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Sartre's second century

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Temporality and the Death of Lucienne in Nausea 51<br />

it constitutes this situation as the past. The past is revealed to<br />

consciousness in this nihilating flight as the facticity of one's existence.<br />

The past obligates him to exist and to exist within this particular, yet<br />

contingent, reality. The past is not ineffectually "pensioned off and<br />

Roquentin is not isolated on the instantaneous island of his present.<br />

It is important to note that the obligation made by one's past is made<br />

on a pre-reflective level. Earlier in Nausea, Roquentin claims that he is<br />

unable to distinguish imagination from memory:<br />

I can search the past in vain, I can only find these scraps of images and I<br />

am not sure what they represent, whether they are memories or just<br />

fiction. 18<br />

Although he is unable to distinguish memory from fiction on a reflective<br />

level, Roquentin's reaction demonstrates how the past is distinguished<br />

from imaginative fiction at a pre-reflective level. This distinction is not<br />

made by an effort of cognition or reflective examination alone. Rather, the<br />

past invokes an obligation in a way that our imagination cannot. The past<br />

lays a primordial, pre-reflective claim upon who we are. Even while<br />

Roquentin is unable to distinguish memory from imagination reflectively,<br />

the past is making its claim pre-reflectively. The past is distinguished from<br />

imagination as that which is constituted in the nihilating flight of<br />

consciousness.<br />

But how is it possible for Roquentin to describe the pre-reflective<br />

obligation that his past has upon him without being able fully to integrate<br />

this past as memory? What accounts for the unity of the past as memory?<br />

Sartre tells us in Being and Nothingness: "In order for us to 'have' a past,<br />

it is necessary that we maintain it in existence by our very project toward<br />

the future." 19 In order for a past experience to be retained in memory, it is<br />

necessary that it somehow fits, and is accounted for, in the projection of<br />

the self into the future. Past experience is ordered and made sense of, at<br />

least tangentially, by one's projects. Even half-forgotten incidents and<br />

ambiguous experiences are organised as far as possible into the many<br />

overlapping projects that make up a self:<br />

A living past, a half-dead past, survivals, ambiguities, discrepancies: the<br />

ensemble of these layers of pastness is organised by the unity of my<br />

project. It is by means of this project that there is installed the complex<br />

18 Nausea, 32.<br />

19 Being and Nothingness, 639.

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