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100Dermot KeoghHad Lemass and other senior politicians been more experienced in the ways ofEEC affairs, there would have been less need to exhibit concern. Whitaker's strategyof “dignified calm”, outlined on 5 March, was a prudent one. But it was difficultto follow when the government needed a “success” in Europe in order to forestallfurther domestic political criticism of its performance. Convinced that hecould overcome the remaining doubts concerning the Irish application in the mindsof the foreign ministers of the Six – had not his trip to Brussels on 18 January hadan impact – the Taoiseach now looked favourably on the suggestion of a tour of theEuropean capitals. Lemass, who was going to the opening of the Second VaticanCouncil on 11 October, saw that as an opportunity to extend his trip to visit thecapitals of the Six. That was a poor pretence.Space does not allow a detailed explanation of Lemass's tour of a number of thecapitals. He visited Brussels, Rome, Paris and Bonn. Upon his return to Dublin,Lemass knew that the Six would agree on the admission of Ireland to negotiations.But he was also aware that formal talks would not begin with Brussels until negotiationshad first been concluded with Britain. In the final week in October, theCouncil agreed in Brussels to the opening of negotiations on the Irish application ata date to be fixed by agreement with Dublin and the governments of the Six.Lemass gave that news to Dáil Éireann on 30 October. 84 While he faced a series ofquestions from the opposition, he refused to give much detail about his trips to thecapitals of the Six. 85 He remained, as ever, economical with his information. 86Lemass recorded the goodwill shown to the Irish application by everyone withwhom he had come in contact. Because of the absolute priority which the Six hadaccorded the British application it was thus unlikely that substantive negotiationswith Dublin would begin for “some months”. Failure of the British applicationwould “create an entirely new situation for all concerned and one about which itwould be impossible to make any useful conjecture” at that time. When pressed byDillon, Lemass speculated that British accession might occur on 1 January 1964. 87A meeting of departmental secretaries reviewed the Irish position on 13 November.Cremin, addressing a number of the remaining problems, said that Britain wasIreland's main market, and he gained the impression from the French foreign minister’sremarks that he intended to write off the Six as a market for Irish exports. Creminfelt that viewpoint would come up again later. He also told his fellow secretariesthat Adenauer had been extremely friendly, giving a dinner in honour of theTaoiseach and attending the dinner given by the Taoiseach. The reception accordedthe Taoiseach in all the countries had been very friendly. Nowhere was there anyindication that some form of preferential association was contemplated for Ireland.The only critical note was that sounded by Sig. Cattani [Secretary General of the84. Dáil Debates, Vol. 197, Col. 3, 30 October 1962.85. Questions had been put down by the leader of Fine Gael, James Dillon, by three members of the LabourParty, Patrick Corish, William Norton and Seán Dunne, and by Noel Browne and Jack McQuillan.86. Dáil debates, Vol. 197, Col. 3, 30 October 1962.87. Dáil Debates, Vol. 197, Cols. 3-4, 30 October 1962.
The Diplomacy of ‘dignified calm’ 101Italian Foreign Ministry] who, although well disposed, was inclined to look at mattersfrom the Community viewpoint and seemed to say that Irish entry to the Communitywas not as simple a matter as his Italian colleagues appeared to think. Creminadded that he had heard from Dutch sources that Hallstein had said that it wasnot clear what would happen to other countries besides Britain. Cremin felt thatthat seemed to be a retreat from what he had previously said to the Taoiseach.However, having achieved their medium term objective, it was a question ofwatching and awaiting the outcome of the British negotiations. In January 1963, deGaulle's veto on British entry put Irish membership out of reach.ConclusionIt would take another ten years before Ireland was accepted as a member of theEuropean Economic Community. Lemass, who was in declining health, resignedsuddenly in 1966 at the age of 67. Only Taoiseach for seven years, he did not live towitness Ireland's admission to the EEC. He retired from Dáil Éireann in 1969 anddied in 1971. Dr Whitaker wrote of him appreciatively some years later:“One can, however, safely assert that this pragmatic nationalist, who had erected thehigh tariff wall in the 1930s to shelter Ireland's infant industry, would have beenhappy to see it razed to the ground in return for the benefits to Ireland of membershipof the Community. He would have been gratified that many of the ‘infants’ werestrong enough to make their way against Continental as well as British competitors.”88The Irish Times in an editorial described Seán Lemass at the time of his death as“a mould breaker and a mould maker”. 89 While he had found it hard to abandon thesafe shores of protectionism, Lemass was not so rigid as to be unable to evaluatethe opportunities which membership of the EEC offered Ireland. While the 1962application failed, it signalled the death knell of the policy of protectionism,marked the consolidation of Monnet-style rational social and economic planning,and proved to be an irrevocable commitment to the achievement of Irish membershipof the EEC. The political and administrative experience gained in handling the1962 application, finally, demonstrated the prudence of the diplomacy of “dignifiedcalm” – a diplomatic style more often aspired to than practised by Dublin during1962. That earlier experience provided a new generation of diplomats and veteransalike with a valuable case study by which they could measure tactics and performancewhen, less than a decade later, they negotiated Irish entry into the EEC.Dermot Keogh88. T. K. WHITAKER, Interests, p. 77.89. The Irish Times, 12 May 1971.
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Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

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