Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

8Wolfram Kaisertion from the Federal Republic of Germany in the EEC could be economically disastrousfor France. In any case, the plan was unacceptable without far-reachingcompensations similar to those France had obtained in the Brussels negotiations,which included EEC funds to subsidise the French colonies and the decision inprinciple to develop a common agricultural policy by the end of 1969. 6 At least thegovernments of the Fourth Republic were still to some extent tempted by the ideathat Britain could provide a useful counterbalance to the Federal Republic in theemerging European structure and thus they showed some political interest in theFTA plan. After his return to power in spring 1958, however, de Gaulle moreclearly preferred the EEC – based on French political leadership – and close cooperationwith the Germans, and the reorganisation of the North Atlantic TreatyOrganisation (NATO) almost immediately became the primary focus of French foreignpolicy. 7After the breakdown of the FTA negotiations the non-Six OEEC states neededto redefine their European policies. They were confronted with the prospect ofgrowing discrimination in the EEC market by comparison with the Six. The EECTreaty provided for the abolition of all internal tariffs on industrial goods and theintroduction of a common external tariff over a period of twelve years, starting withthe first reduction of 10 per cent on 1 January 1959. In addition, the British governmentwas concerned about the EEC offering German industry every advantage inproduction and commercialisation of a larger internal market and thus also providingit with substantial competitive advantages over British industry in third markets.Moreover, as the only larger power among the non-Six OEEC states with continuingworld-wide political interests and responsibilities, the British also fearedthat the EEC without a wider FTA would reduce their political influence in WesternEurope and vis-à-vis the United States. In early 1956 Macmillan, who was thenChancellor of the Exchequer, already had warned that“perhaps Messina will come off after all and that will mean Western Europe dominatedin fact by Germany and used as an instrument for the revival of German powerthrough economic means. It is really giving them on a plate what we fought two warsto prevent.” 8Of the non-Six OEEC states, Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland,Austria and Portugal eventually decided in 1959 to create the European Free TradeAssociation (EFTA), with Portugal joining in the negotiations only after preparatorytalks among the other Six. The Stockholm Convention was initialled on 20November 1959, signed on 4 January 1960, and it entered into force on 3 May1960. Finland later became associated with the so-called outer Seven through FIN-EFTA, which was signed on 27 March 1961 and entered into force on 26 June6. S. BERNIER, Relations politiques franco-britanniques (1947-1958), Sherbrooke 1984, p.178.7. On de Gaulle and the reorganisation of NATO after 1958 see M. VAISSE, “Aux origines du mémorandumde septembre 1958”, in: Relations Internationales 58 (1989), pp.253-68; G.-H. SOUTOU,“Le général de Gaulle et le plan Fouchet”, in: Institut Charles de Gaulle (ed.), De Gaulle en son siècle.Vol. 5: L'Europe, Paris 1992, pp.126-43.8. PRO T 234/100 (1 February 1956).