Sartre's second century
Sartre's second century
Sartre's second century
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Temporality and the Death of Lucienne in Nausea 51<br />
it constitutes this situation as the past. The past is revealed to<br />
consciousness in this nihilating flight as the facticity of one's existence.<br />
The past obligates him to exist and to exist within this particular, yet<br />
contingent, reality. The past is not ineffectually "pensioned off and<br />
Roquentin is not isolated on the instantaneous island of his present.<br />
It is important to note that the obligation made by one's past is made<br />
on a pre-reflective level. Earlier in Nausea, Roquentin claims that he is<br />
unable to distinguish imagination from memory:<br />
I can search the past in vain, I can only find these scraps of images and I<br />
am not sure what they represent, whether they are memories or just<br />
fiction. 18<br />
Although he is unable to distinguish memory from fiction on a reflective<br />
level, Roquentin's reaction demonstrates how the past is distinguished<br />
from imaginative fiction at a pre-reflective level. This distinction is not<br />
made by an effort of cognition or reflective examination alone. Rather, the<br />
past invokes an obligation in a way that our imagination cannot. The past<br />
lays a primordial, pre-reflective claim upon who we are. Even while<br />
Roquentin is unable to distinguish memory from imagination reflectively,<br />
the past is making its claim pre-reflectively. The past is distinguished from<br />
imagination as that which is constituted in the nihilating flight of<br />
consciousness.<br />
But how is it possible for Roquentin to describe the pre-reflective<br />
obligation that his past has upon him without being able fully to integrate<br />
this past as memory? What accounts for the unity of the past as memory?<br />
Sartre tells us in Being and Nothingness: "In order for us to 'have' a past,<br />
it is necessary that we maintain it in existence by our very project toward<br />
the future." 19 In order for a past experience to be retained in memory, it is<br />
necessary that it somehow fits, and is accounted for, in the projection of<br />
the self into the future. Past experience is ordered and made sense of, at<br />
least tangentially, by one's projects. Even half-forgotten incidents and<br />
ambiguous experiences are organised as far as possible into the many<br />
overlapping projects that make up a self:<br />
A living past, a half-dead past, survivals, ambiguities, discrepancies: the<br />
ensemble of these layers of pastness is organised by the unity of my<br />
project. It is by means of this project that there is installed the complex<br />
18 Nausea, 32.<br />
19 Being and Nothingness, 639.