Development of Parties and Party Systems in ... - lah@sam.sdu.dk

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Has the Left any freedom of manoeuvre at all in the economic and social policy taking inconsideration the ongoing globalization and, not to forget, the adaptation to the European Union? 89The principial idea to create more unity on the Left was accepted by SLD. In 1993 SLD itself hadpresented the idea, inviting all important left parties and groups to a “big debate” about alternativesto the economic policy followed by the post-Solidarity governments. In addition, important for SLDwas to obtain the greatest as possible support for Aleksander Kwasniewski as president. Morecooperation among the different parties and groups on the Left might be helpful in order to achievethat goal.However, the plans about the formation of one single united Left platform could not be realized 90 .Instead Leszek Miller spoke about the need to establish an “opposition forum” (“ForumOpozycyjne”) that - with SLD as the leading force – would be able to unify the different parties andgroups in opposition to Jerzy Buzek’s government 91 . The discussions about more unity on the Leftwere not most important for SLD. Under all circumstances SLD remained the most important singlealmost hegemonic party on the Left. Thus, mainly for tactical reasons SLD took part in the “roundtable discussions” as UP might be decisive in the negotiations about constructing of a new left winggovernment. Only few meetings among the left parties took place, but the political rapprochementbetween SLD and the Works Union (UP) was deepened and resulting in an agreement about closecooperation at the 2001 election with common candidate lists and a common political programme.Important was not to repeat the mistakes of the former left wing government from 1993 to 1997.Evidence from SLD-PSL-government 1993-1997 suggest that a government led by SLD difficultiesmight come up when taking controversial but important policy decisions, e.g. concerning newpension schemes and reforms of the health sector. Under the previous SLD-PSL government alsoplans for administrative reforms had circulated, but the final decisions were never taken. The AWSled government took those controversial decisions, which were left over from the formergovernment, but it did not pay sufficient attention to the quality of the law making process and lawimplementation.The prospect of formation of a new centre-left government was facilitated by cooperation betweenSLD, UP and PSL at the local elections in 1998. After that election 9 of the 16 voivods were led bySLD, and 135 of the 235 powiatys had a mayor from SLD. In spite of favourable election polls SLDdid not show interest in a new parliamentary election before 2000 presidential election. The policyof the Buzek government was heavily criticized, but SLD distanced itself from strikes and protestdemonstrations organized by OPZZ and “Samoobrona”. At the 2001 election SLD-UP failed toobtain a majority in the Sejm alone, but SLD became the “hegemonic” party in the new coalitiongovernment. Furthermore, it had the control over the Senate, and close close links to the president(Kwasniewski). Like in 1993, SLD was forced to cooperate with the internally divided PolishPeasants’ Party (PSL), which after the 2001 election came under heavy fire from the populist“Selfdefence” (Samoobrona).At the 2001 election SLD was in the position to make profit from the AWS-UW government’mistakes implementing of the four big reforms, especially the health reform. Therefore, one of theslogans under the SLD 2001 election campaign sounded: “We (i.e. SLD) can do it (i.e. the same)89 Mentioned e.g. in Dominika Wielowieyska, ”Przez morze czerwone”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 9.3., 1999:16-17.90 About those plans, se also Eliza Olczyk, ”Socialdemokratyczna wydmuszka”, Rzeczpospolita 27.-28 March, 1999:3.91 Mariusz Janicki, ”Wylacznosc na lewice”, Polityka, no. 16 (2189), 17 April, 1999:26-28.96
etter”. That election slogan was clearly less radical than the slogan from 1993, “It can not go on inthat way”.Thus, in 2000 and 2001 the prospects for the future seemed to be bright. In 2001 more than half ofthe municipalities and regions were led by SLD or SLD-led coalitions. A “historical compromise”between SLD and Freedom Union (UW) seemed unrealistic, but, as we have seen, some “defectors”from UW took the decision to join the SLD. At the New Year 2000-2001 the majority of the Polishpeople considered SLD as a relevant party, to use Sartoris term, and a party ready to take overgovernmental responsibilities. All that signified that the past was no longer a barrier for theformation of a new centre-left government and a “post-communist” as president, but themacroeconomic problems were increasing and the room of maneuvres in the economic policyremained low.At the turn of the century SLD had emerged as Poland’s strongest political party with a professionalcatch-all profile. The party could lean on an extensive professionalism and political experience andan ability of strategic planning. SLD’s candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski had been re-elected atthe 2000 presidential election. SLD was no longer a party consisting of just veterans from thecommunist era, just opposite, it had liberated itself from extreme political groups such as“Proletaryat” and “PPS Ikonowicza”. SLD could also profit from the existence of a “hard core” ofactivists and supporters and personal networks (Miller, 1999:167-168). Before the 2001 election thepolitical profile had become technocratic and pragmatic. SLD behaved in a catch-all ways,appealing to broad section of the Polish population. Most Poles were “transformation-tired” and didshow almost no interest in the new “big reforms”. Also the electoral support from the trade unionOPZZ and many people from the new private sector played a crucial role. The external evaluationsof the party remained asymmetric as other parties did not recognize SLD as a relevant “standardpolitical party”.To conclude, the transition from an election alliance to a standard party took place relativelysmoothly and without negative consequences as far as electorate support was concerned, in fact justthe opposite was the case. However, the facade of unity could hardly be maintained after takingover government responsibilities.2.15. SLD after the 2002 electionOne of the most important tasks for a new “post-communist” government was to bring to themajority of the Polish people more realistic expectations concerning the future welfare, securePoland a place in the EU and, not least, raise the quality of the law making and law implementationprocess, i.e. the public governance taken as a whole. As a fragile coalition government ruling undereconomic recession the prospects for the future were hardly as bright as anticipated before theelection. Thus, before long a sharp decrease in voter support took place, clearly manifested at thelocal and regional elections in November 2002 and the opinion polls conducted from the first half of2003.The new SLD-UP government put in motion a new programme for more economic growth underthe slogan about “entrepreneurship”, “development” and “work”. The aim was to increase thegrowth of BNP to 5 pct. in 2004 by state support to new entrepreneurs, especially new educated,more employment by higher economic growth, infrastructure projects, lower interest level, andbetter use of the money from the EU-budget. Cuts in the state budget 2002, new rules of support for97
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“This provisional situation chara
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marketisation and privatisationshor
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purposes, are channels for “expre
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the significance of strategic choic
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presidentialism gave rise to “flo
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antipolitics and reinforcement of a
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In the late 1990’s elections most
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determined primarily by “politica
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politics and antipolitics, all sign
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which attitudes to state regulation
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Anti-communism has been defined in
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elections and the Slovak communists
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Cartel agreementsbetter representat
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Basically the absence of clear cons
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After 1989 different types of polit
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complex project for transition unde
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window of opportunity in spite of s
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analyses of party institutionalizat
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political messages and slogans. Thu
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well established party culture may
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expected, much due to the many spli
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Page 62 and 63: values. According to Rybicki, as so
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Page 66 and 67: 2001 parliamentary election, howeve
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Page 86 and 87: such as KSCM and KSS in The Czech R
Page 88 and 89: The SLD leaders were mainly recruit
Page 90 and 91: the falling popular support for pri
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Page 100 and 101: The Labour Union (UP), Democratic U
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