Life-Cycle Management - Army Logistics University - U.S. Army
Life-Cycle Management - Army Logistics University - U.S. Army
Life-Cycle Management - Army Logistics University - U.S. Army
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The port became a holding area. However, problems<br />
with in-transit visibility and insufficient jingle<br />
trucks to move supplies created a bottleneck at the<br />
port, which caused a backlog of containers. Frozen<br />
food storage was another problem. The refrigerated<br />
containers (reefers) required power to keep the food at<br />
a subfreezing temperature for the journey to Kandahar<br />
Airfield. Yet few generator sets (“gensets”) were available<br />
to provide power, and prime power needed to<br />
operate the reefers at Kandahar Airfield was limited.<br />
As a result, if a reefer arrived at the airfield without a<br />
source of power (either prime power or generator<br />
power), the class I staff had to keep the genset used to<br />
power it during shipment. This slowed down the transportation<br />
process and added to the backlog at the port.<br />
These problems will be alleviated with the new cold<br />
storage facility that was built in 2004 and with<br />
increased prime power. Fresh fruits and vegetables<br />
were shipped twice weekly by commercial air.<br />
Class IIIB (bulk petroleum) was pushed from<br />
refineries near Karachi. It was transported to Kandahar<br />
Airfield in 10,000-gallon jingle fuel tankers. The<br />
biggest concern with fuel delivery was force protection.<br />
Fuel trucks make good targets for terrorists.<br />
However, an extensive inspection of fuel trucks entering<br />
the airfield reduced the IED risks.<br />
Challenges<br />
The FSB encountered several difficulties at the tactical<br />
level. For instance, in-transit visibility of trucks<br />
en route from Kandahar Airfield to the various outlying<br />
FOBs was limited, and the time it took to get to the<br />
different FOBs varied. The FSB had no way of knowing<br />
if the truck arrived until it had returned to Kandahar,<br />
which could be up to 2 weeks later. The jingle<br />
trucks also had no license plates, so they were hard to<br />
differentiate. If a truck was attacked,<br />
there was a report stating that a jingle<br />
truck had been attacked, which was<br />
vague since all trucks in Afghanistan are<br />
referred to as jingle trucks. After the<br />
report came in, it took time to figure out<br />
which truck was hit, which FOB it was<br />
supplying, and what emergency resupply<br />
actions were required. This had a<br />
significant impact on the reliability of<br />
supply deliveries.<br />
Because of the lack of in-transit<br />
visibility and the inherent dangers of a<br />
combat zone, the terms of U.S. military<br />
contracts with the Government officials<br />
were usually generous. The contracts<br />
A tanker prepares to deliver fuel to<br />
forward operating bases.<br />
often made it difficult to enforce the timely arrival of<br />
supplies. For example, by contract, a driver may have<br />
had 4 days to deliver supplies to a designated FOB,<br />
when the trip took only 7 hours. This time difference<br />
was a buffer in anticipation of possible problems, such<br />
as maintenance troubles and attacks by anticoalition<br />
militias along the way.<br />
Another problem was pushing fuel forward. In<br />
Afghanistan, there was no standard method or equipment<br />
for cleaning fuel tankers properly. When a tanker<br />
truck was requested, there was no guarantee that it<br />
could carry fuel without contaminating it. Fuel transported<br />
in the vehicles was often too dirty to be used at<br />
the forward bases. As a result, aviation-grade fuel had<br />
to be slingloaded to the FOBs.<br />
During the 10th Mountain Division’s deployment,<br />
the transportation cell, the CRP, and the MCT quickly<br />
adapted to the constraints imposed by long supply<br />
lines over difficult terrain. This flexibility was evident<br />
in the judicious use of host nation vehicles, attention to<br />
safety details, and the optimization of on-hand organic<br />
assets. Therefore, critical supplies were delivered in<br />
a timely manner, both to the forces at Kandahar Airfield<br />
and at the outlying FOBs. This, in turn, proved<br />
crucial to the success of the mission to support Operation<br />
Enduring Freedom IV ALOG<br />
FIRST LIEUTENANT MARY K. BLANCHFIELD IS THE<br />
ASSISTANT S–3 FOR THE 10TH BRIGADE SUPPORT BAT-<br />
TALION (BSB) AT FORT DRUM, NEW YORK. SHE WAS<br />
THE MOVEMENT CONTROL OFFICER FOR THE 10TH FSB<br />
IN KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN, WHEN SHE WROTE THIS<br />
ARTICLE. SHE HAS A BACHELOR’S DEGREE FROM STETSON<br />
UNIVERSITY IN FLORIDA AND IS A GRADUATE OF OFFICER<br />
CANDIDATE SCHOOL AND THE TRANSPORTATION OFFICER<br />
BASIC COURSE.<br />
ARMY LOGISTICIAN PROFESSIONAL 27