Life-Cycle Management - Army Logistics University - U.S. Army
Life-Cycle Management - Army Logistics University - U.S. Army
Life-Cycle Management - Army Logistics University - U.S. Army
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pump wear, and no<br />
measured differences<br />
in engine<br />
operating temperatures<br />
were noted,<br />
which dispelled the<br />
fears of engines<br />
overheating because<br />
of supposedly hotter<br />
burning fuels.<br />
One of the more<br />
significant and comprehensive<br />
tests of<br />
JP8 was a field demonstrationconducted<br />
at Fort Bliss,<br />
Texas, from October<br />
1988 through July<br />
1991. This field<br />
demonstration involved<br />
about 2,800<br />
diesel-powered<br />
vehicles and pieces<br />
of equipment that<br />
consumed over 4.7<br />
million gallons of<br />
JP8. The demonstration<br />
proved successful: no catastrophic failures<br />
were attributed to JP8. In fact, no major differences in<br />
procurement costs, fuel consumption, oil change intervals,<br />
or component replacements were identified when<br />
compared to historical data for the same fleet of vehicles<br />
and equipment using diesel fuel.<br />
Implementation of the SFC Since 1990<br />
When approved by the combatant commander, the<br />
primary fuel support for air and ground forces in overseas<br />
theaters will be a single, kerosene-based fuel. The<br />
SFC was first implemented in December 1989, when<br />
JP5 was used as the single fuel during Operation Just<br />
Cause in Panama.<br />
In August 1990, DOD implemented the SFC by<br />
providing Jet A1 (JP8 without its three mandatory<br />
additives) for U.S. forces in Operations Desert Shield<br />
and Desert Storm. During those operations, some Air<br />
Force units were located on bases where only JP4,<br />
which could not be used in ground vehicles and equipment,<br />
was available. Some <strong>Army</strong> units requested<br />
diesel fuel instead of JP8 because JP8 did not make<br />
acceptable smoke in the M1 Abrams’ exhaust-system<br />
smoke generators. Further compounding the problems<br />
was the lack of training of ground units, which would<br />
have reduced their initial concerns about using aviation<br />
fuels in ground vehicles and equipment. Despite<br />
these problems, the SFC was considered a success.<br />
The SFC was implemented<br />
next for<br />
combat operations in<br />
Somalia, Haiti, and<br />
the eastern Balkans<br />
with the same success<br />
that it had achieved<br />
during Operations<br />
Desert Shield and<br />
Desert Storm.<br />
Minor Problems<br />
During Operations<br />
Desert Shield and<br />
Desert Storm, certain<br />
families of engines that<br />
used fuel-lubricated,<br />
rotary-distribution,<br />
fuel-injection pumps<br />
experienced some operational<br />
problems<br />
that resulted in hotstarting<br />
difficulty and<br />
gradual loss of power.<br />
(Hot starting refers to<br />
restarting a vehicle<br />
while its engine is<br />
still hot.) Usually, the engines that experienced the<br />
most problems were the General Motors 6.2-liter and<br />
6.5-liter engines, which use the commercially manufactured<br />
Stanadyne fuel-injection pump. These<br />
engines power smaller tactical wheeled vehicles, such<br />
as CUCVs and high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled<br />
vehicles (HMMWVs). The Stanadyne fuel-injection<br />
pump is used on a variety of other engine systems that<br />
provide power to combat support and combat service<br />
support equipment.<br />
Causes of the problems with the engines included—<br />
• Sustained operation during high temperatures.<br />
• Failure to retrofit the Stanadyne fuel-injection<br />
pump with elastomer insert drive governor weight<br />
retainer assemblies.<br />
• Improperly manufactured replacement parts.<br />
• Corrosion.<br />
• Unauthorized oils and fluids added to Jet A1 fuel.<br />
• Use of Jet A1 that did not contain corrosion<br />
inhibitor and lubrication-enhancing additives.<br />
The viscosity of the Jet A1 fuel being supplied by<br />
Saudi Arabia under a host nation support agreement<br />
was very low, as was the sulfur content, which further<br />
compounded the hot-starting problems.<br />
Ironically, none of these problems occurred during<br />
the extensive testing at Fort Bliss. In hindsight, the test<br />
at Fort Bliss used JP8, which has a higher viscosity<br />
than the Jet A1 fuel typically refined in the Middle<br />
A fuel specialist with the 127th Area Support Battalion,<br />
Division Supply Command, 1st Armored Division, signals<br />
the pump truck operator to stop the flow while another fuel<br />
specialist prepares to unhitch the fuel line from a UH–60<br />
Black Hawk helicopter at Baghdad International Airport.<br />
ARMY LOGISTICIAN PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF UNITED STATES ARMY LOGISTICS<br />
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