32 3. BAG OF <strong>FACIAL</strong> <strong>SOFT</strong> <strong>BIOMETRICS</strong> FOR HUMAN IDENTIFICATION3.5 Reliability and scaling lawsIn this section we seek to provide insightful mathematical analysis <strong>of</strong> reliability <strong>of</strong> general s<strong>of</strong>tbiometric systems (SBSs), as well as to study error events and underlying factors. Furthermorewe will proceed to articulate related closed form expressions for the single and averaged SBS behaviorby concisely describing the asymptotic behavior <strong>of</strong> pertinent statistical parameters that areidentified to directly affect performance. Albeit its asymptotic and mathematical nature, the approachaims to provide simple expressions that can yield insight into handling real life surveillancesystems.Along with the general setting from section 3.1, in which we referred to the randomly extractedset <strong>of</strong>npeople, out <strong>of</strong> which one person is picked for identification, we here introduce the notation<strong>of</strong> v for such a n-tuple <strong>of</strong> people. Furthermore we denote by v(i), i = 1,...,n the i-th candidatebelonging to the specific group v.3.5.1 Error events, interference, and effective categoriesLet the randomly chosen subject for identification, belong in category φ ∈ Φ. The SBS firstproduces an estimates ̂φ <strong>of</strong> φ, and based on this estimate, tries to identify the chosen subject, i.e.,tries to establish which candidate in v corresponds to the chosen subject. An error occurs whenthe SBS fails to correctly identify the chosen subject, confusing him or her with another candidatefrom the current n-tuple v. An error can hence certainly occur when the category is incorrectlyestimated 1 , i.e., when ̂φ ≠ φ, or can possibly occur when the chosen subject v(i) interferes withanother subject v(j) from the authentication group v, i.e., when the chosen subject is essentiallyindistinguishable to the SBS from some other candidates inv.. We recall that interference occurs,whenever two or more subjects belong in the same category.For a given v, let S φ ⊂ v be the set <strong>of</strong> subjects in v that belong in a specific category φ.Furthermore let S 0 denote the set <strong>of</strong> people in v who do not belong in any <strong>of</strong> the categories inΦ. We here note that no subject can simultaneously belong to two or more categories, but alsonote that it is entirely possible that |S φ | = 0, for some φ ∈ Φ. Hence an error is caused due toestimation noise (resulting in ̂φ ≠ φ), due to interference (subject indistinguishable from othersubjects in v), or when the chosen candidate belongs in S 0 (system is not designed to recognizethe subject <strong>of</strong> interest).For a given v, letF(v) := |{φ ∈ Φ : |S φ | > 0}|denote the number <strong>of</strong> effective categories, i.e., the number <strong>of</strong> (non-empty) categories that fullycharacterize the subjects in v. For notational simplicity we henceforth write F to denote F(v),and we let the dependence on v be implied.3.5.1.1 The role <strong>of</strong> interference on the reliability <strong>of</strong> SBSsTowards evaluating the overall probability <strong>of</strong> identification error, we first establish the probability<strong>of</strong> error for a given set (authentication group) v. We note the two characteristic extremeinstances <strong>of</strong> F(v) = n and F(v) = 1. In the first case, the random n-tuple v over which identificationwill take place, happens to be such that each subject inv belongs to a different category, inwhich case none <strong>of</strong> the subjects interferes with another subject’s identification. On the other hand,the second case corresponds to the (unfortunate) realizations <strong>of</strong>v where all subjects inv fall under1. this possibility will be addressed later on
the same category (all subjects in v happen to share the same features), and where identificationis highly unreliable.Before proceeding with the analysis, we briefly define some notation. First we let P φ , φ ∈ Φ,denote the probability <strong>of</strong> incorrectly identifying a subject from S φ , and we adopt for now thesimplifying assumption that this probability be independent <strong>of</strong> the specific subject inS φ . Withoutloss <strong>of</strong> generality, we also let S 1 ,··· ,S F correspond to theF(v) = F non-empty categories, andnote that F ≤ n since one subject can belong to just one category. Furthermore we letS id := ∪ F φ=1 S φdenote the set <strong>of</strong> subjects inv that can potentially be identified by the SBS ’endowed’ withΦ, andwe note that S id = ∪ ρ φ=1 S φ. Also note that |S 0 | = n−|S id |, that S φ ∩S φ ′ = ∅ for φ ′ ≠ φ, andthatF∑|S id | = |S φ |.φ=1We proceed to derive the error probability for any given v.Lemma 1 Let a subject be drawn uniformly at random from a randomly drawn n-tuple v. Thenthe probability P(err|v) <strong>of</strong> erroneously identifying that subject, is given byP(err|v) = 1− F −∑ Fnφ=1 P φwhere F(v) = F is the number <strong>of</strong> effective categories spanned byv., (3.18)The following corollary holds for the interference limited case where errors due to feature estimationare ignored 2 , i.e., where P φ = 0.Corollary 0.1 For the same setting and measure as in Lemma 1, under the interference limitedassumption, the probability <strong>of</strong> error P(err|v) is given byfor any v such that F(v) = F .P(err|v) = 1− F n , (3.19)The above reveals the somewhat surprising fact that, givenn, the reliability <strong>of</strong> an SBS for identification<strong>of</strong> subjects inv, is independent <strong>of</strong> the subjects’ distribution v in the different categories,and instead only depends on F . As a result this reliability remains identical when employed overdifferent n-tuples that fixF .Pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> Lemma 1: See Appendix A.We proceed with a clarifying example.Example 2 Consider an SBS equipped with three features (ρ = 3), limited to (correctly) identifyingdark hair, gray hair, and blond hair, i.e., Φ = {‘dark hair’ = φ 1 , ‘gray hair’ = φ 2 ,‘blond hair’ = φ 3 }. Consider drawing at random, from a population corresponding to the residents<strong>of</strong> Nice, three n-tuples, with n = 12, each with a different subject categorization, as shownin Table 3.3. Despite their different category distribution, the first two setsv 1 andv 2 introduce thesame number <strong>of</strong> effective categories F = 3, and hence the same probability <strong>of</strong> erroneous detectionP(err|v 1 ) = P(err|v 2 ) = 3/4 (averaged over the subjects in each set). On the other hand for v 3withF = 2, the probability <strong>of</strong> error increases toP(err|v 3 ) = 5/6.2. we assume that estimation causes substantially fewer errors than interference does and ignore them for now
- Page 1: FACIAL SOFT BIOMETRICSMETHODS, APPL
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834) Eye glasses detection: Towards
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857.2 Eye color as a soft biometric
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87Table 7.5: GMM eye color results
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89and office lights, daylight, flas
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93Chapter 8User acceptance study re
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95Table 8.1: User experience on acc
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97scared of their PIN being spying.
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99Table 8.2: Comparison of existing
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101ConclusionsThis dissertation exp
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103Future WorkIt is becoming appare
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105Appendix AAppendix for Section 3
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109Appendix BAppendix to Section 4B
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111Blue Green Brown BlackBlue 0.75
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113Appendix CAppendix for Section 6
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115Appendix DPublicationsThe featur
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117Bibliography[AAR04] S. Agarwal,
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119[FCB08] L. Franssen, J. E. Coppe
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121[Ley96] M. Leyton. The architect
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123[RN11] D. Reid and M. Nixon. Usi
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125[ZG09] X. Zhang and Y. Gao. Face
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2Rapporteurs:Prof. Dr. Abdenour HAD
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Biométrie faciale douce 2Les terme
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Biométrie faciale douce 4une perso
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Couleur depeauCouleur descheveuxCou
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Biométrie faciale douce 103. Proba
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Reviewers:Prof. Dr. Abdenour HADID,
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3hair, skin and clothes. The propos
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person in the red shirt”. Further
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7- Not requiring the individual’s
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9Probability of Collision10.90.80.7
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11the color FERET dataset [Fer11] w
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13Table 2: Table of Facial soft bio
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15Chapter 1PublicationsThe featured
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17Bibliography[ACPR10] D. Adjeroh,
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19[ZESH04] R. Zewail, A. Elsafi, M.