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108Fernando Guiraoof the first FTA proposal was no deterrent to a quick Spanish reaction, rather thecontrary. The immediate and most pressing concern of the Spanish government (asof many others) was to ensure that the FTA provided a means of escape from thediscrimination which their agricultural products would suffer in the markets of theSix, if the Treaty of Rome came into operation without any complementarymachinery linking other OEEC member countries with the EEC. Given the importanceof the OEEC as a trading partner and considering that the initiative could stilltake full consideration of Spain's interests, participation in any free trade zone wasa “guarantee” for the future. 14The possibility of being part of a collective response allowed the Spanish governmentto disregard, until the very end of July 1957, the frequently-formulatedrecommendation to convene experts to study the consequences of the EEC Treaty.Before taking any decision, it seemed prudent to wait and see how the FTA initiativedeveloped within the OEEC. It was Spain's exclusion from the OEEC ad hocinter-governmental committee on the FTA that triggered off the creation of the“Comisión Interministerial para el Estudio de las Comunidades Económicas Europeasy la Zona de Libre Comercio” in order to study the impact of the new institutionaldevelopments taking place at the heart of Western Europe. 15Madrid had no intention of facing negotiations with the EEC in isolation andthus fought its way into the OEEC inter-governmental committee dealing with theproblems of the FTA (the so-called Maudling Committee) before the latter couldreach decisions which would vitally affect the Spanish economy. One could arguethat the FTA neglecting agricultural trade should have been of lesser interest toSpain than the EEC, which cast the seeds of an ambitious common programme.This argument disregards the possibility that the initiative might be changedthrough multilateral negotiation and that Spain when becoming an OEEC partnermight be granted special clauses concerning its major exporting concerns, like agriculturalexports. Far more important, this argument neglects the Spanish considerationof OEEC as the mechanism which would render unnecessary any policytowards the EEC. 16The prospect of reaching a modus vivendi among the OEEC States vanished afew hours after Spain finally had entered the Maudling Committee. The same daythat the French government declared it impossible to form a free trade area betweenthe Six and the other OEEC countries, a representative of the Spanish governmentwas allowed to join the FTA negotiations. The Spanish Council of Ministers was14. MAE, Leg. 4646, exp. 1: “Nota para el Excmo. Sr. Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores sobre entrada deEspaña en la OECE” by the Head of Delegation to the OEEC, Paris, 10 July 1957.15. Decree of 27 July 1957, BOE (Official State Gazette) 21 August 1957, p. 770, which established theComisión interministerial para el estudio de los problemas que pueden plantear en la Península elMercado Común Europeo como una posible Zona de Libre Comercio (CICE).16. PRO, FO 371/136676: Records of conversation between the President of the Board of Trade and (a)General Franco, 11 June 1958, as recorded in Tel. 239, British Ambassador to FO, Madrid, 11 June;(b) minister without portfolio and Chairman of CICE, Pedro Gaul Villalbí, and (c) Minister of CommerceAlberto Ullastres Calvo, both on 9 June 1958, as recorded in enclosures to despatch 82, BritishAmbassador to FO, Madrid, 14 June 1958.
Association or Trade Agreement? 109informed of this diplomatic success at the same time as of the sudden collapse ofthe Free Trade Area of the Seventeen. 17 The Maudling Committee would only meetto plan its discreet dissolution.The collapse of an OEEC-wide strategy led to the formation of the EuropeanFree Trade Association (EFTA) as an alternative grouping to counteract the powerof attraction exercised by the Six on some OEEC countries, while continuing toexercise a collective pressure on moderate EEC discrimination. Negotiationsamong the seven members of the Stockholm Group were looked upon with littleapprehension in Madrid. The various, intermittent statements during the processleading to the Stockholm Convention, which affirmed that EFTA would facilitatethe establishment of a multilateral association embracing western Europe, in factcalmed the Spanish authorities. They had other fish to fry.If the under-developed countries of the western bloc, Finland, Greece, Iceland,Ireland and Turkey, were caught in between the battle of Sixes and Sevens, Spainalso was in the midst of its particular battle for stabilisation. If Spain were to contemplateassociation with either of the trade groupings, it would have required considerablylonger to dismantle its trade barriers than the ten year period consideredby both the Treaty of Rome and the Stockholm Convention. Thus Spain's initialstrategy was to count on a revised OEEC in which intra-European disputes couldfind a solution taking into account the needs of the weakest economies, while in themean-time the Spanish economy was assimilating the stabilisation measures of thesummer of 1959 and the new tariff instrument applied since spring 1960. Preservingthe OEEC as the main institution for European economic cooperation was consideredthe best way to iron out differences between the Six and the Seven, to takeinto account the interest of countries that belonged to neither group, to give animpulse to liberalisation in agricultural trade and to obtain development aid. Aftermore than a decade of exclusion, the government of Spain became enthusiasticallypro-OEEC! 18The Spanish government wanted to stay on the sidelines for as long as theycould, hoping the remodelled OEEC would look after Spain's interests. Because oftrade, they were torn between the Six and the Seven and thus welcomed any kind ofreconciliation. For this reason Madrid was unhappy about the failure of theKennedy Administration to give a strong lead in the right direction. It feared thatthe tug-of-war between Sixes and Sevens would render the new Organisation forEconomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) ineffective. This would forceSpain “to choose fairly quickly between the Six and the Seven”. 1917. MAE, Leg. 4646, exp. 22: Note for the Cabinet, “Zona de Libre Comercio”, 14 November 1958.18. For an account of Spain´s expectations of the OEEC by the time of its accession, MAE, Leg. 5459,exp. 10: President of the Spanish Delegation to the OEEC to Minister Castiella, “Cooperación deEspaña con la OECE”, Paris, 27 July 1959. For the Spanish views on the re-organisation of theOEEC, PRO, FO 371/150086: “Memorandum” by the Spanish Delegation, Paris, 12 March 1960.19. The Director for Economic Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the British Ambassador,PRO, FO 371/150327: British Ambassador to FO, Madrid, 23 December 1960.
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Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

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