reductionwith only minimum or token reductions in the first twelve years. 23 Even a Greekassociationtype of agreement (which was far from being easily reachable) was perceivedby the cabinet as a poor deal which would have made Spain dependent uponthe goodwill of the EEC countries for a comparatively small sum. Obtaining thedegree of flexibility that was then considered necessary both by the administrationand independent specialists led to the choice of favouring association with EFTA.Portugal was the precedent to point at for concessions in the economic field,while Finland's association showed that no political provisions were necessary. 24The Cabinet Committee for Economic Affairs decided on 3 March 1961 toapproach the “more flexible and attainable” EFTA. This decision received the fullsupport of the CICE commission. 25 Confronted with mounting rumours about a20. MAE, Leg. 6415, exp. 26: Minister Ullastres to Minister Castiella, 2 December 1960.21. PRO, FO 371/150327: British Ambassador to FO, Madrid, 24 November 1960.22. Contemporary to the signing of the Treaty of Paris, former Minister of Finance José Larraz, a convincedfalangist who turned out to be an equally convinced supporter of a federal Europe, set up anassociation to study the impact of European integration on the Spanish economy. Larraz sent to theGovernment a summary of the conclusions reached; MAE, Leg. 10383, exp. 4: “La integración dela economía española en Europa”, February 1961.23. J. LARRAZ, La integración europea y España, Madrid 1961, p. 139.24. MAE, Leg. 10383, exp. 4: “España ante la encrucijada de su posible asociación con el MercadoComún o la EFTA”, report by the Director for Economic Cooperation, 3 March 1961.25. Although the minutes of the Comisión Delgada (ACMP, box 2809) do not show any clear inclinationfor EFTA as against the EEC, Gual Villalbí interpreted the decision adopted in this sense; MAE,Leg. 9604, exp. 9: “Informe sobre los trabajos de la Comisión interministerial designada por el Gobiernopara estudiar la posición de España frente a la Comunidad Europea y el eventual establecimientode una zona de libre comercio entre otros países de Europa”, 8 March 1961, to which thequotation belongs.