Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'
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Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l' Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

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106Fernando Guiraofield to proceed as a consolation. The opening of talks on the consequences of EECpolicies for the Spanish economy and trade, as well as the analysis of possible solutionswas what the EEC Council of Ministers understood and Madrid accepted,leading to the negotiation of the agreement concluded in 1970. The flexibility ofthe Spanish application avoided its straightforward rejection and provided enoughroom for the EEC to accept a low-profile solution able to pass unnoticed by theforces in opposition to Franco once they thought to have blocked the path to association.What the Spanish government requested, therefore, was to open negotiations inorder to study the mutually most convenient type of relationship between Spain andthe EEC in which their immediate and long-term problems could get a hearing;what the Spanish government desired, however, was that this relationship shouldadopt the form of proper association. The political stigma that accompanied theFranco regime prevented, again, desires and available options being fused into oneand the same policy outcome.The issue raised so far is not a trivial point. It determines the meaning of subsequentevents. If the weight of analysis is bent towards the flexible approach, the1970 agreement should not be considered as an unexpected result, falling short ofthe original request. Contrariwise, if association is seen as the Spanish government'sfundamental option, a mere trade agreement should be regarded as the inevitableresult of the pariah status of the Franco regime.IIPolitical factors might explain the profile which Spain's EEC policy finallyadopted, but tell us little, if anything, about the policy itself, its point of departure,nature, aims, and timing. Policy developments between the signing of the Treaty ofRome and the decision to request the opening of negotiations with the Community,may be better explained by economic and commercial factors, rather than by politics.At first, the Spanish government disregarded the need to face the EEC bilaterally.It tried to be a part of the collective response being prepared within the OEECin the form of a free trade area (FTA). The importance of Spain's trade with theOEEC area as a whole and the fact that negotiations to achieve membership of theOrganisation were well under way, permitted Madrid to adopt a collectiveapproach.In the period 1954-56, the OEEC countries accounted for fifty-eight and fortynineper cent of Spain's exports and imports, respectively (Table 1). Trade with theEEC was not negligible and was particularly dynamic on the export side: whiletotal exports declined by almost five per cent in 1954-56, exports to the EECincreased by almost eight per cent. The United Kingdom, however, representedSpain's second most important European source of supply (after the Federal

Association or Trade Agreement? 107Republic of Germany) and largest outlet. Despite the decline in exports to Britain,any decision which could drive Spain away from this important market had to bestudied carefully.TABLE 1: Spain´s West European Trade, 1954-56 (in '000 of Gold Pesetas)IMPORTS1954 % 1955 % 1956 %Total imports 1.882.105 100 1.889.572 100 2.346.930 100Imp. from OEEC 966.169 51.3 971.413 51.4 1.054.713 45.0Imp. from EEC * 531.536 28.2 568.332 30.1 610.488 26.0Imp. from UK 194.843 10.3 192.258 10.2 214.906 9.2EXPORTS1954 % 1955 % 1956 %Total exports 1.421.615 100 1.365.967 100 1.353.283 100Exp. to OEEC 814.634 57.3 840.272 61.5 757.511 56.0Exp. to EEC * 370.463 26.1 452.826 33.1 403.200 30.0Exports to UK 236.598 16.6 222.705 16.3 204.682 15.1Source: Estadística de Comercio Exterior de España, Madrid, various years. (*) The EEC includesthe associated overseas countries and territories according to articles 131 ff. and listed in annex 4 ofthe Treaty of Rome.Besides, Spain showed a high dependence on the non-Six OEEC markets formany export goods. In fact, top-ranking staples were distributed almost in identicalpercentages between the Six, the non-EEC OEEC markets and the rest of theworld.With the OEEC as Spain's most important commercial area, the Minister ofCommerce's announcement of active participation in FTA discussions as early asFebruary 1957 is not surprising. 13 The government considered the FTA as the bestway to face the challenge created by the EEC. This meant accelerating accession tothe OEEC, so as to allow Madrid to benefit from the collective response to theproblems posed by the economic division of Western Europe. The industrial profile13. National Archives and Records Administration, General Records of the Department of State, RG 59,852.00: US Embassy to State Department, “Joint Week No. 7 (Economic Section) for State, Air andNavy”, Madrid, 15 February 1957. The new Cabinet which took office in February 1957 and the newMinister of Commerce had no difficulty in continuing with this policy.

Association or Tra<strong>de</strong> Agreement? 107Republic <strong>of</strong> Germany) and largest outlet. Despite the <strong>de</strong>cline in exports to Britain,any <strong>de</strong>cision which could drive Spain away from this important market had to bestudied carefully.TABLE 1: Spain´s West <strong>European</strong> Tra<strong>de</strong>, 1954-56 (in '000 <strong>of</strong> Gold Pesetas)IMPORTS1954 % 1955 % 1956 %Total imports 1.882.105 100 1.889.572 100 2.346.930 100Imp. from OEEC 966.169 51.3 971.413 51.4 1.054.713 45.0Imp. from EEC * 531.536 28.2 568.332 30.1 610.488 26.0Imp. from UK 194.843 10.3 192.258 10.2 214.906 9.2EXPORTS1954 % 1955 % 1956 %Total exports 1.421.615 100 1.365.967 100 1.353.283 100Exp. to OEEC 814.634 57.3 840.272 61.5 757.511 56.0Exp. to EEC * 370.463 26.1 452.826 33.1 403.200 30.0Exports to UK 236.598 16.6 222.705 16.3 204.682 15.1Source: Estadística <strong>de</strong> Comercio Exterior <strong>de</strong> España, Madrid, various years. (*) The EEC inclu<strong>de</strong>sthe associated overseas countries and territories according to articles 131 ff. and listed in annex 4 <strong>of</strong>the Treaty <strong>of</strong> Rome.Besi<strong>de</strong>s, Spain showed a high <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce on the non-Six OEEC markets formany export goods. In fact, top-ranking staples were distributed almost in i<strong>de</strong>nticalpercentages between the Six, the non-EEC OEEC markets and the rest <strong>of</strong> theworld.With the OEEC as Spain's most important commercial area, the Minister <strong>of</strong>Commerce's announcement <strong>of</strong> active participation in FTA discussions as early asFebruary 1957 is not surprising. 13 The government consi<strong>de</strong>red the FTA as the bestway to face the challenge created by the EEC. This meant accelerating accession tothe OEEC, so as to allow Madrid to benefit from the collective response to theproblems posed by the economic division <strong>of</strong> Western Europe. The industrial pr<strong>of</strong>ile13. National Archives and Records Administration, General Records <strong>of</strong> the Department <strong>of</strong> State, RG 59,852.00: US Embassy to State Department, “Joint Week No. 7 (Economic Section) for State, Air andNavy”, Madrid, 15 February 1957. The new Cabinet which took <strong>of</strong>fice in February 1957 and the newMinister <strong>of</strong> Commerce had no difficulty in continuing with this policy.

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