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Life-Cycle Management - Army Logistics University - U.S. Army

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The port became a holding area. However, problems<br />

with in-transit visibility and insufficient jingle<br />

trucks to move supplies created a bottleneck at the<br />

port, which caused a backlog of containers. Frozen<br />

food storage was another problem. The refrigerated<br />

containers (reefers) required power to keep the food at<br />

a subfreezing temperature for the journey to Kandahar<br />

Airfield. Yet few generator sets (“gensets”) were available<br />

to provide power, and prime power needed to<br />

operate the reefers at Kandahar Airfield was limited.<br />

As a result, if a reefer arrived at the airfield without a<br />

source of power (either prime power or generator<br />

power), the class I staff had to keep the genset used to<br />

power it during shipment. This slowed down the transportation<br />

process and added to the backlog at the port.<br />

These problems will be alleviated with the new cold<br />

storage facility that was built in 2004 and with<br />

increased prime power. Fresh fruits and vegetables<br />

were shipped twice weekly by commercial air.<br />

Class IIIB (bulk petroleum) was pushed from<br />

refineries near Karachi. It was transported to Kandahar<br />

Airfield in 10,000-gallon jingle fuel tankers. The<br />

biggest concern with fuel delivery was force protection.<br />

Fuel trucks make good targets for terrorists.<br />

However, an extensive inspection of fuel trucks entering<br />

the airfield reduced the IED risks.<br />

Challenges<br />

The FSB encountered several difficulties at the tactical<br />

level. For instance, in-transit visibility of trucks<br />

en route from Kandahar Airfield to the various outlying<br />

FOBs was limited, and the time it took to get to the<br />

different FOBs varied. The FSB had no way of knowing<br />

if the truck arrived until it had returned to Kandahar,<br />

which could be up to 2 weeks later. The jingle<br />

trucks also had no license plates, so they were hard to<br />

differentiate. If a truck was attacked,<br />

there was a report stating that a jingle<br />

truck had been attacked, which was<br />

vague since all trucks in Afghanistan are<br />

referred to as jingle trucks. After the<br />

report came in, it took time to figure out<br />

which truck was hit, which FOB it was<br />

supplying, and what emergency resupply<br />

actions were required. This had a<br />

significant impact on the reliability of<br />

supply deliveries.<br />

Because of the lack of in-transit<br />

visibility and the inherent dangers of a<br />

combat zone, the terms of U.S. military<br />

contracts with the Government officials<br />

were usually generous. The contracts<br />

A tanker prepares to deliver fuel to<br />

forward operating bases.<br />

often made it difficult to enforce the timely arrival of<br />

supplies. For example, by contract, a driver may have<br />

had 4 days to deliver supplies to a designated FOB,<br />

when the trip took only 7 hours. This time difference<br />

was a buffer in anticipation of possible problems, such<br />

as maintenance troubles and attacks by anticoalition<br />

militias along the way.<br />

Another problem was pushing fuel forward. In<br />

Afghanistan, there was no standard method or equipment<br />

for cleaning fuel tankers properly. When a tanker<br />

truck was requested, there was no guarantee that it<br />

could carry fuel without contaminating it. Fuel transported<br />

in the vehicles was often too dirty to be used at<br />

the forward bases. As a result, aviation-grade fuel had<br />

to be slingloaded to the FOBs.<br />

During the 10th Mountain Division’s deployment,<br />

the transportation cell, the CRP, and the MCT quickly<br />

adapted to the constraints imposed by long supply<br />

lines over difficult terrain. This flexibility was evident<br />

in the judicious use of host nation vehicles, attention to<br />

safety details, and the optimization of on-hand organic<br />

assets. Therefore, critical supplies were delivered in<br />

a timely manner, both to the forces at Kandahar Airfield<br />

and at the outlying FOBs. This, in turn, proved<br />

crucial to the success of the mission to support Operation<br />

Enduring Freedom IV ALOG<br />

FIRST LIEUTENANT MARY K. BLANCHFIELD IS THE<br />

ASSISTANT S–3 FOR THE 10TH BRIGADE SUPPORT BAT-<br />

TALION (BSB) AT FORT DRUM, NEW YORK. SHE WAS<br />

THE MOVEMENT CONTROL OFFICER FOR THE 10TH FSB<br />

IN KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN, WHEN SHE WROTE THIS<br />

ARTICLE. SHE HAS A BACHELOR’S DEGREE FROM STETSON<br />

UNIVERSITY IN FLORIDA AND IS A GRADUATE OF OFFICER<br />

CANDIDATE SCHOOL AND THE TRANSPORTATION OFFICER<br />

BASIC COURSE.<br />

ARMY LOGISTICIAN PROFESSIONAL 27

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