Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

106Fernando Guiraofield to proceed as a consolation. The opening of talks on the consequences of EECpolicies for the Spanish economy and trade, as well as the analysis of possible solutionswas what the EEC Council of Ministers understood and Madrid accepted,leading to the negotiation of the agreement concluded in 1970. The flexibility ofthe Spanish application avoided its straightforward rejection and provided enoughroom for the EEC to accept a low-profile solution able to pass unnoticed by theforces in opposition to Franco once they thought to have blocked the path to association.What the Spanish government requested, therefore, was to open negotiations inorder to study the mutually most convenient type of relationship between Spain andthe EEC in which their immediate and long-term problems could get a hearing;what the Spanish government desired, however, was that this relationship shouldadopt the form of proper association. The political stigma that accompanied theFranco regime prevented, again, desires and available options being fused into oneand the same policy outcome.The issue raised so far is not a trivial point. It determines the meaning of subsequentevents. If the weight of analysis is bent towards the flexible approach, the1970 agreement should not be considered as an unexpected result, falling short ofthe original request. Contrariwise, if association is seen as the Spanish government'sfundamental option, a mere trade agreement should be regarded as the inevitableresult of the pariah status of the Franco regime.IIPolitical factors might explain the profile which Spain's EEC policy finallyadopted, but tell us little, if anything, about the policy itself, its point of departure,nature, aims, and timing. Policy developments between the signing of the Treaty ofRome and the decision to request the opening of negotiations with the Community,may be better explained by economic and commercial factors, rather than by politics.At first, the Spanish government disregarded the need to face the EEC bilaterally.It tried to be a part of the collective response being prepared within the OEECin the form of a free trade area (FTA). The importance of Spain's trade with theOEEC area as a whole and the fact that negotiations to achieve membership of theOrganisation were well under way, permitted Madrid to adopt a collectiveapproach.In the period 1954-56, the OEEC countries accounted for fifty-eight and fortynineper cent of Spain's exports and imports, respectively (Table 1). Trade with theEEC was not negligible and was particularly dynamic on the export side: whiletotal exports declined by almost five per cent in 1954-56, exports to the EECincreased by almost eight per cent. The United Kingdom, however, representedSpain's second most important European source of supply (after the Federal