journal of the texas criminal defense lawyers association

MICHAEL CAMPBELL, No. 027-83, Opinion on D's PDR: Aff'd, Judge Campbell,En Banc, 6/29/83.HARRASSMENT INFORMATION NOT FUNDAMENTALLY DEPECTIVE: Sec. 42.07 providesthat a person commits an offense of harrassment if he intentionallycommunicates by telephone or in writing in vulgar, profane, abscene orindecent language or in a course and offensive manner and by this actionintentionally, knowingly, or wrecklessly annoys or alarms the recipientor intends to annoy or alarm the recipient. The misdemeanor informationomitted the words "by this action". The court held that the gravamen ofthe offense of harrassment was the communication to a victim in vulgar,profane, obscene, or indecent language or in a course manner with theintent to annoy and alarm the victim, and that the phrase "by this action"was a transitory or prepositional phrase that tends to connect the actof communication by the offender to the intent of the offender to annoyand alarm the victim. A commonsense reading of the information shows thatit was sufficient to allege an offense. Ex Parte Adame, 632 S.W.2d 619.EXTRANEOUS OFFENSE - RETALIATION: D was on trial for the murder of X.It appeared that D and a defense witness were subsequently charged forretaliation arising out of threats by them against state's witnesses inthis case. The court held that under these circumstances Art. 38.29 wouldnot prevent demonstration of the charges against the defense witness toshow her bias, prejudice, and interest in testifying for D. By footnotethe court stated that "although the general rule is the details of theoffense should not be shown (Murphy, 587 S.W.2d 718), trial objection wasnot based on that rule. Trial objection must be on the same ground asthat urged on appeal. (Carrillo, 591 S.W.2d 876). Neither was this theoryasserted in the ground of error on appeal.Also important is the court's approval of the following language in the1, CA decision:h he court then recognized that although under Art. 38.29 CCP'unadjudicated criminal offenses are inadmissible for impeachmentpurposes,' evidence of pending charges is neverthelessadmissible 'under certain circumstances for the limited purposeof showing bias, prejudice, interest, and motive of thewitness in testifying as he did'. Carrillo, 591 S.W.2d 876;Moreno, 587 S.W.2d 405."ALONZO HYNSON, No. 902-82, Opinion on D's PDR: Rev'd, Judee Clinton, EnBanc, 6/29/83.DOES "RECENT UNEXPLAINED POSSESSION ETC." RULE APPLY TO PROSECUTION FORRECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY?, No. Jn order to draw inference of presumptionof guilt from the circumstance alone of possession of stolen property,such possession must he personal, must be recent, must be unexplained,and must involve a distinct and conscience assertion of property by theaccused. HL?_e, No. 620-82, del. 3/16/83. However, such possession doesnot justify the conclusion that he fraudulently received the st6leg propertyknowing that it was stolen and thereafter concealed it.August 1983IVQIC8 for the Defense SD-19