Development of Parties and Party Systems in ... - lah@sam.sdu.dk

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Polish middle class. Thus, in January 2001 the platform (PO) gained between 17 and 20 pct. of thevotes; the question, however, was, whether the high electoral support might be sustained also at theforthcoming elections. Some other parties and factions joined the PO. After some time of hesitationthe liberal AWS faction SKL took the decision to join the Civic Platform (PO). At the 2001 nationalelection PO gained 12 pct. of the votes. Nonetheless, the left wing SLD-UP was able to establish anew majority government together med the PSL. Thus, the votes of PO did not become decisive atthe formation of the new government. As noted above, the Freedom Union (UW) lost representationin parliament. The new middle class and entrepreneurs tended to prefer the platform (PO) due tofear of waste of votes. A great part of the intelligentsia liked PO’s “economic language”, subjectslike macoeconomic stabilization, lower taxes and a new labour market policy and labour codex 75 .The Civic Platform (PO) aimed to be transformed into a political party in the proper sense of theword, yet with a more “light” almost American cadre type institutional structure. The applicationabout being registrated as a political party was handed over in November 2001 and accepted by theauthorities in March under the slightly revised name The Republic of Polands Civic Platform 76 . Theparty convent became the center of decision making. PO’s organizational kernel, however, was theparliamentary group. The aim was to avoid as much party bureaucratization as possible. Somegroups, e.g. the conservative faction SKL, rejected that type of party institutionalization 77 . Onregional level, that person, who obtained the greatest number of votes, should be the regionalleader.Soon after the 2001 election some of the new parliamentarians, such as the former minister ArturBalacz, left the platform refusing to subscribe the declaration about joining the new party CivicPlatform (PO). Later, one of the “tenors”, Andrzej Olechowski, resigned from the leadership,however, without much political “noice” and without leaving the party. Artur Balazs set up a newpolitical formation (“SKL-Ruch Polski”), which included some centre-right groupings, mostly fromthe former SKL and the Christian-Democratic PPChD, in other words, one more attempt to “unitethe Right”. It seemed that Olechowski aimed once more to be presidential candidate in 2005, inwhich case Kwasniewski according to the constitution had to leave the post. That plan, however,was thwarted because of the defeat at the local election.in Warsaw. Instead, at the 2003 conventionthe party chairman Donald Tusk was put forward as the candidate for president. Thus muchindicated that the new party might tend to be divided in different veto-type factions just like thefomer AWS. At the party convent in June 2003 Plazynski informed about his decision to resignfrom the platform arguing that the new party had become too elite-driven and therefore not aspokesman for the ordinary citizen. Moreover, Plazynski argued that the leadership of the party hadnot been able to promote establishment of a broadly based centre-right alternative to the SLD-UPgovernment.At the party convention in June 2003 Donald Tusk became the new chairman of the party and thelikely future candidate for president. And Andrzej Olechowski became the chairman of theprogramme comimission of the party. The party programme aimed to combine liberal principles andthe minimal state with religious values according to the slogan about “freedom, tradition andchristianity”. Maybe the party had an eye to the Hungarian FIDESZ, that in the mid 1990’ssuccessfully transformed itself from a distinct liberal to a soft center-right traditionalist party. The75 See e.g. Mariusz Janicki, Wieslaw Wladyka, “Kto wpuscil Leppera?”, Polityka, no. 40 (2318), 6 October 2001:5.76 “Platforma Obywatelska Rzecczpospolita Polskei”.77 Mariusz Janicki, “Platforma Obywatelska: ledwie partia, juz rozlam, Dwoch bez atu”, Polityka no. 47 (2325) 24November 2001:30.84
critique of the SLD-UP government became sharper regardless the agreement with SLD about theEU policy. The aim was after next election to form a government with Jaroslaw Kaczynsky’s PiSdespite personal and policy disagreements, e.g. different attitudes to tax policies and the fortcomingEU constitution treaty. However, moving closer to next ordinary election in 2005 the policydifferences between PO and PiS became more striking. Maybe therefore, Civic Platform (PO)changed strategy toward constructive programmatic opposition (Fiala etc, 2003:15), in crucialpolicy questions even supporting Marek Belka’s transitory government in return for obtainingimportant appointments in the government. The EU policy gave rise to some debates in the CivicPlatform (PO). Jan Rokita preferred a tough line according to the slogan about “Nice or die” andformer forminister Andrzej Olechowski preferred a compromise with France and Germany on theEU consitution treaty. At the 2004 EP elections PO gained 24 pct. of the votes. Also FreedomUnion (UW) passed the treshold requirement, may be due to the candidacy of still popular formerparty chairman Bronislaw Gemerek.After some setbacks in electoral support, in autumn 2003 the prospects of electoral success seemedbrighter, in the opinion polls the Civic Platform (PO) passed the left wing SLD by gaining about 30pct. of the votes, moving close to a majority of seats in parliament. That positive trend wasconformed at the European Parliament election in June 2004, gaining 24 pct. of the votes. Thus, thefinal outcome of the next national election seemed be a new PO led minority government, maybewith the tacit support (a “secret power sharing agreement”) with at least one of the two socialdemocratic parties, i.e. SLD and SDPL. As noted above, an indication of that trend was the partialsupport of PO to the government of Marek Belka. Thus, in summer 2004 PO supported proposalsfrom this “transition government” when voting on changes in the health sector and public transferincome regulations, maybe in that way reprocitating the oppointment of people close to PO, e.g.minister of finance Miroslaw Gronicki and Andrzej Ananicz to leader of the intelligence service, toimportant posts in society. In other words, a a political “power triangle consisting of ” “Wiejska(parliament)- Rozbrat (SLD) and the presidential institution (Alexander Kwasniewski)” seemed toemerge.2.13. SLDAfter the demise of the old system and the defeat at the first semi-free election the Polish Left badlyneeded a new political vision, a new discource. SDL was founded in July 1990 as an electionalliance consisting of more than 20 different left wing groups. Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, the laterpremier and foreign minister, and Aleksander Kwasniewski, the later president, were among theinitiators. Thus SdRP and later SLD were established after a split inside the old communist party(PZPR) that took place after the round table negotiations in 1988-1989. The decision about thefoundation of SLD shall be seen in the context of preparations to the first free election in 1991. Inspite of the election defeat many Poles had a share in the old system. Therefore the rejection of realsocialism was not unconditional. In other words, SLD was established in an “exogen” wayconnected to those social groups with a share in the old system. The formation of SLD took place inthe “endogen” way as the foundation of SLD was caused by the split inside the then communistparty (PZPR).As noted in presious sections, the left wing parties in the CEEC’s can be divided into three parts,first authentic historical social democratic parties such as the Czech CSSD, second reformed postcommunist“successor” parties and, thirdly, non-reformed or partly reformed communist parties85
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“This provisional situation chara
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marketisation and privatisationshor
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purposes, are channels for “expre
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the significance of strategic choic
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presidentialism gave rise to “flo
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antipolitics and reinforcement of a
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In the late 1990’s elections most
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determined primarily by “politica
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politics and antipolitics, all sign
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which attitudes to state regulation
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Anti-communism has been defined in
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elections and the Slovak communists
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Cartel agreementsbetter representat
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Basically the absence of clear cons
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After 1989 different types of polit
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Page 38 and 39: analyses of party institutionalizat
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Page 44 and 45: expected, much due to the many spli
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Page 50 and 51: whole, on the one side an authorita
Page 52 and 53: The economic recession and the grav
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Page 58 and 59: group. RS AWS constituted the Chris
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Page 62 and 63: values. According to Rybicki, as so
Page 64 and 65: AWS should fight against all types
Page 66 and 67: 2001 parliamentary election, howeve
Page 68 and 69: and workers voted ZChN. At the 1993
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Page 72 and 73: establishment like than LPR’s. Th
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Page 76 and 77: industrial policy. According to the
Page 78 and 79: pressurizing the government to give
Page 80 and 81: democrats, thereby locating itself
Page 82 and 83: To conclude, the Freedom Union (UW)
Page 86 and 87: such as KSCM and KSS in The Czech R
Page 88 and 89: The SLD leaders were mainly recruit
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Page 96 and 97: Has the Left any freedom of manoeuv
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Page 100 and 101: The Labour Union (UP), Democratic U
Page 102: Nevertheless, before that had taken
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