draining development.pdf - Khazar University

508 Indexdynamic nature of links betweencapital outflow, domestic capitalretention, and development,37–38for fragile developers, 45, 53–57,58tgovernance issues in, 8, 22, 35for intermediate developers (normaldeveloping countries), 44–53economic actors, financialoutflows driven by, 45, 47–52logical framework for, 52–53, 53tmiddle-income countries, notsynonymous with, 64n3policy responses to IFFs, 59–62political actors, financial outflowsdriven by, 45–47policy responses, 58–64, 60fpolitical settlement, concept of,23–24, 26, 42Andean Pact, 160Andreas, P., 189Anglo-Leasing affair, Kenya, 382,437–41AngolaChiluba case and, 445DTAs, lack of, 284Anguilla, as tax haven, 340Ani, Anthony, 418anti-money laundering (AML) controls,14, 373–411amounts of laundered money,estimating, 381–83in analytical framework forunderstanding IFFs, 63–64case studies of grand corruption,389–96in Colombia, 10, 145, 147, 154–57,156t, 165confiscation schemes, 408n3defining corruption and bribery andtheir proceeds for purposes of,379–81development and processing ofmoney laundering suspicions,400–404, 402beffectiveness of, 373–76, 404–7, 488–90financial institutions as recipients ofcriminal proceeds, 385–87,386tFIUs and, 374, 375, 378–79, 384, 392,396, 398–401, 403–4, 406–7,408n7goals of, in developing countries,376–79informal value transfer systems and,383–84, 490lack of impact, accounting for,397–400legitimate economy, preventingcriminal proceeds fromentering, 383SARs, 374, 390, 392, 396, 400–401,402b, 403–7situational opportunity models ofcorruption and, 388–89use of criminal proceeds, 384–85Antigua and Barbudatax evasion and, 260n16as tax haven, 346Anzola, Marcela, 10, 145, 492Apenkai, 392Aquino, Corazon, 75, 78arap Moi, Daniel, 438Arcelor Mittal, 285Ardila, Pablo, 165n1Argentinatax evasion in, 82–83, 96n28tax havens and, 360in typology of political jurisdictions,471Armenia, tax evasion in, 80–81arm’s-length principle (ALP) fortransfer pricing, 238–44concept of, 210, 211, 238–39, 256–57,303n2