<strong>in</strong>novation was formation <strong>of</strong> the political programme council (“rada polityczno-programowa”)consist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> party members as well as <strong>in</strong>dividuals represent<strong>in</strong>g different organizations that werecooperat<strong>in</strong>g somehow with SLD. Thus, some non-party c<strong>and</strong>idates could be found on SLD’s list atthe elections, even representatives from religious organizations. The ma<strong>in</strong> task <strong>of</strong> the council was toput forward a new political programme <strong>and</strong> br<strong>in</strong>g to the party federation a new broad “catch all”pr<strong>of</strong>ile. Of the 32 groups <strong>in</strong> the “old” federation only five groups refused to jo<strong>in</strong> the new party SLD.However, the clos<strong>in</strong>g down <strong>of</strong> the election alliance SLD could not take place without critique,especially <strong>in</strong> the party daily “Trybuna”. The PPS-leader Piotr Ikonowicz did not want to jo<strong>in</strong> aunitary political party, argu<strong>in</strong>g that SLD should rema<strong>in</strong> a party federation. Some defectors eventook the decision to jo<strong>in</strong> the peasant movement party Samobrona. It seemed impossible to closedown a party like PPS that had existed <strong>in</strong> almost 100 years. However, PPS’ options outside SLDwere few. The prime motive to jo<strong>in</strong> the SLD was to be represented <strong>in</strong> parliament. The withdrawal <strong>of</strong>PPS did not br<strong>in</strong>g any negative consequences for SLD as a whole, but PPS’ views had some support<strong>in</strong> some other political groups <strong>in</strong>side the alliance. However, many <strong>in</strong> SLD considered PPS <strong>and</strong> notleast the chairman Piotr Ikonowicz as an embarrassment because <strong>of</strong> his uncompromis<strong>in</strong>g politicalstyle. Before 1989 Piotr Ikonowicz had been political dissident, but s<strong>in</strong>ce 1989 he has persistentlydefended classical trade union values <strong>and</strong> criticised SLD for the rapprochement to the FreedomUnion (UW), also the old “apparatchik” Leszek Miller was accused <strong>of</strong> “sabotage” because <strong>of</strong> theplans about etablish<strong>in</strong>g a new unitary left w<strong>in</strong>g party SLD. Opposite Ikonowicz, after thetransformation <strong>of</strong> SLD the former “party boss” Leszek Miller behaved much more centre-orientated<strong>and</strong> pro-western.As said, much critique came from the party newspaper “Trybuna”, <strong>and</strong> especially directed aga<strong>in</strong>stLeszek Miller who accord<strong>in</strong>g to the opponents behaved <strong>in</strong> dictatorial ways without be<strong>in</strong>g able topresent to the public any consistent <strong>and</strong> politically realizable political alternatives to the governmentpolicy. Thus SLD was <strong>in</strong> danger <strong>of</strong> constitut<strong>in</strong>g a non-ideological cartel party without present<strong>in</strong>grealistic alternatives to the electorate. Former Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski argued theop<strong>in</strong>ion that SLD have several <strong>in</strong>telligent leaders <strong>and</strong> many experienced adm<strong>in</strong>istrators with apr<strong>of</strong>ound knowledge about governmental <strong>and</strong> public affairs 84 . However, gradually SLD became a“party <strong>of</strong> social democrats <strong>in</strong> smok<strong>in</strong>g” with a dist<strong>in</strong>ct market economic, technocratic <strong>and</strong> western<strong>in</strong>tegrationist pr<strong>of</strong>ile. One <strong>of</strong> the ma<strong>in</strong> problems problem is that SLD seems to neglect those policyproblems that troubles Polish people <strong>in</strong> their every day life; <strong>in</strong>stead the leaders <strong>of</strong> the party havebeen focus<strong>in</strong>g too much on unimportant “apparatus talk”. The question <strong>of</strong> transform<strong>in</strong>g SLD <strong>in</strong>to aunitary st<strong>and</strong>ard political party should have belonged to the less important political options, but thesubject was given the highest priority. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the critics the new unitary party tended to begoverned top-down, almost accord<strong>in</strong>g to a new-old Len<strong>in</strong>ist pr<strong>in</strong>ciple based on democraticcentralism.Also different views about the procedures connected with the foundation <strong>of</strong> the new SLD existed.One group expressed the op<strong>in</strong>ion that a discussion about the party programme should take placebefore the formation <strong>of</strong> the new party organization. Another group used the argument thatfunctional organisation <strong>and</strong> a well-discipl<strong>in</strong>ed party apparatus should have the first priority. Formerpresidential c<strong>and</strong>idate for SLD <strong>and</strong> former Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz kept a lowpr<strong>of</strong>ile, but <strong>in</strong>directly he supported the first group. Interviewed <strong>in</strong> the Polish weekly “Polityka” hesaid that the new SLD under no circumstances should move towards a centralist governed unitary84 Anna Bogusz, Dorota Mecieja, Z<strong>of</strong>ia Wojtkowska, ”Falszywa lewica”, Wprost, 18 May, 1999:22-23.92
party. The highest priority should be given the development <strong>of</strong> a democratic party culture <strong>and</strong>debate 85 .Most difficult was to close down <strong>of</strong> The Republic <strong>of</strong> Pol<strong>and</strong>’s Social Democratic <strong>Party</strong> (SdRP), theold SLDs strongest s<strong>in</strong>gle political group. It has been argued that s<strong>in</strong>ce 1989 SdRP had been SLDs“salvation”. In the first years after 1989 it had dem<strong>and</strong>ed much courage <strong>and</strong> willpower to jo<strong>in</strong> SLD.At that time SDL was exposed to several heavy attacks from right w<strong>in</strong>g parties. Nonetheless, afterthe clos<strong>in</strong>g down <strong>of</strong> the old SLD people with a background <strong>in</strong> the old SdRP did not ga<strong>in</strong> anyprivileges compared with those who jo<strong>in</strong>ed the party after the crisis <strong>in</strong> Solidarity <strong>and</strong> demise <strong>of</strong>AWS.The new SLD’s organizational structure <strong>and</strong> political programme was adopted at the first congress<strong>in</strong> December 1999. At the found<strong>in</strong>g congress SdRP, the “core party”, was forced to take thedecision about dissolv<strong>in</strong>g itself. The party members <strong>and</strong> the members <strong>of</strong> parliament should decidefor themselves whether to jo<strong>in</strong> the new SLD on an <strong>in</strong>dividual basis or not. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to normalPolish st<strong>and</strong>ard women were well represented <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terim leadership <strong>of</strong> the party, 8 out <strong>of</strong> 27were women. Also representatives from the newly established coord<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g groups on the voivodlevelwere <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the party leadership. Furthermore, some important posts were given t<strong>of</strong>ormer members <strong>of</strong> the Freedom Union (UW), e.g. Andrzej Cel<strong>in</strong>ski, a former member <strong>of</strong> UW <strong>and</strong>KOR, <strong>and</strong> later, <strong>in</strong> 2001 m<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>of</strong> culture, elected as chairman <strong>of</strong> the commission that preparedthe new SLDs first political programme. The election <strong>of</strong> Andrzej Cel<strong>in</strong>ski was a tactical move, asthe choice <strong>of</strong> Andrzej Cel<strong>in</strong>ski might remove what SLD called “the most irrational <strong>in</strong> Polishpolitics”, the division <strong>of</strong> the Polish population <strong>in</strong> “We” (i.e. Solidarity) versus “Them” (i.e. the“post-communists”) 86 .However, not all groups were represented <strong>in</strong> the leadership. Jerzy Urban’s organisation NIE(“Niezalezna Inicjatywa Eurpejska”) requested that, but the request was refused. The new SLDleadership hoped to obta<strong>in</strong> 100,000 party members, held up by the <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> electoral support.Already <strong>in</strong> October 1999 21,000 people had jo<strong>in</strong>ed the new SLD on an <strong>in</strong>dividual basis. From thattime no legal connection existed between the old <strong>and</strong> new SLD. To the still unsolved problemsbelonged the party debt, so before clos<strong>in</strong>g down the old SLD the new SLD had to pay 2.5 mio. zlotyto the Polish state.At the first congress Leszek Miller was elected as the chairman <strong>of</strong> SLD by an almost unanimousvote. The choice <strong>of</strong> five vice-chairmen was met with more excitement. Here Leszek Miller had hisown way, as both one woman (Lybacka), a representative from OPZZ, <strong>and</strong> Andrzej Cel<strong>in</strong>ski, thedefector from UW, were elected. Also one <strong>of</strong> the vice-chairmen for the Sejm (Borowski) <strong>and</strong> JerzySzmajdz<strong>in</strong>ski, a close friend <strong>of</strong> Miller, became one <strong>of</strong> the party vice-chairmen. Opposite, formerPremier M<strong>in</strong>ister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz was not elected. The congress decided that womenshould constitute at least 30 pct. <strong>of</strong> the c<strong>and</strong>idates to elections, <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g to 50 pct. <strong>in</strong> the year2007.The new party organization was divided <strong>in</strong> 160 local party units with 16 party coord<strong>in</strong>ators on thevoivod-levelm thereby obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the best territorial coverage as possible. As noted above, collectivemembership <strong>of</strong> the party was replaced by <strong>in</strong>dividual membership, <strong>and</strong> also members <strong>of</strong> OPZZ hadto jo<strong>in</strong> the new SDL on an <strong>in</strong>dividual basis. The admission <strong>of</strong> new members <strong>in</strong> the new SLD took85 Polityka, no. 40 (2213), 2 October, 1999:30-31.86 Put forward e.g. by Cimoszewicz <strong>in</strong> Polityka no.40 (2213) 2 October, 1999:30-31.93
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Anti-communism has been defined in
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Cartel agreementsbetter representat
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complex project for transition unde
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analyses of party institutionalizat
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political messages and slogans. Thu
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