13.07.2015 Views

Need to Know: IFRS 10 - Consolidated Financial ... - BDO Canada

Need to Know: IFRS 10 - Consolidated Financial ... - BDO Canada

Need to Know: IFRS 10 - Consolidated Financial ... - BDO Canada

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS
  • No tags were found...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

34 <strong>IFRS</strong> <strong>10</strong> <strong>Consolidated</strong> <strong>Financial</strong> StatementsThe example below indicates how the criteria set out above could be applied in practice.Example <strong>10</strong> – Application of ‘linkage’ criteria [<strong>IFRS</strong> <strong>10</strong>.B72 Application Example 14 – 14D]Basic ScenarioA fund manager (the decision maker) establishes markets and manages a fund that provides investmen<strong>to</strong>pportunities <strong>to</strong> a number of inves<strong>to</strong>rs.The fund manager must make decisions in the best interests of all inves<strong>to</strong>rs and in accordance with the fund’sgoverning agreements but has wide decision-making discretion.The fund manager receives a market-based fee for its services equal <strong>to</strong>:––1% of assets under management, and––20% of all the fund’s profits if a specified profit level is achieved.The fees are commensurate with the services provided.AnalysisThe fund manager is likely <strong>to</strong> be an agent.Although it must make decisions in the best interests of all inves<strong>to</strong>rs, the fund manager has extensive decisionmakingauthority <strong>to</strong> direct the relevant activities of the fund.The inves<strong>to</strong>rs do not hold substantive rights that could affect the fund manager’s decision-making authority.The fund manager is paid fixed and performance-related fees that are commensurate with the services provided.In addition, the remuneration aligns the interests of the fund manager with those of the other inves<strong>to</strong>rs <strong>to</strong>increase the value of the fund, without creating exposure <strong>to</strong> variability of returns from the activities of the fundthat is of such significance that the remuneration, when considered in isolation, indicates that the fund manager isa principal.Scenario 2Same facts as in basic scenario plus:––Fund manager has 2% investment in fund but no obligation <strong>to</strong> fund losses beyond its 2% investments––Inves<strong>to</strong>rs can remove the fund manager by a simple majority vote, but only for breach of contract.AnalysisThe fund manager is likely <strong>to</strong> be an agent.The fund manager’s 2% investment increases its exposure <strong>to</strong> variability of returns from the activities of the fundwithout creating exposure that is of such significance that it indicates that the fund manager is a principal.The other inves<strong>to</strong>rs’ rights <strong>to</strong> remove the fund manager are considered <strong>to</strong> be protective rights because they areexercisable only for breach of contract.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!