democrats, thereby locat<strong>in</strong>g itself <strong>in</strong> the political middle with a big coalition potential, at least aslong as the majority <strong>in</strong> the Sejmen belonged to the parties with a background <strong>in</strong> the Solidaritymovement.In June 1990 Democratic Union’s (UD) the found<strong>in</strong>g congress took place <strong>in</strong> Warszawa, at whichoccasion the ongo<strong>in</strong>g “wars <strong>in</strong> the top” <strong>in</strong>side the Solidarity movement between the Walesa w<strong>in</strong>g”<strong>and</strong> the “Mazowiecki w<strong>in</strong>g” was clearly reflected. Nevertheless, questions about the read<strong>in</strong>ess tocooperate closely with the trade union Solidarity <strong>and</strong> president Lech Walesa was not evendiscussed. Only one delegate raised the question about the need <strong>of</strong> “speed<strong>in</strong>g up” <strong>of</strong> the fightaga<strong>in</strong>st the old system <strong>and</strong> lustration <strong>of</strong> former communists <strong>and</strong> their agents, but accord<strong>in</strong>g to them<strong>in</strong>utes from the meet<strong>in</strong>gs the speech was met by ironical remarks that the speaker might havemistaked the UD-congress for the congress <strong>of</strong> the Center Alliance (PC), another Solidarity faction 68 .The support <strong>of</strong> the round table negotiations <strong>and</strong> the aim to “cross out” the time before 1989 ( “grubakreska”), outl<strong>in</strong>ed by prime m<strong>in</strong>ister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed.The Liberal-Democratic Congress (KL-D), the Freedom Unions (UW) other leg, orig<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> theliberal groups <strong>in</strong> Gdansk <strong>in</strong> the 1980’s. In the first elected contractual parliament the Liberal-Democratic Club (KL-D) was established as an <strong>in</strong>dependent party with a clear neoliberal pr<strong>of</strong>ile.KL-D belonged to those parties established by an <strong>in</strong>terplay between a faction <strong>in</strong> the parliament <strong>and</strong>liberal groups outside the parliament, especially among <strong>in</strong>tellectuals <strong>in</strong> the bigger towns. In otherwords, the party was at the same time formed externally <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternally. The power <strong>of</strong> penetrationwas relatively weak, even among Polish <strong>in</strong>tellectuals liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the big towns. Thus the voter appealwas too narrow. In spite <strong>of</strong> a active “'American” type election campaign <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial support fromoutside the party did not pass the threshold requirements <strong>and</strong> lost its representation <strong>in</strong> parliament atthe 1993-election.KL-D’s election defeat gave rise to plans about a merger <strong>of</strong> the Democratic Union (UD) <strong>and</strong> theLiberal-Democratic Congress (KL-D). However, the merger <strong>of</strong> the two parties did not give the newFreedom Union (UW) a broader electoral basis, because <strong>of</strong> the dist<strong>in</strong>ct liberal pr<strong>of</strong>ile <strong>of</strong> the partychairman Leszek Balcerowicz. The new Freedom Union (UW) strived to comb<strong>in</strong>e liberal ideologywith pragmatism, political moral with political realities <strong>and</strong> social ethics, <strong>and</strong> at least until year2000 Solidarity type <strong>of</strong> “wars <strong>in</strong> the top” camp were avoided. In the first ten years after 1989ROAD, UD <strong>and</strong> UW had a great impact on Polish politics, for s<strong>in</strong>ce the democratic break-throughROAD, UD <strong>and</strong> UW have produced no less than three prime m<strong>in</strong>isters, Tadeusz Mazowiecki,Krzyszt<strong>of</strong> Bielecki <strong>and</strong> Hanna Suchocka <strong>and</strong>, not to forget, m<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ance, LeszekBalcerowicz. Despite <strong>of</strong> that, at the 1995 presidential election the c<strong>and</strong>idate <strong>of</strong> UD, Jacek Kuron,who accord<strong>in</strong>g to the op<strong>in</strong>ion polls was one <strong>of</strong> the most popular politicians <strong>in</strong> Pol<strong>and</strong>, ga<strong>in</strong>ed only 9pct. <strong>of</strong> the votes.From start the Freedom Union (UW) was composed <strong>of</strong> different non-veto political platforms. Thosegroups did not, like <strong>in</strong>side AWS, <strong>and</strong> behave like veto-groups, rather as policy-formulat<strong>in</strong>g fractionsor fractions <strong>of</strong> the b<strong>and</strong>-wagon type. The division <strong>in</strong>side UW goes back to the merger between UD<strong>and</strong> KL-D, dseparat<strong>in</strong>g social liberals from “staunch” neo-liberals 69 . Other observers dist<strong>in</strong>guishbetween “ideologists” (“ideowców”), the “old hyenas” “(stare hieny”) <strong>and</strong> the “young wolves”. Inother words, the Freedom Union (UW) <strong>in</strong>cluded a group that supported Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s68 See m<strong>in</strong>utes from the DU found<strong>in</strong>g congress <strong>in</strong> Tygodnik Solidarnosc 17 May, 1991:8, ”Wezmy slub, jakos tobedzie”.69 Jan Król, ”Polityka Arystotelesa”, Wprost, 24 January, 1999:24-25.80
“s<strong>of</strong>t social liberal l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> another group that supported Leszek Balcerowicz’ neoliberal policyl<strong>in</strong>e.At he 1997 election did surpris<strong>in</strong>gly well, ga<strong>in</strong>g between 10 <strong>and</strong> 14 pct. <strong>of</strong> the votes, supported byan <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the number <strong>of</strong> party members from 9.500 to 23.000. At all elections the party didespecially well <strong>in</strong> the bigger towns <strong>and</strong> among <strong>in</strong>tellectuals. Opposite, the share <strong>of</strong> the votes wasalmost extremely low <strong>in</strong> the rural areas. The Freedom Union (UW) aimed to establish a pro-reformalliance consist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> those groups <strong>in</strong> society, which had made a good show<strong>in</strong>g socially <strong>and</strong>therefore were satisfied with their new social position. Here we were mostly deal<strong>in</strong>g with welleducated, people work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the cultural sector, entrepreneurs <strong>and</strong> well <strong>of</strong>f people <strong>in</strong> the biggertowns. The majority <strong>of</strong> those vot<strong>in</strong>g on the party has supported the establishment <strong>of</strong> new enterprises<strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>troduction <strong>of</strong> market reforms <strong>and</strong> has been strongly <strong>in</strong> favour <strong>of</strong> the membership <strong>of</strong> theEU.After the 1997 election UW obta<strong>in</strong>ed a rather strong position <strong>in</strong> parliament. The UW party leaderLeszek Balcerowicz was nom<strong>in</strong>ated as m<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ance <strong>and</strong> vice-prime m<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>in</strong> the AWS-UWmajority government. Economic policy subjects captured a central position dur<strong>in</strong>g the Balcerowiczleadership. The party has literally considered as the “defender <strong>of</strong> the budget”. Not without reason,the party was accused <strong>of</strong> “neoliberal boschevism”, especially after the merger <strong>of</strong> Democratic Union(UD) <strong>and</strong> the Liberal Congress (KL-D). The <strong>in</strong>ternal decision mak<strong>in</strong>g process was dist<strong>in</strong>ctly topdownwith great power to the party leader (Balcerowicz). In January 1997, shortly before thenational election seven MP’s from the Freedom Union (UW) left the party <strong>and</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>ed the liberalw<strong>in</strong>g (SKL) <strong>of</strong> Election Alliance Solidarity (AWS). Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the op<strong>in</strong>ion polls, because <strong>of</strong> thedefections the party lost some electoral support, but the party overcame the “m<strong>in</strong>i-crisis” <strong>and</strong> didsurpris<strong>in</strong>gly well at the election later <strong>in</strong> 1997. Before that happened, the defeat <strong>of</strong> the socialliberalpresidential c<strong>and</strong>idate Jacek Kuron at the 1995 presidential election had given the neoliberal w<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> the party even more impetus. Thus, after the 1997 election Balcerowicz presented a new“Balcerowic plan II” for speed<strong>in</strong>g up the transformation <strong>of</strong> Polish economy toward market economy<strong>and</strong> adaption to the EU.The loss <strong>of</strong> votes at the regional <strong>and</strong> municipial elections <strong>in</strong> 1998 gave raise to some “soulsearch<strong>in</strong>g”.Many critisized that Balcerowicz was not only the party chairman, but at the same timealso M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>of</strong> F<strong>in</strong>ance <strong>and</strong> vice-Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister. Furthermore, to many Balcerowicz behaved tooarrogant <strong>and</strong> authoritarian. He did not like party discussions, tended to be impatient, preferred topdowndecision mak<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> was <strong>in</strong> general aga<strong>in</strong>st shar<strong>in</strong>g political power with other persons <strong>in</strong> theparty 70 .As noted above, the government cooperation between AWS <strong>and</strong> Freedom Union (UW) did not lastthe whole election period. In the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> 2000 the disagreements <strong>in</strong>side the government wasgrow<strong>in</strong>g, e.g. as regards the <strong>in</strong>troduction <strong>and</strong> later implementation <strong>of</strong> the four “big reforms” <strong>of</strong>Polish society. Thus, dur<strong>in</strong>g the governmental crisis <strong>in</strong> the w<strong>in</strong>ther 1999-2000 the UW leadersdem<strong>and</strong>ed that AWS withdraw f<strong>in</strong>ancially expensive proposal <strong>in</strong> parliament <strong>and</strong> its “syndicalistist”proposal about privatisation (“powszechny uwlaszczenie”). Furthermore, UW rejected proposalsput forward by AWS <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> import duties on foodstuffs, forbid retail trade on Sundays <strong>and</strong>shorten the work<strong>in</strong>g week to 40 hours over two years. In addition, AWS <strong>in</strong>sisted to br<strong>in</strong>g the illprepared reforms <strong>of</strong> the public adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the pension systems, education <strong>and</strong> health theend.70 Underl<strong>in</strong>ed e.g. by Waldemar Kuczynski <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terview <strong>in</strong> the weekly Wprost no 42, 16 october, 1999:20-22.81
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marketisation and privatisationshor
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purposes, are channels for “expre
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the significance of strategic choic
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presidentialism gave rise to “flo
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antipolitics and reinforcement of a
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In the late 1990’s elections most
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determined primarily by “politica
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politics and antipolitics, all sign
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which attitudes to state regulation
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Anti-communism has been defined in
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Cartel agreementsbetter representat
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