price discrimination in the airline industry - Fagbokforlaget

price discrimination in the airline industry - Fagbokforlaget price discrimination in the airline industry - Fagbokforlaget

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2.4 Frequent flyer programsFrequent flyer programs can be regarded as a quantity discount: by purchasing a certainamount of a good, it receives one unit of the good for free. In this Section we analyse thewelfare effect of such a particular price discrimination scheme. We start out by analyzingmonopoly, and then discuss how our conclusions may change when we have acompetitive setting. 7As a starting point, let us interpret a frequent flyer program as a discount program.The discount is not a price reduction as such, but a larger quantity offered for a givenprice. This is valuable for the consumer. The effects for the consumer are illustrated inFigure 7.Figure 7 The welfare effects of a frequent flyer program with monopolyPriceDemand with a frequent flyer programCP FFPp MONBADemand without afrequent flyerprogramQuantity7 The analysis we present here draws heavily on Steen and Sørgard (2001), chapter 7.© Steen and Sørgard 16

The solid line is the demand if there is no frequent flyer program. If we introduce afrequent flyer program, then the demand expands from the solid to the dotted line inFigure 7. One way to see this, is to consider the consumers’ willingness to pay. For agiven quantity, the consumers will have a higher willingness to pay. The reason is thatthe consumers now receive an additional amount, or more precisely an option on anadditional amount of the good in the future. Therefore, the demand curve shifts upward.An increase in the willingness to pay is of importance for the firm’s price setting.The firm can extract part of the increase in consumer surplus by increasing the price. Thisis illustrated in Figure 7 with the price increase from p MON to p FFP in Figure 7.What are the effects for the consumers of the introduction of a frequent flyerprogram? With no frequent flyer program the consumer surplus is A + B in Figure 7.From the Figure we see that after the introduction of the frequent flyer program theconsumers surplus is B + C. Then we see that the effect for the consumers of theintroduction of a frequent flyer program is ambiguous. On the one hand it has a higherwillingness to pay for the good, since it includes an option for a free unit in the future. Onthe other hand, the consumer is hurt by the price increase triggered by the introduction ofthe frequent flyer program. We see from Figure 7 that the consumers are worse off afterthe introduction of the frequent flyer program if A > C.The introduction of a frequent flyer program is analogous to an increase in qualityfor the good in question. As shown in Spence (1975), a quality increase has anambiguous effect on the consumer surplus. The basic reason is that the consumers careabout how a quality change affects the total willingness to pay, while the firm cares abouthow quality affects the marginal willingness to pay. There is no mechanism that canassure that those two effects coincide. Hence, there is no reason to expect that the marketoutcome leads to the quality level the consumers would prefer.The above analysis shows that from a consumer point of view the frequent flyerprogram has an ambiguous effect in monopoly. However, there are two important aspectsthat are left out of the analysis so far. First, the incentive structure for the consumers. Inthe industry in question we often observe that the person that buys the product is notpaying for the good. An employee buys the air ticket, while the employer pays the ticket.However, the frequent flyer program is an individual program. It implies that the© Steen and Sørgard 17

The solid l<strong>in</strong>e is <strong>the</strong> demand if <strong>the</strong>re is no frequent flyer program. If we <strong>in</strong>troduce afrequent flyer program, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> demand expands from <strong>the</strong> solid to <strong>the</strong> dotted l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong>Figure 7. One way to see this, is to consider <strong>the</strong> consumers’ will<strong>in</strong>gness to pay. For agiven quantity, <strong>the</strong> consumers will have a higher will<strong>in</strong>gness to pay. The reason is that<strong>the</strong> consumers now receive an additional amount, or more precisely an option on anadditional amount of <strong>the</strong> good <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> future. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> demand curve shifts upward.An <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> will<strong>in</strong>gness to pay is of importance for <strong>the</strong> firm’s <strong>price</strong> sett<strong>in</strong>g.The firm can extract part of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> consumer surplus by <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>price</strong>. Thisis illustrated <strong>in</strong> Figure 7 with <strong>the</strong> <strong>price</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease from p MON to p FFP <strong>in</strong> Figure 7.What are <strong>the</strong> effects for <strong>the</strong> consumers of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction of a frequent flyerprogram? With no frequent flyer program <strong>the</strong> consumer surplus is A + B <strong>in</strong> Figure 7.From <strong>the</strong> Figure we see that after <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction of <strong>the</strong> frequent flyer program <strong>the</strong>consumers surplus is B + C. Then we see that <strong>the</strong> effect for <strong>the</strong> consumers of <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>troduction of a frequent flyer program is ambiguous. On <strong>the</strong> one hand it has a higherwill<strong>in</strong>gness to pay for <strong>the</strong> good, s<strong>in</strong>ce it <strong>in</strong>cludes an option for a free unit <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> future. On<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> consumer is hurt by <strong>the</strong> <strong>price</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease triggered by <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction of<strong>the</strong> frequent flyer program. We see from Figure 7 that <strong>the</strong> consumers are worse off after<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction of <strong>the</strong> frequent flyer program if A > C.The <strong>in</strong>troduction of a frequent flyer program is analogous to an <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> qualityfor <strong>the</strong> good <strong>in</strong> question. As shown <strong>in</strong> Spence (1975), a quality <strong>in</strong>crease has anambiguous effect on <strong>the</strong> consumer surplus. The basic reason is that <strong>the</strong> consumers careabout how a quality change affects <strong>the</strong> total will<strong>in</strong>gness to pay, while <strong>the</strong> firm cares abouthow quality affects <strong>the</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>al will<strong>in</strong>gness to pay. There is no mechanism that canassure that those two effects co<strong>in</strong>cide. Hence, <strong>the</strong>re is no reason to expect that <strong>the</strong> marketoutcome leads to <strong>the</strong> quality level <strong>the</strong> consumers would prefer.The above analysis shows that from a consumer po<strong>in</strong>t of view <strong>the</strong> frequent flyerprogram has an ambiguous effect <strong>in</strong> monopoly. However, <strong>the</strong>re are two important aspectsthat are left out of <strong>the</strong> analysis so far. First, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>centive structure for <strong>the</strong> consumers. In<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dustry <strong>in</strong> question we often observe that <strong>the</strong> person that buys <strong>the</strong> product is notpay<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> good. An employee buys <strong>the</strong> air ticket, while <strong>the</strong> employer pays <strong>the</strong> ticket.However, <strong>the</strong> frequent flyer program is an <strong>in</strong>dividual program. It implies that <strong>the</strong>© Steen and Sørgard 17

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