Close Combat: Armys Fundamental Skill - Australian Army

Close Combatbriefly constructing a straw man for institutionalised close combat training in theAustralian Army. Many of the ideas for the straw man come from the United StatesMarine Corps (USMC) exercise Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV). EMV is a twentyeightday Operation ENDURING FREEDOM pre-deployment training packageconducted at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in California.A necessary preliminary to this discussion is to define the term ‘close combat’,which has been obscured by a melee of related terms such as ‘close battle’, ‘closequarter battle’ and ‘close quarter combat’. The definition of close combat providedby Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept, and that which is usedin this discussion is:Close combat is that carried out with direct fire weapons, against identifiable individuals,supported by indirect fire, air-delivered fires and nonlethal engagement means. Note:Close combat defeats or destroys the enemy forces or seizes and retains ground. 5This definition implies close combat occurs in offensive and defensive manoeuvres,but for the sake of simplicity I will discuss close combat in an offensive context only.The exclusion of the defensive phase of war would no doubt please the author of theopening quote, General Patton. Patton’s quote is quite explicit as to level of commandat which close combat training should be conducted and the method used to conductit. However, the absence of any clear instruction on ‘what to train’, delivered withsimilar conviction, is conspicuous and reflective of our own conceptual difficulties.Understanding which close combat skills to train requires detailed understandingof the tactics, techniques and procedures required in close combat. Doctrine is anobvious start point for this understanding. Unfortunately the close combat explanationsare somewhat simplistic and close combat, ‘closing with the enemy’ and ‘fireand manoeuvre’ are treated as largely synonymous. Fire and movement is explainedin ‘The Rifle Platoon’ as ‘the technique of using fire to cover exposed movement.Within the platoon, one or more sections may cover the movement of another.’ 6This explanation hardly does justice to the complexities of close combat. MountedMinor Tactics introduces swarming, autonomous teams, the close combat cycle ofobserve–suppress–move–clear–observe and sensor shooting coupling in the openingchapter, but then reverts to simplistic examples and descriptions of linear tacticsin subsequent chapters describing tactics, training and procedures. 7 The effect ofthese simplistic explanations is simplistic understanding and subsequently simplistictraining. We are all familiar with this type of simplistic training: assaults in extendedline, movement occurring regardless of the effectiveness of suppression, or suppressionbeing deemed effective without confirmation of where the rounds are impactingor the effects they are having. Other manifestations are: the Tactical Exercise WithoutTroops solution, for which the mortar firing position is not identified; allowingthe gun target line geometries to be assumed away; or attack aviation fires beingAustralian Army Journal • Volume VII, Number 1 • page 155

Training, Doctrine and Education • Major James Davisemployed ‘freestyle’, regardless of direct fire locations and artillery gun target lines.These observations lead to a deduction that Army is potentially losing clarity in itscollective understanding of realities, difficulties and complexities of close combat.Not knowing what close combat ‘looks’ like makes it difficult to train.If our doctrine provides only simplistic explanations of close combat, from wheremight we get a better understanding? David Kilcullen’s analysis of assault tactics inhis article ‘Combined Arms and the Close Battle in Complex Terrain’ is a usefulstart point for understanding the relationship between fire and manoeuvre in closecombat and formulating ideas of how to train it. Kilcullen illustrates the passing ofthe simplistic linear assault tactics as follows:Soldiers in close combat engagements tend to move using covered approaches that areoften non-linear in character while fighting in a cycle of ‘observe–suppress–move–clear–observe’. In the close fight, soldiers tend to operate in small, semi-autonomousteams that ‘flock’ or ‘swarm’, rather than move forward in large linear-based groups.Because of the reality of close combat, it probably makes more sense to consider terrainin terms of representing a network of points and nodes, rather than as a sequence oflines. Under a point or nodal model of attack, manoeuvre supports fire. In other words,troops manoeuvre in order to generate effective fire, and then apply this fire in order toneutralise the enemy and achieve victory. 8Brigadier Justin Kelly and Dr Michael Brennan present similar ideas in theirworking paper on Distributed Manoeuvre as follows: ‘the inter-relationship between“lines” and “columns” is the basic mechanism of tactics. It is universal, has beencontinuous since pre-history, and remains evident even on the relatively formlessbattlefields of today.’ Kilcullen’s view is that themovement from node to node is performed as acolumn because it presents the smallest face forthe enemy to engage and allows manoeuvre andcontrol through difficult terrain. The columnbecomes a line when the situation requires themaximum number of weapons to engage theenemy, and the terrain or friendly suppressionpermits this with acceptable risk. In this way,Not knowing what closecombat ‘looks’ like makesit difficult to train.movement in columns (node to node) ‘enables the attacker, at least initially, tomaintain a “limited liability” posture in which the forces gambited are sufficient toprompt the defender into a response, but not so large as to allow the attacker tobecome decisively engaged’. 9 This idea is important as in all probability our threatwill exist below our Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance(ISTAR) threshold 10 and it needs to be identified through what AdaptiveCampaigning calls discovery actions.page 156 • Volume VII, Number 1 • Australian Army Journal

Close CombatThe logical follow-on from the identification of the crust of the enemy’s defence isthe attrition of the strong points. ‘This attrition is fundamental in forcing the defenceto adapt and thereby creating signatures that the attacking force has postured itself tocollect.’ 11 The purpose of this collecting of signatures is obviously to then allow thedestruction or suppression of the newly discovered enemy forces and for the closecombat cycle to repeat. In summary, ‘close combat’ in the offense generally consists ofgroups of soldiers manoeuvring from point to point. The purpose of this manoeuvreis to identify and attrite enemy strong points, as theact of doing so forces a response from the defenderwhich creates a signature. To respond to the actionsof the offensive force the assaulting force is then ableto manoeuvre to apply fire (either directly or througha sensor shooter relationship) to the elements of theenemy’s system that revealed itself. This completes anevolution of the close combat cycle. To designtraining that reflects these characteristics, it shouldbe asked what it is in combat that forces soldiers toadopt this means of attack as opposed to linear assault…‘close combat’ inthe offense generallyconsists of groups ofsoldiers manoeuvringfrom point to point.tactics. The answer, as it is with most innovations in warfare, is the basic human desireto avoid effective enemy fire. The obvious deduction is that genuine close combattraining requires an enemy that can return effective fire (a glimpse of the blindinglyobvious, I know). This return of fire and other responses is important to replicate the‘prod/sense’ dynamic inherent in close combat. Similarly, the terrain cannot allow theattacker an information or position advantage such that the enemy can avoidDistributed Manoeuvre. Not stated but implied is that the enemy will generally attemptto disrupt movement between nodes through the use of obstacles.Kilcullen’s second major point is that ‘fire’, not manoeuvre, is the thing that leadsto winning in close combat and manoeuvre is simply a method of getting fire whereit can kill the enemy. As Patton said,I think, if we should say ‘Fire is the Queen of Battle’, we should avoid arm arguments andcome nearer telling the truth. Battles are won by fire and movement. The purpose of themovement is to get the fire in a more advantageous place to play on the enemy. This isfrom the rear or flank. 12The follow-on is that close combat is a battle to gain support by fire, and attack byfire locations (nodes in Kilcullen speak) which enable the suppression or destructionof the enemy. In Patton’s view, and intuitively in our own, we know that destructionis more likely to result from fire at the enemy’s least protected areas. Supporting theidea of fire as the dominant factor in close combat, a 2001 study into attrition andsuppression in close combat concluded that:Australian Army Journal • Volume VII, Number 1 • page 157

Training, Doctrine and Education • Major James DavisModelling and historic analysis agree that success in offensive close combat is significantlyimproved by capabilities that: provide intimate support to the assault, and destroy threatsto the assault group after all remote (from close combat) supporting fire has ceased;provide direct fire to support the assault as it finally closes with the defence; and provideindirect fire support to suppress the enemy’s defences as the assault closes. 13It is significant that all three ‘success factors’ relate to fire, not manoeuvre. Thededuction is that close combat training should focus on the delivery and assessmentof fires.Determining where to focus our efforts in training the delivery and assessmentof fires requires analysis of how fire is arrayed or employed in close combat. I willsidestep any examination of the evolutionary trail from single system engagementsat Agincourt to the multiple system engagements of Fallujah and simply state as anassumption that, because the enemy presents himself in different guises (mounted,dismounted, dug in, etc) the location from which our fire is delivered will changeby range, system and nature. These differencesnecessitate the use of an array of weapons to achievesuppression and destruction across the geographicand material depth and breadth of the enemy. It israre that a single Support By Fire or Attack By Fireweapon system will achieve the suppression ordestruction effectively, though I have trained thisfolly many times at troop/platoon level. Small teamsusing or directing multiple Support By Fire andweapons systems require effective sensor shoot… destruction is morelikely to result fromfire at the enemy’s leastprotected areas.‘links’ or ‘coupling’ in Adaptive Campaigning terms. Thus for the close combattraining ‘problem’ to be realistic, the enemy and the terrain should generally notallow destruction or suppression by a single weapons system or single firing location.The enemy will contribute to this problem through the emplacement of obstacles,which the attacking force will be required to reduce if they are to move to positionsof advantage. The follow-on is the desirability of training that allows employmentof the maximum number of weapons systems from the widest number of locationswith the most permissive arcs. These weapons effects should be able to be directedor controlled by the soldier best able to observe the target and effects of fire.The other obvious implication of multiple firing points is the need for an instinctiveunderstanding of the geometries of fire. Only by making ‘safety’ the domainof the exercised force do we compel an understanding of minimum safe dangerdistances, gun target line restrictions and minimum engagement ranges at the lowestlevel. Thus the onus for effective and safe employment of weapons systems shouldlie with the exercised force and be executed in the ‘manner expected in combat’. 14page 158 • Volume VII, Number 1 • Australian Army Journal

Close CombatIn short, if we don’t know what the rules are to begin with it is difficult to assessthe risk in breaking them. It would be naïve to assume that safety restrictions aren’tvalid considerations in combat, and as such an understanding of geometries of fireis paramount to prevent fratricide. Furthermore there is a requirement of deployingforces that intimately understand and feel confident in the balance between the riskof fratricide and the risk of exposing friendly forces to an unsuppressed enemy.Lieutenant Colonel Robert Stevenson’s paper Not So Friendly Fire summarises thisin the chronologically dated but nonetheless relevant comment:…developing targeted doctrine, hard, realistic training, and appropriate safety procedurescan also play a role in minimising friendly fire incidents. However, unless the technologyis underpinned by high-quality education and training, the Army will be left with amismatch between its human and equipment capabilities. This will be the real challengeof HNA [Hardened Networked Army], to harness the synergistic effects of combined armsand joint operations without exponentially increasing the danger of large-scale fratricideincidents. This, unfortunately, can only be achieved by accepting some risk in peacetimetraining. Otherwise, the whole risk will simply be transferred to operations, where thethreat is higher, the loss of life potentially greater, and the implications more severe. 15Finally, multiple attack points or nodes implies there is need to plan, control andresupply ammunition during the assault. I will not discuss this facet in depth, butwonder out loud if we still own or practice this skill?Thus far this analysis has revealed the following requirements for a ‘close combattraining system’, complex terrain, and a responsive enemy which forces an adoptionand practice of Distributed Manoeuvre. Distributed Manoeuvre in turn requires thatthe small teams or nodes are capable of destroying orsuppressing enemy strong points. For a small team todo this successfully they are reliant on a dynamic sensorshooter coupling, understanding of geometries of fire,in-contact resupply, and an ability to assess the effectsof fires. Exercising geometries of fire understandingand sensor shooter links requires the widest latitudepossible in the number of weapons employed and thelocations and circumstances in which they can beemployed. Close combat training should demonstrate… an understandingof geometries offire is paramount toprevent fratricide.a bias to training fire over manoeuvre. Excepting a ‘responsive enemy’, these factorspoint overwhelmingly to live fire as the close combat training system of choice.So what might such a ‘close combat training system’ look like? Are there systemsoperating in other militaries that might serve as a model for the Australian Army?Any training activity that addresses the identified close combat characteristics is likelyto be complicated and require non-standard safety procedures. Acknowledging this,Australian Army Journal • Volume VII, Number 1 • page 159

Training, Doctrine and Education • Major James Davisthe USMC has outsourced the most realistic of its close combat training to the TacticalTraining Exercise Control Group (TTECG). The mission of TTECG is toConduct block IV (TF LFMX) pre-deployment training and assessment of tacticalelements of the MAGTF [Marine Air Ground Task Force] in the execution of the corecompetencies of combined arms techniques and procedures during full spectrumoperations [in order to] prepare units for OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom]. 16You can imagine TTECG as a Combat Training Centre (CTC) equivalent.TTECG performs three functions which allow the conduct of close combat training.I will examine each of these with an eye to CTC performing similar training.Firstly, TTECG provides a safety backstop; this eliminates the need for exercisingunits to devise and develop the range safety architecture. If you want people to dosomething, make it easy. This is not to say that units don’t have the imagination andwherewithal to coordinate this training, but a dedicated control group allowseconomies such as standing waivers for reduced safety distances, standing risk assessmentsand a standing series of instructions. Further enhancing the economy of effortis TTECG’s use of gazetted purpose-built ranges. These ranges allow the use of allorganicinfantry and light armour weapons at platoon and company level and havebeen designed to provide complex terrainlikely to induce Distributed Manoeuvre, andmitigate potential risks through intelligentdevelopment of terrain which supportssound geometries of fire.Using a gazetted purpose-built rangereduces manoeuvre options for the exercisedforce. This is entirely in keeping with thecharacteristics of close combat training andis reflected in the TTECG mission, whichAny training activity thataddresses the identified closecombat characteristics islikely to be complicated…focuses on ‘techniques and procedures’ only. It may appear that the presence of safetystaff is contradictory to the idea that the exercised force should be responsible for theconduct of safety in the manner they are expected to in combat. In practicality thereis no such contradiction and the phrase ‘safety backstop’ is an excellent descriptionof a covert safety architecture that is there to ‘catch the exercise force if they fall’ andnothing else. Our range doctrine permits such an approach, but I am less convinced ofthe supportiveness of our philosophy and outlook. It is conceivable that this expertiseand these ranges could be developed by CTC to allow the conduct of close combattraining as part of a warfighter series. A standard company training iteration couldconsist of a live fire attack per platoon and company attack. The weapons support,such as mortars and machine guns, should be provided to local high readiness unitsor the parent battalion.page 160 • Volume VII, Number 1 • Australian Army Journal

Close CombatSecondly, TTECG staff brings the range to life by providing feedback to the rangeparticipants as to the enemy’s actions. This is enabled and controlled through the‘corridor’, which ensures the consistency and accuracy of the enemy picture.Throughout their training Marines are instilled with three basic ‘paints’: ‘heavy fire’,‘effective fire’ and ‘sporadic fire’. The Marinesunderstand the implications of these ‘paints’ fortheir movement, and respond by adjustingmovement techniques or suppression as appropriate.‘Fighting the enemy’ enables the corridorto manipulate the range for achievement oftraining objectives and forces the use ofDistributed Manoeuvre and fires.Finally, TTECG staff provides assessment. Itake it as universally agreed that assessment is aUsing a gazetted purposebuiltrange reducesmanoeuvre options forthe exercised force.good thing and is already within the CTC remit, so I won’t laud it here; if, however,Army wishes to claim close combat as its fundamental skill it should be assessedin detail.The EMV close combat training model is ‘a way’ of training close combat. Onthe surface it seems feasible to adopt in the Australian Army. The key enablers ofthis training are the gazetted purpose-built ranges, modified safety restrictions anddedicated safety staff. Many of these things require effort to develop but once inplace require little effort to maintain. Conducting this training in a single organisationremoves the burden of reinventing the wheel by units. Only by making thistraining directed and assessed will Army achieve the focus that close combat’simportance merits. Without an institutional approach, individual units will be tooeasily consumed by the effort to make EMV-style close combat training work.In conclusion, the Australian Army’s doctrine leaves no doubt that close combatis at the heart of its capability. However, the anecdotal evidence is that this is notreflected in training areas and schools across the country. While doctrine is very goodat identifying the importance of close combat, it is less successful at outlining thenuts and bolts of its conduct that might form the baseline of a training methodology.Two relatively recent examinations of Distributed Manoeuvre have identified theprincipal characteristics of modern close combat. In broad summary, close combatgenerally consists of the movement of small teams from location to location to attriteenemy strong points and elicit a response from the enemy defensive system. MountedMinor Tactics identifies this as the close combat cycle of observe–suppress–move–clear–observe. 17 From this a training system to support the practice of close combatwas generically identified as one that had a responsive enemy, used complex terrain,allowed the use of the widest array of weapons in the widest range circumstances,placed the onus on safety on the exercised force, practiced sensor shooter couplingAustralian Army Journal • Volume VII, Number 1 • page 161

Training, Doctrine and Education • Major James Davisand had a bias for training in the use of fire as opposed to manoeuvre. A trainingsystem with these characteristics is used as part of USMC pre-deployment training.The system is enabled by gazetted purpose-built ranges, a dedicated safety staff andrigorous assessment. Such a training system could be considered by CTC to conductclose combat training in the Australian Army. Much of this may seem obvious, butit seems to have escaped Army’s collective attention for some time. Institutionalisingclose combat training ensures that it gets done and cannot be postponed, diluted orfragmented. Our doctrine makes it clear that compromising close combat trainingundermines achievement of the Army mission.Endnotes1 General George S Patton, letter of instruction, dated 3 April 1944, as quoted inPatton, War As I Knew It, Houghton Miffen, New York, 1985, p. 417.2 Land Warfare Doctrine 1 (LWD-1) – The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, Departmentof Defence, Canberra, 2008, p. 17.3 Ibid., p. 17.4 Australian Army, Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept,Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009, p. 81.5 Ibid., p. 11.6 Australian Army Manual of Land Warfare, Part Two, Volume 1, Pamphlet No 2,‘Infantry Training: The Rifle Platoon’, Department of Defence, 1986, p. 134.7 Land Warfare Procedures – Combat Arms (Mounted Combat), LWP–CA MTD CBT3-3-1 Mounted Minor Tactics – Amendment List 1, Department of Defence, 2006, p. 118 Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, ‘Combined arms and the close battle in complexterrain’, Australian Army Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2003, p. 79.9 J Kelly and M Brennan, Distributed Manoeuvre: 21st Century Offensive Tactics,Working Paper No. 134, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, June 2009, p. 10.10 Lieutenant Colonel Wayne D Eyre, ‘The Role of the Infantry in the War of the Snakes’,Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 9.1, Spring 2006, p. 86.11 Ibid.12 Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 394.13 D K Bowley, T D Castles and A Ryan, Attrition and Suppression: Defining the Natureof Close Combat, proceedings of the Australian Army Land Warfare Conference,Adelaide, 2001, p. 73.14 Tactical Training Exercise Control Group (TTECG), Safety Handbook, MAGTFTraining Command, Department of Defence, 2009, p. 2.15 Lieutenant Colonel Robert Stevenson, Not-so Friendly Fire: An Australian Taxonomyfor Fratricide, Working Paper No. 128, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, March2006, p. 52.page 162 • Volume VII, Number 1 • Australian Army Journal

Close Combat16 Tactical Training Exercise Control Group (TTECG), ‘Safety Handbook’, MAGTFTraining Command, 2009. p. 117 LWP–CA MTD CBT 3-3-1, p. 73.The AuthorMajor James Davis has served as a Troop Leader and Squadron Commander in the 2ndCavalry Regiment as well as the Cavalry Officer Instructor at the School of Armour. Hehas also been employed as the 2IC of Tank Squadron. Major Davis has served in staffappointments at HQ 1 Bde and Land Headquarters. He has deployed to Timor-Leste andIraq in staff and command appointments. Major Davis is currently posted as Second inCommand of 1st Armoured Regiment. In 2009–10 he was the contingent commanderof Australian Instructor Support Team Twenty Three which supported the conduct ofExercise Enhanced Mojave Viper.Australian Army Journal • Volume VII, Number 1 • page 163