draining development.pdf - Khazar University

The Practical Political Economy of Illicit Flows 465come to occupy a prominent place on international policy agendas: thenotion of fragile, failing, or weak states. 7 Let us term this the weak statephenomenon. While the terms and definitions remain diverse and tosome degree contested, it is widely accepted that we are dealing with anew, generic phenomenon, which is found, in particular, in CentralAmerica, parts of Central Asia and Pakistan, significant parts of theAndean region of South America, and much of Sub-Saharan Africa. 8Governance failures are not new. They are, rather, the historical norm.Most attempts to establish legitimate and effective public authority failsomewhere along the way and end in disorder (Keefer, Loayza, and Soares2008; Reuter 2008). The novelty of the current situation lies in the combinationof several related factors. The weak state phenomenon becamewidespread across the globe within a short time. It arises in part becausepolitical elites in the poorest countries can enrich themselves by acting asgatekeepers between their own political jurisdictions and the global politicaleconomy. They can profit from the large rents attached to naturalresource exports, drug trafficking, and various other kinds of illicit activitiessuch as illegal diamond exports. Armed conflict may help themextract resources in this fashion or provide other opportunities to profit,for example, from arms trading or from the provision of transport andother logistical services to international humanitarian operations.Historically, the political uncertainty and instability that typically followwar or internal conflict elicited a drive toward political resolution.Different interests and parties competed actively for state power. Eitherone party emerged as dominant, or public authority was reestablishedthrough compromise among the leading contenders. A distinctive featureof the situation in some parts of the contemporary world is thatthese processes of political resolution and the reestablishment of relativelyeffective public authority are weak and slow. Failing governmentshave not been ousted militarily or supplanted by expanding neighboringstates. Weak governance and continuous internal conflict have becomeroutine. For every case of apparently successful resolution, such as SierraLeone, there are several in which success is not yet in sight (Maconachieand Hilson 2011). A major reason is that, if they can continue to act asrent-taking gatekeepers, elites often lack strong incentives to put an endto weak governance or disorder and may actively profit from them(Munkler 2005). Control of rent-taking nodes becomes more rewarding